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Abstract: XXliile the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has been extensively 
analysed since its inception and the category 'cluld' has been critiqued for even longer, it seems the 
critiques made about the category' 'child' continue to have limited purchase regarding the CRC's 
construction of the category 'child'. This project was inspired by the seemingly dominant perception that 
there exists something fundamental to the category 'child', a view held even by those who dismiss the same 
perspective regarding the category 'woman' for example. Put another way, the legs upon which the 
CRC's categor}' 'child' stands have been dismantled for all other human categories (capacit)' as a precursor 
for rights; the existence of 'essential' and 'natural' characteristics shared by all persons who make up an 
identity category). This thesis aims to understand how these 'legs' nonetheless continue to prop up the 
category 'child'. This thesis cntiques the CRC's articulation of the categor;- 'child', the taken for 
granted/self-evident assumption that children are fundamentally different from adults, and that this 
'difference' justifies their differential and submissive positioning in relation to adults under the banner of 
cliildren's rights. It seeks to examine the vision of the 'child' articulated in the CRC by employing a 
postmodern deconstructionist analysis, which draws heavily on Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. This 
thesis argues that the CRC's vision of the child as 'developing' and thus in need of 'care' enables the 
regulation and effective control of childhood. As such, the CRC does not describe or provide for the 
'true' childhood. Rather, the CRC prescribes vulnerabilit)' and dependency as the markers of childhood. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
OUTLINE 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE CRC 
II. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
III. LIMITATIONS OF THESIS 
IV. ROLE OF DECONSTRUCTION 
While the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC or Convention)' has 
been extensively analysed since its inception and the categorj' 'child' has been critiqued for even 
longer, it seems the critiques made about the CRC's construction of the category' 'child' continue 
to have limited purchase. This project was inspired by the seemingly dominant perception that 
there exists something fundamental to the category' 'child', that the child has some level of 
incapacity', and that the child's incapacity' is relevant to the child's rights, views held even by 
those who dismiss the same perspective regarding the category' 'woman' for example. Put 
another way, the legs upon which the CRC's category 'child' stands have been dismanded for all 
other human categories (capacity as a precursor for rights; the existence of 'essential' and 
'namral' characteristics shared by aU persons who make up an identity category). This thesis aims 
to grapple with understanding how these 'legs' nonetheless continue to prop up the category 
'child'. Judith Buder argues that, 
|w]e think things are the way they must be because they've become naturalised. 
[We must] make the taken-for-granted world seem spectral, strange. [The 
process of critically examining the 'natural' word is| a painful process, and not 
everybody wants to undergo it. It may well be that we want to construct a 
fiction. . } 
Certainly, critiquing the category 'child' articulated in the CRC often meets strong resistance. 
This thesis argues that the category 'child' in the context of international law continues to appear 
'natural' and is taken-for-granted. This thesis aims to deconstruct the category 'child' to make it 
appear strange, or at least curious. This thesis argues that the CRC's vision of the category 'child' 
as 'developing' and thus in need of 'care' enables the regulation and effective control of 
childhood. As such, the CRC does not describe or provide for the 'true' childhood. Rather, the 
CRC prescribes vulnerability and dependency as markers of childhood. The CRC defines what a 
'true' childhood should be. 
This thesis does not argue that the CRC encapsulates or even is capable of encapsulating a single fixed 
childhood. This thesis focuses on the dominant discursive constructions of the child in the CRC: 1) 
childhood as a period of development, and 2) childhood as a period of dependency or 'care' on particular 
adults. Every treaty is indeed replete with indeterminacy; the CRC is no exception, as is examined later in 
this thesis regarding concepts such as the evolving capacities of the child or best interests of the child. 
Nonetheless, this thesis spends considerable tune arguing that these two particular fundamental 
' Convent ion on the Rights o f the Ch i ld , Nov . 20. 1989. 1577 U .N . T . S . 3. See Append ix I. 
^ Judith Butler, interview with Gar>' Olson and Lynn Worsham. ( 2 0 0 0 ) reprinlcd THE JUDITH BUTLER READER. 3 2 9 (Sara 
Salih ed.. 2 0 0 4 ) . 
understandings of childhood, development and 'care', are indeed dominant understandings of childhood 
per\'asive m the drafting of the CRC as well as in interpretations of the CRC. This thesis then argues that 
it is through these two dominant 'truths' about childhood, in other words through these definitions of 
childhood, that the CRC prescribes ™lnerabilit)' and dependency as markers of childhood. Other 
constructions of the child are possible. It is precisely because other constructions of childhood are 
possible that this projects aims to point out dominant constructions of childhood in the CRC, so we can 
then begin to look for alternative models. 
The first section of this chapter outlines the background to the CRC, starting with the first 
international document on children and leading to the CRC's thirci Optional Protocol . Section 11 
provides an outline for this thesis, offering a roadmap and method for each chapter. Section III 
lays out the limits of this thesis and anticipates possible critiques. Finally this chapter ends with a 
discussion of the role of deconstruction as an acadcmic project. This chapter a ims to outl ine the 
framework for this thesis, to be filled out in subsequent chapters. 
I. B A C K G R O U N D T O T H E C R C 
The first attempt to codif)- norms later found in the CRC preceded the Second Wor ld War and 
the founding of the United Nations. ' It followed the rise in concern regarding child labour, 
compulsor)' priman- education, and the notion of juvenile justice in Western industrialised 
states." The 1924 Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1924 Declaration) was the first human 
rights declaration adopted by any inter governmental organisation and preceded the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) by twenty four years.^ It was adopted in 1925 by the 
League of Nations after being drafted in Geneva in 1923 by Eglanti ne J ebb, the founder of Save 
the Children."^ It contained a mere five paragraphs: 
' Mark Ensalaco. The Right of the Child to Development, in CHILDREN'S HUMAN RIGHTS. 10 (Mark Ensalaco and l . inda 
Majka eds.. 2005). 
' See generally V i v i A N A ZELIZER, PRICING THE P R I C E L E S S C H I L D : T H E CHANGING S O C I A L V A L U E OF C H I L D R E N ( 1 9 8 5 ) , 
GERALDINE V A N B U E R E N , THE INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 8 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ( V a n B u e r e n n o t e s t h a t t h e l l r s l 
international instrument protecting children was the Minimum Age (Industry) Convention adopted by the International 
Labour Conference in 1919): David Tanenhaus. Between Dependency and Liberty: The Conundrum of Children's Rights in 
the Gilded Age. 23 LAW & HISTORY 351, 369 -370 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ( 'By the early twentieth cen luo ' . the child-saving movement had 
legitimated an enhanced role for the state in child protection that paved the way for expanded compulsory education, laws, 
juvenile courts, child labour laws, and public health measures ' . ) ; MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORIIOUSE- A 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 1 1 3 - 4 5 ( 1 9 8 6 ) : B a r b a r a W o o d h o u s e a n d S a r a h K a t z . The Martyrs. The Media, 
and the Weh: Examining a Grassroots Children's Rights Movement Through the Lens of Social Movement Theory 5 
WHITTIER JOURNAL CHILD & FAMILY ADVOCACY 121 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; N o m i a F i e l d s . The Child as Labourer and Consumer: The 
Disappearance of Childhood in Contemporary Japan, in CHILDREN AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE (Sharon Steohens cd 
1 9 9 5 ) . ^ • •• 
' U n i v e r s a l Declaration of Human Rights. G. A. res. 2 I 7 A (III). U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 ( 1948 ) . See a / so GERALDINE VAN 
B U E R E N , T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF CHILDREN. 6 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
' Mark Ensalaco. The Right of the Child to Development. /« CHILDREN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, 10 (Mark Ensalaco and I inda 
Majka eds.. 2005). 
By the present Declaration of the Rights of the Child commonly known as the 
'Declaration of Geneva', men and women of aU nations, recognising mankind 
owes to children the best it has to give, declare and accept it as their dutj' that 
beyond and above all considerations of race, nationality, and creed. 
1. The child must be given the means requisite for its normal development, 
both materially and sprrimally. 
2. The child that is hungrj' must be fed, the child that is sick must be nursed, 
the child that is backward must be helped, the delinquent child must be 
reclaimed, and the orphan and the waif must be sheltered and succoured. 
3. The child must be the first to receive reKcf in times of distress. 
4. The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood, and must be 
protected against every form of exploitation. 
5. The child must be brought up in the consciousness that its talents must be 
devoted to the ser\'ice of its feUow men. 
While the 1924 Declaration is entitled 'Rights of the Child', it only provides for children's 
economic, psychological, and social needs, and as such relates to only to child welfare or 
protection rights." The 1924 Declaration establishes the claim that 'mankind owes to the child 
the best it has to give', which is restated in the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child' and 
the CRC.'° In drafting the 1924 Declaration, J ebb wanted to give a focus to a growing interest in 
international child welfare, as children began to be seen as the most important part of 
humankind, its future." Jebb argued that. 
If |children| are allowed to grow up smnted or neglected or strangers to moral 
values, or are ignored in their miser}- by the more fortunate, they will inevitably 
grow up to hate and destroy, and tomorrow's world can only end up in disaster, 
poHticaUy and economically.'^ 
At the unanimous adoption of the 1924 Declaration, the President of Assembly, Guiseppe 
Motta, stated that 'the Assembly's approval of the Declaration makes it, so to speak, the 
Children's Charter of the League' . " Geraldine Van Bueren argues that the Declaration however 
did not place any obligations on a state. She contends that. 
' R e c o r d s o f the F i f t h A s s e m b l y . S u p p l e m e n t N o . 23 L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s O f f i c i a l J o u r n a l 1 9 2 4 . 
' GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 7 ( 1 9 9 8 ) 
' D e c l a r a t i o n o f the R i g h t s o f the C h i l d . D e c . 10. 1 9 5 9 . G . A . R e s . 1 3 8 6 . U . N . G A O R . u " " S e s s . . S u p p . ( N o . 16). 
C R C P r e a m b l e . See also GERALDINE VAN BUEREN. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 7 ( 1 9 9 8 ) 
" Y V E S BEIGBEDER, THE ROLE AND STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN VOLUNTEERS AND ORGANIZATIONS. 195 
( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
Y V E S BEIGBEDER, THE ROLE AND STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN VOLUNTEERS AND ORGANIZATIONS, 195 
( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
" GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 8 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . c i t ing L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s D o c . 
R e c o r d s o f the F i f t h A s s e m b l y . 177. 
GERALDINE VAN BUEREN. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 7 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
|t|he duty to provide the child with 'the best it has to give' was placed by the 
League on men and women in other words, adults, to ensure the welfare of 
children, because it was then assumed without question that children could and 
should rely upon adults to ensure that their rights as defmed in the Declaration 
were protected. Children were regarded as recipients of treatment rather than as 
the holders of specific rights.'^ 
Under the 1924 Declaration, children were perceived as the object and not the subject of 
international law. Deirdre Fottrell characterises the 1924 Declaration as 'essentially paternalistic 
and welfare oriented', stressing \-ulnerability and protection."" Wliile Fottrell contends that the 
1924 Declaration was largely symbolic. Van Bueren argues that nonetheless it was significant as a 
foundation for the future international children's rights movement and further that it hedges 
against the claim that the protection of children's rights is a new development in international 
law." Indeed the protection of children's rights (where children are objects not subjects of 
international law) preceded all other international human rights documents." 
The UDHR of December 1948 was the frrst universal statement of human rights in the post-war 
era ." It was adopted with forty-eight states in favour and none against, eight abstaining.^" While 
the UDHR proclaims to apply to 'all human beings' and therefore impHcidy to children, only two 
articles explicitly refer to children. Article 25 provides that '[mjotherhood and childhood are 
entided to special care and assistance' and '|a|ll children, whether bom in or out of wedlock, shall 
enjoy the same social protection'. Article 26 provides that elementaty' education shall be free and 
compulsoty' and 'shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'. yVrticle 26 also provides 
that parents have a 'prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
children'. While not expHcidy relating to children. Article 16(3) recogmses that 'the family is the 
" G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE R I G H T S O F C H I L D R E N . 7 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
DEIDRE FOTTRELL. One Step Forward or Two Sieps Sideways? Assessing the First Decade of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, in REVISITING C H I L D R E N ' S RIGH'I S. 2 ( 2000 ) . 
" G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 8 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; D E I D R E F O T T R E L L . One Step 
Forward or Two Steps Sideways? Assessing the First Decade of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 
R E V I S I T I N G C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S . 2 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
" GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 8 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . Van Bueren notes thai the first 
internat ional instrument protect ing chi ldren w a s the M i n i m u m A g e (Industr>') Convent ion adopted by the Internat ional 
Labour Confe rence in I9 I9 . Van Bueren admi ts that the C R C w a s the first to introduce ch i ldren as sub jec ts o f i n t e m a t i o n a l 
l aw . 
" Mark Ensa laco . The Right of the Child to Development, in CHILDREN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, 10 ( M a r k Ensa l aco and L inda 
M a i k a e d s . . 2 0 0 5 ) . 
G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N , 1 7 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . c i t i n g U N D o c A / I 11 . 
natural and fundamental group unit of societ)' and is cntided to protection by the societ}' and the 
State'.^' This language is restated in the CRC.^^ 
Over a decade after adoption of the UDHR, the UN General Assembly adopted the 1959 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959 Declaration) along with its ten Pnnciples.^^ In 
contrast to the UDHR, the 1959 Declaration was adopted without abstention.^'* During the 
drafting of the 1959 Declaration some states expressed a preference for a convention, rather 
than a declaration.'^ Nonetheless, the Netherlands expressed the pre\'ailing sentiment that, 
the great economic, social and cultural difference and the greatiy divergent views 
on moralit)' and religion prevailing in the various Members States [would] give 
rise to many problems which must, at least for the time being, be considered to 
be insoluble.^'" 
The 1959 Declaration, like its predecessor, was aspirational." ITie 1959 Declaration makes 
reference in its Preamble to both the UN Charter and the UDHR. Reference to the UDHR was 
made because states recognised 'with such exceptions as are necessitated by its age the child 
shares in the claims to human rights set forth in that document'."" I'he 1959 Declaration 
establishes the principle that children are entided to 'special protection', where 'the best interests 
of the child . . . shall be the paramount consideration'.^' A number of additional rights were 
proposed, but failed to be incorporated, such as safeguards for children in court proceedings, a 
ban on corporal punishment in schools, and the concept that children not only have rights but 
also responsibihties.'" There is great overlap between the 1959 and 1924 Declarations with both 
The binding nature of the U D H R has been debated but will not be discussed here. This .section a ims to track the 
development of chi ldren 's rights in international law. not debate the specifics of the binding nature of the UDHR. In any 
case, the U D H R is not primarily about chi ldren 's rights. 
^ Convention on the Rights of the Child. Nov. 20. 1989. 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Preamble. 
Declaration of the R i g h t s o f t h e Child. Dec. 10. 1959. G.A. Res. 1386. U.N. G A O R . 14"^  Sess.. Supp. (No. 16). See 
Appendix II. 
GERALDINE V A N B U E R E N . T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 1 0 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
" GERALDINE V A N B U E R E N , T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 1 1 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
GERALDINE V A N B U E R E N . T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE RIGHTS OF C H I L D R E N . 1 1 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . c i t i n g U N D o c E / C N . 4 / 7 8 0 . 
DEIDRE FOTTREI.L. One Step Forward or Two Steps Sideways? Assessing the First Decade of the United Stations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, in R E V I S I T I N G C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S . 2 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
^ GERALDINE V A N B U E R E N , T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 1 0 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Article 2. Dec. 10. 1959. G.A. Res. 1386. U.N. G A O R . 14"' Sess., Supp. (No. 16). 
See also GERALDINE V A N B U E R E N . T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 1 1 ( 1 9 9 8 ) , c i t i n g U N D o c 
E / C N . 4 / L . 5 2 . 
™ GERALDINE V A N B U E R E N . T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 11 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . c i t i n g U N D o c 
E/CH.5/111/Add. 1.3 and UN Doc A/C.3/L729. 
focusing on paternalism and welfare, although the 1959 Declaration did not address delinquency 
and the 1924 Declaration did not explicidy mendon education." 
During the 1970s a 'coherent and robust movement ' emerged in suppor t of chUdren's 
empowerment . ' ' FottreU characterises this period as a move away f rom a purely welfare-oriented 
paternalism towards a more radical liberation-oriented approach ." In 1979, the International 
Year of die Child, Poland imtiated a proposal for the drafting of the CRC, which would be 
legally binding on state parties.'" Many states, U N agencies, and some fift>- non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) assisted in drafting the Convent ion ." Van Bueren notes that at the 
beginning of the drafting of the CRC, states did not regard the Convent ion as a high priorit}'." 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Trea tment or 
Punishment 1984 (CA'!) was still being negotiated at the same t ime." Van Bueren argues that 
the change in attimde since the adoption of the 1959 Declaration in support of a convention 
occurred because states themselves had undergone a fundamental change in their attitude 
towards children in their national laws whereby it was viewed that children's special \'ulnerabilit)' 
and immaturit}' required a higher standard of protection in some areas of their lives than that 
which was found in existing international law.'* 
In 1979, the Commission on Human Rights established a pre-sessional Working G r o u p to draft 
the C R C . " The group was estabhshed as an open-ended Working G r o u p so that states which 
were not members of the Commission on Human Rights were able to participate fuUv.*"' The 
Polish text was initially the basic working document of the group."' In Februan- 1988, nine years 
after the drafting process had begun, the Working G r o u p completed its first reading of the 
" Van Bueren argues that Paragraph 4 of the 1924 Declaration could be argued to imply some sort of requirement of 
education as necessary for a child to be 'put in a position to earn a livelihood". See GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W O N THE R I G H T S O F C H I L D R E N . 1 1 - 1 2 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
DEIDRE FOTTRELL. One Step Forward or Two Steps Sideways? Assessing the Firs! Decade oflhe United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, in REVISITING C H I U J R E N ' S RIGHTS. 2 (2000). See for example JOHN LLOLT, 
E S C A P E F R O M C H I L D H O O D ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; R I C H A R D P A R S O N , B I R T H R I G H T S ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; H i l l a r y R o d h a m . / t Legal Perspective, in 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS; CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ( P a t r i c i a V a r d i n a n d l l l e n e B r o d y e d s . . 1979) . 
" DEIDRE FOTTRELL. One Step Forward or Two Steps Sideways? Assessing the First Decade of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, in REVISITING CHILDREN'S RIGHIS . 2 (2000). 
" Y V E S B E I G B E D E R . T H E R O L E A N D S T A T U S OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L H U M A N I T A R I A N V O L U N T E E R S A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N S 1 9 6 
( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
" Y V E S B E I G B E D E R . T H E R O L E A N D S T A T U S OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L I I U M A N I T A R I A N V O L U N T E E R S A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N S . 1 9 6 
" G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W O N THE R I G H T S O F C H I L D R E N . 13 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
" G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W O N THE R I G H T S O F C H I L D R E N . 1 3 ( 1 9 9 8 ) 
G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N . T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W O N THE R I G H T S O F C H I L D R E N ! 1 3 - 1 4 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . V a n B u e r e n a l s o n o t e s 
thai states recognised the need for a comprehensive and uniform intemalional document for children and that the year o f l h e 
child actcd as an emotional magnet drawing slates towards the idea of a convention 
" G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W ON THE R I G H T S O F C H I L D R E N . 14 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
" " G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W O N T H E R I G H T S O F C H I L D R E N , 1 4 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W ON T H E R I G H T S O F C H I L D R E N ! 1 4 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ! 
Convention.''^ In order to complete its second reading the Working G r o u p held twelve meetings 
from 28 November to 9 December IQaS."" Van Bucrcn states that, 
[t]he overwhehning and understandable desire of the G r o u p was to complete the 
second reading, otherwise the m o m e n t u m would have been lost. Inevitably this 
approach led to a rushing of the work, with several important issues failing to be 
discussed fuUy, in particular the consent of the child to medical treatment, and 
the implication of medical experimentation for children.^'' 
As indicated in the duration of drafting and the number of parties involved in the drafting, the 
CRC is a result of negotiations between states and N G O s . The substance reflects the agendas, 
beliefs, and political considerations of those negotiators. Ultimately, as with any international 
convention, the CRC was a result of compromise. Certain issues were too controversial to 
include (for example, the beginning of childhood, the banning of children ages 15-17 to take part 
in direct combat), while others were brought up too late in the process to be addressed (for 
example, the specific relationship between the CRC and the other existing international human 
rights conventions).''^ l-ottreU also notes that other issues such as the beginning of childhood 
(the beginning of life), the parameters for autonomy as it relates to the freedom of religion, the 
minimum age for child soldiers'", and so on proved difficult to negotiate.'*^ Fottrell argues that 
the drafting process was encumbered by balancing traditional attimdcs about children, cultural 
particularities, and 'radical proposals for the empowerment of children'.'" In this way, adults, 
N G O s , states, have enacted their vision of childhood through the CRC. 
After much amendment , the Working Group adopted its report on 21 |anuary 1989 and the 
report was sent to the Commission on Human Rights for consideration and transmission to the 
" G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N . T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W O N T H E R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 14 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W ON T H E R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 14 { 1 9 9 8 ) . 
' " G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 1 5 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N O N T H E R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 2 6 - 2 7 . 1 3 0 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
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Spain declared that. Spain, wishing to make common cause with those States and humanitarian organizations which have 
manifested their disagreement with the contents of article 38. paragraphs 2 and 3. of the Convention, also wishes to express 
its disagreement with the age limit fixed therein and to declare that the said limit appears insufficient, by permitting the 
recruitment and participation in armed conflict of children having attained the age of llfteen years. See 
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UN General Assembly."' On 20 November 1989 the UN General Assembly adopted the CRC 
without a vote; it was opened for signamre on 26 January- 1990.'° SLxt>'-one states signed it 
immediately and by September 40 states had ratified it, twice as many required for the treat)- to 
enter into force.' ' By 1995, 176 states had ratified or acceded to the CRC. By 2006, 193 states 
had become part)' to the CRC, leavmg only the United States, SomaHa, and as of July 2011 South 
Sudan who have yet to ratify i t ." As such, the CRC is the most widely and rapidly ratified 
international human rights convention in histor)'." 
There have been three optional protocols to the CRC. The first protocol to enter into force 
addresses the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography'"' and the second 
addresses the involvement of children in armed conflict was adopted in 2000 ." Notably, on 2 
November 2011 the UN General Assembly adopted the Human Rights Council's Report, the 
third Optional Protocol to the CRC, and recommended that it be opened for signature in 2012.' ' 
The third Optional Protocol, if adopted, would allow for an indi\ idual or a group of individuals 
within the jurisdiction of a state part)- to the CRC, to submit a written complaint to the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child." The Committee would then request intenm measures 
and/or make recommendations to the state parn. '" The state part)- would then be required to 
submit a written response, including mformation on any actions taken and envisaged in the light 
of the view and recommendations of the Committee ." One of the most common criticisms laid 
against the CRC is its enforcement mechanism, which has been characterised as 'weak'.'*" This 
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" C o n v e n t i o n on the R igh t s o f the Ch i ld . N o v . 20. 1989. 1577 U . N T . S . 3, A / R E S / 4 4 / 2 5 . 
" M a r k E n s a l a c o . The Kighiofihe Child lo Developmeni. in CHILDREN'S HUMAN RIGHTS. 10 ( M a r k E n s a l a c o and L inda 
M a j k a eds . , 2005 ) . 
" M a r k E n s a l a c o , The Right of the Child to Development, in CHILDREN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, 12 ( M a r k E n s a l a c o and L inda 
M a j k a eds . , 2 0 0 5 ) ; U N I C E F , (Almost) The Entire World Endorses Child Rights. 
h t t p : / / v o l u n t e c r s . u n i c e f u s a . o r g / a c t i v i t i e s / a d v o c a t e / c o n v e n t i o n - o n - t h e - r i g h t s - o f - t h e - c h i l d . h t m l . In 2 0 0 9 , the t rans i t ional 
g o v e r n m e n t o f S o m a l i a a n n o u n c e d that it w o u l d ra t i fy the C R C . but h a s ye t to d o so. See REUTERS. Somalia to Join Child 
Rights Pact: UN, N o v e m b e r 20. 2 0 0 9 . h t t p : / / a f . r e u t e r s . e o m / a r t i c l e / t o p N e w s / i d A F J O E 5 A J 0 I T 2 0 0 9 l 120. 
" See h t t p : / / t r e a t i e s . u n . o r g / P a g e s / V i e w D e t a i l s . a s p x ? s r c = T R E A T Y & m t d s g _ n o = l V - 1 1 & c h a p t e r = 4 & l a n g = e n 
O p t i o n a l P ro toco l t o the C o n v e n t i o n on the R igh t s of the Chi ld on the Sa le o f Ch i ld ren , C h i l d P ros t i tu t ion and C h i l d 
P o r n o g r a p h y , Jan . 18, 2 0 0 2 , A / R E S / 5 4 / 2 6 3 . h t t p : / / w w w 2 . o h c h r . o r g / e n g l i s h / l a w / c r c - s a l e . h t m . 
" O p t i o n a l P ro toco l to the C o n v e n t i o n on the R i g h t s o f the C h i l d on the I n v o l v e m e n t o f C h i l d r e n in A r m e d C o n n i c t F e b 
1 2 , 2 0 0 2 , A / R E S / 5 4 / 2 6 3 h t l p : / / w w w 2 . o h c h r . o r g / e n g l i s h / l a w / c r c - c o n n i c t . h t m . ' ' 
* Op t iona l P ro toco l to the C o n v e n t i o n on the R igh t s o f the C h i l d on the C o m m u n i c a t i o n s P r o c e d u r e N o v e m b e r 2 2011 
A / C . 3 / 6 6 / L . 6 6 , h t t p : / / d a c c e s s - d d s - n y . u n . o r g / d o c / U N D 0 C / L T D / N l l / 5 7 7 / 9 2 / P D F / N I I 5 7 7 9 2 . p d f 7 0 p e n E l e m e n t 
Ar t ic le 5 o f the 3 " ' O p t i o n a l Pro tocol . 
" Ar t ic le 10 o f the 3'" O p t i o n a l Pro tocol . 
' ' Ar t ic le 11 o f the 3'" O p t i o n a l P ro toco l . 
® DEIDRE FOTTRELL, One Step Forward or Two Steps Sideways? Assessing the First Decade of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, in REVISITING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, 5 (2000) . See also Ki rs ten B a c k s i r o m 
International Human Rights of the Child: Do They Protect the Female Child?. 3 0 GEORGE W A S I G T O N J O U Z ^ O 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & ECONOMICS 541 ( 1 9 9 5 ) : C y n t h i a P r i c e - C o h e n , Implementing the U N C o n Z Z n l n Z R t , f 
the Child. 21 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW 95 ( 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 0 ) ; M a r y D o n n e l l y a n d ' u r s u l a 
Dehvermg on the Right to Be Heard. 19 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW 27 , 45 (2011 )• I W l h i l e the c lar i iv n f . h l r p T U ^ 
the level o f de ta i led g u i d a n c e p rov ided is u n d o u b t e d l y h e l p f u l in f r a m i n g po l icy , a^ j f n For^in n o t e s ,he a b s e ^ T ^ ^ ^ ' 
m e t h o d s o f f o r m a l e n f o r c e m e n t is a w e a k n e s s ,n the C R C . ' JANE FORTIN, CHILDREN'S R I G H N D ^ H E D E V E L O P L N L T : 4 6 
mechanism would address the argument that the CRC is ineffective as compared to other 
international human rights regimes (for example, CAT) that combine reporting with some kind 
o f quasi-judicial processes, allowing for individual petition.^' Currently, the CRC requires state 
parries to file regular progress reports on compliance/'^ A committee o f ten experts elected by 
the states that have ratified the CRC review the national reports, ask for more information as 
needed, and inform the UN General Assembly ever}' two years on the status o f compliance/^ 
Briefly turning to the substance o f the rights in the Convention, the CRC is said to concern the 
'Three Ps'; Provision (of assistance for basic needs), Protection (against discrimination and all 
forms o f neglect and exploitation), and Participation (of children in decisions that affect their 
Hves)/'' The inclusion o f participation rights was the most significant and arguably the most 
controversial o f the 'P's', as this was the first time the child's right to participate was recognized 
in international law/^ This controversy will be taken up in Chapter 3. The CRC covers a fuU 
range o f civil, pohrical, economic, social and cultural rights/'^ It includes rights applicable during 
peace time as well in in times o f confl ict . " It is considered the fullest legal statement o f 
children's rights to be found anwhere/'" Chapter 2 o f this thesis sur\'eys a full range o f scholarly 
views on the C3RC. Many have argued that the Convention itself is a touchstone for research 
(2009). Donnelly and Kilkelly contra.sl the CRC to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
where ratification of the Optional Protocol allows for a direct right of petition to the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities. Notably a third Optional Protocol has been drafted and submitted to the General Assembly which would 
allow for such direct petition to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Report of the Human Rights Council 2 November 
2011 A/C.3/56/L.66. 
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about and activism for children.® As such, the CRC is seen as a significant tool for advocacy 
regarding cluldren. Given the significance of the CRC, this thesis analyses the CRC as a 
significant discourse about children. The next section details the how the thesis will do so. 
II. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis engages in a postmodern and in particular a Foucauldian/Buderian critique of the 
construction of the child in the CRC. This thesis argues diat the categon- 'child' is predicated 
upon a string of unexplicated knowledges regarding 'difference' in childhood.'" It is as if the 
basic ontological questions, 'what is a child' and 'how is a universal child possible' were 
satisfactorily answered as axiomatic, and then summarily dismissed, all without input from those 
nominated as children." Just as the self-appraised civiUscd person 'knew' the savage to be 
different, and thus worthy of study, rational adults recognise the child as different, less developed 
and in need of explanation.'^ Both of these proceed from a pre-established but tacit ontological 
theory-: a theor)' of what makes up the being of the Other, be it savage or child. These unspoken 
forms of knowledge, these tacit commitments to difference give rise to the acccpted ideas of the 
savage or the child as 'natural'." These theories render the adult-child continuum as utterly 
conventional and take for granted the assumptions upon which they are based. This thesis 
argues that, when viewed through the lens of power, the CRC relates littie to the protection of 
the rights of the child, and at times even the protection of the child. Rather, the rights accorded 
to children in the CRC relate to the regulation and control of childhood, making dependency and 
\'ulnerabilit)' markers of childhood. This thesis argues that the CRC docs not contest, but rather 
reinforces power relations (adults over children; state over family/parents). As such, the rights 
of children found in the CRC perpetuate these power relations.'"' 
Chapter 2 canvasses a range of perspectives on the CRC with a view towards questioning the 
legal construction of the child in the CRC. This chapter argues that dominant perspectives on 
the CRC fundamentally accept that the central issue regarding children's rights is the child's 
capacit}', yet disagree on whether the CRC captured the 'true' child. Most insist that their 
" Anonymous. -Editorial: The CRC as a Touchstone for Research on Childhoods' 6(4) Childhood. 403; Enid I-ourie. The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Crisis for children in South Africa: Apartheid and Detention 
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perception o f the child is more accurate, as indicated in their assessment o f whether the C R C 
adequately provided for the 'true child'. Similarly, by adopting a notion o f a 'universal' child, the 
CRC engages in its own iteration o f the 'true' (and universal) categor)' 'child'. This disagreement 
over the identitj' 'child' did not and has not resulted in questioning whether the identit}' 'child' is 
possible or even helpful. Discussion in the context o f international law continues to focus rather 
on who best 'knows' the flindamental 'cluld'. Chapter 2 argues that the rights o f the child in the 
CRC and dominant perspectives about the CRC are based on the assumption that there exists 
some 'universal' and 'true' category' 'chOd', and that categor)' 'child' requires further or more 
scrupulous investigation. In addition to exploring mainstream perspectives that accept a 
fundamental difference o f childhood from adulthood. Chapter 2 also explores the work o f 
certain academics who argue that the child's alleged immaturit)'/incapacity' has no relevance to 
the discussion o f the child's rights. Such perspectives include the critique o f capacit)- as a 
precursor to rights, or that the CRC's commitment to the protection o f the child's rights and at 
times even the protection o f the category' child goes only so far as such rights do not blur what it 
means to be an adult (capable) and what it means to be a child (incapable).^^ 
When one speaks o f 'the child' or 'the rights o f the child', one is using an identity category to 
distinguish those who fall into the category 'child' from others who do not (adults). The major 
theoretical perspectives this paper employs to deconstruct the identit}- o f the child in the CRC 
are Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. Chapter 3 explores certain parts o f the theoretical 
perspectives o f Foucault and Butler to argue that identity categories are inevitably based on a set 
o f alleged 'natural' characteristics that those within the category uniformly share. Much critical 
work has focused on deconstructing identit)' categories such as gender, race and sexual 
orientation, through the process o f exposing the unnarurakiess and difference within a categor)'. 
In attempting to examine the relatively unexplicated identit)' categon' 'child', a varieU' o f 
theoretical tools that have been 'successfully' deployed to deconstruct other identity categories 
are discussed and selectively utilised to make the argument that the categor)- 'child' is not based 
upon some 'natural' characteristics that those who are aged 0-18 possess. 
T o better understand how the child is cast as fundamentally different from adults in the CRC, 
Chapter 4 examines the rights o f other identit)' categories that have also been singled out from 
the human family as in need o f 'special' attention, in other words given their own international 
human rights document. Through this comparison Chapter 4 argues that no other international 
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human rights document identifies that the problems faced by an identity categor)' result 
exclusively from the category's 'biological' or 'inherent' difference, as opposed to some socially 
constructed difference. Further, no other categor}' of persons is required to relinquish certain 
fundamental rights as the remedy for such difference. Put another way, no other identit}' 
categor}' is constructed as -wholly biologically immature/incapable and thus required to cede 
certain fundamental rights to another identit}' categor}' (read adults/parents). Chapter 4 argues 
that despite similarities in how the law constructs the categories 'woman', 'person with 
disabilities', 'elder' and 'child', the law's differential treatment ('remedy', or 'rights') of the 
categor}' 'child' reflects not some inherent difference of childhood, but rather reflects and 
upholds the adult-child binar}-, where adults are presumed capable and children incapable. What 
is made possible through this construction of the child-as-incapable/immature/dependent, far 
from shoring up of autonomy and participation, as done with aU other identity categories, is that 
^Inerabilit}' and dependency become markers of childhood. In a context where other identit}' 
categories have been deconstructed as narratives that ser\'e political purposes. Chapter 4 notes 
that the CRC evades critique for its engagement in universaHsing the 'child' based on some 
biological 'facts' of childhood. 
Chapter 5 then sun'eys various critical perspectives on the catcgor}- 'child' emerging from the 
field of sociolog}' that help identify certain 'truths' alleged about childhood that make possible 
the differential treatment of the categor}' 'child' in the CRC described in Chapter 4. These 
critical perspectives reflect the theoretical method outlined in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 first 
examines literature that argues that the categor}- 'child' is a social construct, not a biological 
given. Chapter 5 then considers three 'truths' that have been identified by certain sociologists 
that appear to rationalise the differential treatment of the categor}- 'child' in the CRC: 1) 
childhood is a period of development, 2) children are uniquel}' vulnerable and thus in need of 
unique protection, and 3) childhood is a time defined by needs. These 'truths' are reflected in 
the CRC's construction of the category 'child', as wiU be elaborated in Chapters 6 and 7. FinaUy 
Chapter 5 explores the ways in which these 'truths', and therefore the categor}- 'child', are 
constructed through the adult - chUd bmar}-. This chapter argues that to understand what 
characterises the categor}' 'child', one must understand the categor}- 'adult'. I'o be a 'good' child, 
one must not be an adult. A 'child' ts, only to the extent that a 'child' is no! an 'adult'. The 
identities of the opposition enable and therefore fundamentally depend upon each other's 
existence. Nonetheless, the binar}' relation is never equitable."' Rather the relationship between 
the two terms of the opposit ion is laden with values that assume one has dominance over the 
other; one is normal the other abnormal, one is simple the other is complex, one is the rule the 
other is the exception.^^ In the adult-child, adulthood is associated with privileged or valued 
characteristics such as rationaUt}- or mindfulness, whereas childhood is associated with 
irrationaUt)' or recklessness. 
With these ' truths ' and binaries in mind. Chapters 6 and 7 inquire as to how the CRC constructs, 
not only the category 'child', but also the child's 'needs', in light of the third truth identified in 
Chapter 5 (childhood as a period defined by needs). Chapter 6 deconstructs the CRC's ' t ruth ' 
that the catcgorj' 'child' is developing, through the use of Martin Woodhead 's 'needs' equation 
(X [the chUdl needs Y |a particular thing that is secured in the form of a nght | for Z |to 
accomplish some measure]^"). Chapter 6 examines specific rights in the Convention that 
reference the child's development, examining how development operates, in other words what 
the term 'development ' makes possible. Chapter 6 argues that to be a ' true' or 'real' child 
according to the CRC, a person nominated a child must be 'developing'. This chapter then seeks 
to explicate how this ' truth' of the 'child-as-developing' permits a particular hierarchy of power 
surrounding the child.^' This chapter argues that CRC, in its allocation of 'rights' to children, 
sustains and supports a hierarchy of power, where adults (parents, and the state as a back-up 
parent) are positioned over the child, in the name of protection and even as a fulfilment of the 
'rights of the child'. This hierarchy of power is made possible, and even 'necessan,'' by 
constructing childhood as a state of development. 
Chapter 7 then investigates the ' truth' in the CRC that the child requires protection or 'care', as a 
result of the child's state of development. (Chapter 7 argues that the CRC imagines the child to 
be in a particular positional matrix: the family or some similar form of 'care'. This chapter 
employs a textual analysis to examine how the parent, the state, and the child are positioned in 
relation to each other. Chapter 7 argues that the positional matrix portrayed in the C~RC is 
hierarchical. The family or 'care' is defined in the Convention as the adult positioned over the 
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child, in support of the adult — child binar\'. As such, the child is only given autonomy and 
protection rights that buttress the adult - child binar)-. In this way, farrdly/'care' (the adult 
positioned over the child) or 'dependency' (on a parent) and, as such \-ulnerabilit)' becomc 
markers of childhood. Unlike other human rights discourses that seek to redress hierarchies, the 
CRC reinforces and even sustains the inequalities between adults and children. L'nhke any other 
human rights discourse that offers protections from the state, the CRC also offers children 
protection from themselves, as if children experience subjugation, inequality, disenfranchiscment, 
and abuse from themselves. Unlike the defmition of the family in the CRC's Preamble where all 
members of the human family have equal and inalienable rights, the child finds him/herself in a 
family of unequals and with rights that are unavailable because this person has been defined in 
the CRC as a 'child'. 
Chapter 8 then examines the ways in which the vision of category- 'child' articulated in the CRC, 
as developing and in need of 'care', is produced and enforced through the C R C ' s exercise of 
both juridical power (particularly through incarceration and corporal punishment), as well as 
discipHnarj- power (particularly through the gaze over the child through compulsor)- education 
and mandator)' 'care'). This chapter argues that through its performance of the 'child' as 
developing and 'in care', the CRC makes possible the regulation and control of childhood. 
Structuring in even-day life enables the social reproduction of the categor)' 'child'."" In this way, 
the islands of 'care' and 'education' become the means through which the C : R C ' S normative 
childhood is enforced and produced. As will be examined in Chapter 3, this process of 
moulding is what Foucault refers to as the technologies of governmentalit}-: calculated 
preoccupation with activities directed at shaping, channelling and guiding the conduct of persons 
through the production, dissemination, and utilisation of knowledge."' As will be argued in 
Chapters 3 and 5, these 'truths' masquerade as neutral descriptions of subjects (objective 
statements about what the child fundamentaUy is), as opposed to prescriptions (poHtical 
statements about what the child should be). Butier argues that identity categories are not the 
cause or basis, but rather the e f f e c t s of institutions, practices discourses, with multiple and diffused 
points of origin.' ' These 'truths' sen-e the basis for activities that are directed at moulding the 
subject. According to a Foucauldian critique, the developmental framework, to be discussed in 
Chapter 6, operates as a regmie of ' t ru th ' or a system of beliefs and procedures used to construct 
a norm and the normal. As discussed in Chapter 3, these norms govern behaviour and thinking. 
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JUDITH B U T L E R . GENDER T R O U B L E , v i i i - i x ( 1 9 9 0 ) . o r i g i n a l e m p h a s i s . 
and work to exclude certain ways of acting or being. Alternative 'truths' are marginalised, 
diversity' is reduced to abnormaliU". The developmental framework determines who and what a 
child is, and which children and what concerns wiU be disregarded. Establishing 'truths' about 
children also means specifically that certain children's needs will be taken into consideration 
while others wiU be disregarded. As explored in Chapters 3, 5, and 6 this thesis argues that there 
is no single universal pattern of development, and no universal childhood. As such, children 
who fail to meet that which is defmed as normal are excluded and/or 'require' inter\-ention. 
Finally, Chapter 9 explores children that are marginalised, ignored, and/or stigmatised by the 
CRC's vision of childhood. As wiU be discussed in Chapter i , Foucault and Buder both utilise 
the technique of genealog}-, which investigates local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate 
knowledges against the claims of a universal 'truth'."' Foucault describes his method as an effort 
'to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to dismrb people's mental 
habits'."" Chapter 9 argues that the C^RC's performance of childhood is exclusionar}-. Tliis 
chapter argues that, in universalising the child, the CRC not only sustains certain power relations, 
but also expels certain childhoods from human rights discourse. The CRC's performance of the 
child dictates which children matter, which children will be problematised, and which children 
win be ignored. Chapter 9 first examines literature that critiques the CRC as only applicable to 
children in the west. This chapter then argues that the critique of the CRC as inapplicable to 
children in the global south is equally applicable to children in the west. Chapter 9 explores 
various childhoods in the west and in the global south that defy' the C^RC's performance of 
childhood as a period of irresponsibility/immaturity and performance of the family as 
responsible, happy, and safe. It is through this examination of these excluded knowledges, these 
excluded children, parents, states, families, cultures, and traditions, that only expose international 
law's difficult with imagining difference, but also lays bare some of the politics behind choosing 
one 'child' as deserv ing/unproblematic and all others as undeserving/problematic. 
III. LIMITATIONS OF THIS PROJECT 
This thesis has certain limitations. First, this thesis primarily focuses on the text and the Travaux 
Preparatiores of the CRC. It could be argued that a more 'thorough' or 'better' examination of the 
CRC would focus instead on the Committee on the CRC and its interpretation of the CRC. It 
B E N G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K . F O U C A U L T ' S L A W , 3 2 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 4 4 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" M I C H E L F O U C A U L T , P O L I T I C S , P H I L O S O P H Y , C U L T U R E : I N T E R V I E W S A N D O T H E R W R I T I N G S 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 4 . 2 6 5 ( A l a n S h e r i d a n 
trans, l .aurance Kritzman ed.. 1988). 
could be argued that some if not all of the critiques made in this thesis about the CRC could be 
alleviated by looking not to the text of the CRC per se, but rather the interpretation of the text 
by the Committee. While reference to the Committee 's General Comments is made when 
relevant, the Committee's General Comments are not binding on state parties. For example, 
while the Committee has repeatedly and unequivocally condemned any use of corporal 
punishment, state parties still widely practice it.'^ While this discussion will be taken up further 
in Chapter 8, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the subsequent 
practice of states parties in the application of the treat)' shall be taken into account in the 
interpretation of a treat)'."'^ As such, because the CRC does not explicidy ban corporal 
punishment, the practice of state parties suggests corporal punishment is not prohibited under 
the Convention. It would seem that the text of the Convention remains of pnmar\- importance, 
despite the input of the Committee. The CRC Committee 's recommendat ions at times do not 
reflect kx lata, and quite possibility- not even kxferenda. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that this thesis does not endeavour to engage in black letter 
law analysis."' Rather, this thesis seeks to examine how the categor)- 'child' is constructed by the 
CRC, as 'the most significant recent policy development intended to p romote and protect 
children's rights'."" As such, the rights that are included and excluded, as well as rights that are 
modified in this Convention, are all of interest. The specific bundle of rights, and therefore the 
"CommiUec on the Rights of the Child. General Comment No. 8: The Right of the Child to Protection from Corporal 
Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (Mar. 2. 2007). See also Michael 
Freeman. Upholding the Dignity and Best Interests of Children: International law and the Corporal Punishment of Children. 
73 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 211. 250 (2010). For updated statistics, see Global Initiative to Fnd All Corporal 
punishment of Children Home Page, available at: http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/frame.html (accessed May 
30. 2012) (listing twenty-five countries that have abolished Corporal punishment completely). 
® Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 31 (3)(b) , May 23. 1969. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
If so. an easy counter-argument would be that rights given under other international conventions, such as the International 
Convention on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights would 
be applicable to children. Though this counter-argument has met disagreement, even by the drafters of the CRC. this paper 
does not look to engage in such an analysis. Germany suggested that 'All states shall ensure a) that all human rights 
recognized by them also apply to children, b) that general human rights as enshrined in the ICCPR even apply to children, if 
a state party to the present convention is not a party to the Covenant ' . In the final stages of drafting the CRC. Germany 
argued that many of the rights in the International Covenants already apply to children, were included again specifically in 
the draft convention, but on the other hand not all the rights guaranteed by the Covenants appeared in the draft convention, 
for example the right of self-determination, the equal rights of men and women, the ban on slavery , the right of person 
arrested or detained to be brought promptly before a judge, even though they also should apply to children. Fhe delegate 
said that this selective double-regulation of rights would create problems and even contradictions with the Covenants and a 
general clause ensuring the application of general human rights to children should be substituted for the present Article 1. 
Au.straha said that to do so was totally new. bringing into question the whole approach of the Convention to existing rights. 
It may well have been a better way to proceed had it been introduced years before, but that had not happened and now its 
acceptance would only serve to delay adoption of the Convention. Ultimately Germany withdrew its proposal. SHARON 
D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S O F THE C H I L D , A G U I D E T O THE " T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' 
130-131(1992). 
BOB FRANKLIN, The Case for Children's Rights: A Progress Report, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-
C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I C Y A N D P R A C T I C E , 1 6 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
unique bundle o f issues and needs identified for the 'child' in the CRC, tell a ven* specific tale 
about childhood, contrasting with the stor)' told o f adult right-holders in other conventions. ' ' 
It is important to note that this project is not arguing that the catcgor}- 'child' and 'care' can only 
be defmed as will be oudined in Chapters 6 and 7, nor that these are the 'correct' definitions o f 
the categor}- 'child' and 'care'. Rather, this thesis argues that when viewed through the lens o f 
power, the CRC and dominant interpretations o f the CRC can been seen as problematic for 
certain children because both largely assume that children are in a state o f development and thus 
require a particular kind o f adult care. Are there other interpretations o f the CRC? Absolutely. 
Dominant meanings attributed to the category child and care can be dislodged and dismantied 
and new or marginahzed understandings o f both are possible. Yet before seeking out new 
possibilities for the legal construction o f the category' child, the dominant assumptions or claims-
to-truth, must be identified and questioned. 
The second possible criticism o f this thesis is that it constitutes yet another project that 'speaks 
for' children. This thesis critiques the CRC as unlike any international convention, the drafting 
process did not include one person who is the subject o f the CRC, in other words it did not 
include one child in the drafting process. In Hterature surrounding the CRC, the fact that 
children were not involved in the drafting o f the CRC is identified and regretted, but quickly 
dismissed. A major critique made by the 'new' sociological perspectives is that the dominant 
ways o f speaking about children comprise discourses about 'others; about Uves, problems, and 
simations which are not lived or shared but merely obser\'ed externally by the speaking subjects' 
(adults)."' This project also is engaging in that which it is critiquing. Put another way, as an 
adult, this author too is 'speaking for' children. Yet, in another 'speaking for', this thesis argues 
that the notion o f unqualified participation in the political process is essential for the category 
SHARON DETRICK. T H E UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD. A GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX 
PREPARATIORES', 130-131 (1992): Indeed the German delegate expressed concern that certain rights from other human rights 
conventions were included in the CRC while others were not (citing the right lo self-determination, the ban on slavery, the 
equal rights of men and women, the right of a person arrested or detained to be brought promptly before a judge). The 
delegate pointed out that this selective double-regulation of rights would create problems and even contradictions with the 
other human rights conventions. Ultimately the German delegate argued that there should be a general clause noting the 
applicability of general human rights to children. The Australian delegate argued that if the German delegate's suggestion 
was followed, this would be a whole new approach to the Convention, and would derail the entire process, particularly at 
such a late stage in the drafting process. Ultimately the German delegate withdrew its proposal. Given this discussion, one 
could argue that even under a black letter law analysis it is uncertain the effect of the CRC 's selective 'double-regulalion'. 
^ Benno Glauser, Street Children: Decomtruding a Construct, in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD. 144 (Allison James and Alan Prout eds.. 1997); 
MICHAEL WYNESS. CONTESTING CHILDHOOD, 358 (2000); Jens Qvortrup. A J oicefor Children in Statistical and Social 
Accounting: A Plea for Children's Right lo be Heard, in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD. (Allison James and Alan Prout eds., 1997). 
'child'; a controversial idea in the context of law." ITiis thesis 'speaks for ' children to highlight 
that doing so, particularly in the context of human rights, is problematic. 
Another limitation of this thesis is that the genealog}' developed in Chapter 9 relies on the 
empirical work of other authors to make the argument that certain children are ignored or 
problematised by the vision of childhood articulated in die CRC.'^ This thesis project was never 
intended to be other than theoretical. As such, focus was placed on the development of a 
theoretical perspective to examine the CRC from a set of theoretical antecedents. Further, as 
this thesis was formulated, there appeared to exist a wealth of thorough empirical research on 
those children who are excluded and or marginalised by the C R C , " but less on theoretical 
" Chapter 6 will take up this issue more. At this point it should be noted that Article 12 only allows children to express their 
views in matters affecting them, but only to the extent that they are judged by adults to have sufficient maturity. See Chapter 
6 for further discussion. 
For examples of academics who critique the CRC for being exclusionaiy see Erica Burman. Local. Global or Globalised? 
Child Development and Iniernaiional Child Rights Legislation 3 CHILDHOOD 45. 45-66 (1992); Olga Nieuwenhuys. 
Editorial: Is There an Indian Childhood. 16 CHILDHOOD 147. 147-153 (2009); Vanessa Pupavac. Misanthropy Without 
Borders: The International Children's Rights Regime. 25(2) DISASTERS 95. 95-112 (2001); Annette Ruth Appell. Child-
Centred Jurisprudence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Exploring the Connections and Tensions. 46 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 
703. 703 (2009) (speaking about how childhood in the United States is based on a Western conception of childhood, and 
arguing that the CRC largely matches such a conception); Sonia Harris-Short. International Human Rights Law: Imperialist. 
Inept and Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 25 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 
130. 130 (2003) (based on an empirical student of the discussion of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, argues that the 
Convention is still subject to cultural imperialism); John Tobin. Increasingly Seen and Heard: the Constitutional 
Recognition of Children "s Rights. 21 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 8 6 . 8 6 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g t h e w a y s t h a t 
the CRC and the children's rights paradigm is in some ways western, but in other ways not); Sonia Harris-Short. Listening to 
"the Other": The Convention on the Rights of the Child. 2 MELBOURNE INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 3 0 4 . 3 3 4 ( 2 0 0 1 ) 
(argues that the Committee has 'with only very limited exceptions, pre.sented non-Western cultural values and practices in an 
entirely negative light'); Paolo G. Carozza. From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin .American Tradition of the 
Idea of Human Rights. 2 5 ( 2 ) HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 2 8 1 . 3 1 1 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; PHILIP ALSTON, The Best Interests Principle: 
Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD; RECONCILING CULTURE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1994); Judith Ennew. Outside Childhood; Street Children's Rights, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S 
RIGHTS; COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE (Bob Franklin ed.. 1995); John Tobin. Seeking to Persuade: .4 Constructive 
Approach to Human Rights Treaty Interpretation. 23 HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 1. 1-50 (2010) (discussing this 
issue in relation to both human rights generally and the CRC specificallv); Michael Freeman. The Future of Children "s 
Rights. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 111. 282 (2000); Jo Boyden. Childhood and the Policymakers: A Comparative Perspective 
in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD; CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD. 
144 (Allison James and Alan Prout eds.. 1997); Jo Boyden, Children's Experience of Conflict Related Emergencies: Some 
Implications for Relief Policy and Practice. 18(3) DISASTERS 254. 265 (1994); Maria Grahn-Farlev. Neutral Law and 
Eurocentric Lawmaking: A Postcolonial Analysis of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. 34 BROOKLYN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1. 1 (2008) ( 'The colonial legacy of international law is not simply a matter of inclusion or 
exclusion. Nor is it only a matter of neutrality or non-neutrality. Even though the CRC was drafted, adopted, and ratified 
with the possibility of the inclusion and involvement of almost every countrj in the world, the colonial structure is still 
present, not in the substantive legal outcome, but in the legislative process i tself .) ; Frances E. Olsen. Children's Rights: 
Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON LAW 
AND THE FAMILY 192. 215 (1992) (' f he concerns of post-modem feminism that bear most closely on the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child include the whole notion of a universal document to deal with all children, throughout the world' the 
concern that such an eflort will almost inevitably result in a western oriented document that merely purports to be 
u n i v e r s a l .); REX STAINTON ROGERS a n d WENDY STAINTON ROGERS. STORIES OF CHILDHOOD; SHIFTING AGENDAS OF CHILD 
CONCERN. 51 (1992); Michael Freeman. The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights. 6(4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF CHILDREN s RIGHTS 433. 433-444 (1998); Beny MayalL The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children's Rtghts 8 
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approaches to grapple with why such exclusions were made possible in the first place. Chapter 2 
Section 11 explores a few such theoretical critiques o f the C R C . 
Finally, it is important to note that this thesis does not argue that the C R C is ineffectual for all 
children; it does not argue that parental and state care agencies are always abusive. Instead this 
thesis notes that the C R C can be ineffectual for some (perhaps too many) children, that parental 
and state care agencies can be abusive, particularly given the hierarchical relationship that the 
CRC embraces between adults and children. Just as importandy, this thesis does not argue that 
children should be treated as adults. T h e thesis attempts to deconstruct the assumptions made 
about the categor}- 'child' (in particular the child as 'developing' and in need o f 'care'), questions 
the basis for such assumptions, and finally questions the power hierarchies that depend on what 
is assumed to be 'truth' about the categorj- 'child' in the C R C . T h e question o f what should be 
done next after we have done this deconstruction suggests at the need to justif)- the role o f 
deconstruction as a project in and o f itself. The next section attempts to do so. 
IV. THE ROLE OF DECONSTRUCTION 
This section seeks to briefly explore the project o f deconstructionism and its place in critical 
academia. Deconstruct ion is a continuous critique o f a certain metaphysical search for 'the real, 
true, valuable, appropriate'."* A dcconstruction aims to 'lay low what was once high'; to reverse 
and resituate.'^ Pierre Schlag argues that a dcconstruction seeks to challenge and subvert our 
image o f the political, by engaging our tacit understanding o f what constitutes the political."' 
Schlag contends that a dcconstruction o f law engages traditional legal discourse to subvert the 
catcgorical regimes in force within that discourse." Aubrey Neal argues that deconstructionists 
have no confidence in any natural standpoint from which to view the world, and suspect, even 
Childhood. 16 CHILDHOOD 147 (2009); Elsbeth Robson. Hidden Child Workers: Young Carers in Zimbabwe. 36(2) 
ANTIPODE 227 (2004): Kearney Baekett-Milbum et al.. Challenging Childhoods: Young People's .4ccoun[s of "Gelling Bv" 
in Families with Substance Use Problems. 15 CHILDHOOD 461 (2008); Talck Abebc and Asbjom Aase, Children. .AIDS, and 
the Politics of Orphan Care in Ethiopia: The Extended Family Revisited. 64( 10) SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE 2058 (2007); 
Caroline Nicholson. The Impact of Child Labour Legislation on Child-Headed Households in South .Africa. 30 THOMAS 
JEFFERSON LAW REVIEW 408 (2008); Nura Taefi. The Synthesis of .Age and Gender: Intersectionality, International Human 
Rights Law and the Marginalisation of the Girl-Child. 17 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 3 6 0 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; 
Ladan Askari. The Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Necessity of .Adding a Provision to Ban Child Marriage. 5 
ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 123 (1998-1999); DEIDRE FOTTRELL. One Step Forward or Two 
Steps Sideways? Assessing the First Decade of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, in REVISITING 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
Jack Balkin. Tradition. Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction. 11 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1613. 1626 (1995). 
" Jack Balkin. Tradition. Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction. 11 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1613. 1626 (1995). 
"^Pierre Schlag. The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction. 11 C ARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1631. 1635 
(1995). 
" Pierre Schlag. The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction. 11 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1631. 1635 
(1995). 
fear, an authoritarian perspective from those who do.'" Neal argues that deconstruction evoh-ed 
out of the perceived failure of a positivist methodologj'." Deconstruction raises a debate over 
whether concepts like market, labour, value, fiction, fact, language, and so on are neutral tools 
that represent an objectively given world, or whether all such structuring devices are tacidy 
hierarchical.'"" For the deconstruction project, an 'objective' account of anything is infected with 
hidden intentionaUties of a pre-given political worldview. Neal contends that many consumerist, 
careerist, chauvinist, racist, and elitist behaviours are embedded in perspectives in such claims to 
objectivit}', with violence built into the narrative of language.'"' Neal notes that a deconstruction 
can be seen as an aggressive term; controverting 'truth' often 'arouses the ire of dedicated 
professionals'.'"^ She continues that it is not die fault of the postmodernist messenger that the 
nineteenth centun- system of interpretation has broken down.'"' Further, she contends that 
deconstruction can be used by anyone who wishes to describe the pohtics behind a school of 
interpretation.'"" 
Nonetheless, deconstruction does not alleviate the existence of a set of political commitments.'"^ 
First, a deconstruction is itself a political endeavour, as one chooses where to begin and where to 
end, which turns of phrase to subvert and which to leave untouched, jack Balkin contends that 
'without pre-existing values, purposes, or commitments, deconstruction cannot begin'.'"' The 
author chooses where to 'grind our ax' and where to refrain from doing so, which metaphors 
and arguments to leave unquestioned.'"' Deconstruction can never be other than political. One 
deconstructs a particular text because the author has some philosophical, ideological, moral or 
political 'problem' with it. Certainly this thesis fails to account for a//children adversely affected 
and any children positively affected by the CRC's vision of childhood. This thesis too focuses 
on, not only the CRC, but also only certain parts of the CRC, while leave other untouched, such 
as the limitation on life imprisonment. 
Second, deconstruction when performed by individuals, is itself a poHtical practice subject to 
hubris.'"' Schlag maintains that. 
^ A u b r e y N e a l . The Promise and Practice of Deconstruciion. 3 0 C A N A D I A N J O U R N A L OF H I S T O R Y 4 9 ( 1 9 9 5 ) 
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[i]n [deconstruction's] worst moments, it succeeds quasi-comically in 
dogmatically establishing the [critical legal studies] thinker as a radically free 
subject while reducing everj-one else to the unenviable status of a mere vehicle 
for the reiteration of fairly crude structuralist patterns: radical individual 
subjectivism for me and objectified mmdlessness for you... (I win-you lose)."" 
The author is put outside the challenge of the deconstruction and thus remains 'a self-assured, 
coherent, integrated, rational, originarj- source of moral and political acaon'."" According to 
Schlag, to put one's self outside the deconstruction remands it as a metaphysical project.'" 
Indeed Derrida argued with Foucault that, 'to question the western understanding of the world 
with a view to stepping entirely outside it, is only to duplicate the structure of the understanding 
which is in question'. '" While this thesis does not claim a particular version of childhood as the 
true childhood, undoubtedly, this thesis argues that what is 'best for children', is what is has been 
identified in international human rights discourse as best of aU other humans; the right to 
unqualified participation. As such, this author too is engaging in the political assessment of what 
is best Tor children, as assessed by yet another adult. 
Another potential critique of the deconstructionist project is that one might tear apart, in this 
case the CRC, with relative facility, leaving the outstanding issue, what is to come next. Such a 
question imphcitiy conveys that a deconstructionist project is insufficient without a 
reconstruction, or in the case of this thesis, a plan for the fumre of children's rights. This thesis 
argues that before thinking about a reconstruction, the 'truths' articulated about children in the 
CRC and in commentaries about the CRC must first be deconstructed, as these 'truths' have 
particular believabilit)- and as such too often defy' critical inquir)-. The CRC's ontology of what it 
means to be a 'child' is a normative injunction that is imposed insidiously by setting the CRC's 
vision of the categon* 'child' as a necessan- foundation."^ It seems that normative judgments 
about what it means to be a 'real' chUd were made in the drafting process of the CRC without 
critically interrogating how the CRC's construction of the 'child' could result in violent 
exclusions. This 'rush to decision-ism and to strong normativit)-' has failed to consider what is 
Pierre Schlag. The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction. 11 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 153 1. 1634 
( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
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FOUCAULT: POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY. 98-99 (1998). Buller's analysis refers to gender, but as will be argued in this thesis 
has relevance to the construction of the category 'child' in the CRC. 
meant by some of the vcr)' basic terms the CRC's vision of childhood assumes."' Normativit)' 
results m a violent circumscription of the possible (what Hves are considered lives, what 
capacities are considered human), for which the CRC is often not held accountable."' This 
'rush' IS particularly true in the context of children's rights. One continuaUy finds the realm of 
children's rights dominated by normative judgments about what it means to be a 'true' child and 
dierefore what should be the aim and content of children's rights (as will be discussed m Chapter 
2). These normative judgments are made even before the field of possibilities for childhood and 
children's rights has been interrogated."' 
While this thesis will not engage in a reconstruction of the category- 'child' as articulated in the 
CRC, it seeks to highlight elements of a possible reconstruction. In particular, the child's right to 
participate (the 'right to express [his/her] views freely in all matters affccting the child') found in 
Article 12 seems a basic starting point for any reconstructive endeavour. Again, it is noteworthy 
that the categor}' 'cliild' has thus far not been allowed to form a political identit}' of its own. 
When 'we' speak about the categon* 'child' in the CRC, it is the product of an entirely different 
category- of persons, adults. A second element could be the noti(jn of a coalition, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. Ever so briefly, Buder envisages a new configuration of polidcs as an 
anti-foundational coalition politics that would accept the need to act witlun the tensions 
produced by contradiction, fragmentation and diversit)'."^ Buder has argued that the notion of 
universaKt)' is based on foreclosure: there must be something that is not included within the 
universal."" She notes, however, that universalit)' is a discourse that can and must be driven into 
crisis again and again by the foreclosures that it makes."' In this way, the discourse is forced to 
rearticulate itself'"" Universalit)' then would not be violent or totalising. Butler argues that the 
task of politics would be to keep the process of umversality open, to keep it as a contested site of 
persistent crisis, and to not let it be settled.'^' Dianne Otto has argued that by not 'seeking and 
maintaining unit}' at all costs against monolithic understandings of domination', a coalition relies 
" " Judi ih Bul ler . in ten ' icw with Gary O lson and L\ nn Wor sham . ( 2 0 0 0 ) reprinted THE JUDITH B U T L E R R E A D E R . 3 5 5 (Sara 
Sa l i hed . . 2 0 0 4 ) . 
Judi th Bul ler . interview W iih Gar>' O l son and Lvnn Wo r s h am . ( 2 0 0 0 ) reprinted THE JUDITH BUTLER R E A D E R . 3 5 5 (Sara 
Sal ih ed.. 2 0 0 4 ) . 
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possible as such?", were, so to .speak, satisfactorily answered in advance o f the theoris ing and then summar i l y d ismissed' . 
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on the possibility of dialogue across vast differences in power and knowledge.'^^ In this waj^ her 
concept of coalition gives up 'the desire and the apparent safety of certainty and prescription', as 
well as arguably at least some political purchase, and learns 'how to live and act so that 
differences and incommensurabilities can inform and contest the practices of individual identities 
and collective solidarities. ' ' ' ' A coalition for the categoty 'chUd' would necessarily involve the 
first element, children's participation. Beyond that, this thesis is uncertain as to what such a 
coalition would look Hke; but that it could not require an essential identity categoty'. 
This thesis has a particular 'ax to grind' with the CRC's articulation of the categoty- child; the 
taken for granted/self-evident assumption that children are fundamentally different from adults; 
and that this difference justifies their differential and submissive positioning in relation to adults, 
all under the banner of rights of the child. Interestingly, it seems that the unknowabiHty of 
childhood (that childhood is a state of development or state of change) somehow works against 
the categoty' 'child'. Possibly, the alleged state of change/development/malleability- of childhood 
makes the categoty' child in need of even greater control. 
^ D i a n n e O l i o . SexuaUties and Solidarities. 8 AUSTRALIAN G A Y AND LESBIAN L A W JOURNAL 2 7 , 3 4 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . 
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CHAPTER 2 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CRC 
OUTLINE 
VIEWS ON THE CRC BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE 
CHILD'S CAPACITY IS RELEVANT TO THE DISCUSSION OF 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
a. Perspectives That Reject the CRC 
i. The CRC Gives Children Autonomy Rights - Children are Not 
Capable 
ii. The CRC Gives Children State Protection of Their Autonomy 
1. Parents are Best Positioned to Provide for the Children's 
Autonomy 
2. Removing Age-Based Classification Lacks Clarity 
3. Removing Age-Based Classification Increases Intervention 
into the Family 
b. Perspectives That Embrace the CRC - Parents and the State Should 
Protect Children's Autonomy 
c. Perspectives That Embrace the CRC - But Argue That Children Need to 
be Viewed by the State and Parents as More Capable 
d. Perspectives That Reject the CRC - Children are Capable 
II. VIEWS ON THE CRC THAT REJECT THE CHILD'S CAPACITY AS 
RELEVANT TO THE DISCUSSION OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
a. Perspectives That Reject the CRC - Capacity Should Not be a Precursor 
to Rights, the Policy of Protectionism Does More Harm than Good, and 
Children's Capacities are Unknown 
b. Perspectives That Reject the CRC - Universalisation of the Category 
'Child' is Too Exclusionary 
c. Perspectives That Reject the CRC - CRC Merely Reifies Adult-Centrism 
III. CONCLUSION 
This chapter canvasses a range of perspectives on the CRC with a view towards questioning the 
legal construction of the cluld in the CRC. This chapter argues that dominant perspectives on 
the CRC fundamentally disagree on whether the CRC captured the 'true' child and thus 
articulated the 'correct' or appropnate rights for children. For example, 
|tjhe (CRC] is undoubtedly the most significant recent policy development 
intended to promote and protect children's rights. The Convention incorporates 
civil, social, and cultural rights. The 54 Articles of the Convention constitute a 
mixed but highly desirable bag of rights which have been grouped into three 
broad categories and labelled the three Ps: provision, protection, and 
participation. 
[T|he |CRC] takes a "quanmm leap" beyond the UN's 1959 Declaration |on the 
Rights of the Child] by adopting and promoting "an 'autonomous' view" of 
children's rights that is "more based on choice than needs" of children. The new 
"civil rights" provisions of the CRC reject the "integrative" charactcr of the 1959 
Declaration, which had emphasised the "integration of persons into societ)'," and 
instead provides children with a sphere of autonomy and freedom from control. 
While there is much to praise in the CRC's approach to child protection . . . the 
CRC's \-ision of child autonomy is misguided.^ 
As the above quotes indicate, views about the CRC vary greatly, and elicit passionate reactions.' 
Nonetheless, the CRC is the most widely ratified convention in history.^ The Convention 
includes so-called first and second generation rights,^ and is considered the most extensive legal 
statement of children's rights to be found anwhe r e . ' Many have argued that even if one does 
not agree with tlie provisions within the Convention, the Convention itself is a touchstone for 
research about and activism for children.' Others have called the Convention a feminist 
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landmark because of, for example, its gender-neutral language." If nothing else, the Convention 
is seen by many as an expression of good wiU as opposed to 'hard law', reflecting loft)' moral 
language rather than enforceable legal language.' The Convention is unsurprisingly not without 
its critics. Those who may not take issue with the substance of the rights found in the 
Convention, argue that the Convention lacks 'real' enforcement mechanisms.'" Others argue 
that the Convention is pragmatically impossible for most countries to put into practice, 
rendering much of the Convention meaningless." Some contend that the Convention focuses 
too much on liberty rights, giving children dangerous freedoms and undermine respect for those 
in authority positions over the child, encouraging children to be greedy, selfish, and 
irresponsible, and insufficiendy on the protection of children.'^ By contrast, others argue that far 
from granting children overstated freedoms and rights, the Convention is too modest a proposal 
that fails to meet minimal criteria of social justice." Unrelated to the child, still others argue that 
while the discrimination provisions in the Convention are to be applauded, the protection of 
children by the state allows for the control and sur\ eillance of women." These opinions are but 
a glimpse into discourses regarding the CRC. 
Views about the Convention explored in this chapter divide on whether the CRC successfully 
captured the 'essential' or 'true' child. Indeed, one's perception of who qualifies as the 'true' 
child dictates whether one views the CRC as an accurate or inaccurate portrayal of the categorj' 
'child'. Given that perceptions of the 'child', and therefore of rights owed to the 'child' var\' 
' Cynthia Price-Cohen. The CRC: a Feminist Landmark. 3 W I L L I A M & M A R Y J O U R N A L OF W O M E N A N D THE L A W 29 (1997); 
Moushira Khattab. Gender Based Discrimination: Have the Challenge been Met?, in 1 8 C A N D L E S T H E C O N V E N T I O N ON THE 
RIGHTS OF THE C H I L D R E A C H I N G M A J O R I T Y . 6 1 (Jane Connors et al. eds., 2005). 
Anonymous. Editorial: The CRC as a Touchstone for Research on Childhoods. 6 ( 4 ) C H I L D H O O D 4 0 3 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; Kirsten 
Backslrom, The International Human Rights of the Child: Do They Protect the Female ChiW. 3 0 G E O R G E W A S H I N G T O N 
JOURNAL OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W & E C O N O M I C S 5 4 1 . 5 6 6 ( 1 9 9 6 ) ; P Cynthia Price-Cohen, Implementing the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 2 1 W H I T T I E R L A W R E V I E W 9 5 ( 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 0 ) ; PHILIP A L S T O N and J O H N T O B I N . L A Y I N G 
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For example see Kirsten Backslrom. The International Human Rights of the Child: Do They Protect the Female Child?, 30 
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Child-Friendly HealthCare: Delivering on the Right to Be Heard. 19 M E D I C A L L A W R E V I E W 27. 45 (2011); ' | WJhile the 
clarity of the CRC approach and the level of detailed guidance provided is undoubtedly helpful in framing policy, as Jane 
Fortin notes, the absence of direct methods of formal enforcement is a weakness in the CRC". J A N E F O R T I N , C H I L D R E N ' S 
R I G H T S A N D T H E D E V E L O P I N G LAW. 46 (2009). Donnelly and Kilkelly contrast the position to that in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities w here ratification of the Optional Protocol allows for a direct right of 
petition to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Notably a 3"' Optional Protocol has been drafted and 
submitted to the General Assembly which would allow for such direct petition to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
Report of the Human Rights Council 2 November 2011 A/C.3/66/L.66. 
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widely, the belief that the category 'child' is sufficiently unique to justify its own grouping is in 
itself interesting." Even the name of the Convention, 'The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, suggests that there exists a unitar)' category 'child'. The existence of the Convention 
suggests that the categor)' 'child' is sufficiendy collectively unique to necessitate a separate 
delineation of rights." Sharon Detrick writes that Convention did not make cliildren into a 
special group, but rather the CRC was concluded, 
because of the realisation, seventy years ago, that children's specific needs and 
\TalnerabLlit3' demanded particular responses from the international community. 
We can note in that regard that global human rights instruments were not drawn 
up with children in mind, that they have been developed over a period of decade, 
and that as a whole they therefore contain a number of inconsistencies and 
certainly do not reflect current knowledge and experience with regard to 
children's issues. But in addition . . . is the usefulness for promoting knowledge 
and understanding of children's issues." 
Detrick seems to suggest that, at the ven- least, there are particular issues that are unique to the 
category 'child'. In a cycle of self-affirmation. Derrick's reference to 'children's issues' suggests a 
sufficiendy collective experience to justify the 'uniqueness' of childhood in contrast to other 
identity categories. In similar fashion, the CRC presents a unitan' vision for the category 'child', 
as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. Chapter 3 will explore in more detail the 
theoretical consequence of assigning a fundamental unity to the category child, a categorj' 
tethered by 'children's issues'. 
This thesis endeavours to quer)' the assumption that there exists a 'true' unitan* category 'child' 
that flows from the fundamental truths that the child is developing and that the child is in 'care'. 
This thesis argues that the identit)' 'child' has merely congealed over time to produce the 
appearance of some 'natural' being that is alleged to have been there all along. This chapter lays 
the foundation for the chapters to follow by arguing that the defining characteristic of the 
category 'child' and the greatest source of debate regarding the 'true' child is the child's capacity. 
The 'child's' capacity is central to the discussion regarding the universal child. What makes a 
Certainly Ihere have been authors who reject the idea o f a single conception of childhood (to be discussed in Section II 
below). Nonetheless. Ihis thesis argues that regardless, the Convention and dominant discourses surrounding the Convention 
maintain a singular normative view of childhood, an issue to be discussed at length in Chapters 6, 7. and 9. 
For a similar critique of the Convemion on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, see Janet llallev. Rape m 
Rome: Femmisl Inlervenlions in the Chmimltalion of Sex-Rehled Violence in Positive Inlernalional Criminal Law 30 
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P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 2 9 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
person a 'true' child is his or her immarurit5'/incapacit}', leaving issues o f difference within the 
category' marginal. 
Following critiques o f this hegemonic approach to the categorj' ' c h i l d ' , t h i s chapter argues that 
difference within the categor)' 'child' is either not identified or cursorily acknowledged by 
dominant discourses regarding the CRC. " Authors simply do not state for example, 'The child I 
am referring to is in a state o f development that resembles Piaget's developmental model,^" and 
who is middle—class, male, with two heterosexual non-abusive parents, who Kves in a country 
that provides universal education, 'sufficient' health carc, and a legal system that ensures that 
children are not abused'. Most often this has to be surmised. As such, the categorisation o f the 
child behind the authors sun'eyed in this chapter is determined according to the much more 
frequendy discussed issue o f capacit)-. In commentar)- regarding the C R C , the identity o f the 
child behind the rights is often contingent on the issue o f capacit)' and whether the Convention 
effectively reflects the 'true' capacity o f 'the child'. That is not to relinquish the importance o f 
interrogating the categon' 'child', a major goal o f this thesis. This thesis argues that determining 
the child behind a set o f rights conferred by the C R C is fundamental to understanding wly one 
set o f rights is chosen over another. More importandy, determining the 'child' behind a set o f 
rights is fundamental to understanding what is made possible through a particular vision o f the 
category 'child'. After identifying which 'child' is being utilised, the next question must be why 
this particular 'child' over another. I f there is no unitar\- 'child', choosing one 'child' to represent 
all children (for example, the white 'home child' in Canberra, Australia over the 'street child' in 
New Delhi, India) is a political decision, as will be discussed in Chapters 3, 6, 7, and 9. However, 
the purpose o f this chapter is to highlight particular discussions that relate to whether the C R C 
" See for example Judith Ennew. Outside Childhood: Slreel Children's Rights, in T H E HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: 
COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE (Bob Franklin ed.. 1 9 9 5 ) ; Benjamin Shmucli. What Has Feminism Got to Say about 
Corporal Punishment 2 WISCONSIN W O M E N ' S L A W JOURNAL 1 7 7 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Michael Freeman. The Future of Children S Rights. 
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SHIFTING AGENDAS OF CHILD CONCERN. 5 1 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; Michael Freeman. The Sociology of Childhood and Children S Rights. 6 ( 4 ) 
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THE SOCIOLOGICAL S T U D Y OF CHILDHOOD (Allison James and Alan Proul eds.. 1 9 9 7 ) ; CHRIS JENKS. CHILDHOOD ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
Critiques of this hegemonic approach to the category 'child' will be taken up in Section 11 and in Chapter 9. 
''' When the category 'child ' is spoken about in the CRC or otherwise, this 'child' has no age. gender, ethnicity, or sexual 
orientation; or more accurately this child is white, male, heterosexual, upper-middle class. I'hat the CRC is exclusionary to 
certain children will be discussed further in Chapter 9. 
See generally James Garbarino. The Child's Evolving Capacities: Articles 4 and 15. in CHILDREN'S RICMS IN AMERICA: 
U N CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES L A W . 2 6 (Cynthia Price-Cohen and How ard 
Davidson eds., 1 9 9 0 ) : 'Much of our thinking about how children develop intellectually relies upon the pioneering work of 
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captured the 'true' universal child.^' Disagreement on the issue of capacit)', so strongly linked to 
questions of identit)' in the category' 'child' lays the basis for theoretical engagement with the 
strangely unitar;' categorj' 'child' in Chapter 3. 
Before examining various perspectives about the CRC, the t)'pe of rights that are being discussed 
for children should be noted. Basic conceptions of rights relating to children fall into two 
categories: 1) autonomy rights, and 2) protection rights. Protection or welfare rights include 
physical care and securit}'.^^ Autonomy rights, or 'choice rights', on the other hand, include an 
individual's authorit}' to make binding decisions.^' It is worth previewing the contention that the 
CRC's 'autonomy' rights are still quite different from rights given to adults. The child's so called 
'autonomy' rights are instead what this author calls 'qualified autonomy rights'. Though this will 
be discussed further in Chapters 4, 6, and 7, the child receives certain autonomy rights^" in the 
CRC qualified by 1) an adult determination that the child is mature enough to enjoy such rights 
(see for example Articles 5 and 12), 2) an adult determination of the child's best interests (see for 
example Articles 3 and 18), and 3) the parents responsibilit)' to guide and direct the child in the 
child's enjoyment of the rights under the Convention (see for example Article 18). Such 
qualifications place Limits on the child's so-called autonomy rights. That these rights limit the 
child's rights is uncontroversial. These Hinitations on the child's autonomy rights found in the 
CRC arc generally justified on the grounds of the child's immamrit)', or capacity-. \'anessa 
Pupavac argues that. 
Under the classical conceptualisation of rights, children 'by reason of . . . 
physical and mental immaturit)-' were considered to lack capacit)' for rights and 
their interests were held to be represented by their parents or guardians. As we 
have seen, contcmporarj- notion of children's rights, too, takes this lack of 
capacit)' as its starting-point. The impulse for the institutionalisation of 
cliildren's rights is the \-ulncrabilit\- and incapacity of children. Inherent in 
children's rights is the need for advocacy on behalf of the child.^^ 
^^  A s a resu l l . it should be noted that this chapter d o e s not s e e k to d i s c u s s ever> a r t i c l e in the C o n v e n t i o n in depth . 
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Pupavac asserts that while the child is treated as the rights-holder under the Convention, the 
child is not regarded as the moral agent who determines those rights, as shown in for example. 
Articles 3 of the Convention.^'^ Under Articlc 3, it is 'the best interests of the child', not the 
child's views, that 'are to be of priman* consideration'. It is important to be cognisant of what is 
meant by 'autonomy rights' in the context of children's rights: qualified autonomy rights. Again 
this classification of the rights for children as different from rights given to adults is not 
controversial, but rather seen as a lex specialist'' Indeed the entire impetus of the CRC was to 
pro\'ide 'special consideration' to children.^' This chapter attempts to give a range of -saews 
about the vision of the categor}' 'child' in the CRC. Such disagreement leads to querying the 
assumption of a universal and fundamental category child. 
Section 1 explores views about the CRC that are based on the assumption that the child's 
purported capacity is relevant to the discussion of children's rights. This section includes 
perspectives that reject, endorse, or endorse in part the articulation of the child's rights in the 
CRC, all based on varj-ing views of the child's capacity'. Section II examines views about the 
CRC that reject that the child capacity is relevant to the discussion of children's rights. Such 
perspectives include arguments that capacity' remains irrelevant to any discussion of rights, 
including children's rights, protectionism does more harm than good, and the current regime 
found in the CRC merely reifies adult-centrism. 
I. VIEWS ON THE CRC BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE 
CHILD'S CAPACITY IS RELEVANT TO THE DISCUSSION OF 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
This section explores perspectives on the CRC that defme the category' 'child' as incapable of 
exercising capacity' as a result of the child's immaturity. As such, the perspectives ovcr\'iewed in 
this section argue that children require parental and/or state authority to ensure the child's 
protection. The concept of minority legal status, or the legal categor)' 'child', is argued to protect 
children from their own temporarj' lack of capacity, giving 'children advantages designed to 
protect them from abuse and nurture them toward maturity'.^' The perspectives explored in this 
Vanessa Pupavac, Misanthropy Without Borders: The International Children's Rights Regime. 25(2) DISASTERS 95. 100 
(2001). 
" Bruce Abramson, Article: 2. The Right of Non-Discrimination, in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, ix (Andre Alen el al. eds.. 2008). 
" Bruce Abramson. Article: 2. The Right of Non-Discrimination, in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, ix (Andre Alen el al. eds.. 2008). The Preamble of the C R C notes that 'childhood is entitled t( 
special care and assistance". 
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to 
section agree that primarily parents, but sometimes that state should provide protection to 
children. However, perspectives diverge on the issue of whether the parents and the state should 
be empowered to protect the cluld's autonomy. Put another way, the rights or the remedial 
measures needed to address the child's alleged inherent state of immaturity' and thus dependeno', 
vary from exclusive parental control over die child's autonomy to a shared control, where the 
state is a faU back in the event that the child and parent disagree about the chUd's autonomy. 
a. Perspectives That Reject the CRC 
This section will primarily focus on the authors Bruce Hafen and Jonathan Hafen.^" These 
authors have been selected because their work is representative of a larger categor}- of 
perspectives on children's capacit}-, and therefore children's rights." It should be noted that diis 
perspective will be sur\-eyed in detail, largely because it represents a foil for the majorit}' of 
responses that defend die CRC's account of children's rights.'^ As a consequence, this 
perspective initiates a discussion regarding basic political forces underlining the debates about 
children's rights. Further, it should be noted that unlike the rest of the perspectives that will 
merely be described in this chapter, this sub-section will not only outline Hafen and Hafen's 
perspectives, but also critique them, along with the perspective outlined in Section I (d) (which 
argues that all children are capable). The rest of the perspectives put forward in Section 1 will 
simply be described in this chapter, but will be critiqued alongside the CRC in latter chapters 
because the same critiques apply to the CRC apply to the perspectives merely described in this 
chapter. Hafen and Hafen's perspective on the CRC, as well as the perspective that argues that 
all children are capable present unique criticisms, and as such will be examined in this chapter. 
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Generally, in this perspective, the CRC quite rightly accepted the child as incapable, but as in a 
state of progress or development into full capacity ( adu l thood) .Pro tec t ion rights, such as those 
found in Article 3"*, are also deemed appropriate. In this perspective, however, the CRC errs 
when it moves beyond protection rights to the provision of (even qualified) autonomy rights for 
children, such as those found in Article In this view, children's incapacity renders them 
incapable of holding autonomy rights. Accordingly, this perspective argues that children's 
autonomy rights should be supen'ised exclusively by the child's parents, restrained by the state 
only when those parents are 'demonstrably unfit'.''" Interestingly, the state of being 'unfit ' relates 
only to whether the parents are providing the child protection (food, shelter, abuse-free 
environment), not whether parents are respecting the autonomy of children. 
i. The CRC gives Children Autonomy Rights - Children are Not Capable 
Hafen and Hafen first argue that rights for children should not be designed to increase children's 
personal choice, but to protect children against the abuse of unchecked adult discretion. 
Interestingly, Hafen and Hafen do not find unchecked adult discretion regarding the child's 
autonomy problematic. Hafen and Hafen argue that children's relative lack of adult-level 
capacit)' enhances the need for such protections.'^ Further, they argue that the denial of 
autonomy rights is. 
not a way of discriminating against children, but is a way of protecting them, and 
society, from the long-term consequences of a child's immature choices and 
from exploitation by those who would take advantage of a child's unique 
^^  Bruce Hafen and Jonathan Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights 
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Article 3 slates that the best interests of Ihe child will be a primar> consideration in all decisions concerning the child. 
^^  Bruce Hafen and Jonathan Hafen. Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights 
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\ailnerability. To confer the full range of choice rights on a child is also to confcr 
the burdens and responsibilities of adult legal status, which necessarily removes 
the protection rights of childhood.'® 
Hafen and Hafcn take issue with certain articles of the Convention: 13 (right to freedom of 
expression), 15 (right of association and peaceful assembly). Article 14 (right to religious 
freedom), and Article 16 (right to privacy)." The central arguments against the CRC's grant of 
autonomy rights in this perspective are 1) cliildren arc too immature to exercise autonomy rights, 
and 2) autonomy rights in the CRC are incompatible with dominant positivist perspectives on 
law, in other words the CRC with its 'new and provocative personal autonomy dimensions' is 
inconsistent with current United States law regarding children.*' While Hafen and Hafen are 
cognisant of the recognition in Article 5 and 18 given to the role of parental rights in guiding the 
child in her/his exercise of all rights under the Convention, they deem autonomy rights an 
unnecessar}- step away from protection rights. Hafen and Hafcn contend, by way of example, 
[i]f free speech is to be meaningful, a citizen must not only be free to speak but 
should have something worth saying, together with the mamrit)-, insight, and skiU 
needed to say intelligibly. To develop the capacity' for autonomous action, 
children must submit their freedom temporanly to the schoolmaster of education 
and training, the developmental processes that create the tools and skills that are 
essential for responsible and self-determined action."" 
One not only wonders who gets to decide whether a saying is worthy, but also whether many 
'worthy' adults would pass muster. In what will become an important theme in Chapter 6, 
Hafen and Hafen's conclusion that children lack capacit)-/rcquire development is never much 
substantiated beyond noting that American (adult) societ)- has never recognised autonomy rights 
for children."- As will be elaborated, this lack of justification for one's version of childhood is 
endemic to most discourse about the rights of the child. That the category- 'child' is different 
from the category- 'adult' on the basis of the child's lack of capacity- and the adult's possession of 
capacity is assumed universally true, a 'truth' that will be critiqued throughout this thesis. 
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ii. The CRC Gives the Children State Protection of Their Autonomy 
Second, Hafcn and Hafen take issue with the CRC's grant of 'subjective autonomy', as seen in 
Article 5 and Article 14. Subjective autonomy according to Hafen and Hafen is the right of the 
child to have the state protect the child's capacit)'/autonomy, as they develop, rather than the 
child having no state protection of autonomy until the date of maturit}' (age 18 or as otherwise 
specified by law). Hafen and Hafen argue that the 'subjective autonomy' model 'undermines the 
very autonomy-building process of education and nurturing that every child needs'.*" Notably, it 
is not the grant of autonomy to the child that undermines the 'autonomy-building process' that 
occurs in childhood. The empowerment of the state, along with parents, to determine the child's 
capacity is what 'abandons children to their childhoods'. It is noteworthy that Hafen and 
Hafen's usage of 'subjective' implies that children determine for themselves their own autonomy. 
Such a characterisation does not accurately describe the rights in the CRC nor describe the 
problems that Hafen and Hafen have with the CRC. Possibly, characterising the rights given to 
children in the CRC as 'subjective' makes the CRC seem more controversial, with a 'kiddie-
Hbbing' agenda. Rather, it is the empowerment of another group of adults other than the child's 
parents (the state in its various capacities) that determine the child's autonomy that is deemed 
problematic. Hafen and Hafen argue against this empowerment of the state for three reasons: 1) 
parents are in the best position to judge and evaluate the child's capacit}' for autonomy, 2) the 
lack of clarit)' that results from determining a child's capacitj' on a case by case basis, and 3) the 
involvement of the state in such matters would increase, unnecessarily, intervention into the 
home. 
1. Parents are Best Positioned To Provide for the Children's 
Autonomy 
Hafen and Hafen's main argument is that the subjective autonomy model (children acquire 
legally enforceable autonomy rights as the develop capacit)', not at the age of majorit)') 
undermines the parental role because it shifts the abiUt}' to determine maturit)' to a person other 
than the parent. They argue that providing for the child's burgeoning autonomy is the parents' 
primary task."*"' Interestingly, Hafen and Hafen admit that 'mamrit)' as a concept is hopelessly 
"" Bruce I l a f en and Jona than H a f e n . Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights 
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complcx and subjective . . . so many choices are laden with hea\'y personal value preferences'.''^ 
For Hafen and Hafen, caregiver control, as opposed to state control, over children's autonomy is 
necessan' precisely because 'judges hardly know the children whose maturity' they must judge'*", 
as if in all other cases judges have intimate relationships with those embroiled in cases before 
them. Similarly, a judge should then not make decisions about, for example, marital assets. 
Rather the judge should leave the decision to the husband, as a judge does not have an intimate 
relationship with the wife to be able to make such a 'subjective' and 'value laden' determination. 
It is in part because judges do not know those before them, that they are deemed better fit to 
make such complex, subjective, and value laden decisions. 
As stated above, it appears that Hafen and Hafen's argument that children's rights should only 
be directed towards 'unchecked adult discretion' simply does not apply to unchecked adult 
discretion regarding the child's autonomy, even though the same arguments could apply. 
Further, Hafen and Hafen fail to acknowledge that either system (age-based or subjective) does 
precisely that: leave children to unchecked adult discretion. The only question that remains is 
which adults exercise this discretion (age based - only parents; subjective - parents plus those 
adult empowered by the state). Pupavac contends that the underlying imperative to 
institutionalise children's rights is an implicit mistrust of the child's parents."^ One might ask 
whether women's rights contain an implicit mistrust of dieir male counterparts and whether such 
'mistrust' is problematic. Underlining Hafen and Hafen's position appears to be the belief that 
parent-child relationships are somehow fundamentally different. Chapter 7 and Section 3 below 
wiU more thoroughly address this point. Pupavac argues that die overall impact of children's 
nghts results is the empowerment of outside professionals to represent the interests of the child, 
displacing the child's family (parents) as advocates for the child's interest."" Indeed, this grant of 
power to adults and rarely to the child is cunous and wiU be further discussed in Chapter 7. 
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2. Removing Age-Based Classification Lacks Clarity 
Hafen and Hafen also argue that removing age-based classifications results in a lack of clarit)', as 
children would reach legal capacit)' at difference ages. These authors pretend that lack of clarit)' 
is not found throughout law, whether the 'reasonable person' or determining whether an elderly 
person possesses similar competence to be able to exercise his/her autonomy, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. Interestingly, no similar law exists regarding elderly persons. For 
example all persons above the age of 70 arc not presumed incompetent and their children for 
example given exclusive rights to 'protect' and 'provide' (exercise capacity on their behalf). AU 
jurisdictions known to this author require courts to make a case-by-case determination regarding 
the capacity of the elderly (see Chapter 4 for further discussion). Why is 'lack of clarity' in the 
contexts of children's rights uniquely an issue? It seems that exclusive parent control over 
autonomy is merely a matter of convenience for parents, as the lack of clarity to which Hafen 
and Hafen refer is not resolved. The question of when children obtain enough capacity to 
exercise autonomy is not answered by having clear cut age classifications. Parents and children 
are stiU left to struggle over whether the child has obtained capacity before the age of maturit)'. 
The only clarity that is afforded is that only certain adults (parents) have exclusive control over 
the child's exercise of autonomy; all based on the idea that children cannot do so for 
themselves.'" This kind of 'clarity' merely results in children being left with no remedy when 
their views regarding autonomy conflict with their parents, or 'abandoned' to their parent's 
unchecked discretion. Hafen and Hafen themselves acknowledge that, in the words of the 
United States Supreme Court |ustice Stevens, 'it is perfectly obvious that such a yardstick [age-
based legislation] is imprecise and perhaps even unjust in particular cases'.^" Yet, these authors 
support this age-based classification for maturity merely by stating a positivist perspective of 
law.^' One might forget that rights are supposed to be fundamental; much less that all persons are 
supposed to be guaranteed these rights, under United States, as well as international law.^ ^ At the 
ven' least, this acknowledged 'unjust'-ness would seem to induce Hafen and Hafen, and for that 
matter Justice Stevens, a bit more pause for consideration. 
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3. Removing Age-Based Classification Increases Intervention 
into the Family 
Givmg children autonomy rights is viewed as undermining, not just die abilit>' of parents to 
make decisions, but also the entire structure of the family.^' According to this perspective, rights 
are viewed as distancing otherwise connected persons, valuing individuaUsm and selfishness over 
collectivit)' and responsibiUties.'" Children are given the right, increasingly, to make choices 
under die CRC. The argument according to this perspective is that autonomy rights, when read 
together m the context of the entire Convention, place children and parents on the same plane as 
'co-autonomous persons in their relationship with the state'." Hafen argues that ultimately such 
rights give way to a lower threshold for inter\-ention into 'intact' families.^' What Hafen means 
by 'intact' would be interesting, particularly for the children who have different conceptions 
about their capacities, their religion, their sexualitj', regardless of whether diese children are well 
fed, well housed, well educated. 
Although this discussion will be taken up more in Chapter 7, the notion of family protection 
through non-inter\-ention has been heavily critiqued." Michael Freeman notes that anti-
interi-ention into the family is argued to afford citizens individual freedom and human dignit)'.^" 
However, Freeman argues that anti-inter\'ention misses whose freedom and whose dignit}' this 
ideology upholds.^' An enormous problem with anti-intenx-ntion is that without piercing the 
veil of cushy words like 'communit) ', 'farrdly', and even 'non-inter\'ention', as has been argued in 
relation to women and the family, critical inquiry- is foreclosed." I'hose who exist in the shadows 
of these veiled words are forced to remain, while presuming that family relationships exist in 
" Michael Freeman. The Future of Children's Rights. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 111 (2000). 
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Utopias. Lynn Wardle argues that 'defining parent-child relationships in terms of rights misses 
the point and undermines the real needs of the parties themselves'/'' Freeman counters that this 
assumes all parties define 'needs' in the same way.'^ Freeman argues that one needs only to 
substitute 'husband-wife' for 'parent-child' to appreciate just how untenable this anti-
inten-ention position is/"' 
It should be noted that this thesis roundly rejects that idea that the CRC puts parents and 
children on a 'co-autonomous' plane. What has been argued in the context of woman/wives and 
men/husbands, equalitj', has been largely rcjcctcd in discourses about children's rights, and 
rejected in the CRC, as will be discussed in Chapters 4, 6, and 7. In the CRC, the child's opinion 
is only taken into account to the extent that the child is deemed mature by adults. If parents 
were on the same plane, parents' opinions would only be taken into account to the extent that 
the adult is deemed mamrc, or parents and children's opinions would be given equal weight. 
This simply is not the case under the CRC, as will be further explored in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Even if we pretend that parents and child are on the same plane in the CRC and if we use the 
analogy of women's rights, one must ask whether 'lowering' the threshold for state interi-ention 
by making the wife and the husband co-autonomous before the state was a 'good' or 'bad' thing. 
One must ask whether including the voice of a person to have a say in his or her autonomy 
matters. Was giving the wife a voice to make a claim against her husband a 'good' inter\'ention? 
More importandy, what or who is the bar to rnter\'ention into the home protecting, the husband 
and the parents?^"' Who suffers as a result of the unwillingness of the state to inter\'ene within 
the privacy of the home, in only certain instances?'^ The wife and children?'^'^ Most importantly. 
" Michael Freeman. The Future of Children's Rights. 1 4 C H I L D R E N & S O C I E T Y 2 7 7 . 2 8 0 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . quoting Lynn Wardle. 
Essay: The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Child. 2 7 L O Y O L A U N I V E R S I T Y C H I C A G O L A W 
J O U R N A L 3 2 1 . 3 2 1 - 3 4 8 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
" Michael Freeman. The Future of Children S Rights. 1 4 C H I L D R E N & S O C I E T Y 2 7 7 . 2 8 0 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
" Michael Freeman. The Future of Children S Rights. 1 4 C H I L D R E N & S O C I E T Y 2 7 7 . 2 8 0 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
" M I C H A E L F R E E M A N . T H E R I G H T S A N D W R O N G S OF C H I L D R E N . 4 7 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . 
" It has been argued that the slate indeed intervenes into the privacy of the home, whether regarding the regulation of who 
may marry, or which genders may engage in sexual intercourse. These topics have been discussed at length and will not be 
di,scussed here. See generally Frances E. Olsen. Myth of State Intervention in the Family 18(4) U N I V E R S I T Y OF M I C H I G A N 
J O U R N A L OF L A W 835. Olsen refers to ihe intervention versus non-inlervention discussion as Ihe -incoherence argument' . 
She argues that 'as long as the slate exists and enforces any laws at all. it makes political choices . . . even the staunche.sl 
supporters odaisse: faire always insisted that the state protecl their property interests and courts enforce [Ihem]'. She 
argues that il is a matter of choice the extent to which laws get taken for granted (and thus allow for the myth of laissez faire 
10 masquerade) and which law gets marked as intervention. Interestingly Olsen discusses further that the -staunchest 
opponents of slate intervention in the family will insist that the state reinforce parents' authority over their children'. Olsen 
includes examples such as. reluming runaway children, courts with incorrigible children, parent consent to non-emergency 
surgeo'. if the neighbours take the child on vacation withoul parental consent. This will be further discussed in Chapter 7. 
" Carol Gilligan argues that the family is the most dangerous place for both woman and children. See Zvi Trigger. To Dare 
to Look at the God of Love: Conversation with Carol Gilligan. in T R A I L S OF LOVE , 557. 564 (Oma Ben Naflali and Hannah 
Naveh eds., 2005). 
if 'our' concern is about the 'protection' of children, we must ask hard questions, such as where 
docs most abuse or mistreatment occur. The General Comment No. 13 notes that while laws 
may prohibit the abuse of children, '|w]idespread social and cultural attitudes and practices 
condone violence." General Comment No. 13 further notes that, 
|c]hildrcn may be subjected to violence by primary- or proxy caregivers and/or by 
others against whom their caregiver does provide protection (for example 
neighbours, peers and strangers). Furthermore, children are at risk of being 
exposed to violence in many settings where professionals and State actors have 
often misused their power over children, such as schools, residential homes, 
police stations or justice institutions. AU of these conditions fall under the scope 
of article 19, which is not limited to violence perpetrated solely by caregivers in a 
personal context.^'" 
While Article 19 and General Comment No. 13 discuss intra-family/care mistreatment. Chapter 
7 will argue that the CRC gives limited protection to the child in 'care', as the CRC emphasises 
'care' as the natural place for childhood. One author writes, 'the CRC's reinforcement of the 
sanctity of the family unit tends to disregard the fact that infanticide, genital surgeries, and 
domestic abuse often occur within the family unit'.*^' See Chapter 7 for further discussion. 
Beyond assuming children as inherentiy incapable and adults as inherentiy capable, what seems 
curious is the idea that other people (parents) can be trusted to act in other peoples' best interest 
(children's) all or even most of the time. If this was in fact true, then there would be no need for 
laws and indeed rights. A person could trust that her/his employer would not take advantage of 
her/his junior stams to overwork him/her and her/his gender to underpay him/her. A person 
could trust that her partner will not tr\' to take more than half of the shared resources in the 
event that the relationship dissolves. These are nice stories that are at times true. They are also 
stories that not always are not cognisant with even- person's experience. l iven in the context of 
the family, in light of domestic abuse or fighting over resources after the death of a parent, one 
could hardly argue that 'family members act on behalf of each other's best interests'. How is it 
that in the context of the parent-child relationships, 'we' (adults) are comfortable with this 
assumption that adults wiU act in the best interest of die child, when this assumption is not made 
in any other relationship, when virmaUy aU mistreatment of children happens at the hands of 
General Commen l No. 13 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 'The Right of ihe Chi ld to Freedom from Al l Forms of V io l ence ' CRC/C/GC/H 6 
« Genera l Comment No. 13 ( 2 0 1 1 ) "The Right of the Ch i ld to Freedom from All Forms of V i o l e n c e ' CRC/C/OC 3 13 14 
Kirs len Backs l rom. The Inlernalional Human Rights of Ihe Child: Do They Protect the Female Child' 30 GFORCP 
W A S H I N G T O N J O U R N A L OF INTERNATIONAL L A W & E C O N O M I C S 5 4 1 , 5 6 6 - 5 7 6 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . ' 
those responsible for them™, and when 'we' (adults) cannot agree on the best interests m the first 
placed' Again these issues will be taken up again and in more detail in Chapter 7. 
b. Perspectives That Embrace the CRC - Parents and the State Should 
Protect Children's Autonomy 
Frances Olsen writes that '[w]hatever criticisms 1 may have of the Convention, I beKeve it is 
better for it to be ratified and enforced than for it not to be'.'^ This embrace of the CRC is what 
this chapter wiU argue to be the dominant perspective of the CRC: the CRC is a tremendous 
statement about children's rights; the international communit)' need only to tweak the 
Convention to better enforce and to better realise those rights." Those tweaks relate to, for 
example, the CRC's allowance of children ages 15-17 to participate in dircct combat or, that 
traditional practices prejudicial to the child's health are not banned by the Convention. 
However, probably the most common critique of the CRC, as per the usual critiques of human 
rights or international law generally, is that the CRC lacks true enforcement mechanisms, and 
™ This is particularly curious when, as Valentine has pointed o u t statistically children are more at risk in private space from 
people they know. Gill Valentine. "Oh Yes I Can. " "Oh No You Can 'I": Children and Parents Understandings of Kids 
Competence to Negotiate Public Space Safely. 29 ANTIPODE 69 (1997). 
" Robert Mnookin. Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy. 39 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEM.S'. 260(1975); Robert Mnookin asserts that, 'deciding what is best for a child poses a question no 
less ultimate than the purposes and values of life i tself . Hafen and 1 lafen also argue that the Convention in no way reflects 
•United Nations" approaches to children's needs or rights, nor did |lhe CRC| originate in requests initiated by delegates from 
UN member nations'. Hafen deems it problematic that the Convention 'consciously breaks new ground' by creating a 
'totally new right of individual personality" and involved 'an unusually direct role of non-state parties in helping to draft the 
CRC". This positivist approach fails to recognise basic concepts of international law and its sources. Regardless of who was 
involved in the creation of the Convention, states nonetheless ratified it and therefore consented to the Convention. Thus the 
critique that non-state parties were involved lacks significance. See Bruce Hafen and Jonathan Hafen. Abandoning Children 
to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 37 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 
4 4 9 . 4 5 8 - 4 5 9 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
" Frances E. Olsen. Children's Kights: Some Feminist .Approaches to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. 6 I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L ON L A W A N D THE F A M I L Y 1 9 2 . 2 1 7 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" See generally P H I L I P A L S T O N a n d J O H N T O B I N , L A Y I N G THE F O U N D A T I O N S FOR C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; F r a n c e s E . 
Olsen. Children's Rights: Some Feminist .Approaches to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 6 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON LAW AND THE FAMILY 192 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; C y n t h i a P r i c e - C o h e n , The CRC: a Feminist Landmark. 3 
WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW 2 9 ( 1 9 9 7 ) ; P r i s c i l l a A l d e r s o n , UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: Some Common Criticisms and Suggested Responses. 96 CHILD ABUSE REVIEW 439 (2000); Anonymous, Editorial: 
The CRC as a Touchstone for Research on Childhoods. 6(4) CHILDHOOD 403 (1999); Michael Freeman. The Future of 
Children's Rights. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 277. 280 (2000); 566-576; Michael Freeman. The Sociology of Childhood and 
Children's Rights. 6 ( 4 ) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN"S RIGHTS 4 3 3 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; L a d a n A s k a r i . The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: The Necessity of Adding a Provision to Ban Child Marriage. 5 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 123 (1998-1999); Thomas Hammarberg. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and How to 
Make it Work. 12 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 97 (1990); Cynthia Price-Cohen. Implementing the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 2 1 W H I T T I E R L A W R E V I E W 9 5 ( 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 0 ) ; G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N . T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W O N THE 
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, (1998); Pe Miljeteig-Olssen. Advocacy of Children's Rights—The Convention as More than a Legal 
Document. 12 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 148 (1990); Enid Fourie. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and the Crisis for children in South Africa: Apartheid and Detention. 12 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 106 (1990). 
" See generally P H I L I P A L S T O N a n d J O H N T O B I N , L A Y I N G THE F O U N D A T I O N S FOR C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; A n o n y m o u s . 
Editorial: The CRC as a Touchstone for Research on Childhoods. 6(4) CHILDHOOD 403 (1999); Enid Fourie. The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Crisis for children in South .ifrica: Apartheid and Detention. 12 
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 106 (1990); Kirslen Backstrom. The International Human Rights of the Child: Do They Protect 
the Female Child?. 3 0 G E O R G E W A S H I N G T O N J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W & E C O N O M I C S 5 4 1 . 5 6 6 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
that non-compliance is the major issue.'" As such, for a majorit)' of practitioners and academics, 
it is not the substance of the Convention that is seen as problematic, but the lack of willingness 
on the part of states and state agencies to enforce the Convention.'^ That the Convention and 
its 'substance' were designed by states to lack this enforceabUit}' appears to be beyond inquiry." 
Regardless, the CRC is generally deemed progressive because it is argued to have gone beyond 
just protection rights to include autonomy rights as well for children. For example. Freeman 
writes: 
It is barely a quarter of a centur)' since Hillan- Rodham described children's 
rights as 'a slogan in search of a definition'. The [Convention] gave us a 
definition. It offered us the fullest legal statement of children's rights to be found 
anj-where. The world's first international legal instrument on children's rights 
was the product of ten years of negotiation among government delegations, 
inter-governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations. I'here 
had been previous Declarations, in Geneva in 1924 and by the UN in 1959, but 
these had been aspirational and the emphasis paternalistic. There was no 
recognition of a child's autonomy, of the importance of a child's views, nor any 
appreciation of the concept of empowerment." 
According to this perspective, those who reject the CRC on the basis that the Convention does 
not sufficiently take into account parental rights (for example Hafen and Hafen) simply do not 
understand the CRC. Likewise, it is argued that those who contend that the CRC does not give 
the child enough autonomy simply do not understand the categon- 'child'. Indeed, the 
Convention is lauded because it does not merely make children into adults. Freeman argues that 
'the 'kiddie-Hbbing' movement of the 1970s [which sought to give children the same rights as 
adultsj has been transcended by the now dominant model of participation found in [the CRC's[ 
S£.CGCNCRA//Y PHILIP A L S T O N a n d J O H N T O B I N , L A Y I N G THE F O U N D A T I O N S FOR C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S ( 2 0 0 5 ) : ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; 
Anonymous. Edilorial: The CRC as a Touchstone for Research on Childhoods. 6 (4 ) CHILDHOOD 403 (1999)- Enid Fourie 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and tl,e Crisis for citildren in South Africa Apartheid and 
D^ennon. 12 H U ^ N RIGHTS QUARTERLY 106 (1990) ; Kirslen Backslrom. The International Human Rights of the Child: 
Do^They Protect the Female Chdd?. 3 0 GEORGE WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & ECONOMICS 5 4 1 . 5 6 6 
" Notably, on 2 November 2011 the UN General Assembly adopted the Human Right.s Council 's Report, the Third Optional 
Protoco to the CRC. and recommended that ,t be opened for signature in 2012. The 3rd Optional Protocol, if adopted 
would allow for an mdiv.dual or a group of individuals within the jurisdiction of a state party, to submit a written complaint 
to the Committee on the Rights ot the Child. The Committee would then request interim me'asures and/or make 
recommendations to the state party. The state party would then be required to submit a written response including 
mfomat ion on any anions taken and envisioned in the light of the view and recommendations of t t e Committee This 
. hltp://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/Ll'D/N 1 1/577/92/PDF/N1 157792.pdf?OpenElement. 
" See for example David Kennedy. The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem'' 1 5 H A P v . p n n , 
R I G H T S J O U R N A L 1 2 0 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . ' m me rrootem. 1 5 H A R V A R D H U M A N 
" Michael Freeman, The Future of Children's Rights. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 277 (2000) . 
Article Rmbracing views of the child offered by traditional strains of developmental 
psychology, the CRC is deemed successful bccause it envisions the child not as statically 
incapable, but as evolving/developing into capacity/maturity throughout his/her childhood. 
The CRC's vision of the child as 'developing' (the child as inherendy incapable, but 
developing/evolving towards capacity) is viewed, according to this perspective, as a giant leap 
forward for children's rights. A full discussion of the role of developmental psychology in the 
development of, and responses to the CRC will take place in Chapter 6. For the purposes of the 
chapter, it will only be noted that those who embrace the CRC do so bccause the CRC accepts 
the version of childhood that certain traditional strains of development psychology purport to be 
'true'.™ 
It is argued that the CRC better respccts the developing child in a variety of ways. First the CRC 
promotes the voice of the child in Article 12. I'hc inclusion of the voice of the child in the 
Convention is heralded by some as the pinnacle of progression for children's rights."" The 
General Comment No. 12 states that '|t|he right of all children to be heard and taken seriously 
constitutes one of the fundamental values of the Convention'."' The issue of how much weight 
should be given to the child's views is, according to this perspective, rightfully dictated by the 
maturity of the child and thus should not be held to strict age restrictions. In deciding how 
much weight to give the child's preference, the adult authorised to make such a determination 
wiU take into account the child's maturity. Second, the Convention explicitly recogmses in 
Articles 5 and 14 that the child develops capacit)' over the course of childhood and that capacity-
requires recognition. One of the best known proponents for of perspective is Freeman."^ 
Michael Freeman. The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights. 6 (4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S 
RIGHTS 433.435 (1998). 
" S e e generally for a discussion of the role of developmental psychology in the construction of childhood CHRIS JENKS, 
CHILDHOOD (2005); Stuart Aitken & Thomas Herman. Gender. Power and Crib Geography: Transilional Spaces and 
Polenlial Places. 4 GENDER. PLACE AND CULTURE 63. 63-68 (1997); Berry Mayall. I 'alues and Assumptions Underpinning 
Policy for Children and Young People in England. 4( 1) CHILDREN'S GEOGRAPHIES 9 (2006); Catherine McDonald, The 
Importance of Identity in Policy: The Case For and Of Children. 23 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 241 (2009); James. A. and ProuL 
A. (1990) "Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood: 
C o n t e m p o r a r y I s s u e s ; A L A N P R O U T , T H E F U T U R E OF C H I L D H O O D : T O W A R D S THE INTERDISCIPLINARY S T U D Y OF C H I L D R E N 
( 2 0 0 5 ) ; R E X S T A I N T O N R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y S T A I N T O N R O G E R S . S T O R I E S OF CHILDHOOD: SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D 
CONCERN ( 1992) . 
See for example G E R A L D I N E V A N B U E R E N , T H E INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; N i c k L e e . The 
Challenge of Childhood: Distributions of Childhood's .4mbiguity in .4duh Institutions. 6 CHILDHOOD 455 (1999) ; Michael 
F r e e m a n . The Future of Children S Rights. 1 4 C H I L D R E N & S O C I E T Y 2 7 7 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; PHILIP V E E R M A N , T H E R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D 
AND THE C H A N G I N G I M A G E OF CHILDHOOD. 1 8 4 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" General Comment No. 12 (2009) 'The Right of the Child to be Heard' CRC/C/GC/12. 5: "The Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (the Committee) has identified article 12 as one of the four general principles of the Convention, the others being 
the right to non-discrimination, the right to life and development, and the priman' consideration of the child's best interests, 
which highlights the fact that this article establishes not only a right in itself but should also be considered in the 
interpretation and implementation of all other rights'. 
See generally M I C H A E L F R E E M A N , T H E R I G H T S AND W R O N G S OF C H I L D R E N ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; M I C H A E L F R E E M A N , Taking Children's 
Rights more Seriously, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS VOLUME I (2003) ; Michael Freeman. Why it Remains Important to Take 
Children S Rights Seriously. 1 5 ( I ) INTERNATIONAL J O U R N A L OF C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S 5 ( 2 0 0 7 ) . 
Freeman explains the evolving capacities theor}' as outlined by the House of Lords in the Gillick 
case"; now known as GilHck competence."" In 1985, The House of Lords upheld the right of a 
child under the age of 16 to obtain confidential medical advice regarding contraception, contrary-
to the wishes of her parents, so long as the child has 'sufficient understanding and inteUigence'."^ 
Lord Fraser stated that while the age of maturit;' is 18 under the laws of the United Kingdom, 
the age of mamrit}' prior to that tune is 'a dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to 
enforce against the wishes of the child (and the more so) the older he is. It starts with a right of 
control and ends with litde more than advice'.'"' Both Articlc 5 and 14 are applauded for 
reflecting the 'true' child, who is not in a period of stasis throughout the period of cluldhood, but 
is developing greater capacit)', a dynamic which should be respected by parents and the state."' 
Finally, the inclusion of qualified autonomy rights, as discussed in the previous sections. Article 
12 (right to be heard), Article 13 (right of expression). Article 14 (right of religion), Articlc 15 
(right of association), and Article 16 (right of privacy), are all viewed as positive steps in 
respecting the child as a right holder. Yet, under the CRC, the child is able to participate and 
have these freedoms only to the extent that that child has evolved into maturity: the greater the 
mamrity the greater the autonomy. The level of maturity is determined by those in positions of 
authority, whether the parent or the state. These rights are qualified by Article 5's grant of 
responsibiUt)' to parents provide direction to the child in the child's excrcise of the rights in the 
Convention 'in accordance with the evolving capacities of the child'. Thus, far from 'abandoning 
children', the CRC is argued to have struck the proper balance between respecting the child as a 
subject before the law (by respecting the child inherent burgeoning capacity) and the parent's 
priman- responsibility- to guide and direct the child.'" The CRC's embrace of the certain views 
expressed in of the disciphne of developmental psychology is argued to better describe the 
developing child, or in the words of the CRC to better prepare the child 'to Uve an individual life 
Gillick V H'esi Norfolk and IVisbech Area Health Aulhorily 11985| 3 Al l ER 402 (HL) . 
M i c h a e l F r e e m a n . The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights. 6 ( 4 ) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CIIILDREN'S 
R I G H T S 4 3 3 . 4 3 6 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
Gillick V. ll'esl Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authurlly. 119851 3 Al l ER. 4 0 9 - 1 0 (I IL) . The Court s t a l e s that, ' ( l l h e 
child must be capable of mak ing a reasonable assessment of the advan t age s and d i s a d v a m a g c s o r t h e Ireatmcnl proposed so 
the consent, if g iven , can be properly and fair ly descr ibed as true consent ' . 
Gillick West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authurity. 11985] 3 Al l ER. 412 (HL) . 
See PHILIP A L S T O N a n d JOHN TOBIN. I ,AYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S . 4 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) - P r i s c i l l a A l d e r s o n 
"" Criticisms and Suggested Responses. 9 6 CHILD A B U S E REVIEW 
4 3 9 . 4 4 0 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; M i c h a e l F r e e m a n . The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights, 6 ( 4 ) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
CHILDREN S RIGHTS 4 3 3 . 4 3 5 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
® See PHILIP A L S T O N a n d JOHN TOBIN. L A Y I N G THE FOUNDATIONS FOR C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S . 4 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; P r i s c i l l a A l d e r s o n 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: Some Common Criticisms and Suggested Responses. 9 6 CHILD A B U S E REVIEW 
4 3 9 . 4 4 0 ( 2 0 0 0 ) : M i c h a e l F r e e m a n . The Sociology of Childhood and Children S Rights. 6 ( 4 ) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAI OF 
C H I L D R E N ' S RIGHTS 4 3 3 . 4 3 5 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
in society'.*'' Most importantly, this perspective assumes that the child's maturity is merely a 
question to be answered objectively and based on mere obser\'ation.'° Always, as a given, this 
'true' child has a 'good' and 'willing' adult to 'enable' and instruct the child. When that 'good' 
and 'willing' adult is proven in fact 'not good' and 'unwiUing', there exists a state entity that will 
stand in as the 'good' and 'wiHng' adult for this 'true' child (to be discussed further in Chapters 6 
and 7). The main issues that remain in this view relate to realisation and enforcement of rights. 
Critical inquity' about the existence of the CRC's fundamental 'child' is considered irrelevant. 
The obviousness of the child as universally 'developing' begs no question. Instead, the focus is 
on enhancing compliance with the CRC's provisions and its Committee's recommendations. 
c. Perspectives That Embrace the CRC - But Argue That Children Need to 
be Viewed by the Court and Parents as More Capable 
Certain academics agree with those in the previous section that the child is developing 
capacity/maturity', and that the state and the parents should arbitrate the chUd's increasing 
capacity. However, this perspective also argues that children have much greater capacity than 
society is currently vviUing to attribute to them. As a result, children should be enabled to 
participate to a greater extent in choices that affect them. Notably, this perspective does not 
argue for outright respect for capacity', but rather greater expectations regarding the child's 
capacity for autonomy. Authors of this persuasion argue that while the C'RC is a step in the right 
direction towards realising the true rights of the child, the subsequent interpretations of the CRC 
have been inaccurate for failing to take more seriously the autonomy of the child. The 
Convention provided the correct rights for the categoty- 'child', society however has failed to 
more fully challenge childhood as a site of development and therefore incapacity. It should be 
noted that many of those who argue that the child should be considered more generally capable, 
tend to regard the CRC as a step in the right direction when compared to the 1959 Declaration. 
Ultimately, this perspective argues that children should be able to participate and exercise their 
autonomy as they acquire capacity, and that the state should be able to review autonomy based 
P r e a m b l e . See generally MICHAEL FREEMAN. THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF CHILDREN, 4 6 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; J e r e m y R o c h e . Children: 
Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475 (1999) . 
Neilson v Demark. a case before the European Court of Human Rights, presents an interesting counter example to the 
claim that determining the child's maturity is a straight forward assessment. In Neilson. the applicant's mother consented lo 
the child's hospitalization for the protection of the child's health, and not merely to keep the child away from his father. The 
Court held thai Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to privacy and family life) provided a broad 
range of parental rights and responsibilities in regard to the care and custody of children. On the matter of the child's own 
views and their relevance lo the child's hospitalisation, the majority considered that '[the child] was still of an age at which it 
would be normal for a decision lo be made by the parent even against the wishes of the child'. '" See Neilsen v Demark A 
144 (1988) : 11 EHRR 175 para 72 PC. As one author notes, given thai the child was 12 years old. this reflects a "peculiarly 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n v i e w o f t h e p a r e n t a l r o l e ' . " ® See J A N E F O R T I N , C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S A N D THE D E V E L O P I N G L A W , 1 0 1 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
conflicts, as outline in the CRC. In short, this perspective argues that adult society must take 
children's autonomy more seriously." 
Bern- Mayall argues that children must be 'extracted from their care-givers, their family, and 
professionals - to study childhood; to smdy them as people, not becomings'.'^ She contends 
that childhood is a political issue, and that child development and children's needs are not 
somehow an apolitical, formulaic determination." Further, Mayall argues that by defining 
children as inferior, as objects o f adult socialisation, adults deny children their right to participate 
in structuring their own lives.'" Jeremy Roche further argues that children are often rendered 
silent and invisible by the attitudes and practices o f adult societ) ' ." He argues that 'the "not-yet-
fuUy-formedness" o f the child is not the only obstacle in the way o f a respectful recognition of 
children as social actors'. Quoting judith Ennew, he obsen-es diat 'modern recognition of 
children constructs children out o f society-, mutes, their voices, denies their personhood, and 
Hmits their potential'.' ' The evacuation o f children from societ)', per Roche, appears to emerge 
from a concern to protect; a commitment to the welfare o f children in a world that is perceived 
as being increasingly hostile and dangerous.'^ The overwhelming imager)' surrounding children 
and young people is negative; they either need to be better protected (better policed from the 
evils o f the adult world) or better controlled (because o f the failure o f certain families to police 
properly their children)." (Chapter 8 wiU take up this discussion in further detail. Roche 
contends that children who take on ven- serious rcsponsibilit)' are rendered invisible and mute by 
adults, an assertion which wiU be explored in much greater depth in Chapter 9. Roche makes the 
following three contentions in support o f his point: 
" See for example Berr> Mayall. The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children's Rights. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 243 (2000): Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475 
(1999): Olga Niewenhuys. Editorial: The Ethics of Children's Rights. 15( 1) CHILDHOOD 4 (2008): Michael Freeman. The 
Sociology of Childhood and Children s Rights. 6(4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 433 (1998). 11 should 
be noled thai Freeman is quoted in this section and the previous one. It is argued that the earlier works of Freeman were less 
critical of the CRC and the latter began to focus more on the influence of sociological perspectives on childhood, to be 
discussed in Chapter 5: perspectives that critiqued a more protectionist position 
Ben^ Mayall. The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children's Rights. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S 
RIGHTS 2 4 3 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
"Berry Mayall. The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children's Rights. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S 
RIGHTS 243. 244 (2000). 
Beny Mayall. The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children's Rights. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S 
RIGHTS 243. 245 (2000). 
^ Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475. 476 (1999). 
Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475. 477 (1999). quoting Judith Ennew. 
Outside Childhood: .Street Children's Rights, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE POLICY AND 
PRACTICE, 125-143 (Bob Franklin ed.. 1995). 
" Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475. 477 (1999). quoting Judith Ennew. 
Outside Childhood: Street Children S Rights, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE POLICY AND 
PRACTICE. 125-143 (Bob l-ranklin ed.. 1995). 
Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475. 477 (1999), quoting Judith Ennew. 
Outside Childhood: Street Children S Rights, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE POI ICY AND 
PRACTICE, 125-143 (Bob Franklin ed.. 1995). 
1) Many adult professionals are unable to deal (or unused to dealing?) with 
children as partners. Practices of speaking with children, listening to them and 
involvmg them in the proccss of coming to a decision is unknown to too many 
professions, 
2) The ideology of family privacy results in family members being seen to 
Volunteer' to do a range of tasks that omit the family from pubHc scrutiny so 
long as the family is able to function reasonably. In the case of child careers, for 
example, their actions need not be taken seriously, as they are just 'helping out' 
3) 'Adultism' the oppression of children and young people by adults which may 
operate in the lives of young people with a similar power dimension to racism 
and sexism." 
Roche ultimately argues that except for the 'child hbcrationists', no one argues that children are 
identical to adults or that they should enjoy the same bundle of civil and political rights as 
adults. '" Rather, the demand that children be given autonomy rights is simply a request that 
children be seen as more prominent members of societ}', with a legitimate perspective and 
valuable voice."" Participation, according to Roche, is 'about making sure that children do not 
simply bccomc exhibits in a show of concern or fear'.'"^ Given the Convention's emphasis on 
protecting the family and parental rights (discussed in Chapter 7), the Convention is critiqued for 
not correspondingly challenging ideas about children and their incapacity'. As a baseHne, 
however, this perspective argues that without change in social views on children, current 
disempowering and exclusive practices wiU persist.'"^ 
Hillan' Rodham advocates a reversal in the presumption against the child's capacit)'.'"" Rodham 
argues that the law should presume children capable of autonomous legal action unless proven 
otherwise.'"^ Rodham contends that to combat bias regarding children's (in)capacit)', a reversal 
of onus is required, where it is the child's incapacity that should be proven, as opposed to 
requiring the child to assert her/his competence. Wliile some academics view Rodham's 
argument as distinct from the more 'radical' 'kiddie-Ubbing' movement, this author wonders 
whether Rodham's burden shift has the pragmatic effect of conferring on children adult rights. 
" J e r e m y R o c h e . Children: Rights and Participalion and Citizenship. 6 C H I L D H O O D 4 7 5 . 4 7 6 (1999) . It is in te res t ing that 
Roche t e r m s th i s o p p r e s s i o n o f y o u t h ' a d u h i s m ' . A s an ana logy , ma-seuline h e g e m o n y resul ts in s ex i sm, w h i c h f e m i n i s m 
a ims to address . T h e h e g e m o n y o f adu l t s resul ts in w h a t c o u l d be label led a g e i s m , w h i c h ch i ld i sm cou ld h a v e as its a im to 
address . W h y a d u l t i s m and no t a g e i s m ? It r e f l ec t s (un in t en t iona l ly? ) the cent ra l i ty o f adul t s . H e d o e s not use a mu tua l l y 
appl icab le te rm like a g e i s m , a r g u a b l y a t e rm that r e f l ec t s the m e n t a l l y it a t t e m p t s to desc r ibe . 
™ J e r e m y R o c h e . Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 C H I L D H O O D 4 7 5 . 4 7 9 (1999) . 
J e r e m y R o c h e . Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 C H I L D H O O D 4 7 5 . 4 7 9 (1999) . 
J e r e m y R o c h e . Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship, 6 C H I L D H O O D 4 7 5 . 4 8 8 (1999) . 
See M i c h a e l K i n g . The Child Childhood, and Children S Rights Within Sociology. 1 5 K I N G ' S L A W J O U R N A L 2 7 3 ( 2 0 0 4 ) . 
King o f f e r s an in t e res t ing c r i t ique o f the idea that ch i ld ren r igh t s can r ight the w r o n g s e x p e r i e n c e d by ch i ld ren . 
Hi l lary R o d h a m . A Legal Perspective, in C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S : C O N T E M P O R A R Y P E R S P E C T I V E S 21 . 33 (Pa t r i c i a V a r d i n and 
l l lene B r o d y eds . . 1979). 
Hi l lary R o d h a m . A Legal Perspective, in C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S : C O N T E M P O R A R Y P E R S P E C T I V E S 21 . 33 (Pa t r i c ia V a r d i n and 
ll lene B r o d y eds . . 1979) . 
For, if the law presumes children as possessing capacity, as in the case of adults, they should 
enjoy the same rights. Generally, however, in holding that the child should be viewed by the law 
(mcluding the CRC) and by socicty as more capable, the perspectives outlined in this sub-section 
continue to rely on the existence of a universal/fundamental 'child' that is incapable subject to 
developing capacity. Indeed, dominant perspectives about children's rights (in sub-sections a-c) 
rely on such an assumption, yet fail to justify this portrayal of childhood; this portrayal that 
forms the basis upon which the CRC was drafted signed, and ratified by all but three countries 
in the world. 
d. Perspectives That Rejects the CRC - Children arc Capable 
The discussion of which adults should act as an intermedian' for the child's interests becomes 
moot if one believes that children hold adult capacities. The alleged fundamental difference 
between children and adults, according to this viewpoint, is fictional or irrelevant to the 
discussion about children's rights. As such, if there is no difference between adults and children 
in their capacity for autonomy, there should be no difference in the rights granted to these 
identity categories. However, vety few academics argue that children should have the same legal 
and political rights held by adults because children are in fact competent.""' Interestingly, the 
notion that children arc capable is rarely analysed in detail, if mentioned at all. The idea that 
children are capable and therefore deserve the same rights as adults is particularly controversial. 
Most telling is Jason Sorens' argument that: 
There arc those 'children's rights' advocates who argue that children have the 
same rights as adults. Rather than engaging in a lengthy refutation, I wiU simply 
assume that thev arc wrong. No liberal theon' wishes to treat adults as 
children."" 
Similarly, Laura Purdy acknowledges that 'the human track record with respect to [making 
distinctions about who can exercise rationality] is shameful . . . given this histoty, the appeal of 
erring on the side of generosity is understandable'.'™ Nonetheless, Purdy continues diat the 
difficulty of exacting distinctions on the basis of rationality' might seem persuasively alluring in 
the context of children, yet, she argues that, 
Indeed, this author does not know of any. Some academics may refer to R I C H A R D F A R S O N B I R T H R I G H T S 1 1 9 7 4 ) 
or J O H N H O L T . E S C A P E F R O M C H I L D H O O D ( 1 9 7 4 ) , but neither argue that children are capable, f h e next sect ion will t lesh out 
their perspectives. 
" " J A S O N S O R E N S . L I B E R T A R I A N T H E O R Y AND C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S T H E F I D U C I A R Y M O D E L , R A T I O N A L I T Y I N T E R E S T S A N D THE 
C H A L L E N G E OF A B O R T I O N ( 2 0 0 1 ) , h t t p : / / w w w . l i b e r t a r i a n . c o . u k / l a p u b s / p h i l n / p h i l n 0 6 1 p d f I I N I L K E S T S A N D T H L 
L A U R A P U R D Y . IN T H E I R B E S T I N T E R E S T ? . 3 2 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
refusing to make distinctions can cause us to treat unlike cases alike - ignoring 
differing needs, capacitics, and desires. . . In short, in some situations such as this 
one [children|, we must resist the charms of generosit)' and return to the hard 
labour of making distinctions trusting democratic discussions to protect against 
109 oppression. 
Viewing children as 'different' and casting the differential treatment of children as uniquely 
acceptable is indeed a common trend, even among the most critical of scholars. While the 
argument that children are capable is intriguing and could be useful for challenging social views 
about children, it easily falls prey to stalemate."" Federle rightly points out that to argue that 
children have capacity opens the door for opponents of granting children autonomy rights to 
claim that children do not have capacity; and that for their own protection they should not and 
do not have political and legal rights. '" As Chapter 5 will argue, since there is no definitive 
psychological, sociological, or even legal statement about children's competence, the capacity of 
the child to obligate others is centrally disputed by rights theorists."^ Certainly those who 
opposed autonomy rights for children find support in the psychological and sociological 
literature, just as proponents rely on similar research to contravene those findings." ' This 'going 
- back - and - forth' about who holds the most 'accurate' painting of the category 'child', the 
most accurate portrayal of the child's capacity, the most correct needs of and rights for children 
is laid out in this chapter. 
II. VIEWS ON THE CRC THAT REJECT THE CHILD'S CAPACITY AS 
RELEVANT TO THE DISCUSSION OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
In contrast to Section I where the child's capacity was central to the discussion regarding their 
rights, this section outlines a handful of academics reject the assumption that the child's capacity-
is relevant to the discussion of children's rights. This section wiU review first the arguments put 
forth by the 'kiddie-Hbbcrs' of the 1970s that argue that the child deser\'es the same rights as 
adults because capacity' should never be a precursor to rights, protectionism docs more harm to 
children than good, and adult society does not know the capacities of the child. This section will 
also review authors who criticise the CRC for envisioning a universal 'child' that is exclusionary. 
L A U R A P u R D Y . IN T H E I R B E S T I N T E R E S T ? , 3 2 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . O n e w o n d e r s w h e t h e r P u r d y i m p l i e s t h a t s u c h • d e m o c r a t i c 
d i s c u s s i o n s " s h o u l d i n c l u d e c h i l d r e n . 
M I C H A E L KING a nd C H R I S T I N E P I P E R . H O W THE L A W T H I N K S A B O U T C H I L D R E N . ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
" ' Ka the r i ne Feder le , R i g h t s Flow Downhill. 2 I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L OF C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S 3 4 9 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
Kather i ne Feder le . R i g h t s Flow Downhill. 2 I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L OF C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S 3 4 9 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; M I C H A E L KING 
and C H R I S T I N E P I P E R . H O W THE L A W T H I N K S A B O U T C H I L D R E N . ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
Ka the r i ne Feder le , R i g h t s Flow Downhill. 2 I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L OF C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S 3 4 9 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . q u o t i n g 
M i c h a e l W a l d , C h i l d r e n ' s R i g h t s ; A Framework f o r A n a l y s i s ? . 2 5 5 U N I V E R S I T Y OF C A L I F O R N I A D A V I S L A W R E V I E W 2 5 5 . 
2 7 4 - 7 5 ( 1 9 7 9 ) . 
and sen-e to insfltutionalise the adult's position over the child in the CRC. The argument that 
there is no 'true' universal categorj' 'child' proves an important theme throughout this thesis. So 
too is the claim that the project of universaKsing the child in the CRC is about the regulation and 
control of childhood through the sustainment of hierarchical power relations of adults over 
children. 
a. Perspectives That Reject the CRC - Capacity Should Not be Precursor to 
Rights, the Policy of Protectionism Does More Harm than Good, and 
Child's Capacities are Unknown 
This sub-secdon will explore the works of John Holt and Richard Farson. While their work does 
not address the CRC, this section will apply their perspectives to the CRC. Both authors argue 
that children should be given the option of fuU adult rights, a rejection of fundamental premises 
in the CRC."*" Notably, Holt and Farson are generally characterised as 'radical' in their views. 
Neither author argues that children should be given autonomy rights because children hold adult 
capacity. A closer inspection of the justifications presented for their perspectives will prove 
important for ongoing themes in this thesis. This section contends as a starring point that the 
ideas of Holt and Farson have been oversimplified and/or mischaracteriscd. Franklin notes that, 
[wjhat is important in aU this is that the case for |fuU political rights for children] 
is dismissed, not by systematic, closely reasoned or coherent argument, but rather 
on the basis of impHcit and taken-for-grantcd assumptions; as sort of self-evident 
common sense which concludes the matter to be unworthy of serious 
consideration and thereby precludes discussion."^ 
This section attempts to flesh out their opinions within the range of perspectives identified in 
this chapter. Three important points should be made. First, Farson argues that capacity should 
never be a precursor to rights.'" While such a statement is uncontroversial in the context of race 
or gender, such a statement is undoubtedly controversial in the context of manirity, or children. 
When one speaks about capacit)- as an insufficient or unjustifiable precursor to children's rights, 
such statements are met with accusations of 'abandoning children to their rights' or ignorance of 
current literamre on children, particularly in the area of developmental psychology'. 
One could argue that the option for r.ghts ,s mdeed what adults have. We do not always employ our rights all of the time 
Rather, on the occasion that one requires such rights we "fall back' on them. See for example. Jeremy Waldron When 
Justice Replaces AffecUon: the Need for Rights. 11 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUB[ ic POLICY (,->5 N QSSI 
B O B F R A N K L I N . T H E R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N , 2 6 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . ' 
R I C H A R D F A R S O N . B I R T H R I G H T S . 3 1 - 3 2 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . 
Second, these authors argue that the methodologj' of protectionism is insufficient, harmful, and 
potentially abusive. Holt argues that \'iewing the child as an object of protection does most 
young people more harm than good, and he instead proposes that aU rights, duties and 
responsibilities of adult citizens be 'made available to any young person, of whatever age, who 
wants to make use of them'.'" It is worth dwelling on Holt's quite controversially contention 
that protectionism is more harmful than Hafen and Hafen's fear of 'abandoning children' to 
their rights. Holt's perspective is likely combustible to those whose work depends on the 
altruism upon which protectionism depends that one category' of persons wiU look out for the 
bests interests of another catcgor\'; an altruism that has been heavily criticised in the context of 
all other (adult) identitj' categories. As a result of the greater harm caused by protectionism. Holt 
argues that autonomy rights should be made available to children who want to make use of 
them. As this section repeatedly notes, this perspective is quite different from one that contends 
children as capable. Further, Holt is not arguing that aU children should be 'abandoned' to their 
autonomy rights, if indeed affording autonomous rights could ever amount to abandonment. 
Holt contends that, 
|m]ost people who believe in the institution of childhood as we know it see it as a 
kind of waUed garden in which children, being small and weak, are protected from 
the harshness of the world outside until they become strong and clever enough to 
cope with it. Some children experience childhood in just that way. I do not want 
to destroy their garden or kick them out of it. If they like by, by all means let 
them stay in it. But 1 believe that most young people, and at earlier and earlier 
ages, being to experience childhood not as a garden but as a prison. What 1 want 
to do is put a gate, or gates, into the wall of the garden, so that those who find it 
no longer protective or helpful, but instead confining and humiliating, can move 
out of it and for a whUe trj' living in a larger space. If that proves too much for 
them, they can always comb back into the garden. Indeed, perhaps we all ought 
to have waUed gardens to take refuge in when we feel we must."" 
Holt's vision for children's rights is more nuanced than simply stating that all children should be 
given autonomy rights. Holt's version of rights refuses to place a veil of ignorance around the 
family and around parent-child relationships by acknowledging that at times these relationships 
are not in the best interests of the child and/or do not respect the child's autonomy. The role of 
die family in the CRC will be further discussed in Chapter 7. 
JOHN H O L T . E S C A P E F R O M C H I L D H O O D . 4 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . 
JOHN H O L T , E S C A P E F R O M C H I L D H O O D . 2 6 - 2 7 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . 
Third, Holt contends that the 'child' is viewed by adult societ}' as 'wholly subservient and 
dependant', 'a mixture of expensive nuisance, slale, and super-pet ' ." ' Farson appears to concur 
with Holt on this point, arguing that despite holding fundamental beliefs about the categor)' 
'child', societ)' simply does not know about the capacities of children and therefore should lean 
towards granting autonomy rather than protection.'^" Farson maintains that the fundamental 
barrier to granting children autonomy rights is, 
our deeply-held belief in the innocence and helplessness of cliildren. . . While 
it is certain that societj' actually creates innocence and helplessness in 
cliildren, we do not, and cannot, know if there are in fact any characteristics 
that are inherent in children. . . Rather than debating the issue, a more 
valuable and pertinent task might be to evaluate the consequences and risks 
involved in granting children the right to self-determination.'"' 
While agreeing that adult society does not 'know' the capacities and potential of children, this 
thesis argues that one can never 'know' the categor)' 'child', much less the capacities of each and 
even' child. This argument will be developed throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapter 3. 
Ultimately this thesis will argue that 'objective' or 'fundamental' knowledge about any identit)' 
categon', including children is impossible. As such, critical inquir\' should focus on what is being 
accomplished by claiming such 'truths'. This discussion is pursued m C^hapters 6, 7, and 8. 
Farson argues that it is time to admit that no one 'knows how to grow people':'^^ 
[pjerhaps no single group of people has been studied more than children, both 
scientifically and clinically. A large body of literature on cliildren and childhood 
has developed and a complete and separate disciphne has emerged. Research has 
given us a more comprehensive understanding of the through processes, 
attitudes, behaviour, developmental stage, and interpersonal dynamics of children 
that we have of any other class of people. Recognising the politics of childhood, 
however, may force us back into the laboratory and clinic to re-evaluate our 
research on children for the simple reason that research done on any group of 
people m an atmosphere of prejudice and subjugation is bound to be full of 
systematic error.'^' 
This thesis builds on the more nuanced views of Holt and Farson to explore the poHtics of the 
CRC's construction of childhood in Chapters 6 and 7 by examimng certain 'trudis' about the 
categor)' 'child' presented in die CRC. The Foucauldian/Buderian theoretical lens used in tins 
J O H N H O L T . E S C A P E F R O M C H I L D H O O D . 4 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . 
R I C H A R D F A R S O N . B I R T H R I G H T S . 9 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . 
R I C H A R D F A R S O N . B I R T H R I G H T S . 3 2 - 3 3 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . 
R I C H A R D F A R S O N , B I R T H R I G H T S . 2 9 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . 
R I C H A R D F A R S O N . B I R T H R I G H T S . 11 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . 
thesis to deconstruct the politics of the CRC's version of childhood is outlined in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 considers sociological perspecUves that have critiqued an essentialist version of the 
categor}' 'child'. 
b. Perspectives That Reject the CRC - Universalisation of the Category 
'Child' is Too Exclusionary 
A primar)- critique of the CRC is that the CRC is based on a particular version of childhood that 
is not enjoyed by every child and, as a result, further marginalises and stigmatises those not 
included in the CRC's vision. (Chapter 9 will explore various childhoods that are excluded 
and/or stigmatised by the CRC's normative 'child'. Generally, this thesis contends that 
childhood cannot be understood outside the context of other variables such as gender, class, 
ethnicit)', culture, sexuaHty, and so on. If childhood is a social construction (see Chapter 3, 5 and 
9 for further discussion), then there are 'childhoods', rather than a single, universal, cross-cultural 
phenomenon. The C2RC adopts, however, a universaUst approach to the category' 'cliild'.*^'' 
Similar arguments have been laid at the feet of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination of Against Women (CF.DA•W)'^^ Janet HaUey has argued that CEDAW too is a 
positivist, identity-driven construction that reflects what Janet HaUey calls 'Feminist 
UniversaHsm'.'^'^ In this way, CEDAW presumes universaHt)' for the categon* 'women', a 
universal term that conveys an obvious meaning to most people in most cultures, without 
interrogation. Dianne Otto notes that the term 'woman' created a cross-cultural site that was 
able to resist other idenat)' traits, such as nationalit)', class, race and reHgion.'^^ It could be 
argued (and wiU be argued in Chapters 8 and 9) that the CRC's idenrit\'-driven construction 
reflects a normative 'Child Universalism' that ignores and resists other non-normative identity' 
traits. One must ask whether the Convention beyond imagining childhood as anything but 
Eurocentric and phallocentric.'^" As will be argued in Chapters 3, 8, and 9, probably the more 
important question is whether any identit)' category' can function without exclusivit}'. Freeman 
writes. 
Michael Freeman. The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights. 6(4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S 
RIGHTS 433. 438 {1998). See generally regarding rights: David Kennedy. The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies' in 
Left Legalism/Left Critique. 188 (Janet Halley and Wendy Brown eds.. 2002): 'Rights are a key element in the 
universalisation projects of ideological intelligentsias of all stripes. A universalisation project lakes an interpretation of the 
interests of some group, less than the whole polity, and argues that it corresponds to the interests or to the ideals of the 
whole. Rights arguments do this: they restate the interests of the group as characteristics of all people' . 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Dec. 18. 1979. 1249 U.N.T.S.I3. 
Janet Halley. Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related t'iolence in Positive 
International Criminal Law. 3 0 M I C H I G A N J O U R N A L OE I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W 1. 6 ( 2 0 0 8 ) . 
Dianne Ono. Discovering •Masculinities'. Reinventing the Gendered Suhject(s) of International Human Rights Law. in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES, 106 ( D o r i s B u s s a n d A m b r e e n a M a n j i e d s . . 2 0 0 5 ) . 
Judith Ennew. Outside Childhood: Street Children S Rights, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE 
POLICY AND PRACTICE ( B o b F r a n k l i n ed . . 1995) . 
[d]o human rights documents such as the |CRC] lose their meaning in cases 
where a chUd has failed to experience any of the rights enshrined therein? It 
seems that they work reasonably well when a person enjoys almost all of his 
or her rights - when a person comes up short on only one count, it is 
relatively easy to petition that this violation be rectified using international 
norms and covenants as a referent. But when a person is denied not one, not 
two, but most of the rights outlined in the documents, the question is not 
just where to begin, but whether the entire document has meaning left at 
all.'^' 
This sub-section will briefly explore three perspectives that question the CRC on this basis. The 
first, represented by Ennew, argues that the CRC excludes non-Western childhoods. Ennew 
argues the Convention's text and implementation is based on a Western, modern childhood, 
which has globalised through colonialism and then through the imperialism of international 
aid."" Adopting a slightly different approach, Freeman argues that the Convention to some 
extent recognises different t^-pes of children, such as those 'in especially difficult circumstances' 
or children from cultural minorities and indigenous children.'^' Freeman suggests that for 
children who would not be included as a 'normal' child under the Convention by virtue of the 
child's culture, a variet)' of articles could apply. For example. Article 17(d) requires states to, 
'|e]ncourage the mass media to have particular regard to the linguistic needs of the child who 
belongs to a minorit}- group or who is indigenous'. Article 20(1) states that when considering 
whether to place the child outside the home, 'due regard shall be paid to the desirabilit)- of 
continuit)' in a child's upbringing and to the child's ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic 
background'. Article 30 provides for ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and persons of 
indigenous origins. Whether these articles translate to the inclusion of cultural and ethnic 
minorities is not the focus of this chapter, although it is worth noting that I'reeman certainly 
does not think so."^ In this, Freeman would be in line with literature that holds the CRC to 
privilege Western assumptions about the developmental trajector)- of the chi ld . '" In these views, 
the CRC reflects an effort to globalise the notion of Western developmentalism, where 
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biologically-based relations between parents and children are more fundamental and natural than 
other sorts of family or community relations."'' Michael King and Christine Piper contend that 
the law relating to children is enslaved to children's welfare and development discourse. '" 
Pupavac argues that the CRC assumes that there is a model of cliildhood development that is 
universally applicable, 'that there are universal needs, such as the need for rehabilitations, and 
that there is consensus both domestically and internationally on what policies should be in place 
to realise the best interests of the child' ." ' How the Convention deals with development, and 
how the developmental trajectory of the Convention is simultaneously 'universal' and 
marginalising, will be discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 9. 
The second allegation of exclusion levied against the CRC concerns issues deemed specific to the 
girl-child, such as absence of a provision regarding minimum age for marriage '" or the 
suggestion that the gender-neutral language of the Convention's protection of education, health, 
or participation does not adequately take into account the implications of gender difference."" It 
is argued that the Convention does not address when harsher punishments are sought reflecting 
the enforcement of gender stereotypes that, for example deal with sexual activity or being 
beyond parental control ." ' In fact, one author argues that the inclusion of the girl-child in the 
CRC was too controversial.'*' The girl-chUd will be discussed at length in Chapters 6, 7, and 9. 
As a third category of crititjue from this perspective, Hnnew advances a convincing argument 
that the rights enshrined in the CRC are at times incompatible with the reality of marginal 
children's existence.'"" In particular, Ennew contends that Convention fails to account for 
children who exist outside the care of adults, thereby marginalising them. Ennew argues that 
under the Convention, the place for childhood is 'inside': inside societ\', a family, a private 
dweUing.'"'' Those not inside, according to Ennew, are the ultimate outlaws, 'placed outside of 
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cli i ldhood'." ' These children are portrayed as \'ulnerable and in danger. Thus, children have lost 
the freedom to explore the world of peer group relationships and the geography of their 
communit}', according to Ennew.""* Instead, children are required to exist out of society, to be 
mute, and have their time filled up and scheduled completely.'"^ Ennew contends that the 
predominant perception is that, 
[tjhe unhappy child does not have an adult to depend on - to be powerful on 
its behalf or, if it needs to be rescued, to put it back into childhood which, in 
ideological terms, stands for happiness, play innocencc and some kind of 
essential goodness in human nature.'"" 
Ennew argues that the Convention privileges the modern conception of the modern nuclear 
family in which many children do not exist. Ennew then delineates how the articles of the CRC 
do not apply to street children. For example, under Article 3, state provision for street children 
is undertaken less in their best interests and more in the interest of cleaning the streets of their 
presence.'"^ Another example includes Article 2's protection against discrimination. Ennew 
argues that the stigma and guilt generated by merely being on the 'street' means that street 
children are often discriminated against as they are targeted by state action without having done 
anything legally wrong.'""* Ennew maintains that not only was the CRC drafted with a particular 
'child' in mind, it treats those outside this model as marginal. As a result, per Ennew, the 
Convention does not fuUy engage with the entire class of persons who are defined as children. 
She argues that even when certain articles of the CRC attempt to target these marginal children 
(for example labour or sexual exploitation); it only succeeds in further marginalising them. This 
occurs because these articles and others may be ambiguous and/or contradictor)- in the face of 
the real experiences of these children. I'nnew's lasting contention is that if we define childhood 
as a space for economic and social dependence on the family and claim for all children the 'right' 
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to such a situation, we excludc millions of street and working children altogether from 
membership in the analytical categor}' 'chi ld ' ." ' 
If the Convention is grounded in a particular construct of childhood, some argue that it is no 
surprise that the CRC has proven of limited efficacy in enforcing the rights of individuals who 
do not fit within the traditional roles assigned them in this (patriarchal) structure.'^" Yet if 
human rights arc intended to apply to all peoples, this thesis grapples with understanding why 
and how the CRC chooses one 'childhood' over another. The perspectives in this section, unlike 
the perspectives in Section I, argue that there is no universal/essential child. As such, the CRC's 
acceptance of the universal child can function to exclude and marginalises those who are deemed 
children, but do not live up to the normative vision of the categorj' 'child' articulated in the CRC, 
a position this thesis will underscore in Chapter 9. 
c. Perspectives That Reject the CRC - CRC Merely Reifies Aduh-Centrism 
Finally, some argue that far from granting children overstated freedoms and rights, the CRC is 
rather a too modest proposal to meet minimal criteria of social justice.'^' It is argued that the 
CRC's commitment to remedying the vulnerabiHt)' unique to childhood can only go so far as its 
rights do not blur what it means to be an adult (capable) and what it means to be a child 
(incapable). As such the CRC is argued to merely uphold the position of the adult over the 
child.'" Considering this claim is crucial for this thesis. Again, this claim posits that the CRC 
will give the child rights and even protection only to the extent that those rights and that 
protection do not blur the distinct appearance of the categories 'adult' and 'child'. One example 
of this limitation on autonomy rights granted to the child is found m Article 12, tlie right of the 
child to have a say in matters considering the child. Article 12 is argued to be the most 
controversial and paradigm-shifting articles in the CRC, as it recognises the child as a subject of 
rights and not merely an object of care based on needs. '" Nonetheless, Maria GIrahn-Farley 
argues that Article 12 stops short of the point at which the image of the 'child' articulated in the 
CRC would be threatened, where the incapacit)' of the child would be questioned. Article 12 
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stops short of giving the child the right to be heard by stating that 'the views of the child (must 
be] given due weight in accordancc with the age and matunt)' of the child'. Thus, far from 
grounding-breaking, the Convention merely gives the child the heavily quaUfied right to be heard 
based on the perceived quaHt)' of the speech (as measured by adults)."" Indeed the General 
Comment No. 12 states that Article 12 of the [CRC] is a unique provision in a human rights 
treat)-; it addresses the legal and social status of children, who, on the one hand lack the fUU 
autonomy of adults but, on the other, are subjects of r ights ' . '" This double standard regarding 
such a fundamental right is justified on the basis of the view that the categor)' 'child' is incapable 
and the category' 'adult' is capable. 
Grahn-Farley also critiques the right to freedom of expression found in Article 13; the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion found in Article 14; and the right to freedom of 
association and to freedom of peaceful assembly found in Article 15.'^" Cirahn-Farley argues that 
each of these articles arc limited not by what is relevant to the fulfilment of the rights described, 
but rather based on the system of law that seeks to uphold the hierarchical rcladonship between 
the adult and the chi ld. '" The CRC states in Article 15: '[njo restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of these rights other than those imposed in conformit}' with the law', the parental rights, 
public order, or morals'. Grahn-Farley argues that this means that the rights have an internal 
limitation that ends where law and order begin.'^" Simply put, so long as the restriction on rights 
is done in conformit)' with the requirements of law (notably exclusively adult controlled) and 
does not impose on parental rights, such restrictions are permissible. Children may have rights 
only to the extent that those rights do not step on the toes of parental rights, which are grounded 
in upholding the appearance of the adult-as-capable and the child-as-incapable. The focus in the 
CRC is then about upholding the parent or adults position over the child. The parent-child 
binar)' relationship will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. 
Alderson argue.s that, ' the C R C does not grant to chi ldren the hberty or au tonomy r ights w hich adu l t s in democrac ies take 
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Cirahn-Farley goes so far as to argue that even protection of the child is granted to children in 
the CRC only to the extent that such protection docs not blur the adult - child distinction. She 
argues that the protection against exploitation is mediated by adults, not by breaking down 
legally and socially constructed limitations on children's access to what Grahn-Farley argues to 
be effective human, organisation, and economic resources.'^' Rather than some essence inherent 
to the child, she argues that it is the disproportionately poor allocation of resources given to 
those deemed a child that makes them Soilnerable' and thus exploited. She identifies rights as a 
resource."" Grahn-Farley argues that the CRC does not connect the fact that children are not 
living under the CRC's imagined conditions for a child, but under various limitations placed on 
children for being children. She writes, 
[t]he CRC is inconsistent on its own terms. . . When a child is not granted extra 
protection as a consequence of its mental and physical immaturity, the CRC does 
not adjust its rights to fit the child that is being exploited . . . by equipping the 
child with extra resources that would recognise and remedy the fact that the child 
is living in even harsher situations than would be legally and socially accepted for 
adults. The CRC still treats every child according to the same standard: the self-
justified master norm, a norm of adults as adults and children as children . . . 
even when adults do not really behave in ways that adults are imagined to behave 
in relation to children. [Tjhe child is not allowed access to its own protection; 
instead, the child is forced to seek protection based on the good wiU of adults. 
The fact that adults do not fulfil their end of the deal does not change the rules 
for the children."' 
Even in the instance that the child does not receive the extra protection and care that she/he 
should receive as a consequence of being a child/assumed mentally and physically immature, 
Grahn-Farley argues that the exploited child is not exempt from the rules that render the child 
powerless to stand against adult exploitation on the child's own. She maintains that the child is 
thought to be exploitable and the response, incredibly, is to maintain the exploitability of the 
child unless the child fmds another adult's good wiU."'^ The child, then, is made \nlnerable in 
the name of his/her supposed natural vulnerabilit)'. The child is denied access to the means of 
the child's own protection in the name of the child's need for protection."' It is through the 
withholding of, in this case, rights from children that Grahn Farley asserts that the construction 
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of the child can be made 'real ' . '" As such, this language of nghts does not evacuate children 
from places that are perceived as exploitive and abusive by adults. Children are not abused and 
exploited because there is an over-representation of children possessmg rights or because they 
are abandoned to their rights. Rather, chUdren are vulnerable because they arc under-
represented.'" Children are not exploited because they exist 'outside' sociaUy constructed norms 
for children (without a protective adult), but rather because children are forced 'inside' sociaUy 
constructed norms for children and dierefore 'behind' an equaUy fictitious 'good' and 'willing' 
adult. 
By mamtaimng the clear categories adult (capable) and child (incapable), the CRC demonstrates 
its commitment, not to eHminatmg the unique vulncrabilm' of chUdhood, but rather to upholding 
the position of die adult over the child, where the child is required to rely on the adult for 
protection. Grahn-Farley's critiques here are persuasive particularly when considering the CRC's 
version of rights through a Foucauldian-Buder lens (discussed in chapter 3, applied in Chapters 
6, 7, 8, and 9). The differential treatment of children, as experienced through child's rights 
relates Httie to who the child 'really' is, much less who the adult 'really' is. The lack of 
justification regarding the perception of the child's incapacity- and why that alleged lack of 
capacit)' affects the child's allocation of nghts is precisely as the old adage goes, 'because [adults] 
say so'. Similarly to h'arson and Holt, Grahn-l-arley contends that we do not know what a 
person categorised as a 'cliild' is capable of doing; we only know what a child is allowed and not 
allowed to do."^ '^  If capacit)- is no longer central to the discussion of children's rights, the 
immarnrit)' of children is irrelevant to their claim to autonomy rights. PaternaHsric concerns 
simply cannot justify- the state's nor the care-giver's restriction on the child's liberties. It would 
seem that there is no basis for distinguishing children's rights from adults' rights."*' The law and 
its 'truths' about the child make the need to justify gross discrimmation against children mute. 
The essential child, upheld by law, maintains a particularly kind of politics, a particular kind of 
adult-centric power relations. The examination of the construction of the category 'child' 
through the lens of power will be discussed further throughout this thesis. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to canvass accounts of the CRC as a means to begin questioning the legal 
construction of the child in the CRC. The majority' view regarding the CRC's child is that the 
child IS incapable but developing towards capacit)'. This chapter argues that dominant discourses 
on the CRC, sur\'eyed in Section 1, fail to explicate the category- 'child', while each perspective 
insists that it better knows the 'true' child. Section 1 examined perspectives that maintain that 
the child's purported capacity is relevant to the discussion about children's rights. Under this 
section four distinct views on the CRC were discussed. One perspective rejects the CRC on the 
count that the CRC empowers children and the state (as opposed to just parents) in relation to 
the child's autonomy. This perspective argues that, not only are children unable to have 
autonomy rights, but that parents are in the best position to determine the child's capacity for 
autonomy. The second perspective discussed in Section 1 embraces the CRC for its accurate 
portrayal of the child as developing towards capacity and for empowering the child and the state 
to protect the child's autonomy as it develops. I'or this perspective the main outstanding issue 
for the CRC is its need for better enforcement mechanisms. It should be noted that this 
perspective is arguably the most dominant discourse concerning the CRC. The third perspective 
outlined in this section embraces the CRC for empowering the child and state-inten-ention 
concerning the child, but argues that society should interpret the CRC in such a way that 
continues to challenge social views about the child's incapacity for autonomy. The final 
perspective surveyed in Section I argued that children are indeed capable and therefore deseri'c 
all rights given to adults. 
Section II overviewed perspectives that do not engage in conventional disagreement over 
whether the CRC adequately captured the 'true' child's capacity. Rather this section examined 
three perspectives that reject the CRC and its universal child. T'he first perspective rejccts 
protectiomsm within the CRC, claiming that a failure to give children adult rights results in more 
harm than good, particularly because the capacities of the child are unknown and because 
capacity should never be a precursor to the grant of rights. The second perspective argues that 
CRC's universal 'child' has an exclusionary effect. For these authors, children who do not live 
up to the normative framework of the CRC are excluded from and stigmatised by the 
Convention. The examples of the non-western child, the girl child, and the child without a 
responsible adult were briefly discussed to explore how the Convention is irrelevant and 
unhelpful to a large swath of children living outside the conditions imagined for childhood in the 
CRC. The final perspective discusscd in Section II rejects the CRC because the Convention is 
seen to merely reify the hierarchy of adults over children. According to this perspective the 
Convention grants chUdren rights and protection only to the extent the child-adult distinction is 
not blurred. The Convention will only grant children rights to the extent that those rights 
maintain the appearance of the incapable child and the capable adult. 
This chapter has attempted to investigate why so many different perspectives about the CRC 
exist. It IS argued that the reason for such var)-ing views about the CRC is precisely because 
there exists remarkably different answers to die question: 'what is a child?'. The answer to the 
question 'what is a child?' wiU largely dictate the answer to the question 'what rights should 
children have'. A central contention for this thesis is that in questioning the child behind the 
rights, one is able to query- assumptions made regarding the child's 'true' identity. Further, one 
is able to quen- what is accomplished by constructing the child in a certain way as opposed to 
others. 
Generally, this chapter raises the following questions: 
1. Why is it assumed that the categories 'child' and 'adult' are fundamentally 
different, most times without any justification? 
2. What is the basis for assuming the child lacks or possesses mamrit)'/capacit)'? 
3. Why is the child's lack of capacit)' determinative of what rights he/she is given? 
4. What is the basis for assuming the adult's possession of capacity' and good-will? 
5. WTiy arc there so many versions of the 'true'/'universal' children? 
6. Considering the various and numerous claims to knowing the 'true' children, why 
arc academics (and drafters of the CRC), most times, unwilKng or unable to 
identify, much less justify', the children to which they refer? Does the illusion of 
the 'true' child have too much political purchase? 
7. What are the implications of particular constructions of the categon- 'child' and 
the corresponding rights? 
Holt, Farson, Knnew, and Grahn-Farley adopt perspectives on the CRC that go beyond the 
'capacit)' debate', which dictates most mainstream discussions about children and their rights. 
All of these perspectives argue that the CRC's universaHsation of the child and the privilege 
status given to adults is at the expense of those labelled 'child'. These critiques of the CRC are 
exceptionally persuasive, but nonetheless lack 'mainstream' purchase. Agitating the appearance 
of an essential identity- categorj' has been employed in the context of various 'Others'; yet those 
same critiques are virtually ignored regarding the category- 'child'. Chapters 3 will examine 
critiques of constructing identit)' categories or 'truth' in the contexts of the law and in particular 
in the context of rights. Grappling with understanding how these critiques are so effectively 
ignored in the context of the categon- 'cliild' is aided by the theories of Michel Foucault and 
Judith Buder, discussed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL TOOLS: GRAPPLING WITH POSTMODERN 
PERSPECTIVES ON IDENTITY AND LAW 
OUTLINE 
FOUCAULT AND BUTLER ON IDENTITY 
a. Discourse/Tfuth-Claims: Hidden Ideologies 
b. Tfuth-Claims/Knowledge/'Truth'/Power 
c. Binary Oppositions: How 'Truths' Are Created 
d. Govemmentality 
e. Genealogy: A Method 
II. CRITIQUES OF FOUCAULT AND BUTLER 
a. Foucauldian/Butlerian Theory Kills the Subject — How Can Docile Bodies 
Engage in Resistance? 
b. Foucauldian/Butlerian Theory Have No Normative Framework - Why 
Resist and against Whom? 
c. Foucauldian/Butlerian Theory Renders Political Action Impossible -
How Can One Engage in Politics without Universal Identities? 
III. CONCLUSION 
This chapter lays out the theoretical lens of this thesis that is employed m later chapters. Much 
critical work has focuscd on deconstructing identit)' categories such as gender, race and sexual 
onentation, through the process of exposing the unnamralness and difference within a categon-.' 
While a good deal of academic work has aimed to deconstruct the category 'child' in and outside 
the discipline of law,' this thesis argues that dominant legal discourses about children's rights 
remain dependent upon some fundamental categorj- 'child'. Ze'ev Falk notes that, '[tjhere is a 
certain irony in the fact that at this "post-modern" time rejecting aU other ideologies, the 
ideologj' of "children's rights" and "children's autonomy" has gained a lot of authont}-'.' Karin 
Lesnik-Oberstein argues that 'die child has a tendency to recur as a foundational or essential real, 
even in some queer and feminist theoretical writings which express an explicit commitment to 
questioning essentialist notions of identit)''." Buder's statement, regarding the categorj- 'woman', 
has particular purchase for the category' 'child': 
|w]e think things are the way they must be because they've become naturalised. 
[We must] make the taken-for-granted world seem spectral, strange. [The 
process of critically examining the 'namral' word is] a painful process, and not 
even'body wants to undergo it. It may well be that we want to construct a 
fiction. . 
In attempting to examine the relatively unexplored identit)- category' 'child', a variet)' of 
theoretical tools that have been 'successfully' deployed to deconstruct other identity' categories 
will be discussed. This chapter wiU argue that many of these same theoretical tools can be 
applied to the category' 'child' to make the argument that, contrar\' to the CRC's vision of a 
universal categorj' 'child', the categor}' 'child' cannot be based on a set of 'natural' characteristics 
common to those who are below the age of eighteen years." When we speak of the categor)' 
'child' or the 'rights of the child', we assume that there exists a group of persons sufficiendy and 
' See generally JUDITH B U T L E R . GENDER T R O U B L E ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; G A Y A T R I S P I V A K . IN OTHER W O R L D S ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; R A T N A K A P U R . 
EROTIC JUSTICE (2004) ; Dianne Olio, Discovering 'Masculinities Reinvenling the Gendered Subject(s) of huernalional 
Human Rights Law. in INTERNATIONAL LAW; MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES (Doris B u s s and Atnbreena Man j i eds . . 2005); 
BELL HOOKS. Am Y / A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Janet I l a l l e y . Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in 
the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive Internationa! Criminal Law. 3 0 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL L A W 1 ( 2 0 0 8 ) . 
^ See generally ALLISON J A M E S , C H R I S JENKS , AND A L A N P R O U T , THEORISING CHILDHOOD ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; JO BO> d e n . Childhood 
and the Policymakers: A Comparative Perspective in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD; CONTEMPORARY 
ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD (Al l i son J ames and A lan Prout eds . . 1997) ; Berr\- M a j a l l . ed . . 
C H I L D R E N ' S CHILDHOODS; O B S E R V E D AND EXPERIENCED ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; B E R R Y M A Y A L L . T O W A R D S A SOCIOLOGY FOR CHILDHOOD; 
THINKING FROM CHILDREN'S LIVES (2002) ; Judith Ennew, Outside Childhood: Street Children's Rights, in THE HANDBOOK 
OF C H I L D R E N ' S RIGHTS; COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE ( B o b F r a n k l i n e d . . 1 9 9 5 ) . 
' Ze ' ev Falk. Rights and Autonomy - or the Best Interests of the Child?, in Children s Rights and Traditional I alues. 111 
(Gil l ian Douglas and Les l ie Sebba eds. . 1998). 
' Karin Lesnik-Oberstein. Childhood. Queer Theory, and Feminism. 11 FEMINIST THEORY 309 . 3 0 9 ( 2010 ) . 
Judith Butler, interview with Gary Olson and Lynn Worsham. ( 2 0 0 0 ) reprinted THE JUDITH BUTLER READER 3 2 9 (Sara 
Sa l ih ed.. 2004) . 
' Art ic le I of the C R C states that, ' a chi ld means every human being be low the age of e i gh teen y e a r s un less under the law 
appl icable to the child, major i ty is attained ea r l i e r ' . 
inhercndy unique to be categorised 'child' in contrast to those categorised 'adult'. Identit)' 
categories are inevitably based on alleged 'natural' characteristics uniformly shared by those 
within a category. If there is no unitary, much less 'natural', subject represented by the categorj' 
'child', the basis on which the 'child' is constructed is in need of question. More importandy, if 
there is no essential childhood, what is made possible through the construction of a universal 
singular childhood in the CRC must be critically examined. Ultimately, these questions seek to 
identif)' the power relations that depend on the CRC's fictitious 'child'. To deconstruct the 
identity of the child in the CRC, this chapter draws upon the theoretical perspectives of Michel 
Foucault (Truth/Power/Knowledge, Genealogy), and Judith Buder (Performativity, Genealogy, 
Binar)' oppositions). 
Foucault's perspectives on discourse, truth, knowledge, power, and governmentaHty contribute 
to an understanding of how a diverse group of persons arc ascribed 'natural' characteristics and 
made into a unitan' identity category. If no common cxperience/voice/identity/category exists, 
Foucault's perspectives help change the focus to power configurations that are perpetuated by 
the appearance of a unitary category (here the fictitious category 'child'). Most importandy, his 
conceptions of power not only enable the means for understanding how power can work, but 
also the ways in which power can work for those who find themselves less able to exercise it. 
Woven throughout this discussion of Foucault's perspectives on power, wiU be Judith Buder 
interpretation of Foucauldian ideas as they specifically apply to identity. In particular, Buder's 
use binarj' oppositions wiU also be utilised to better understand how meaning, and therefore 
identity, is constructed. 
One might wonder, 'why Buder?' Surely there arc many other feminist (and non-feminist) 
interpretations of identity. The answer lies in a vocabulary, buried deep within her prose, that is 
akin to donning a pair of glasses when one's vision is not terrible, but neither is it 20-20. You 
know that something is out there; something is making you uncomfortable, but you cannot quite 
pinpoint that which you sense. While 20-20 vision is never be possible, Buder seems able to cast 
one perspective, one moment of clarity upon the troubling case of identity, giving a vocabular)' 
with which to conceptualise it. Ultimately, both Foucault and Buder better clarify the wsion of 
this author, affording tools to examine the category 'child' in not simply a unique way (for what 
of uniqueness?), but in a way that initiates, at the very least, a discussion about the category 
'child', which seems to be so far beyond discussion; everywhere taken for granted, rarely 
explicated. 
This chapter wiU first discuss the theoretical tools developed by Foucault and Buder. Section I 
wiU examine the ways m which 1) discourse/truth-claims operate as vehicles for hidden 
ideologies, 2) truth-claims become 'knowledge' and even 'truths', 3) binar>- oppositions operate 
to fashion these 'truths', and 4) 'truths' are enforced through disciplinan- and jundical power 
and finaUy 5) a genealogical method can help investigate who is omitted by the deployment of 
certain 'truths'. Section II will explore diree much-discussed cnriques of both Buder and 
Foucault, namely that their perspectives: 1) kill off the subject, making agcncy and resistance 
impossible, 2) lack a normative framework to guide us m why we should resist and against 
whom, and finally 3) make political mobilisation impossible. 
Ultimately tliis chapter will argue that because no one is exempted from a colonising gaze, the 
Butler-Foucauldian lens enables the questioning of identities, independent of the stated aims of a 
movement (protection, securing rights of the child, emancipation, and so on). Too often, even 
movements that seek to include voices of the 'other' (for example, feminism, post-colonialism, 
third-world perspectives on international law) have failed in the sense that they too marginalise 
other voices. Catherine MacKinnon famously wrote that she was 'here to speak for those, 
particularly women and children, upon whose silence the law . . . has been buUt'.' Postmodern, 
and particularly post-colonial, critiques of MacKinnon's category- of 'woman', though numerous, 
wiU not be outlined here." The relevant point is that not only does MacKinnon claim to be 
speaking for all women; she also authorises herself to speak for all children in a quest for 
emancipation. As Rex and Wendy Stainton-Rogers note, ' [wjomenhood does not confer 
immunit}' against being ageist nor does it prevent oppression and mistreatment of the young'.' 
To bcHeve that any account/quest/categor)' is only emancipatory becomes another colonising 
endeavour.'" Does this postmodern acknowledgement render the task of hearing/speaking 
moot? No. What it does do is to engage in the task of ensuring that when a movement or 
unitar)' 'voice' is presented, that it too stays on its toes, that it too is held responsible for its acts 
of marginalisation. To brush off 'postmodernism' is to engage in the belief that a certain voice is 
incapable of marginalisation. 
' C A T H E R I N E M A C K I N N O N . On Collaboration, in F E M I N I S M U N M O D I F I E D . 1 9 8 . 2 0 4 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 
' See generally G A Y A T R I S P I V A K . IN O T H E R W O R L D S ( 1 9 9 8 ) : R A T N A K A P U R . E R O T I C J U S T I C E . 4 ( 2 0 0 4 ) : ' P o s t c o l o n i a l 
feminism is in part a challenge to the systems of knowledge thai continue lo inform feminist understandings of women and 
the subaltern subject in the postcolonial world, and seeks to create a project of inquiry' and interrogation that will better 
mform feminist projects lhat speak to and for these subjects'. 
' R E X STAINTON R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y S T A I N T O N R O G E R S . S T O R I E S OF C H I L D H O O D : S H I F T I N G A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N . 
1 9 0 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
Angela Harris. Race and Esseniialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY. THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard 
D c l g a d o . e d . . 1 9 9 5 ) . JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 1 9 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
I. FOUCAULT AND BUTLER ON IDENTITY" 
a. Discourse/Tfuth-CIaims: Hidden Ideologies 
D i s c o u r s e is any ac t , v e r b a l o r n o n - v e r b a l , t h a t i n v o l v e s a f o r m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h e t h e r 
intended o r u n i n t e n d e d . W h a t o n e d o e s a n d says, as wel l as e v e n t s , o b j e c t s , n a m e s , p e r s o n s , a n d 
so o n , are fil led w i t h m e a n i n g s t h a t t h e a c t o r , i n t e n d s a n d / o r t h a t t h e v i e w e r u n d e r s t a n d s . 
Th ink ing o f d i s c o u r s e in this w a y e n a b l e s us t o s e e its p r e v a l e n c e . W e ' s e e ' a n d e x p e r i e n c e t h e 
world t h r o u g h t h e l ens o f d i scourse . '^ N e v e r t h e l e s s , d i s c o u r s e d o e s n o t s imply a n d o b j e c t i v e l y 
name o r label an e x t e r n a l o b j e c t i v e r c a K t y . " I n s t e a d , b e c a u s e o u r s o c i a l w o r l d is e x p e r i e n c e d 
through language , d i s c o u r s e c o n t a i n s a s e t o f c o m p l e x assoc ia t ions . ' " ' T h e a m b i t o f d i s c o u r s e 
includes a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t c o m e t o m i n d w h e n o n e e n g a g e s in o r e x p e r i e n c e s an e v e n t o r o b j e c t 
and media tes h o w w e u n d e r s t a n d t h a t o b j e c t o r e v e n t . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e t e r m ' w i f e ' d o c s n o t 
simply d e n o t e a p a r t i c u l a r legal r e l a t i o n s h i p , b u t i n c l u d e s w h a t it m e a n s t o b e a w i f e in a 
particular cul ture a n d at s o m e par t i cu lar p o i n t in t ime. '^ A s will b e d i s c u s s e d in t h e C h a p t e r 5 , 
the w o r d ' ch i ld ' a l s o d o e s n o t jus t d e n o t e t h o s e b e l o w t h e age o f e i g h t e e n . T h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' 
c o n n o t e s w h a t it m e a n s t o b e a ch i ld in a par t i cu lar c u l t u r e a n d at s o m e par t i cu lar p o i n t in t i m e . " ' 
" It should be noted that it is not alleged here that Butler and Foucault share the same theoretical perspectives. Rather, this 
thesis draws upon certain elements of both Butler's and Foucault's theoretical perspectives for the purposes of 
deconstructing the identity "child' in the CRC. 
RICHARD DELGADO. Legal StoryleUmg:Slorylellingfor Oppositionist and Others: A Plea for Narrative, in CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, T H E CUTTING E D G E , 6 9 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
" BEN GOULDER a n d PETER FITZPATRICK, FOUCAULT'S L A W . 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
'•' SARA MILLS, MICHEL FOUCAULT, 55 (2003): 'Discourse does not simply translate reality into language; rather discourse 
should be seen as a system which structures the way that we perceive reality'. 
BEN GOULDER a n d P E T E R FITZPATRICK. F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
" Various academics have argued that the concept 'child' has varied throughout time and across cultures. See generally 
PHILIPPE ARIES , CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF F A M I L Y LIFE ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS 
AND CHILDHOOD ( 2 " ' ' e d . 2 0 0 4 ) ; D A V I D A R C H A R D . CHILDREN. F A M I L Y AND THE S T A T E ( 2 0 0 3 ) : M i c h a e l F r e e m a n . The 
Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights. 6 ( 4 ) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 4 3 3 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; ERIK 
ERIKSON. CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1977); Sarah L. Holloway & Gill Valentine, Spatiality and the New Social Studies of 
Childhood. 34(4) SOCIOLOGY 763 (2000); John Holt, Escape from Childhood (1974); Allison James. Confections. 
Concoctions and C o n c e p t i o n s , 1 0 ( 2 ) JOURNAL OF THE ANTHROPOLOGY SOCIETY OF O X F O R D 8 3 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; ALLISON JAMES, 
CHRIS JENKS, AND ALAN PROUT , THEORISING CHILDHOOD ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d C h r i s J e n k s . Constructing Childhood 
Sociologically, in AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILDHOOD ( M a o " J a n e K e h i l y . e d . , 2 0 0 4 ) ; ALLISON JAMES AND ADRIAN JAMES, 
CONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: T H E O R Y P O L I C Y , AND SOCIAL PRACTICE; CHRIS J E N K S , Constituting the Child, in T H E 
SOCIOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD - ESSENTIAL READINGS (1982); Chris Jenks. Child A buse in the Postmodern Context: ,4n Issue of 
Social Ideniity.lQ) CmhDHOOoWX (1994); Chris Jenks. The Post-Modern Child IN CHILDREN IN FAMILIES: RESEARCH AND 
P O L i c v ( J u l i a B r a n n e n & M a r g a r e t O ' B r i e n , e d s . . 1 9 9 6 ) ; B E R R Y M A Y A L L . TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY FOR CHILDHOOD: 
THINKING FROM CHILDREN'S LIVES (2002); Alan Prout. Children's Participation: Control and Self-Realisation in British 
Late Modernity, 1 4 ( 4 ) CHILDREN AND SOCIETY 3 0 4 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; ALAN PROUT, T H E FUTURE OF CHILDHCXJD, TOWARDS THE 
INTERDISCIPLINARY S T U D Y OF CHILDREN ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; JENS QVORTRUP, Varieties of Childhood, in S T U D I E S I N M O D E R N 
C H I L D H O O D : S O C I E T Y . A G E N C Y A N D C U L T U R E ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; JENS QVORTRUP, CHILDHOOD AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON A N 
INTRODUCTION TO A SERIES OF NATIONAL REPORTS ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; R E X STAINTON R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y STAINTON R O G E R S . STORIES 
OF CHILDHOOD: SHIFTING AGENDAS OF CHILD CONCERN, ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; PHILIP VEERMAN, T H E RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND THE 
CHANGING IMAGE OF CHILDHOOD (1992); Gill Valentine, Angels and Devils: Moral Landscapes of Childhood. 14 
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING SOCIETY AND SPACE 5 8 1 , 5 8 1 - 5 9 9 ( 1 9 9 6 ) ; Gi l l V a l e n t i n e , Boundary Crossings: Transitions 
from Childhood to Adulthood. 1 ( 1 ) C H I L D R E N ' S GEOGRAPHIES 3 7 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; VIVIANA ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: 
THE CHANGING SOCIAL V A L U E OF CHILDREN ( 1 9 8 5 ) . 
Foucault argues that 'we must conceive of discourse as a violence which we do to things or in 
any case as a practice which we impose on them; and it is m this practice that the events of 
discourse find die principle of dieir regularit)''."' According to Foucault, there are no single 
truth, or an aU-encompassing descnption, just indeterminate interpretations or impositions."' 
Embedded in discourse are perceptions of events or objects, a hidden ideolog)', or notions about 
what is and what should be ." In other words, discourse generates truths, or at least 'truth-
claims': certain ways of thinking about something that appears to be objective.'" In this way, 
discourse restricts our perceptions. UnHke die traditional Hberal conception of truth, Foucault's 
tmth IS neither produced impartiaUy, nor is it uncovered through the 'scrutiny of scrupulous 
inquin''.^' Neitiier is truth counterpoised to falsit}' or error. Instead, truth-claims assert what is 
true and what is false, through the exclusion, marginalisation and even prohibition of other 
competing truths." Societ)' participates in producing that which it appears to be merely 
describing.^' Using this understanding of 'discourse' enables us to see the ways in which identity 
categories are produced through characteristic ways of associative thought."'' Most importantly it 
enables us to understand the conditions in which certain ways of 'knowing' are made possible 
and others rendered impossible. Returning to the label 'wife', with what do we associate it? 
What is the essence of being a 'wife'? Mother, domestic ser\-ant, cook? What about bread-
winner, Olympic athlete. President?"^ Likewise, what is the essence of being a 'child'? Student, 
playful, care-free? What about head of the household, care-giver, soldier? 
Relating Foucault's theon- of discourse to the concept of idcntit)-, Butler describes identity as 
seri'ing a 'normative function of a language which is said either to reveal or to distort what is 
assumed to be true about [women]'.^"' An identity does not describe some objective essence of 
womanhood. According to Butier, gender" identities are constructed and constimted by 
" Michel Foucault . The Order of Discourse, in UNTYING THE TEXT. 67 (Robert Young , cd. . 1981) . 
RICHARD DELGAIX), Legal StoryieUing:Stor}>tellingfor Opposilionisi and Olliers: A Plea for Narrative, in CRITICAL RACE 
T H E O R Y , T H E C U T T I N G E D G E . 6 5 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
RICHARD DELGADO, Legal Storylelling:Slorylelling for Opposilionisi and Olhers: A Plea for Narralive. in CRITICAL RACE 
T H E O R Y , T H E C U T T I N G EDGE, 6 6 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
™ B E N G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K , F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 1 4 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
- ' B E N G O U L D E R a n d PETER F I T Z P A T R I C K . F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 11 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . c i t i n g M I C H E L F O U C A U L T . P O W E R / K N O W L E D G E : 
S E L E C T E D INTERVIEW A N D O T H E R W R I T I N G S 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 7 . 3 1 ( C o l i n G o r d o n e d . . 1 9 8 0 ) . 
^^ B E N G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K . F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 11 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
RICHARD DELGADO. Legal Slorylelling:Slorylellingfor Opposilionisi and Olhers: A Plea for Narralive. in CRITICAL RACE 
T H E O R Y , T H E C U T T I N G EDGE, 6 6 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
^^ B E N G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K . F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
® It is even interesting which of those labels are capi ta l i sed and wh ich are not. 
JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 3 - 4 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, 8 ( 1990 ) : ' [ S J e x by def in i t ion wi l l be shown to have been gender a l l a l o n g ' . The 
interchangabihty of the terms ' s e x ' and ' g ende r ' is intentional and re f l ec t s the a rgument But ler m a k e s in Gender Trouble. 
that -gender ' mascarades as ' s e x ' and that both arc soc ia l l y constructed. 
language, which mean there is no gender identity that preceded language.'" There was no 
'woman' that existed before language; rather language formed 'woman'. The subject is 
constructed in discourse by the acts it performs and the acts performed upon it. Gender is an 
act that brings into being what it names.^' In her theoty' of performativity, the subjcct is 
therefore something we 'do' rather than something we 'are'.'" 'Gender' is a verb, not a noun." 
Identity, in this case 'woman', is unstable, or 'in-process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot 
rightfully be said to originate or to end ' ." Gender merely 'congeals' over time to produce the 
appearance of a natural subject that has been there all along." While Budcr's focus remains on 
gender/sex, her analysis could be extended to other categories of identity. The identity 'child' 
serves a normative function that is claimed alternatively to reveal or distort what is assumed to 
be true about the 'child'. As such, there is no objectively accurate 'child'. Rather, the identity 
'child' brings into being what is understood as a 'child'. In this way, the 'child' is not some 
'being', but is rather unstable and in-process, a becoming. The identity 'child', has merely 
congealed over time to produce the appearance of some 'natural' being that is alleged to have 
been there all along. These fundamental arguments will be reiterated through the course of this 
thesis. 
In sum, discourse nominates what gets included and excluded: it authorises some views to be 
taken seriously, while others are marginalised, derided, excluded and even prohibited.''' 
Discourses generate truths, or rather claims to truth. Truth-claims are produced with what 
Foucault calls 'wtU to truth': 
|e]ach society- has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the type 
of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, die means by 
which cach is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts 
' ' JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 2 4 - 2 5 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 2 4 - 2 5 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 4 3 - 4 4 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E , 3 3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" R a t h e r t h a n a p r e - e x i s t i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l t r a v e l l e r . J U D I T H B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 4 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 4 3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) : ' C e r t a i n c u l t u r a l c o n f i g e r a t i o n s o f g e n d e r t a k e p l a c e o f " t h e r e a l " a n d 
c o n s o l i d a t e a n d a u g m e n t t h e i r h e g e m o n y t h r o u g h t h a t f e l i c i t o u s s e l f - n a t u r a l i s a t i o n " . 
" BEN G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K . F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 8 - 9 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
" M I C H E L F O U C A U L T . P O W E R / K N O W L E D G E : S E L E C T E D I N T E R V I E W A N D O T H E R W R I T I N G S 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 7 . 1 3 1 ( C o l i n G o r d o n e d . . 
1 9 8 0 ) . 
Discourses produce what it is possible to tliink, speak, and do.'^' For example. Chapter 2 
discussed perspectives on the CRC that assumed the category- child to be incapable/immature 
and at the same time developing towards capacmVmatunt}-. Chapter 2 argued that the 
assumptions made about essential 'child' (described in Section I) were rarely justified. When the 
CRC's 'child' IS viewed as a discourse, an entirely different lens of analysis is enabled. The CRC's 
performance of the cliild is no longer an 'objective' description of childhood, but rather a 
particular discourse diat has been 'included', 'taken senously', while others have been 
margmaHses and excluded. Chapters 5 - 7 discuss further certain 'truths' assumed about the 
category' 'child'. Chapter 9 spccificaUy examines children margmahsed by the CRC's version of 
childhood. 
b. Truth-Claims/KnowIedge/'Truth'/Power 
Foucault's notion of knowledge as a pri\-ileged form of discourse conceptuaHses how ccrtain 
discourses are entrenched within societ)-. Knowledge is, in this way, the next generation (in the 
technological sense) of truth-claim, or 'Truth-Claim 2.0'. Knowledge is a dominant truth-claim. 
A particular 'discipline' states that A is B or A needs C based upon ccrtain tests and 
obsen'ations. An 'objective description' of rcalitj' is presented as a given. According to Foucault 
the process of testing and obser\-ing does not reveal objective knowledge." Rather, testing 
informs us about the ideolog\' within which the test has been conceived. Obser\-arions at most 
result in a kind of representation as the obser\-er has to interpret/give weight to the obsen'ed." 
Nonetheless, the impossibilit}' of 'objective' knowledge has not prevented know-lcdgcs (in other 
words, truth-claims with particular force) from using objective-stj-le vocabulan*. These 
knowledges masquerade as what is universally, naturally 'true', in some instances with far-
reaching impact upon the way people lead their Uves." What appears to be merely an epistemic 
order, a way of ordering the world, does not readily admit the constraints by which that ordering 
takes places."^ Simply put, dominant knowledges acquire the level of Truth, that which is 
understood as the namral, innate, essence of that which is being described. 
" B E N G O U L D E R a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 8 - 9 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
" Michel Foucault. The Order of Discourse, in UNTYING THE TEXT. 59 (Robert Young, ed.. 1981): 'A discipline is not the 
sum of all that can be truthfully said about .something: it is not even ihe sum of all that can be accepted about the same date 
in virtue of some principle of coherence or systemalicit>' . . . For a proposition to belong to botany or pathology, it has to 
fulfil certain conditions, in a sense stricter and more complex than pure and simple truth; but in any case, other conditions'. 
B E N G O U L D E R a n d PETER FITZPATRICK, F O U C A U L T ' S L A W , 1 6 - 1 8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
" BEN GOULDER a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 18 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; R E X S T A I N T O N R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y S T A I N T O N 
R O G E R S . STORIES OF CHILDHOOD: SHIETING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N . 3 8 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
Judith Butler. What is Critique, /n THE JUDITH BUTLER READER. 314-315 (SaraSalih ed.. 2004). 
In the context of the category' 'child' in the CRC, Foucauk's notion of knowledge proves 
insightful. Although it will be discussed in much further detail in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6, the 
CRC grounds its vision of the category' 'child' or 'truth-claim' regarding childhood in the 
'discipline' of developmental psychologj-. Certain more traditional strains of developmental 
psychology' have argued (with amazing success) for the concept of development as a 'natural' 
process encoded within a series of benchmarks or normative structures for children made 
conventional within the adults' world.'" Childhood, characterised by state of development, has 
become an objective 'truth' that is reflected in the CRC's version of childhood."" As a result, the 
Convention's 'truth-claims' about childhood become, in effect, non-controvertible. Notably, the 
drafters of the CRC never discussed whether childhood should be characterised by 
development."' Yet, how does a claim to truth, then, become dominant? If discourses arc 
merely 'truth-claims' and certain of those 'truths' predominant, the next step involves 
understanding the conditions that make such predominance possible. Foucault's perspective on 
truth/knowledge in relation to power is useful as it arms to illustrate the ways in which certain 
discourses possess such seemingly strong truth-claims. 
Unlike traditional liberal theories, Foucault argues that truth is not separated from power; rather 
it is one of the most important vehicles and expressions of power, as power is exercised through 
the production and dissemination of truth."" Since the metaphysical quest for truth is doomed, 
Foucault urges focus on the task of identifying techniques of truth and power."^ Understanding 
Foucault's conception of power (ironically) involves first understanding that which power is not 
(perhaps not so ironic?). Importantiy, power is not equated with repression, negati^ty or 
something that is bad (or good for that matter)."'' Equally importantly, power is not something 
diat is possessed, that certain persons 'have' and others 'have not'."^ Power is not a zero-sum 
Catherine McDona ld . The Importance ofldentin- in Policy: The Case For and Of Children. 23 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 241 . 
2 4 4 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; C H R I S J E N K S , C H I L D H O O D , 3 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; R E X S T A I N T O N R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y S T A I N T O N R O G E R S . S T O R I E S OF 
CHILDHOOD: SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
The CRC uses Ihe word -deve lopnient ' e ighteen l imes , fourteen of which refer to the ch i l d ' s deve lopment . See Chapter 6 
for further discuss ion. 
See generally S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE 
• T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" M I C H E L F O U C A U L T . D I S C I P L I N E A N D P U N I S H M E N T . T H E B I R T H OF THE P R I S O N , 2 7 - 2 8 ( A l a n S h e r i d a n t r a n s . . 1 9 9 5 ) : ' W e 
should a d m i t . . . that power produces k n o w l e d g e (and not s imply by encourag ing it because it se rves power or by app ly ing it 
because it is usefu l ) ; that power and k n o w l e d g e d i rect ly imply one another; that there is no power relat ion w ilhout the 
con-elative constitution of a f ie ld o f know ledge , nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same l ime 
p o w e r r e l a t i o n s ' . See also A L A N I LUNT a n d G A R Y W I C K H A M . F O U C A U L T A N D L A W : T O W A R D S A S O C I O L O G Y OF L A W A S 
GOVERNANCE, 1 1 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
" A L A N H U N T a n d G A R Y W I C K H A M . F O U C A U L T A N D L A W : T O W A R D S A S O C I O L O G Y OF L A W A S G O V E R N A N C E , 1 4 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
M I C H E L F O U C A U L T . D I S C I P L I N E A N D P U N I S H M E N T , T H E B I R T H OF THE P R I S O N . 1 9 4 ( A l a n S h e r i d a n t r a n s . . 1 9 9 5 ) : ' W e m u s t 
cease once and for all to descr ibe the e f fec t s of power in negat ive terms: it ' e x c l ude s ' , it ' r epresses ' , it ' censors ' , it 
'abstracts' , it ' m a s k s ' , it ' concea l s ' . In fact, power produces ; it produces rea l i ty ; it produces doma ins of objects and r i tuals 
o f t r u t h ' . See also B E N G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K , F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 1 5 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
B E N G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K . F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 1 4 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
game. It is because of these features that Foucault insists that power is unstable, and thus 
capable o f redirection."" Foucault's understanding o f power is o f particular use when 
conceptualising how those who are less able to exercise power retain the potential to exercise 
power without necessarily needing to perform a 'power grab' from the 'powerful'. The idea that 
power is not a zero-sum game is particularly important in the context o f children's rights where 
the popular misconception seems to prevail that the rights o f children can only be won at the 
expense o f denying rights to others, whether parents, practitioners, and others who work with 
children."' 
Foucault does not suggest we should be, or that it is even possible to be, neutral about power. 
Rather, he stresses that the play o f power produces systematic power relationships.^" He 
suggests that we should 1) identif)' the relevant powers at work, and 2) evaluate o f the interplay 
o f these powers by making judgments about whether the cumulative effects give rise to 
domination and subordination, particularly by listening to excluded voices.^' When thinking 
about the categor)' 'child' in the CRC, identifying the power relations that are made possible 
through the CRC's production and dissemination o f universal 'truths' about childhood 
(cemented by the 'discipline' developmental psychology) is essential as we consider whether (and 
when) the Convention gives rise to domination and subordination. This thesis argues that the 
CRC enables and sustains the regulation o f the childhood through the hierarchical relationship of 
the adults over children. See Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 for further discussion. 
c. Binary Oppositions: H o w 'Truths ' Are Created 
The next step to the deconstruction o f truth-claims/identities is grappling with how 'truths' are 
created. T o understand the meaning of, in this case, an identit}', one must understand what an 
identit)' is not. Supplementing I-oucault's analysis o f 'truths', this section highlights the value of 
another theoretical concept, that o f binary oppositions. The notion o f binarj' oppositions is 
MICHEL FOUCAULT. HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME 1.101 (Robcn Hurley trans.. 1980): i l j i is in discourse thai power 
and knowledge are joined together . . . we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between the accepted discourse and 
excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements 
that can come into play in various strategies . . . discourse can be both an in.strument and an effect of power . . . Discourse 
tran.smits and produces power; il reinforces it. but also undermines and exposes it. renders il fragile and make il possible to 
Ihwart It . See also Anlhony Beck. Foucault and Law: The Collapse of the Law S Empire. 16(3) OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEOAL 
STUDIES 4 8 9 . 4 9 0 ( 1 9 % ) . 
BOB FRANKLIN. The Case for Children S Rights: A Progress Report, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-
COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE. 5 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
Michel FoucaulU The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom, in THE FINAL FOUCAULT. 19 (James Bcmauer 
a n d D a v i d R a s m u s s e n e d s . , 1 9 8 8 ) . S E S also A L A N HUNT a n d G A R Y W I C K H A M . F O U C A U L T AND L A W ; T O W A R D S A SOCIOLOGY 
OF L A W AS GOVERNANCE. 15 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
" A L A N 1 IUNT a n d G A R Y W I C K H A M . FOUCAULT AND L A W ; T O W A R D S A S O C I O U W Y OF L A W AS G O V E R N A N C E , 1 5 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
theorised as the foundation for dominant discourses m 'Western thought'.^^ Quite simply, binan' 
opposition means, in the context of identity, that there is no identit)' that stands alone; an 
identit)' is created in relation to some other identit)'." Identit)' depends on difference because 
one identit)' cannot he unless it can be different from something else.^ "* Using the above example, 
to feel Uke a wife (homemaker, jogger, T' Lady) requires differentiation from what stands as its 
opposite, a husband (bread-winner, Olympic athlete. President). Buder has illustrated this in her 
discussion of the category 'female' in relation to the categor)' 'male'.^^ Butler argues that one is a 
particular sex only to the extent that one is not the other sex.^' To feel and to act Hke a woman 
or man requires differentiadon from the opposite sex. Likewise, to feel like an adult (mature, 
independent, capable) requires differentiation from what stands as its opposite: a child 
(immature, dependent, incapablc). 'I'he identities of the opposing identit)' categories enable and 
therefore fundamentally depend upon each other's existence. Neither term of the opposition 
can be original and fundamental because both are related to each other in a system of mutual 
dependences and differences.^^ Nonetheless, this relation is not equitable. Rather the 
relationship between the two terms of the opposition is laden with values that assume one has 
dominance over the other; one is normal the other abnormal, one is simple the other is complex, 
one is the rule the other is the exception.^' The couphng includes 1) a subject: an agent that is 
viewed positively, according to dominant discourses (for example, the rational) and 2) the 'other': 
the abnormal, the undesirable, even'thing the subject is not (for example, the emotional).^' 
For Buder, in the context of gender, the internal coherence and unit)' of either identit)' requires 
both a stable and oppositional heterosexualit)' and therefore limits gender possibilities within that 
oppositional binar)' gender system. Buder describes this as a repressive heterosexual matrix that 
violendy forecloses internal incoherence, which is demonstrated by the fact that when people 
" Jack Balkin, Deconstruclive Practice and Legal Theory. 96 YALE LAW REVIEW 743. 748 (1987) . The structural l inguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure posited tl ial l anguage is a sys tem of d i f fe rences wi lh in an arena with no posi t ive , concrete forms. For 
Saussure. there is no inherent connect ion be tween the sign (e .g . the word cha i r ) and its referent (e .g . the thing that 1 am 
sitting on now) . The sign on ly a cqu i r e s mean ing from its posit ion within a sys tem of l anguage as a whole . J acques Derr ida 
developed this idea into his notion oidifferance. wh i ch means both d i f ference and deferral , referr ing to the w a y in which 
signification is both dependent on w hat is absent , and absent of se lf-referent mean ing . From this theoretical background, the 
term -binary opposi t ion ' has evo lved See generally C la re Dallon. An Thesis in Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine. 94 
Y A L E L A W R E V I E W 9 9 7 ( 1 9 8 5 ) : J O N A T H A N C U L L E R . O N D E C O N S T R U C T I O N : T H E O R Y A N D C R I T I C I S M AFTER S T R U C T U R A L I S M 
( 1 9 9 4 ) ; C H R I S T O P H E R N O R R I S . D E C O N S T R U C T I O N : T H E O R Y A N D P R A C T I C E ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; J o n a t h a n CuWer. Jacques Derrida. in 
STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE ( John Sturrock ed. . 1979) : JACQUES DERRIDA. OF GRAMMATOLOGY. ix (Gayatr i Sp ivak trans. , 
1 9 7 6 ) . 
" JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 3 0 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" Jack Ba lk in . Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory. 96 YALE LAW REVIEW 743. 748 (1987 ) . 
" JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 6 - 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
' ' JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 6 - 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" Jack Ba lk in . Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theor)'. 96 YALE LAW REVIEW 743. 751 (1987 ) . 
' ' Jack Ba lk in . Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory. 96 YALE LAW REVIEW 743. 747 (1987 ) . 
'do' their gender mcorrecdy, they are punished by cultures and laws."' This process defines yet 
another binarj- opposition of what it means to be a 'good' woman (homemakcr, wife, mother) or 
a 'bad' one (motherless, single mother, career woman). As such, bmar>- opposit ions serv-e a 
particular poUtical ideolog)' and are cnforccd through the requirement of mternal coherence of 
each of the oppositional t e rms ." 
Although It wiU be discussed m much greater depth m Chapter 5, the adult - child bmarj- senses 
as the basis for understanding what it means to be a child, and likewise what it means to be an 
adult. The adult is mamre, capable, and responsible, whereas the child is immature, incapable, 
and irresponsible. Similarly, the good-child - bad-child bmarj- operates such that the 'bad' child 
is one diat mamfests adult-like quaUties. Take, for example, the ten-year old child who commits 
intentional murder.'^ Will this person be tried in a court of law as incapable of capacit)- {mm 
nas) or will the law decide that the child is now an adult, a person w h o has capacit)', who must be 
held responsible, and therefore who receives the maximum penalt\' if found guilt)-? This child 
has violated the norms of what it means to be a child. Because of the 'violence' this child has 
done to the cohesion of the categor)' 'child', violence to the 'essence of being a child', this child 
is often made into an adult (in other words, tried as an adult) to keep up the appearance of two 
oppositional coherent categories: adult-child." The binaries operating within the category' child 
will be discussed at length in Chapter 5. 
Suffice it to say here that with the binaries of both m e n / w o m e n and adult/child, there is this 
insatiable desire to distribute, classify', force these persons into this binar)' frame, despite the 
overwhelming internal incoherence of the oppositions. The appearance of internal coherence 
" JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 2 7 - 3 3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . S a r a S a l i h e d . . T H E J U D I T H B U T L E R R E A D E R . 9 3 ( 2 0 0 4 ) . 
JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 2 7 - 3 3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
Kssues related lo gender, race, caste, class, and so on will be examined in Chapter 8. 
" See for example Stale of Florida v. Lionel Tale. Case No. 4D01-1306 (Fla. 4th DCA). Tate was convicted for first-degree 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for. at the age of 12. battering a girl to death. In 
sentencing Tate to life imprisonment. Judge Lazarus of Broward County Circuit Court said that ' I t lhe acts of Lionel Tate 
were not the playful acts of a child. The acts of Lionel Talc were not bom out of immaturity. I'he acts of Lionel Tate were 
cold, callous and indescribably cruel.' The sentencing was overturned on appeal to one year ' s house arrest and 10 year 
probation. Quite possibly there are racial implications for this case as well. Kenneth Nunn has argued that ' l l l n so fa ras 
African American boys and girls arc concerned, it is somew hat inaccurate to speak of an 'end of adolescence' . . . The 
concept of a group of young people who were entitled to special treatment because they were impetuous and immature was 
never extensive enough lo include African American chi ldren. . . When adolescence began for white children in 1880 [in the 
US]. African American children remained slaves'. . Kenneth Nunn, The Child as Other: Racial Differential Treatment in 
the Juvenile Justice System. 51 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 679. 679-680 (2002). A famous case in the United Kingdom involving 
the death of James Bulgar is another illustration. See MICHAEL FREEMAN. The James Bulger Tragedv: Child Innocence and 
the Construction ofGuih. in T H E M O R A L S T A T U S OF C H I L D R E N : E S S A Y S ON THE R I G H T S O F THE C H I L D . 2 3 5 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . A l s o 
during the drafting of Article 37 in the CRC. the United Slates delegate slated that 'it was implicilly understood that a child 
commilting an offence which, if committed by an adult, would be criminal could be treated as an adult. SHARON DETRICK, 
T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D , A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 6 5 - 4 6 6 
( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
becomes so important to our understandings of what is 'true' about identity' categories, instances 
of incoherence are ignored, made exceptional, or turned into a case that requires remedy. The 
theon' of binary- oppositions is an important conceptual tool that demonstrates in greater detail 
how 'truths' are constructed, and more importandy how 'common sense' associations with 
specific identities are rebuttable. The deconstructionist project involves 1) the identification of 
hierarchical oppositions, 2) followed by an illustrated reversal of the hierarchy in order to 
demonstrate that the privileged status of one of the terms is an illusion, precisely because the 
terms are mutually dependent.'"* 'ITie aim of doing so is to wrench us from our accustomed 
modes of thought to be able to question the political ideologies at work; an approach rarely 
employed in any context, and even more rarely employed in the context of children. 
d. Govemmentality 
Thus far, Section 1 has described how discourse appropriates 'truths' that form 'knowledge', 
stmctured and remforced by oppositional identit)' categories. 'ITie next step in an investigation 
into how 'truth-claims' become perceived as 'natural', relates to the enforcement of 'truths'. 
Foucault's notion of governmentaHt\- is helpful in understanding how certain norms become 
accepted and followed. The term governmentalit)' can be understood as the distinctive 
mentahries of government or governmental rationaUt;' which involve a calculating preoccupation 
with activities directed at shaping, channelling and guiding the conduct of persons through the 
production, dissemination, and utilisation of knowledge.'^ At its most general, governmentalit)-
refers to any manner in which people think about, and put into practice calculated plans for 
governing themselves and others.'"'" Notably, Foucault emphasises that the state is not a 
centralised structure, but rather 'a tricky combination in the same pohtical structures of 
individuaUsation techniques and of totahsation procedures'.*^' In this way governmentalit)': 1) 
examines how governments have recourse to 'processes by which the individual acts upon him 
[or her] self (technologies of self),'"' and 2) allows scrutiny of the close relationship between 
techniques of power and forms of knowledge, as governmental practices make use of particular 
" J ack B a l k i n . Deconstruclive Practice and Legal Theory. 9 6 YALE LAW REVIEW 7 4 3 . 7 4 6 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 
" BEN GOULDER a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. FOUCAULT'S LAW. 2 6 - 2 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
" BEN GOULDER a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. FOUCAULT'S LAW. 3 0 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
' ' Michel F o u c a u l t . The Subject and Power, in POWER: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT. V o l . 3. 3 3 2 ( J a m e s 
Faubion ed. . 2 0 0 2 ) . 
" Michel F o u c a u l t . My Body This Paper. This Fire, in POWER: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT, V o l . 2 . 2 0 3 ( J a m e s 
Faubion ed . . 1 9 9 8 ) . 
V o l . 2 . 2 0 3 . 
npcs of rationaUty.'' Simply put, govcrnmentaHty is the way m which 'good citizens' ate 
fashioned. 
According to Foucault there are two mechanisms that ensure the mternalisation of certain 
norms/'truths' (in other words, how 'good citizens' are produced: 1) juridical power (for 
example, physical punishment or incapacitation) and 2) disciplinan' power (for example, 'the 
gaze').™ Disciplmar>^ power docs not aim to pumsh subjects for their transgressions of a pre-
given law (as is done in the exercise of jundical power), but rather for failure to attain an 
evolving and immanent normaUt)', to function in a manner deemed positive and productive." 
With the rise of the liberal state, Foucault argues that there has been a move from extemal 
regulation or the exercise of juridical power, to inner production or the exercise of disciplinary-
power. Foucault argues that it is not through the resort to jundical mechamsms (for example, 
physical punishment or incapacitaaon) that the resultant compliant modern subject (or docile 
body) is forged, though these forms have not disappeared. Rather, the constitution of the 
modern subject of discipline is achieved through new and different disciplinary techniques: 
spatial distributions, hierarchical obser\'ations, normalising judgments, constant sur\-eillance, and 
examinations.'^ In this way, the liberal art of government does not directiy affect individual and 
collective agents' freedom. Rather, the liberal art of government inter\-enes indirecdy to 
strucmre the fields of possibility'." 
To produce the modern subject of discipline or to produce what Foucault calls 'a reality-
fabricated by this specific technology of power that 1 have called 'discipline"''', Foucault 
discusses a number of different discipHnan' techniques.'^ For Foucault, Jeremy Bentham's 
'Panoptican' is emblematic of the functioning of disciplinan- power: 'the major effect of the 
Panoptican is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures 
the automatic functioning of power'.''' Disciplinary power is argued to be more effective because 
its power docs not acmaUy have to be enforced, it is automatic as the discipUned individual 
® ULRICH BROCKLING e l a L GOVERNMENTALITY: C U R R E N T ISSUES AND F U T U R E C H A L L E N G E S , 2 ( 2 0 1 1 ) . 
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S h e r i d a n t r a n s . . 1 9 9 5 ) ; BEN GOULDER a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 1 9 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
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" MICHEL FOUCAULT. DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT. T H E BIRTH OF THE PRISON. 2 0 1 ( A l a n S h e r i d a n t r a n s . . 1 9 9 5 ) : BEN 
GOULDER a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. F O U C A U L T ' S L A W , 2 0 - 2 1 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
assumes that the guard in the tower is watching and modifies his or her behaviour accordingly.'^ 
Whilst under similar disciplinarj' conditions the schoolchild, the patient, the soldier, or the 
prisoner is directed to perform a homogenising n o r m J ' The specificit)' of the disciplinary' gaze 
actually affords a greater mdividualisation of the subject of discipline.™ Individuals are turned 
into 'cases' and their relative distance from the norm is ranked hierarchically in the discipHnarj' 
regime. 
Supplementing his formulation of discipHnarj' power, Foucault notes that while disciplinary-
power focuses on the individual body in need of correction, bio-power focuses at the level of a 
population.*" Like disciplinary power, bio-power is also productive (in other words, unKke 
sovereign power, which is vengeful and violent). It is the 'entry of life into the order of politics' 
or the emergence of 'society in which political power has assigned itself the task of administering 
Ufe' (related to propagation, birth, mortaHt}', health, life expectancy, and so on)." Biopower is 
wcU illustrated by the case of child-rearing practices which, while highly individualised, exhibit 
distinct patterns that are heavily influenced by a succession of child-rearing experts."^ Bio-power 
is concerned with the 'well-being' of the population. The combination of disciplinary power and 
bio-power aims to harness life for particular political aims. Notably, the population becomes the 
political object of governmentality, and it is towards the population that the techniques of 
govemmentaUty are brought to bear."' 
This thesis will ultimately examine how the law works as a specific form of governmentality, an 
expression of both disciplinary and juridical power. Many issues come to the fore when speaking 
about the role of law and disciplinary power in modernit}'. Much debate has taken place on the 
role of law in modernit)'."" For the sake of rime and space, this debate wiU not be fully laid out 
here. As outlined by Ben Goulder and Peter Fitzpatrick, 
[l]aw . . . facilitates the opcrarion of [knowledges] by consrituting spaces which 
arc then transversed and invested by the discipKnes . . . Far from receding in 
importance, then, the law in modernity comes to be ever more constantiy 
" B E N G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K , F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 2 0 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
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" BEN G O U L D E R and P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K , F O U C A U L T ' S L A W , 20-21,30 (2009), 
See for example A L A N H U N T and G A R Y W I C K H A M , F O U C A U L T A N D L A W : T O W A R D S A S O C I O L O G Y OF L A W A S G O V E R N A N C E 
( 1 9 9 4 ) ; G O U L D E R and P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K . F O U C A U L T ' S L A W , 22 (2009), 
s 
involved m deploymg and harnessing the disciplines - a kind of consntutive 
compatibility of law and discipline."' 
This quote represents the perspective adopted m this thesis: that law's interaction with discipline 
has the ability to cement knowledges as 'trudi'. One needs only to consider Herbert Hart' 
separability thesis to appreciate that certain academics', judges' and practitioners' desire for the 
law to have die same 'objective' quaHty as is alleged m the sciences."' Further, Foucault utilises a 
law from 1838 regarding the handling of the 'msane' to demonstrate the relationship between 
what he labels 'discipHnes' and the law. He argues that by defining a certam law, the 'speciaHsed 
medical character' of the confinement, '[t]he law consecrated psychiatn' as a medical discipline, 
but also as a speciaUsed discipHne withm the field of medical practice,'"' and 'sanction[ed] the 
role of psychiatry- as a particular scientific and speciaHsed technique of pubHc hygiene'."" These 
nvo objective 'truths' (law and a discipUne) have the power to fortify and rcinforce each other. 
To begin thinking about how die law operates in relation to identity, it is important to note that 
the law itself potendy encapsulates both forms of power: juridical (punishment-power to 
enforce) and disciplinar)- (productive/form of knowledge/truth). Drawing on Foucault, Buder 
contends that although juridical notions of power found in law appear to regulate political life 
only in negative terms (through prohibition, regulation, control, and so on), the subject is acmally 
positively formed, defined, and reproduced by these structures in accordance with its 
requirements."' In the domains of political and Unguistic representation, the qualifications for 
being a certain subject must first be met before representation can be extended.'" Discussed at 
length in Chapters 6-8, the CRC, when viewxd through this lens, is not about giving children 
rights, but rather producing what it means to be a child through limiting the field of possibility' 
for childhood. 
Juridical power ultimately produces that which it claims to merely represent." The law not only 
produces the subject, but further conceals its productive nature to legitimate the law's own 
" BEN GOULDER a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. F o u c A i n ^ f s LAW. 2 7 - 2 8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . T h e a u t h o r s g o to g r e a t l e n g t h to a r g u e , in 
response to Hunt and Wickhani that the law. according to Foucault. actual ly does not recede into unimportance in modemiw. 
HERBERT H A R T . THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994). 
" BEN GOULDER a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 2 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) , q u o t i n g M I C H E L F O U C A U L T . A B N O R M A L : LECTURES 
AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 5 . 1 4 1 ( G r a h a m B u r c h e l l t r a n s . . 2 0 0 3 ) . 
2 MICHEL FOUCAULT. ABNORMAL: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 5 . 1 4 1 ( G r a h a m B u r c h e l l t r a n s . . 2 0 0 3 ) . 
JUDITH B U T L E R . GENDER T R O U B L E . 4 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . q u o t i n g M I C H E L F O U C A U L T . H I S T O R Y OF S E X U A L I T Y V O L U M E I ( R o b e r t 
Hurley trans.. 1980). 
• " J U D I T H B U T L E R , GENDER T R O U B L E . 4 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" JUDITH B U T L E R , GENDER TROUBLE, 5 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
regulator}' hegemony.'^ As such, the subject does not create or cause institutions, discourses, or 
practices, but laws create or cause the subject by determining the characteristics that a particular 
subject should (and should not) possess." Simply put, the subject is an effect of institutions, 
discourses, or practices, not the cause. Recoding, counting, tabulating, calculating, comparing 
have become both the means by which governmental intcr\'ention expands, as well as one of its 
chief by-products.''' Disciplinary' power becomes the means through which the subject is 
produced and regulated. In this way, children are not merely described in the CRC, nor are the 
institutional framework and practices that surround the international discourse on the rights of 
the child merely in reaction to a fundamental, universal child. Quite the opposite; the child is 
produced through CRC, and its related institutions and practices. This thesis will further argue 
that the juridical and discipHnar\- power exercised on the category 'child' is quite unique. It will 
be argued that the period of childhood experiences greater levels of juridical and disciplinar}' 
power. It win be argued in Chapter 8 that the cxercise of discipHnan' power over the categor)' 
'child' has a substantial and unique role in the CRC.'^ For example, the child is always subject to 
the adult gaze, whether by compulsorj' schooling or compulsorj' 'care' (parents or in the absence 
of parents, the state, as elicited in Chapters 6 and 7)."' Also, according to the CRC the child 
acceptably experiences unique forms of juridical power such as corporal punishment or 
incapacitation.'^ See Chapter 8 for a more thorough discussion. 
e. Genealogy: A Method 
Thus far this chapter has considered the impossibilit}' of 'objective' truth, instead identifying 
dominant 'knowledges', which are cemented by modalities of governance. The genealogical 
approach is helpful in so far as it enables the challenging of so-called 'objective facts'. A 
genealogical approach is useful to question a set of knowledges and how these knowledges were 
made possible. Foucault described this approach to history as a 'history of the present'": not a 
search for what 'really' and 'factually' happened, but how a particular way of contemporar\' 
JUDITH B U T L E R . GENDER T R O U B L E , 5 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" S A R A S A L I H . JUDITH B U T L E R , 1 0 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
"" S A R A S A L I H . JUDITH B U T L E R . 2 7 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
'' See for example Article 28(2) a l lows for corporal punishment against children while in school and Article 28(a ) makes 
primary' education (a particular form of ' g aze ' , examination, testing) compulsory for all children. Other examples w ill be 
discussed at length in Chapter 8. 
" See Article 28(a ) and though the argument that children are required by the CRC to be in the 'care ' of some adult wi l l be 
discussed in Chap te r ? , see also Article 19(1). which does not make sense if the child is not in 'care". 
" See for example Article 28 (2 ) a l lows for corporal punishment against children while in school. 
" MICHEL F O U C A U L T . L A N G U A G E . C O U N T E R - M E M O R Y . P R A C T I C E ; SELECTED E S S A Y S AND INTERVIEW ( D o n a l d B o u c h a r d , e d . . 
1977); BEN GOULDER and PETER FITZPATRICK. FOUCAULT'S LAW. 31 (2009). See also Amy Alder. The Perverse Law of 
Child Pornography. 101 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 209 (2001). 
thinking and speaking came about." The aim is not to discover the origins, but to 'identify the 
accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversals . . . that gave birth to 
those tilings that continue to exist and have value for us'.'"° 
A genealog)' is intended to give expression to subjugated knowledges, to give voice to histories 
that have been lost or neglectcd."" Foucault and Buder both utilise the technique of genealog;-, 
which investigates local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of 
a universal 'truth'.'"^ The technique of genealog)' is based on die desire to escape from the 
per\-asivc features of orthodox historj', such as assumptions of linearit}-, tcleolog)', evolution, and 
progress."" The aim is to first disturb the obviousness of prcsendy 'understood' knowledges.""' 
Foucault described his method as an effort 'to question over and over again what is postulated as 
self-evident, to dismrb people's mental habits'."'^ Butler, in turn, argues that no biological, 
psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents; it is 
civilisation as a whole that produces this creature described as feminine.""' The fundamental aim 
of Gender Trouble^"^ and Buder's theorj- of performativit)' is to call into question the existence of 
the unitar}- categor}- 'woman'."'® 
The second aim of a genealogy is to then desolidify or deconstruct an identit)' by enquiring how 
an identit}' has become so widely accepted as an ontological given."" As Butler puts it, a 
'genealog)' investigates the political stakes in designating as an origin and cause those identitj' 
categories that are in fact the ejfeds of institutions, practices discourses, with multiple and diffused 
points of origins'."" Believing that certain political stakes are scr\'ed in the construction of 
identit)-, one must consider what configuration of power exists, and therefore what forms of 
power restrain and regulate the subject. Put another way, a genealogical inquir)- is about 
B E N G O U L D E R a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. F O U C A U L T ' S L A W , 4 6 ( 2 0 0 9 ) , c i t i n g V I K K I B E L L . INTERROGATING INCEST-
F E M I N I S M . F O U C A U L T . AND THE L A W , 2 ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 
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( 1 9 8 4 ) . 
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discourses surrounding the subject, how they function, and the political aims they fulfil . '" For 
Buder, regarding women, the political forces at work are phallocentrism and heterosexualitj'."^ 
In sum, the aim is not to investigate i f practices conform to 'objective' rationalities (the 
epistemological endeavour), but to discover which kind o f rationalit}' or 'truth' is being used, ' " 
and to inquire what political aims are being sen-ed. By calling into question the 'essence' o f an 
idcntit}' put forth as 'truth', one is then able to investigate the powers that are ser\'ed in a 
particular 'truth'. 
Though it will be more thoroughly elaborated in subsequent chapters, this thesis seeks to disrupt 
the appearance o f the universal category' 'child', in part, through the agitation o f certain 'truths' 
about childhood (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7) that are enforced through the exercise o f juridical and 
disciplinar)' power (see Chapter 8), but also through the examination o f 
discourse/knowledges/claims to 'truth' that are excluded from the CRC's pur\'iew. Chapter 9 
will endeavour to querj- who is left out, disqualified, delegitimised by the CRC's version o f 
childhood. Chapter 9 will argue that the CRC's normative framework not only regulates what it 
means to be a 'good' child and 'good' adult, but does so through the sustainment and expansion 
of particular power relations that emphasise adult power over children, while solidifying the 
dominant role o f the state in the matrix o f family relations. 
II. CRITIQUES OF FOUCAULT AND BUTLER 
The first section o f this chapter has set out the theoretical methodology that will be employed 
throughout this thesis. However, before employing that methodology, it is necessar}- to justify' 
its use, in light o f certain criticism commonly levelled at both Foucault and Butler. This section 
seeks to explore three o f the major critiques o f Foucault and Butler: 1) Foucauldian/Butlerian 
Theory Kills the Subject — How Can Docile Bodies Engage in Resistance?, 2) 
Foucauldian/Butierian Theorj ' Has N o Normative Framework - Why Resist and against 
Whom?, and 3) Foucauldian/Butierian T'heory Renders Political Action Impossible - How Can 
One Engage in Politics without Universal Identities? Although other critiques have been 
made,"" this section will focus on the ones deemed most relevant to this thesis. 
JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 5 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
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a. Foucauldian/Butlerian Theory Kills the Subject - How Can Docile Bodies 
Engage in Resistance? 
Some scholars argue that Foucault's version of power rcduces individuals to docile bodies, or 
objects rather than subjects of power."^ Linda Alcoff, for example, argues that Foucault's 
understanding of power excludes agency, and this denial of agency is argued to be incompatible 
with the emancipator)' project.'"^ Resistance by the subject might then be conceived as merely a 
ruse of power, as the subject is argued to be wholly determined by social forces." ' Alcoff argues 
that, 
[g]iven the enormous productive efficacy Foucault accords to power/knowledge 
or the dominant discourse, there could be agency only if human beings were 
given the causal ability to create, affect, and transform power/knowledge or 
discourses, but Foucault does not concede to us this capacit}'... if Foucault's 
analysis of subjectivit}' is correct, a feminist emancipator)- project is in trouble."* 
Similarly, one of the many critiques of Butler is that she has, through her theorising, made 
individuals into mere objects that lack agency."' Gender performances are argued to be 
subjecdess productions, as the individual does not have the abilit)- to choose her or his gender.'^" 
i. Butler's Response 
By way of response, Butler asserts that she does not go as far as saying that agency is illusor)'.'^' 
Buder has said that she neither discounts the possibilit)' of agency nor the limitations on 
Butler is not arguing anytliing neu (just using a new vocabular> ) and 2) that Butler"s perspective is purely academic: "The 
great tragedy in the new feminist theory in America is the loss of a sense of public commitment. . . Hungry women are not 
fed by this, battered women are not sheltered by it, raped women do not find justice in it. gays and lesbians do not achieve 
legal protections through it'. Martha Nussbaum. The Professor of Parody. T H E N E W R R P U B L I C ( 1 9 9 9 ) , 
http://www.lnr.eom/archive/0299/022299/nussbaum022299.html. Lloyd has responded that Buller highlights that the very 
norms that Nussbaum champions (transparency or accessibility) serve certain interests and obscures the operations of power. 
See M O Y A L L O Y D . JUDITH B U T L E R (2007). 
Nancy I lartsock. Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women, in F E M I N I S M / P O S T M O D E R N I S M . 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 (Linda Nicholson 
e d . . 1 9 9 0 ) . 
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agency. According to Butler, however, a description of agency is not one in which a person 
stands outside one identit)' and simply selects it.'^' She argues that doing so would be 
impossible, since one is already one's gender and one's choice of 'gender st\-le' is limited from 
the start. Instead, Buder asserts that, 
to choose a gender is to interpret received gender norms in a way that organises 
them anew. Less a radical act of creation, gender is a tacit project to 'renew' 
one's cultural history' in one's own terms . . . something we have been 
endeavouring to do aU along.'""* 
In an inter\'iew in 2000, Buder describes in detail the issue of the agency-less subject. She states 
that the subjcct is born into a network of language and uses language but is also used by it.'^^ 
The question becomes whether agency has been vanquished altogether.'^'^ Buder e.xplains that 
while we are constituted socially through certain kinds of Hmitations, exclusions, and 
foreclosures, we are not constituted for all time in that way.'^^ She argues that it is possible to 
undergo an alteration of the subject that permits new possibilities that would ha\'e been thought 
psychotic or 'dangerous' in an earlier phase of Hfe.'^" Buder contends that while we are clearly 
born into a world in which certain limitations constrain the possibiHt)- of one's subjecthood, 
those limitations are not there as strucmrallv static features of one's se l f ' " ' Limitations are 
subject to renewal. One performs (mainly unconsciously or implicitl)') that renewal in the 
repeated acts of one's person."" She states that, 
|e|ven though my agency is conditioned by those limitations, my agency can also 
thematise and alter those limitations to some degree. This doesn't mean that 1 
will get over limitation - there is always a limitation; there is always going to be a 
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foreclosure of some kind or another ^ but I think that the whole scene has to be 
understood as more dynamic than it generally is . '" 
In this way, Butler disagrees that the possibilities of agency are set up as a binan- opposition: to 
have or to not have agency."^ Buder contends that there are limitations on agency, but that 
those limitations do not render the subject subject-less. '" Buder's version of agency appears 
when dominant gender norms fail to eradicate gendered expressions that defy the internal 
coherence of gendered n o r m s . H o w e v e r , Buder argues that liberation as a term that promises 
radical freedom from constramt is impossible. Holding onto this conception of liberation, she 
argues, will just redeliver us to new constraints and plunge us into forms of political cynicism."^ 
In approaching the problems of what and how to change, Buder again notes that we are already 
within the confines of discourse and an institutional apparatus that will orchestrate for us (the 
limits of?) what will and will not be possible.'"' Though some would suggest that anything we 
seek to change only augments the power of the order and that we are co-opted and contained in 
advance Buder argues that this account is incomplete. '" Extending the power regime does not 
mean extending it always in the same form; it could mean reiterating it in new forms."* I'ower, 
according to Buder, can produce unanticipated effects ." ' She contends that while we can 
certainly extend existing power, we can also extend it into an unknown future.'*' In this way, 
political insurrection is based on a citation of existing norms, but also has potential to produce 
something new. She does not call this 'liberation', but rather a 'critical subversion', or a 'radical 
resignification': 
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[i]t does not engage in the fantasy of transcending power altogether, although it 
docs work within the hope and the practice of replaying power, of restaging it 
again and again in new and productive ways.'*" 
In the instance of both the individual and political movements being seized by existing structures 
of power, Buder rejects the subject - object binar\', where one is either or. Rather she 
acknowledges the vast limitations on individuals and movements in their quests for 
resignification, but she does not foreclose the possibility of its occurrence. 
ii. Foucault 's Response 
Whereas in his earlier genealogies Foucault emphasised the processes through which individuals 
were subjected to power, in his later writings he turned his attention to practices of self-
constitution or 'practices of freedom', which he called ethics. According to Foucault, 'there are 
no relations of power without resistances; the latter arc all the more real and effective because 
they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised'.'"" Foucault argues 
that power has a dual function: to both Limit and create possibilities for persons.''" Foucault 
writes that, 
in power relations there is necessarily the possibilit)' of resistance because if there 
were no possibilit)- of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategics 
capable of reversing the situation), there would be no power relation at all.'"*'' 
Foucault notes that the term 'domination' is 'what we ordinarily call power'.'"^ Yet even in the 
event of domination, in other words, asymmetrical relationships of power in which subjects have 
limited abilit}- to cxercise power, Foucault argues that these subordinated persons still have the 
ability' to exercise power, albeit in a manner 'extremely limited'.'*' For Foucault, resistance 
means the abiUtj' to alter how one fits within a particular set of power relationships or even the 
alteration of power relations themselves. Arguably, agency is implicitly embedded in Foucault's 
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notion of power.''*^ In his discussion of ethics, Foucault does not suggest that individuals may 
onh' react against power. Radier, he suggests that individuals may alter power relationships in 
ways that expand their possibilities for act ion." ' 'I'hus, Foucault's work on ethics can be linked 
to his concern to counter domination, that is, forms of power that limit the possibilities for the 
autonomous development of the se l fs capacities."" By distinguishing power relations that are 
mutable, flexible and reversible, from simadons of domination in which resistance is 'extremely 
limited, Foucault seeks to encourage practices of liberty 'that will allow us to play . . . games of 
power with as little domination as possible'.'^" Foucault notes the importance of establishing 
new behaviour and attitudes that empower those who find themselves less able to exercise 
power, thus ensuring that mutable relations of power do not congeal into states of domination: 
[i]f there are relations of power in every social field, this is because there is 
freedom everywhere. In a great many cases, power relations are fLxed in such a 
way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin 
of freedom.'" 
Sawicki argues that Foucault's notion of practices of freedom has the potential to broaden our 
understanding of what it is to engage in emancipatory poHtics.'^^ In Foucault's conception of 
freedom as a practice aimed at minimising domination, Sawicki discerns an implicit critique of 
traditional emancipatory politics that tends to conceive Liberty as a state free from every 
conceivable social constraint. '" Following Foucault, Sawicki argues that the problem with this 
notion of emancipation is that it does not go far enough, for 'reversing power positions without 
altering relations of power, is rarely liberating. Further, it is not a sufficient condition of 
liberation to throw off the yoke of domination'.'^" Ultimately, for Sawicki, the value of 
Foucault's late work for feminism consists in the conceptual tools that it provides to think 
beyond traditional emancipatory theories and practices. Similarly, for Moya Lloyd, the 
F'oucauldian practice of critique allows for alternative practices of the self and, thus, for more 
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autonomous experiments in self-formation. '" Foucauldian resistance, thus, cannot be found 
outside power. Rather resistance relies upon and emerges from the power against which a 
particular resistance struggles. Foucault's understanding of resistance as internal to power 
refuses the Utopian dream of achieving total emancipation from power.'^'" In the place of total 
liberation Foucault envisages more specific, localised struggles against forms of subjection aimed 
at loosening the constraints on possibilities for action.'^' 
It would appear that Foucault allows more scopc for agency/liberty in his conception of power. 
In fact, it seems that Foucault's description of domination is Butler's version of power. Yet, one 
could argue that Butler is merely describing an instance of domination (in other words, gender), 
in which agency is extremely limited. Where they do share common ground, both Foucault and 
Buder describe a less absolute form of 'Hberation'/agency. The notion of absolute 
liberation/agency may seem more comfortable, it is more likely to gain political purchase, and 
makes 'sense' based on the binar\' opposition to 'have' or 'not have' agency. However, Foucault 
and Butler's version of agency and liberation or 'radical resignification' resonates with this 
author's \'iew of how agency and liberation operate. When one thinks of Horn Haber's example 
of the woman who goes to the g j m to discipline her body so that she complies with the latest 
beaut}' requirement for females (toned body), she might just find her newfound strength a source 
of empowerment.'^" Most likely this woman is not now 'liberated' from social views about what 
her body should look Uke. Nonetheless, a resignification has occurred. 
Within the context of the CRC, the criticism that the theories of Buder and Foucault render the 
subject agcndess requires an arguably more complicated analysis. First, Foucault and Buder 
theories on power are not the only ones which are argued to deny agency to children. The 
dominant discourse on children, the CRC, denies agency, as given to adults, to children.'^' Put 
another way, the CRC does not offer children the same agency that is offered to adults in other 
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international human rights documents, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. As vviU be discussed in 
Chapter 2, few acadcmics and practitioners advocate for children to have legal agency, as given 
to adults."" Second, children rights do not just address children themselves, but also those who 
speak 'for' children. For example, the CRC enables others to act on behalf of, exercise 
autonomy on behalf of, and even speak for the child, something done with no other identity' 
categon-, as will be discussed in Chapters 4, 6, and 7. Indeed, no child participated in the 
drafting of the CRC. As such, one could argue that the issue of as reducing children to docile 
bodies, at least to some degree, would not present a problem for current discourse on children's 
rights."' 
Nonetheless, this thesis could be critiqued for engaging an interpretative lens that results in that 
which it is critiquing. Put another way, by accepting Foucauldian/Buderian theories of power, it 
could be argued diat this thesis reduces children to docile bodies/agentiess subjects, in the same 
way that this thesis is critiquing the CRC for doing so. By way of response, this thesis first does 
not argue that the CRC reduces children to docile bodies. Rather, this thesis argues that the 
CRC limits the possibilities of what it means to be a child in unique ways that would be 
unimaginable for other categories of humans, as wiU be discussed in Chapters 4 and 7 (in other 
words, mandating 'care' or requiring the 'cliild' give away their own agency to their binary-
opposition - adults). Second, this thesis's utilisation of Foucauldian/Butlerian theories of power 
acknowledges that absolute agency is unlikely. Agency wiU always have limitations. This version 
of power does not render the subject docile, but instead views agency as restricted, not 
impossible. 
b. Foucauldian/Butletian Theory Has No Normative Framework - Why 
Resist and against Whom? 
It has been argued that Foucault's critique of Enlightenment rationality and humanism results in 
relativism and nihilism. Nancy Fraser argues that if one rejects the precepts of I Enlightenment, 
one is neither left with a basis upon which to criticise current conditions of p o w e r , n o r an 
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explanation as to why these current conditions should be resisted.""' Further, one is left with no 
way to identify systematic unequal relations of power."''' Similarly, one of the most common 
critiques of Butler's work is a 'lack of normative framework'."'^ It is argued that Butier refers to 
new possibilities, but that she does not indicate which possibilities are worth pursuing, and which 
are per\'erse. Put another way, Butier does not have a set of strong norms that instruct which 
possibilities to actuaHse and which not. Butier herself has said that not all possibilities should be 
realised."'' So why not distinguish amongst them? 
i. Butler's Response 
Butier responds by arguing, 
|w]hat worries me is that we very often make decisions about what life to pursue 
and what possibilities to realise without ever asking how our ver\' notions of 
'what is possible', 'what is liveable', 'what is imaginable' are constrained in 
advance, and maybe in some very politically consequential ways." ' 
Butler argues that an ontology of gender is not a foundation, but 'a normative injunction that 
opposes insidiously by installing itself into political discourse as its necessary ground' ." ' She asks 
what it means to make a normative judgment without critically interrogating how the field of 
possibility is itself constimted through often violent exclusions."'' Butier argues that she is 
concerned with, what she calls, the 'rush to decision-ism and to strong normativity'.'™ She 
argues that often this rush fails to consider what is meant by some of the very basic terms it 
assumes.'" In a sense, political normativity is missing a critical dimension.''^ Normativity results 
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in a violent circumscription of the possible (what lives are considered lives, what capacities are 
considered human), for wliich we are not accountable. '" 
This 'rush' is particularly true in the context of children's right. One continually finds the realm 
of children's rights dominated by normative judgments about what it means to be a child and 
therefore what should be the aim and content of children's rights (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
These normative judgments are made even before the field of possibilities for childhood and 
children's rights has been interrogated."" It will be argued throughout this thesis that the CRC, 
the most prominent international discourse on children's rights, has been constituted through 
some violent exclusions, while what is possible for the categon- 'child' has never been critically 
interrogated (see Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8)."^ 
ii. Foucault's Response 
It has been argued that Foucault neither reject nor embraces the linHghtenment, but rather 
adopts a critical attitude by examining what 'reason is', what its effects are, and why we use it. '" 
Critical questioning does not amount to wholesale rejection, but rather rejects the use of a 
universal moral and political judgment. It is the critical attitude of problematisation that is 
important to the process of critical inquin* and transcending binar}- logic (understanding through 
binar}- oppositions as discussion above in Scction 1(c)).'" It would seem that the process of 
engaging in practices that limit domination is in fact a normative position. 
The claim that Butier and Foucault lack a normative framework denotes at least a level of 
discomfort in the absence of absolutes. Both reject 'domination' and encourage 'inclusion' 
through exposing unequal power relations through utilisation of the genealogical method. While 
it might often be more comfortable to know who and what is 'bad' and who and what is 'good', 
there simply is no 'axis of evil', except where such a label is 'objectively' conferred. The project 
of continually questiomng hegemony and the damage (exclusion and marginalisation) resultant in 
the use of norms is the normative aim. What becomes important is not what to resist because all 
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forms of domination are not identified (or identifiable); rather it is the method that is important. 
The moment one claims what is bad/what is good as Tmlhs, (for example 'all children are 
immature', or for that matter 'all children are mamre'), one participates in the process of 
marginalisation and exclusion. The focus of critical inquir\-, as opposed to the discover)' of a 
foundational Truth, is an entirely different project. The latter forecloses critical inquir)' (as will be 
argued throughout this thesis regarding the CRC), whereas the former makes continual 
questioning its premise. 
c. Foucauldian/Butlerian Theory Renders Political Action Impossible -
How Can One Engage in Politics without Universal Identities? 
A third category' of critique argues that Butler and Foucault's refusal of identit}' politics makes 
collective political action impossible. In this critique, since Foucault and Butler's theories 
threaten the stabiliU' of an identit}-, the}- thereby undermine the ability of an identity category to 
mobilise support. Joan Cocks argues that 1-oucault's greatest weakness is 'the inability' to support 
any movement that through its massiveness and disciplined unity would be popular and yet 
powerful enough to undermine an entrenched legal-political arena'."" For Nancy Hartsock, 
Foucault's perspective functions to preclude the possibility of feminist politics which, she claims, 
is necessarily an identity-based politics grounded in a conception of the identity, needs and 
interests of women.'™ Similarly, Butler is critiqued for making political movements impossible 
because of her critique that identity representation is inherentiy \'iolcnt."'" It is argued that one 
cannot engage in political representation without an identity categor)-. 
i. Foucault's Response 
Foucault's critique of identity does not deny the realit)' of identity poHtics, but rather 
demonstrates its limitations and dangers."" Instead of politics based on some perceived essence, 
Foucault argues that political action can be based on 'creating a new culmral Hfe, or common 
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interest'.'"^ Moving beyond identity politics recognises that identities are constructions. This, in 
turn, mcreases opportunities for resistance because it allows individuals, 
to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions, to 
affirm the local possibilities of intcr\-ention through participating in precisely 
those practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the 
immanent possibility of contesting them."" 
In this way the key to political struggle is to fracture the limitations imposed by normalising 
identity categories. 
ii. Butler's Response 
According to Buder, feminists should be waty' of political representation that requires a uniform 
idea of women's nature and interests. Simply put, when creating a political categoty' (for 
example, woman) a movement has constructed what it means to be a woman, and thus defmed 
which women matter, and which women do not. Buder argues that, 
|t]he premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a 
seamless categoty of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the 
categoty'. These domains of exclusion reveal the cocrcive and regulatoty' 
conscquences of that construction, even when the construction has been 
elaborated for emancipatoty' purposes. Indeed, the fragmentation within 
feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from "women" whom 
feminism claims to represent suggest the necessaty' limits of identity poHtics.'"" 
Buder argues that the subject woman is neither stable nor distinct, and as such is subject to 
multiple power relations (race, class, sexuality, and so on).'"^ Gender is simply not constituted 
coherendy or consistendy in different contexts. By treating white, middle-class, female 
experiences as universal, feminism alienates women that do fall in this description.'"'" As such, 
feminist identity- politics reproduces the harm it seeks to alleviate: that of marginalisation and 
exclusion. Buder argues that Foucault's work provides feminists with the resources to think 
beyond the stricmres of identity politics. In Foucault's presentation of identity as an effect, 
Buder sees new possibilities for feminist political practice, possibilities that arc precluded by 
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FOUCAULT.VOLUME I. 114 (Paul Rabinow ed.. 1994). 
JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 187-188 (1990 ) . 
JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 4 (1990 ) . 
JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 3-5. 298 (1990 ) . 
2 Moniquc Deveaux ftmm'.m W Empou-erment: A Critical Reading ofFoucauU. in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF 
MICHEL FOUCAULT. 232 (Susan Hekman ed.. 1996). 
positions that take identit)' to be fixed or foundational. One of the distinct advantages of 
Foucauh's understanding of the constituted character of identit)' is, in Buder's view, that it 
enables feminism to politicise the processes through which stereon pical forms of masculine and 
feminine identit}' are produced. 
Butler argues that Foucault's characterisation of identity' as constructed does not mean that it is 
completely determined or artificial and arbitran-. Rather, a Foucauldian approach to identity 
production demonstrates the role played by cultural norms in regulating how we embody or 
perform our gender identities. According to Butler, gender identit)' is simply 'a set of repeated 
acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congcal over time to produce the appearance of 
substance, of a namral sort of being'.'"^ The regulatory power of the norms that govern our 
performances of gender is both disguised and strengthened by the assumption that gendered 
identities are natural and essential.'"" Thus, for Butier, one of the most important feminist aims 
should be to challenge dominant gender norms by exposing the contingent acts that produce the 
appearance of an underlying 'natural' gender identity."" Against the claim that feminist politics is 
necessarily an identity' politics, Butler suggests that, 
[i]f identities were no longer fixed as the premises of a political s^-llogism, and 
poHtics no longer understood as a set of practices derived from the alleged 
interests that belong to a set of ready-made subjects, a new configuration of 
politics would surely emerge from the ruins of the old."" 
Butler envisages this new configuration of politics as an anti-foundational coalition politics that 
would accept the need to act within the tensions produced by contradiction, fragmentation and 
diversity.'" Butier has argued that the notion of universality is based on foreclosure: there must 
be something that is not included within the universal."^ She notes, however, that universalit)- is 
a discourse that can and must be driven into crisis again and again by the foreclosures that it 
makes. '" In this way, the discourse is forced to rearticulate i tse lf"" The process of universality 
is made open-ended by being brought into crisis again and again by what is outside of itself 
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Universality then would not be violent or totalising. Butler argues that the task of politics would 
be to keep the process of universality open, to keep it as a contested site of persistent crisis, and 
to not let it be setded." ' Buder contends that, 
the open-endness that is essential to democracrisation implies that the universal 
cannot be finally identified with any particular content, and that this 
incommersurability (for which we do not need the Real) is crucial to the futural 
possibilities of democratic contestation."' 
Admittedly, this cnticism of Buder and Foucault seems to this author to have the greatest merit, 
tiiough does not for this author defeat the efficacy of their theories. Foucault and Buder 
rightfully argue that a group of persons do not need to share a common essential identity. 
Rather, all that is necessaty' are shared interests. Compromise will always result, whether at the 
point of constructing a universal identity (compromises are made in the defining of an identity 
category, the Travaux Preparatiores of the CRC demonstrates this quite well, as is discussed in 
Chapter 6 and 7)"^ or at the determination of common interests."® So then why is essential 
identity required, when we are quite aware of difference even within a categor\ ? It seems that 
there is this understanding that an essential united identity postured against some essential united 
form of domination, yields one the floor, yields one the space to have a voice, or as Buder has 
said 'you've achieved recognition, stams, legitimation; and that is the end of your struggle . . . 
becoming sayable is the end of politics'.'"" Dianne Otto has argued that by not 'seeking and 
maintaining unity at all costs against monolithic understandings of domination', a coalition relies 
on the possibility of dialogue across vast differences in power and knowledge.™' In this way, her 
concept of coalition gives up 'the desire and the apparent safety of certainty and prescription', as 
well as arguably at least some political purchase, and learns 'how to live and act so that 
differences and incommensurabilities can inform and contest the practices of individual identities 
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and collective solidarities'.^'" While Butler acknowledges that she could only see the violent and 
exclusionary' character of umversaHt}' in Gender Trouble, she has 'become more convinced in 
recent years that there is an open-ended sense to universality that can be affirmed'.^"^ Butier 
argues that universals can be affirmed in to far that they are 'empty' when they are said, but given 
meaning when applied and redeployed in way that cannot be fully anticipated?'" 
What the refusal to accept an 'essential' and 'natural' identity' category does is this: by 
acknowledging that categories are not natural and are exclusionary', categories are more open to 
evolve and change because they are more open to criticism. The CRC is a perfect example of how 
the fiction of a universal and natural category (child) forecloses critical inquiry about whose interests 
arc being represented and along what political lines. By insisting that the CRC represents the 
essential universal child as opposed to the interests of those, in particular states and adults, who 
have deeply political aims, the CRC evades the interrogation of how those interests are 
manifested. Again, it is noteworthy that the category child has thus far not been allowed to form 
a political identity of their own. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to outline and justify the theoretical method to be employed throughout this 
thesis. Further, this chapter sought to explore Foucault and Buder's theoretical perspectives on 
identity and forecast their relevance to the identity category 'child'. This chapter has argued that 
these perspectives on identity are useful to unpacking the ways in which the child is constructed 
in the CRC. Given the discussion in the previous chaptcr on how dominant discourses about 
the child, including the CRC, forever assume that an essential, 'natural' child does indeed exist, 
these theoretical perspectives allow us to take a step back to examine the ways in which the CRC 
deploys this fiction (of a universal natural child). This theoretical lens enables us to begin to 
query the existence of a universal child, and to begin to critically examine the operation of 'truth' 
and power in the CRC, an examination that has largely been foreclosed by the appearance and 
assumption of a 'natural' child. By disturbing the existence of a universal child, one is able to 
query what is made possible, and who is excluded, by the CRC's particular vision of the category 
'child'. 
Dianne Otto. Sexualiiies and Solidarities. 8 A U S T R A L I A N G A Y A N D LESBIAN L A W J O U R N A L 2 7 . 3 4 - 3 5 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . 
Judith Butler, interview with Oar>' Olson and Lynn Worsham. (2000) reprinted THE JUDITH BUTLER READER. 339 (Sara 
SaHh ed . . 2 0 0 4 ) . 
Judith Butler, interview with Gar\ ' Olson and LJ nn Worsham. (2000) reprinted THE JUDITH BUTLER READER. 339 (Sara 
S a l i h e d . . 2 0 0 4 ) . 
Section I explored Foucault and Buder's theories of 'truth/knowlcdge/power, binarj' 
oppositions, governmcntality, and genealogies to aid in the understanding of how certain 
identities become understood as 'natural'. Section II explored the three major critiques of 
Foucauldian/Butlcrian theor\-, namely that it: 1) kills die subject, 2) lacks a normative framework, 
and 3) renders political action impossible. Section II explored Foucault and Buder's response to 
diese criticisms, including commentar\- by this author. Ultimately it was argued that whatever 
criticism laid again this theoretical lens could not only be theoretically overcome, but more 
importandy the value of agitating 'truths' by exposing relations of power and examining excluded 
claims to 'truth' was greater than any of the 'problems' created by this theoretical lens. While 
one might be uncomfortable with uncertaint)', exclusion through the creation of fictionalised 
identities in the name of certainty- seems fundamentally problematic. 
The theoretical vocabularies developed in this chapter will be applied throughout this thesis to 
the category 'cliild'. In particular. Chapter 5 will discuss certain 'truths' about childhood and the 
various binaries in operation regarding the category' 'child'. Chapter 6 will specifically explore the 
'truth' posited by the CRC that describes the child as developing. Chapter 7 will examine 
another 'truth' of the CRC: that the child is always or should always be in 'care'/in a family. 
Chapter 8 will explore the operation of juridical and disciplinan- power in the C^RC. Finally, 
Chapter 9 will engage in a genealog)' of the CRC's child. These theoretical tools allow a critical 
engagement with the CRC. As argued in the previous chapter, dominant discourses surrounding 
the CRC and the CRC itself uncritically accept not only the existence of a universal child, but 
also accept a particular version of that universal child. The CRC, as an international human rights 
convention that has almost universal acceptance, is undoubtedly important as one of the most 
prominent and authoritative discourse on the rights of the child. Stepping back to cntically 
examine the CRC's \-ision of the categon- 'child' enables assessment of a set of fundamental 
questions: 1) 'what is a child?', 2) 'how is the CRC's acceptance of a particular child possible?', 3) 
'how is the denial of what has been identified as fundamenlai nghts possible?', and 4) 'what are the 
hierarchical oppositions upon which the CRC grounds itself^', and 5) 'how can we reverse these 
hierarchy to expose the privilege status of one of the bmary opposititms as an illusion (and rather 
mumally dependent)?'. 
Before applying die theoretical method laid out m this chapter to the categon- 'child', the next 
chapter (Chapter 4) examines other categories that have been separated from the human family 
for their own international human rights document. The purpose of domg so is to discern die 
ways in which children arc constructed as 'fundamentally different' from all other categories o f 
humans, even those who arc also identified as ^oilnerable, discmpowered, unequal, and m some 
instances also possessing less than 'normal' capacity'. Chapter 4 will argue that the law's different 
treatment o f the categor)' 'child' reflects not some sort o f inherent difference o f childhood, but 
rather reflects and upholds the adult - child binary, where adults are presumed capable and 
children incapable. 
CHAPTER 4 
RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN VS. RIGHTS FOR OTHER 'SPECIAL' 
CATEGORIES: INVESTIGATING A BASIS FOR DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT 
OUTLINE 
REMEDIES FOR INEQUALITY, DISEMPOWERMENT, AND 
VULNERABILITY - CEDAW and CRPD 
a. Why Are These Groups Separated from the Human Family? 
b. How are the Reasons for Separation Addressed in the Context of CEDAW 
and CRPD? 
c. What are the Implications for the Rights of the Child? 
II. REMEDIES FOR CHANGING CAPACITY - ELDERHOOD 
a. Why Are These Groups Separated from the Human Family? 
b. How are the Reasons for Separation Addressed in the Context of UNPOP? 
c. What are the Implications for the Rights of the Child? 
III. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 2 argued that dominant perspectives about children's rights and the vision of the 'child' 
articulated in the CRC assume that there are 'naturall' or 'essential' characteristics to the categor\' 
'child'. The disagreement over whether the CRC captured the 'true' child has not led to 
fundamentally questioning whether such a 'true' child exists. Chapter 3 built on some of the 
critiques of the CRC explored in Chapter 2 that reject the knowabilit)- of the categor}- 'child' and 
focus instead on the lines of power enabled by casting the 'child' as immature, dependent, and 
developing. Chapter 3 outlined a Foucauldian/Butlerian theoretical perspective that aims to 
agitate the appearance of a 'unitary' and 'namral' identity category. Before this theoretical 
perspective is applied to the categon' 'child' in the CRC, this chapter seeks to briefly examine 
how international law treats other identity' categories that have also been singled out from the 
human family as in need of 'special' attention, in other words given their own international 
human rights document. This chapter examines the Convention on the Elimination of AU Yarns of 
Discrimination of Against Women (CEDAW),' the Convention on Vdghts of Persons mith Disabilities 
(CRPD),^ and the United Nations Principles on Older Persons (UNPOP), ' comparing these 
instruments to the CRC. This chapter argues that no other international human rights document 
characterises the problems faccd by an identity category as resulting exclusively from the 
category's 'biological' or 'inherent' difference, in contrast to socially constructed difference. 
Further, no other category' of persons is required to relinquish certam fundamental rights as the 
remedy for such difference. Put another way, no other 'vulnerable' identity category' is 
constructed as wholly biologically immature/incapable, with the consequence that they turn over 
certain fundamental rights to another identity categor)' (adults/parents). 
CEDAW, CRPD, and UNPOP mention, to varying degrees, the role that social construction and 
social discrimination play in making the categories 'woman', 'person with disabilit)-', and 'elder' 
•s-ulnerable, dependent, and unequal. Even when these international instruments contemplate 
their subject as 'inherendy' less capable/immature (particularly elderhood), the remedies for such 
incapacity (in other words, the rights) aim to enhance respect for autonomy and increasing 
participation." This is in sharp contrast to the CRC's requirement that the child surrender her or 
his autonomy rights unul the child can demonstrate to adults her or his maturit)', an exercise no 
other identit)' category is required to perform. It would seem tiiat where conceptions of social 
^ Convention on the Elimination o fAII Forms ofDisc r imina t ion Against Women . Dec. 18, 1979 1 2 4 9 U N T S 13 
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United Nations Principles for Older Persons, Dec. 16. 1991. G.A. Res. A/RES/46/91 
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^ This thesis wi l l not address the issues invoWed with the implemenlat ion of these convent ions, or other such cr i t iques. This 
chapter w. l l only e x a m m e the discourse used m the text of these conventions as they relate to the quest ions a s k e d l this 
chapter. The author is aware that these conventions and principles are not in themse lves unproblemat ic 
discrimination in the case of women, persons with disabiKties, and elders result in international 
documents that aim to shore up autonomy and participation, 'biological' immaturitj'/incapacit)' 
yields a convention that requires the subject to relinquish the subject's autonomy to an entirely 
different person, to an entirely different categorj' of persons. Yet, to the extent that persons with 
disabilities or elders are constructed as biologically immature/legally incapable, neither CRPD 
nor UNPOP require their respective subjects to relinquish autonomy, as done in the CRC. 
This chapter argues that a comparison of CKDAW, CRPD, and UNPOP with the CRC reveals 
that the unique requirement for children to surrender their autonomy rights in the CRC makes 
'sense', not because of some unique or inherent difference of children (in other words, a period 
of changing maturitj'/capacitj', dependency, lack of mamrit)'/capacity) as compared to adults. 
Rather, the unique allocation of rights makes 'sense' only within the regulator}- framework that 
adopts the adult/capable - child/incapable binar\- opposition, which is more thoroughly 
discussed in the next chapter. What is made possible thrcjugh this construction of the child-as-
incapable/immature/dependent is not the protection of the child's autonomy and participation, 
as done with aU other identity categories, or in some cases even the protection of the child her or 
himself^ Instead, \'ulncrability and dependency are made markers of childhood. This chapter 
concludes that in offering children 'special assistance' to address the 'special' problems of 
childhood, the CRC alters the rights of the child in ways that would be unimaginable for aU other 
(human) identity categories. The argument that children will simply grow up, or that adults 
never have to fear remrning to childhood, should not be barriers to the agitation of the 
construction of the category 'child' and thus the hierarchy of power in the CRC. 
To compare CEDAW, CRPD, and UNPOP to the CRC, tiiis chapter will engage in a textual 
analysis and will examine these four identity groups with the following questions in mind: 1) why 
are these groups separated from the human family?, 2) how are the reasons for separation 
addressed in the respective documents?, and 3) what are the implications for the rights of the 
child? It should be noted that dominant discourses surrounding the 'child', including the CRC, 
maintain that there is no analogy between the category' 'child' and other oppressed social groups. 
Onora O'Neill argues that even the extension of human right to children is illusor}' because 
doing so exaggerates the analogies between children's dependence and the dependence of other 
' Certainly there are instances where the ch i l d ' s protection is provided for in the Convent ion , but there are also instances 
when the ch i ld ' s protect ion is sacr i f iced for the protect ion of parental r ights or the s ta te ' s rights. See Chapter 9 for fur ther 
discussion. 
oppressed social groups.' O'Neill assumes some inherent 'difference' of childhood versus that 
of adulthood, without justifying such a differendation.' Again this thesis is not arguing that 
children should be treated as aduks. Rather, this thesis is querjing the foundations that lurk 
beneadi the highly political belief that children should no! be treated as adults. Section 1 aims to 
compare both the 'problems' identified and the remedies suggested in CEDAW and CERD with 
those found in the CRC. Section II compares conceptions of clderhood m UNPOP with 
conceptions of the child in the CRC. Elderhood, this paper argues, is constructed similarly to 
childhood as a period of changing (declining as opposed to increasing) capacity. However, die 
rights and remedies proffered are vastiy different. 
I. REMEDIES FOR INEQUALITY, DISEMPOWERMENT, AND 
VULNERABILITY - CEDAW AND CRPD 
This section will focus on the discourses of 'inequality', 'disempowerment' and '\-ulnerabilit5'' in 
CEDAW and CRPD, as compared to the CRC. The preambles of the conventions wiU 
constimte a focus as this chapter examines the 'stories' told in the various conventions about 
why these groups have unique 'problems' and how these problems should be addressed. It is the 
view of this author that the preambles best 'tell the stories' about the subject of a convention, 
considering the aim of a preamble is to contexmaHse the focus and purpose of a convention.' 
a. Why Are These Groups Separated from the Human Family? 
The question 'why are these groups separated from the human family' aims to inquire, in basic 
terms, what is deemed 'wrong' with these groups sufficient to require a separate human right 
convention. Why is separation or 'special treatment' required? In the Preamble of CEDAW, 
women are deemed to warrant special treatment because of the extensive discrimination against 
them, and because discrimination adversely affects women's fuU and equitable participation in 
' Onora O'Nei l l . Children s Rights and Children S Lives, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-RE-VISIONED. 39 (Rosa l ind Fkman Ladd 
e d . . 1 9 9 6 ) . 
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society.' C E D A W notes that in situations of povert)' women usually live in worse conditions as 
they have the least access to that which is necessan' for survival.'" C E D A W ' s Preamble also 
states that the contribution made by women to the welfare of the family and the development of 
society has yet to be fuUy recognised." In sum bccause of certam views about women, women 
are vulnerable to discrimination, which has severe adverse impacts on women's participation and 
livelihood. 
The Preamble of the C R P D outlines many of the reasons why persons with disabilities are 
deemed vulnerable. Persons with disabilities facc 'multiple or aggravated forms of 
discrimination'.'^ The C P R D also states that the majority of persons with disabilities live in 
conditions of poverty," and notes that despite the current human rights regime, 'persons with 
disabilities continue to face barriers in their participation as equal members of society and 
violations of their human rights in aU parts of the wor ld ' . " Additionally, CRPD underlines an 
important point in the Preamble. In paragraph (e) the Preamble states: 
disability' is an evolving concept and that disability results f rom the interaction 
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers 
that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others. 
It seems that this paragraph is hedging against the idea that 'disability' is purely a result of some 
biological condition.'® This paragraph argues that it is rather how certain conditions (for 
example, blindness) are viewed and thus provided for by society' (for example, stop lights that 
also have an accompanying sound that indicates when to proceed across a street). In CRPD it is 
' See for example, the Preamble of CEDAW slates: -Concemed, however, thai despite these various instruments extensive 
discrimination against women continues to exist ': 'Recalling thai discrimination against women violates the principles of 
equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with men. in 
the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries, hampers the growth of the pro.sperity of society and the 
family and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of 
humanity': 'Aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is 
needed to achieve full equality between men and women'. 
'Concerned that in situations of poverty women have the lea,st access to food, health, education, training and opportunities 
for employment and other needs'. 
" 'Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the family and to the development of society, so far not 
fully recognised, the social significance of maternity and the role of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of 
children, and aware that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the upbringing of 
children requires a sharing of responsibility between men and women and society as a whole'. 
(p) 'Concerned about the difficult conditions faced by persons with disabilities who are subject to multiple or aggravated 
forms of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex. language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic, 
indigenous or social origin, property, birth, age or other status'. 
" (t) -Highlighting the fact that the majority of persons with di.sabilities live in conditions of poverty, and m this regard 
recognising the critical need to address the negative impact of poverty on persons with disabilities". 
Preamble. 
" See for example MichacI Ashley and Janet Lord. Future Prospects for the United Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, in T H E U N I T E D C O N V E N T I O N O N THE R I G H T S OF P E R S O N S WITH D I S A B I L I T I E S : E U R O P E A N A N D S C A N D I N A V I A N 
PERSPECTIVES. 25-26: 31-39 (Gerard Quinn & Oddny Mjoll Amardottir eds. 2008). 
not some inherent biological state that impairs an individual from participation and equal rights, 
rather social views about certain physical, mental or emotional traits, that impair persons with 
disabiUties participation and enjoyment of equal rights. Both CEDAW and CRPD focus on the 
ways in which society discriminates against both women and persons with disabilities and how 
that discrimination affects their fuU, effective, equal participation and enjoyment of equal nghts. 
The Preamble of the CRC, on the other hand, states that the special treatment of children is 
necessitated 'by reason of (the child's] physical and mental immaturity'. The CRC's Preamble 
also notes that there are children living in exceptionally difficult conditions. What may be more 
interesting, however, is what is omitted from the CRC's Preamble. Although the Preamble 
mentions that even'one is entitled to the rights of the CRC without distinction of any kind and 
that all 'members of the human family' enjoy 'equal and inalienable rights,' the CRC neitiier 
expHcidy mentions diat the child in particular enjoys equal or fuU nghts to other identity 
categories, nor does it mention that children suffer from exceptional discrimination based on 
their status as a 'child' ." The aim of the CRC, one could argue, is not towards protection of the 
children's claim to equal rights (in other words, equal rights as compared to the rights given to 
adults) and freedom from discrimination (in other words, freedom from discrimination based on 
their status as 'chUdrcn')." The CRC does not mention any social barriers that children 
experience that inhibit their fuU participation. Rather, the CRC mentions only the child's 
(physical and mental) immamrity. If not equal rights and full participation, what does the CRC 
guarantee children, now that the CRC has identified children as biologically and essentially 
immamre? As wiU be argued throughout this thesis, the CRC guarantees dependency and 
vulnerabilit\' as markers of childhood. 
" Interest ingly, the issue of d iscr iminat ion on the bas i s of age is v i ewed a s be\ ond d iscuss ion . One of the a c a d e m i c s that 
makes the argument that chi ldren should not be d iscr iminated aga inst as an identity- category re la tes to corporal punishment: 
•Article 2 fo rb id s ju s t i f y ing corporal punishment of chi ldren jus t because they are ch i ld ren ' . See A n g e l a Ba r tman . Spare the 
Rod and Spoil and Child? Corporal Punishment in Schools around the World. 13 INDIANA INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE 
LAW REVIEW 283. 293 (2002) . Such a reading is rarely emp loyed , and wou ld have d e a r impact on a number o f ar t ic les in 
the C R C that enable the different ia l treatment of chi ldren. 
" Mean ing that whi l e a state cannot di.scriminate based on race or gender for examp le , it m a y do so on the bas i s of age . In 
this w a y . the state may d iscr iminate aga inst all chi ldren, but may not d i scr iminate among chi ldren. M a n y international 
ch i ldren ' s right scholars agree that the law should treat the chi ld d i f ferent ly , based on the idea that ch i ldren are 
fundamenta l l y different and thus require different protect ions and r ights a l together . See for example Gera ld ine Van Bueren. 
Article 40: Child Criminal Justice, in A C O M M E N T A R Y ON THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE CHILD. 
19 (Andre Alen et al. eds . 2006) : Bruce Abramson. Article: 2. The Right of Non-Discrimination, in in A COMMENTARY ON 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, i x ( A n d r e A l e n c t a l . e d s . 2 0 0 6 ) ; ( T h e a u t h o r d o e s n o t 
recognize the different ia l treatment of chi ldren as a form of d iscr iminat ion. The authors s ta tes ' g ene r a l l y speak ing , people 
understand that human r ights include chi ldren. In addit ion, because o f their particular position, ch i ldren have been g iven 
specia l provis ion; the C R C can be considered lex specialis wi th regard to the Universa l Declarat ion of Human Rights-
Emphas is added. ) ; I lerd is Thorgeirsdott ir . Article 13: The Right to Freedom of Expression, in A COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD. 4 (Andre A len et al. eds . 2006 ) : ' A f f o r d i n g ch i ldren this right 
|to express ion] in a specia l instrument in addit ion to the other instruments that do not dis l ingui ,sh be tween chi ldren and adults 
m being holders of this right, is a recognit ion of the s i gn i f i c ance of chi ldren acqu i r ing cogni t ive , emot iona l , soc ia l and moral 
competenc ies absorbing inf luence from the environment and express iong their react ion, opin ions , and sen t iments ' . 
I l l 
b. How are the Reasons for Separation Addressed in the Context of CEDAW 
and CRPD? 
CEDAW's Preamble envisions certain entitlements to rectify- discrimination and to remedy its 
adverse effects. W o m e n are repeatedly granted 'fuU equaUt}' with men': worded as 'equalitjf o f 
rights of men and women' two times, 'full enjoyment o f rights o f men and women,' and 'equal 
rights of men and women'. 'EquaHtj'' and 'equal rights' o f men and women are mentioned at 
least eight times in the Preamble alone. In the realisation o f this equalit)' women are entided to 
have 'maximum participation o f women on equal terms with men in all fields'. Further, 
according to C E D A W ' s Preamble, the traditional roles o f men and women are to be changed, 
and even a 'new international economic order based on equit)- and justice' is to be established 
with the goal o f promoting equaHt}' between men and women. The Preamble states that women 
are entitled to the elimination o f discrimination 'in all its forms and manifestations'. 
Interestingly, C E D A W ' s Preamble states that the 'full and complete development o f a country' 
and even the 'welfare o f the world and the cause o f peace' require the maximum participation o f 
women on equal terms with men'. It seems that even larger goals that exist beyond o f the goal 
of women's equality depend upon women's participation. As such, it seems that according to 
CEDAW's Preamble the equal participation is almost a dire requirement for humanit)'. While 
many articles could be examined beyond the Preamble, it is already apparent that the evident 
focus of C E D A W is on enabling equaUt)- and participation, as compared to men, through 
addressing the ways in which society discriminates against w o m e n . " 
The Preamble o f the C R P D states that persons with disabihties arc entitled to: 1) the full 
enjoyment o f human rights (not just those mentioned in the C R P D ) " , 3) full protection, 3) 
freedom from discnmination, 4) full participation (mentioned twice), 'including [for] those who 
" This chapter is nol arguing that CEDAW is unproblemalic. Indeed many have argued veo' similar critiques of CEDAW. 
Mackinnon inquired whether separating the category' "woman' (in CEDAW) from human rights discourse makes women's 
r ights n o n - h u m a n . See CATHERINE MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER DIALOGUES ( 2 0 0 6 ) . M a n y o t h e r s h a v e 
argued that the universalisation of the category woman has further marginalised those who do not fit into CEDAW's 
normative framew ork of w hat it means to be a woman (much like what is being argued here regarding children;. See 
generally Dianne Otto. Discovering •Masculinilies V Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of Internationa! Human Rights 
Law. in INTERNATIONAL L A W : MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES ( D o r i s B u s s a n d A m b r e e n a M a n j i e d s . , 2 0 0 5 B E L L HOOKS, 
AIN'T IA WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM ( 1 9 8 1 ) : Jane t Ha l l ey . Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the 
Criminalization of Sex-Related I "iolence in Positive International Criminal Law. 30 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW I (2008). Nonetheless it is argued here that while the categoo" 'woman' has been heavily criticised, similar critiques of 
the child, in the context of law , have little footing. 
" While the Preamble .states that the UNDR and other international covenants on human rights apply to everyone. Article 41 
of the CRC states that 'nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the 
realisation of the rights of the child and which may be contained in: (a) the law of a Slate party: or (b) international law in 
force for that Stale'. The statement 'more conducive to the realisation of the rights of the child-, is interesting, if not utterly 
confusing. Indeed the relationship of other human rights found in other conventions was considered by some during the 
d r a f t i n g o f t h e C R C a s u n c l e a r SHARON DETRICK. T H E UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD , A GUIDE 
TO THE -TRAVAUX PREPARATIORES' . 1 3 0 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
require more intensive support', 5) individual autonomy and independence with the abilit}' to 
freely make their own choices, 6) the opportunity' to be actively involved in decision-making 
processes, even those that do not direcdy affect them, 7) assistance provided by die state to both 
the family and the disabled person for the fuU enjoyment o f the disabled person's nghts, and 8) 
protection o f rights and dignity o f the person with disabilit}' with the aim to help address the 
profound social disadvantages they face. Further, C R P D ' s Preamble states that, states should 
equalize opportunities for persons with disabilities and notes the importance o f mainstreaming 
disability' issues. Similar to C E D A W , the Preamble o f C R P D also states that the promotion of 
human rights and o f full participation o f persons will disabilities will result not only in their 
enhanced sense o f belonging, but also will result in 'significant advances in the human, social and 
economic development o f society' and the eradication o f poverty.' As with C E D A W , it seems 
that not only do persons with disabilities benefit for their own participation, but also their 
participation benefits society as well. The focus in the C R P D appears to be on enabling equality 
and participation o f persons with disabilities. Though the barriers to realising equality and 
participation for women and persons with disabilities may differ, and therefore are addressed in 
different ways, the aim o f both C E D A W and C R P D appears to be promoting equality and full 
participation. 
c. What are the Implications for the Rights of the Child? 
I f children are not deemed a special group because they experience social discrimination by 
virme o f being categorised a 'child', then why separate them from the human family? According 
to the CRC, children are separated from the human family, not because o f social discrimination, 
but rather because o f their own 'physical and mental immamrity'. Although future emancipation 
is the en-s-isioned goal o f childhood,^" the immediate practical result o f the rights package 
conferred on the category 'child' is that inequality, -s-ulnerability, and disempowerment are not 
'corrected' by making children a special category in the CRC; rather they are radier reinforced. 
This entrenchment o f inequality, \-ulnerability, and disempowerment is accomplished by a variety 
o f means in the CRC, five o f wliich will be discussed here. 
First, die Preamble o f the C R P D , C E D A W , and the CRC recognise fuU entidement to the rights 
and freedoms 'in the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and m International Covenants on 
Human Rights' without distinction o f any kind. While the CRC states that discrimination is 
Preamble: "Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society'. See also Berrv Mavall. 
( alues and Assumptions Underpinning Policy for Children and Young People in England 4( I) CHILDREN'S GEOGRAPHIES 9. 
N (2006); Catherine McDonald. The Importance of Identity in Policy: The Case For and Of Children. 23 CHILDREN & 
prohibited on the grounds of 'the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, propert}-, 
disability, birth or other status',^' the child is not specifically protected from discrimination on 
the basis of her/his status as a 'child' in the CRC.^^ Both the CRPD"' and CEDAW''* exphcidy 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disabiUty and gender respectively. The CRC does not 
explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of 'maturit)''. Moreover, in the CRC, the word 
'equal' is mentioned only once"^ and then only in relation to all members of the 'human family', 
never specifically with regard to the child. In contrast, the CRDP and CEDAW both underline 
the importance of equahty numerous times. The implication appears familiar: children are not 
entitled to such equahty during the period of childhood. 
Second, the child's delayed participation contrasts with calls for the woman's 'maximum' 
participation and the persons with disabiUties' 'full' participation. It is interesting that while the 
CRPD contemplates that certain persons with disabihties may be more vulnerable to 
discrimination because they may require more support, the CRPD does not then require its 
subject to give away her or his autonomy. Rather, the CRPD reaffirms the need to protect and 
assist the person with disabihtj^'s right to autonomy in hght of the possibihty of discrimination in 
the course of dependence. Such autonomous participation is simply not conceived for children 
in the CRC. For example during the drafting of Article 12, it was roundly accepted that the child 
should only be given the right of participation in matters that affected the child and only as the 
child matured.^' The debate focused on in what instances the child should have the right to 
participate, conditioned upon the adult's determination of the child's maturit)', not whether 
qualified participation was either fair or appropriate.^' While Article 12 gives a child the right to 
The nebulous 'other status' leaves open the possibilit\' for the age category' 'minor' to be a status for discrimination, 
although this has not been interpreted as such to date. 
It is noteworthy that in Bruce Abramson. Article: 2. The Right of Non-Discrimination, in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD ( A n d r e A l e n ct al. eds . . 2 0 0 8 ) , the i s sue o f d i s c r im ina t i on aga ins t the 
category 'child' is not addressed. Also the Travaux Preparatiores is silent on this issue SHARON DETRICK, THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A GUIDE TO THE ' T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 1 4 1 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
Discrimination based on one 's status as a 'child' seemingly does not necessitate discussion. 
CRPD Preamble: -Recognizing also that discrimination against any person on the basis of disability is a violation of the 
inherent dignity and worth of the human person'. 
^^  Article I of CEDAW states, ' IHorthe purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against women" shall 
mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or 
nullilying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field". 
" The Preamble states that, 'recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and pcace in the world'. 
SHARON D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S CONVENTION ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A GUIDE TO THE ' T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES' . 2 2 4 - 2 2 8 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" It was eventually decided, in 1989. that the child, if deemed at the appropriate level of maturity by an adult, should have a 
say in all matters affecting the child. Notably. Article 12 of the CRC places two conditions on the child's ability to participate 
I) that the child is determined to have a requisite maturity, and 2) that the matter is determined to directly affect the child. 
participate, the overriding assumption remains that children should have a ver)' limited right to 
participate, at least as a starting point. This point is further made clear in the next section, as weU 
as in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Third, the role of the family in the CRC as compared to the CRPD is noteworthy. Like the 
CRC, the CRPD envisions a person with disability to be in the care of the family. The CPRD 
Preamble states that 'the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of societ)' and is 
entided to protection by societ)- and the state'. The CRC states that 'die family, as the 
fundamental group of society' and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all 
its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessar)' protection and 
assistance'. Though both conventions describe the family as fundamental, they feature divergent 
concepmalisations of how the family functions within the rights matrix of each category'. The 
CRC identifies only the family unit as entided to assistance and protection, whereas in the CRPD 
both the person with disability and the family are given protection and assistance. In the CRC 
the purpose of conferring assistance and protection to the family is to enable '[the family to] fuUy 
assume its responsibilities within the community,' making the child more of an object of law, 
rather than a subject. The child will only become a fuU subject (with the right to participate and 
the right to equality before the law), according to the Preamble, after the duration of childhood.^' 
Arguably, CRPD's aim, even within the family context, is to ensure the fuU and equal rights of 
the person with disabiht)'. This is in contrast to the CRC's conception of assistance to the family 
as a means of preparing the child for eventual enjoyment of their rights. There is no mention of 
the family being given assistance and protection contingent on a mandate to help the child realise 
her or his full and equal rights, as done in the CRPD. I'he focus for family care is rather 
ensuring the 'full and harmonious development of [the child's] personality'', by necessitating the 
delay in the attainment of full and equal rights for children.™ The Preamble of the CRC, by mrn. 
Neither of these conditions is placed on any other category of humans. See generally SHARON DETRICK. THE UNITED NATIONS 
C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE ' T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 2 2 4 - 2 2 8 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
CEDAW too envisions a woman as being a part of a family . Nonetheless, a women ' s maternal role or biological 
difference are not to affect her equal status within the family or at home. The Preamble of CEDAW states that. -Iblearing in 
mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the family and to the development of society, so far not fully 
recognised, the social s ignif icance of maternity and the role of both parents in the fami ly and in the upbringing of children, 
and aware that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the upbringing of children 
requires a sharing of responsibility between men and women and society as a whole ' . 
•[ r|he child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society ' . According to Art ic le 5. the child too may 
acquire adult rights as the child demonstrates (to adults) his or her evolution into maturitv. This wi l l be discussed further in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
Bern- Ma>'all. The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children's Rights. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S 
RIGHTS 243. 243-244 (2000). Regarding the idea that the focus of childhood a l w a y s regards the future person/adult as 
o p p o s e d t o t h e p r e s e n t p e r s o n / c h i l d , see generally A L L I S O N J A M E S . C H R I S J E N K S , A N D A L A N P R O U T . T H E O R I S I N G CHILDHOOD 
( 1 9 9 8 ) : E R I C E R I K S O N . C H I L D H O O D A N D S O C I E T Y ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
grants children; 'special care and assistance,' 'particular care,' 'special safeguards and care'. The 
child's ™lnerabilit)', immaturit)', and dependence as a result of being inherendy 'immature', are 
remedied in the CRC through 'care'. 'Care' translates into the child's 'right' (or requirement) to 
grow-up in a family environment, which as will be argued in Chapter 7, results in the child being 
subject to the hierarchical structure of the family. Though this will be discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 7, 'care' in the CRC translates into a requirement that certain adults 
exercise the child's autonomy on behalf of the child. The net result is that the child's immaturit)', 
dependence, and \-ulnerability are remedied by providing the child with care, which in the CRC's 
view necessitates the child relinquishing, to a large extent, autonomy rights in exchange for rights 
that are deemed more appropriate for children (for example, right to play, right to care). 
Chapters 6 and 7 expand this discussion. 
Fourth, to underscore the difference in how these conventions treat their subject, it is important 
to note that in the Preambles of the CRPD and CPT5AW, persons with disabilities and woman 
are given responsibilities and duties to their community' and other individuals. Children, in 
contrast are envisioned as being incapable of having duties and responsibilities" due to their 
'physical and mental immaturity'. Only adults hold responsibilities in the CRC.'^ I-inaUy, while 
CEDAW and CRPD urges that not only wiU their respective subjects benefit from their 
participation and fuU enjoyment of human rights, but so too wiU societ)-. Indeed, CEDAW and 
CRPD arguably cast societ\''s future (its development, process) as dependent upon such 
participation and enjoyment. In contrast, the CRC seems to present the idea that deferring 
certain human rights for the period of childhood benefits not only children (protects children 
from their own 'physical and mental immaturit)'' by offering 'special assistance'), but also 
benefits societ)' as the child is currendy not 'fully prepared to live an individual life in societ)'' and 
does not yet know 'the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations' ." It seems that 
societ)' and the categorj- 'child' require this period where children must have limited and qualified 
set of rights ('care', 'assistance' and so on as mentioned in the previous paragraph). Chapter 8 
discusses how childhood becomes a site of regulation, a period where the child is disciplined into 
what it means to be a child according to the CRC. That moulding process, in other words 
turning children into productive citizens, is what benefits not only children but also societ)'. 
" The chi ld ' s inability to have responsibi l i t ies and dut ies was not discussed dur ing ihe draf t ing of the C R C . The ch i ld ' s 
immaturity and thus incapacity mus t have been loo obvious to debate. SHARON DETRICK, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE " T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
The Preamble refers to the family as having responsibil i t ies. Article 5. for example , states that parents have 
responsibilities, but nowhere does the C R C speak about the child as having responsibil i t ies. 
" Preamble. 
In sum, the litany of difference in rights envisioned for and conferred upon subjects of CEDAW 
and CRPD versus the subjects of the CRC could highlight an alternative, non-emancipatot}' 
reading of the CRC, where children suffer: discrimination on the basis of age, delayed 
participation, subordination in the family contcxt (to parents), and a lack of recognised duties or 
responsibilities. In contrast to the normative aims of the CEDAW and CRPD, in support of 
other Siilnerable' categories, it would appear that goals such as assistance towards participation, 
equality, and freedom from discrimination by virtue of being a 'child' arc not the aim of the 
CRC. The aim is rather assistance into the context of the family and 'care', winch, as will be 
further discussed in Chapter 7, can result in limited participation and inequalit)'. In the context 
of the category 'child', it would appear that differential treatment is viewed as eminently 
acccptable because cliildren are 'fundamentally different'. Fundamental difference is a 
worrj'ingly familiar claim. Bob Franklin argues that, 
it is clear that the case for the exclusion of different groups from fuU political rights 
has never been cogently argued and could withstand no more than curson' 
examination. Political history is littered with examples: women, propert\'-less, black, 
and slaves have all been the victims of common sense. It was argued that women 
lacked the rationality', judgment and knowledge of the political world necessary to 
exercise the obligations of citizenship, which those without property had proven 
their inability to direct their own affairs by their very property-less-ness. In 
democratic societies the presumption must always be against exclusion, and the 
burden of proof must rest with those who propose to dis franchise. 
While many argue that there is limited or no analogy between the critiques of other human 
categories and the category 'child', it is nonetheless notable how many rimes the 'biological' 
differences in 'rationality, judgment and knowledge' between children and adults been cited, 
most notable in the Preamble of the CRC. Yet, as the previous chapter examined, that which is 
perceived as 'facts', in this case about childhood, are but one story or version of childhood (see 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 for further discussion). The CRC's requirement of dependency and 
^-ulnerability for childhood also makes 'sense' when viewed through the lens of power, through 
the adult - child binary-, explored in the next chapter. An examination of how international 
discourse views elderhood further makes this point. 
II. REMEDIES FOR CHANGING CAPACITY - ELDERHOOD 
B O B F R A N K L I N . T H E R I G H T S OF C H I L D R E N . 2 6 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . 
The issue of capacity is central to a discussion about children's rights, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
The internal 'problem' children possess is the child's inherent lack of maturity, and thus legal 
capacity. While the issue of capacity' has been challenged in the context of gender and in a post-
colonial critique of rights, capacity nonetheless remains central to the discussion of children and 
their rights. Section I drew an analog)' between the rights given to women, persons with 
disabilities, and even elders, groups constructed as S-ulnerable', 'disempowered', and 'unequal'. 
Elderhood, however, provides a further basis for comparison with childhood. Elderhood, in 
contrast to adulthood and more like childhood, is a period in which an adult is perceived as 
having vatying capacity, as opposed to static capacity." Despite similarities in how the law 
constructs the capacity of children and the capacity of elders, this section argues that incapacity 
for children jfields the relinquishment of autonomy rights, whereas incapacity for elders results in 
greater respect for autonomy rights. If vatying capacity is at issue with both of these categories, 
why does the law treat these two categories differently? This section posits that the law's 
differential treatment of these two categories reflects not some inherent difference of childhood, 
but rather the CRC's adherence to the adult - child binaty' (discussed in the next chapter), where 
adults are presumed capable and children incapable. T'he adult - child binar\' upholds the 
hierarchical position of the adult over the child, despite the law's own contradictoty' position on 
capacity as it relates to the child and the elder. 
Two broad similarities can be identified when comparing childhood and elderhood: 1) both are a 
temporaty' state and 2) all persons at one point in their life can reasonably expect to fall into 
diese identity categories. These congruencies give further insight mto the political forces that 
come into play in the CRC's construction and treatment of the categoty 'child'. Elderhood, Hke 
childhood, is a definitive period of time; a person has not always been an elder. While aU adults 
have been a child, a large number of adults will become an elder (or at least expect to become an 
elder). Though similar in their temporal nature, childhood and elderhood fall at distinguishable 
periods in a lifecycle. Children will graduate, unlike elders, many persons with disabilities, 
women. Our savage will be civilised.'' Our child will become an adult. It could be argued that 
the temporaty, yet receding, state of childhood is one of the possible reasons why the 
subjugation of children is deemed less important. Children will simply grow up ." The elder will. 
Jenks notes that, ' l i ln the obvious . . . all people 'need' others in order to generate a meaningful environment for change, 
stasis, or whatever; quite simply we cannot make sense alone. Adults, however, are assumed within social theory to operate 
with a degree of ba.sic reciprocity of perspectives and interchangeability of standpoints in terms of processes of meaning 
g i v i n g a n d m e a n i n g r e c e i v i n g " . C H R I S J E N K S , C H I L D H O O D . 4 0 - 4 1 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
" CHRI S J E N K S . C H I L D H O O D . 3 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
" Onora O'Neill. Children i Rights and Children "s Lives, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-RE-VISIONED. 31 (Rosalind Ekman Ladd 
ed. 1996). 
however, remain an elder for the rest of his or her life. Further, most adults will evenmally enter 
elderhood, adults will never again return to childhood. This section will suggest that unlike 
childhood, a state that adults do not have to fear returning to, entermg elderhood is highly likely. 
Who would support the disenfranchisement of a categor)' that we will one day join? The 
political stakes in keeping up the appearance of the adult - child binar)', a self-mterested 
endeavour, become even more apparent. 
Here, the focus is on contrasting sets of rights surrounding the notion of (in)capacit}'. As with 
the previous section, the discussion will here centre on why elders, as compared to children, are 
singled out for special mention in die law, what remedies are afforded to the group, and what 
implications may arise for the rights of the child. UNPOl' is representative of the discourse of 
international rights/international agendas on the elderly.'" This document was not conceived as 
a full statement of the rights for persons who are elderly; no such document currently exists." 
However, these principles give substantial indication of how elders arc conceived in international 
human rights law discourse. 
a. Why Are These Groups Separated from the Human Family? 
The Preamble of UNPOP does not directly use the words 'discrimination' and 'equalit)-'; yet it 
makes some interesting points related to social discrimination, capacity, and divcrsit)'. First, 
unlike the CRC, the wording of UNPOP suggests that elders face discrimination based on 
societal views, similar to the Preambles of the CRPD and CHDAW. UNPOP identifies that 
social perception of disabilit)' plays a role in the discrimination that elders face, stating that 
'scientific research disprov[es] many stereot)-pes about inevitable and irreversible decHnes with 
age'. UNPOP even employs 'science' to underline the point that 'declines with age' are neither 
inevitable nor irreversible, casting doubt on a relationship that could correlate increasing age with 
decreasing rights. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of how 'science', in particular certain more 
traditional strains of developmental psychology', is employed to support the notion tiiat 
Greal Britain. The Human Rights of Older People in Healthcare: Eighteenth Report of Session 2006-2007. 124: " Although 
not binding on governments, the UN principles are designed to inlluenee national programmes for older people and provide 
a useful framework for policy markers'. See also 1982 Henna International Plan of Action on Aging, adopted by the World 
Assembly on Aging, available: http://www.un.org/ageing/documents/Intlday/pgme08.pdf; 2002 Madrid International Plan 
of Action on Aging, adopted by the World Assembly on Aging, http://www.c-
fam.org/docLib/20080625 Madrid_Ageing Conference.pdf 
" There have been calls for such a convention. See for example CONGO Committee on Ageing. (2008) A Call for a 
Convention on the Rights of Older Persons, http://www.un.org/ageing/documcnts/lntlday/pgmc08.pdf; Jan Williams. An 
International Convention on the Rights of Older People?, in Emerging .ireas of Human Rights in the 21" Centura' 128 
(Odello. M. & Cavandoli. S. eds.. 2011). 
increasing age/maturity for children should be a precondition for the grant of autonomy rights 
to children. 
Second, while both the CRC and UNPOP refer to variation in capacity of their respective 
subject, UNPOP starts with the vety strong assumption that elders possess capacity, whereas the 
CRC starts out with the assumption that children are immature, both physically and mentally, 
and are thus incapable."" The CRC goes on to recognise that children may acquire maturity in 
Articles 5 and 18, by recognising die 'evolving capacities of the child'.'" Nonetheless, these 
differences in constructing identities based upon notions of default capacity, reveal vcty' different 
conceptions of the identities of children and elders, and as such become the basis for differential 
treatment. Third, UNPOP notes that there is 'tremendous diversity in the simation of older 
persons, not only between countries but within countries and between individuals that require a 
variety of policy responses'. This is interesting particularly as the principles themselves admit 
that while elderhood is being made into a distinct categoty, there stiU exists 'tremendous' 
diversity within the catcgoty' itself As discussed in Chapter 2, there are some those who criticise 
the CRC's attempt to universaHse the categoty child with the result that it recognises only certain 
versions of childhood.''^ Chapter 9 argues that the CRC's construction of a universal 'child' is an 
exclusionaty process that recognises vety- little diversity within the categoty' 'child'. 
Finally, the Preamble acknowledges that the 'strains on family life . . . require support for those 
providing care to frail older persons'. In this, UNPOP acknowledges the potential biological or 
inherent causations exist for an elder's differential treatment. This picture drawn of elderly 
persons, as a drain on the family, describes elders as more 'child-like', as 'burdens' for those who 
have to care for/provide for/be responsible for the elder. It is true that the result is a 
requirement of 'support' for those care-takers in UNPOP. Nonetheless, UNPOP specifies a 
focus on 'frail' older persons, not on aU older persons. In this way, the diversity within the 
categoty' 'elder' is again underlined, making the role of the family, and the construction of the 
elder's identity (as exceptionally 'in need'), quite different than that envisioned for children (see 
The Preamble of UNPOP stales lhal 'opportunities must be provided for willing and capable elders to participate in and 
contribute to the ongoing activities of society'. Here UNPOP refers to the possibilit>- that some elders may be 'incapable'. 
If opportunities must only be provided to those willing and capable, there must be some that are not w illing and not capable. 
The notion of 'evolving capacities', found in Article 5 of the CRC. means that the child's capacities will progress and 
develop over the period of childhood and thus as the child develops capacity, the child's autonomy and responsibilities 
should increase a c c o r d i n g l y . See far example GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF 
CHILDREN, 53 {1998); Michael Freeman. Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child Conflicts, in A COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD. 6 5 ( A n d r e A l e n et a i .eds . 2 0 0 7 ) ; M i c h a e l F r e e m a n , The Future 
of Children S Rights. 1 4 C H I L D R E N & S O C I E T Y 2 7 7 . 2 8 9 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
See generally Erica Burman. Local. Global or Globalised? Child Development and International Child Rights Legislation 
3 CHILDHOOD 45 (1992) ; Olga Nieuwenhuys, Editorial: Is There an Indian Childhood. 16 CHILDHOOD 147 (2009); Vanessa 
Pupavac. Misanthropy Without Borders: The International Children's Rights Regime. 25(2) DISASTERS 95, 101 (2001). 
Chapters 2 and 6 for further discussion). For the CRC's child there is ver^- Utde diversit,' 
recognised withm the category- children (elaborated in Chapter 9). In the case of the CRC's 
'child', 'science', in particular certain more conser%'ative strains of developmental psychology' are 
employed to rationaHse the assumption that the child lacks inherent capacit)'. As a result, social 
discrimination, so prevalent as a context envisioned for the rights of elders, women, and die 
disabled, IS not identified as a priman* issue for children's rights. Rather, in the CRC, it is the 
child's 'internal' biological immaturit)- that remains the primary- hurdle to the exercise of rights, a 
hurdle that must be overcome with the help of die CRC (in other words, adults). Unlike 
CEDAW and more like CERD, UNPOP's principles regarding elders identify' certam internal 
conditions that elder face that make them \ailnerable. The next subsections discuss die ways m 
which these 'internal problems' are addressed through rights differendy in the case of children as 
they are in the case of elders. 
b. How are the Reasons for Separation Addressed in the Context of UNPOP 
To remedy the discrimination faced by elders, UNPOP addresses five principles: independence, 
participation, care, self-fulfilment, and dignity. Under independence, the elder 'should have 
access to food water, shelter, clothing, and health-care through the provision of income, family 
and community support, and self-help'.'*^ In paragraphs 2 and 3, die elder is entided to access to 
work or 'income-generating oppormnities', as well as the ability 'to participate in determining 
when and at what pace withdrawal from the labour force takes place'. Self-help, access to 
income-generating opportunities, and participation in the determination of when to leave the 
labour force are not envisioned as possible in the context of the CRC's child. As will be argued 
in Chapters 6 and 7, the CRC's child is to be predominandy envisioned as not engaged in paid 
labour. The child is to be provided for by adults,'''' and required to instead attend (unpaid) 
primary education.''^ As such, the child has little say regarding her or his entry into the work 
force. 
Under the principle of participation, the elder is entided to remain integrated in society and to 
participate actively. Here the focus is on participation of elders, unlike the CRC's qualified 
participation for children. While children under the CRC have the right to participate in all 
decisions that direcdy affect them, children's participation is subject to an adult's assessment of 
" Paragraph 1. emphasis added. 
'" See Articles 5. 18. and 27 for example. 
Article 38(a) mandates primar> cducalion. 
the child's 'evoh-ing capaci t ies ' (in o the r w o r d s , h o w ma tu re they really are)."" U N P O P also 
speaks of the elder 's ability t o form m o v e m e n t s o r associat ions of older persons . Whi le the child 
is given the ' r ight ' to assemble and associate, this r ight, and all o the r rights in the Conven t ion , are 
limited by the d i rec t ion and gu idance o f pa ren t s (which will b e argued in Chap te r s 6 and 7 
amounts to substantial c o n t r o l ) . " 
Unlike the child, elders have the r ight to social and legal ser\ 'ices that cnhance their au tonomy , 
protection, and care. T h e child is n o t guaran teed the right to legal ser\-ices, even w h e n s h e / h e is 
involved in penal matters."" U N P O P also dcHneates that elders ' dignit)', beliefs, needs , and 
privacy be fully respected , as well as the r ight to m a k e decis ions abou t their care and the quality 
of their lives. N o t only are these same rights fo r the child subject first to the parents 
'responsibilit)'' to 'guide ' the child in h e r / h i s decisions, n o w h e r e in the C o n v e n t i o n is the child to 
be respected by adults carers , w h e t h e r their paren ts o r state carers."" ITiis discussion will be 
taken up fu r the r in C h a p t e r 7. T h e 'best interests o f the child ' remain the omnisc ien t and 
primary consideration^". T h e child m u s t respect the parents.^' T h e state m u s t respect the 
responsibilities o f the parcnts.^^ The state m u s t respect the rights of the child.^' But never are 
adults required to respec t the ch i ld . " In this way, the C R C casts the child as requiring no t 
Article 5. 
" Article 5. 
This point will be taken up more thoroughly in Chapter 8. The main argument for having 'appropriate assistance' is that 
such provision is alleged to reflect a ' m o v e towards a child centred just ice system". See Geraldine Van l iueren. Article 40: 
Child Criminal Justice, in A C O M M E N T A R Y ON THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . 7 ( A n d r e 
Alen at al. eds. 2006). Van Bueren argues that ' l o jvc rcmphas i s should not necessarily be placed on legal or non-legal 
qualifications of the ch i ld ' s representative; it is the quality of the representation which is important ' . Geraldine Van Bueren. 
Article 40: Child Criminal Justice, in A C O M M E N T A R Y ON THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D , 
19 (Andre Alen et al. eds. 2006). Chapter 8 will argue that only the 'difference" of childhood could explain this rationale as 
justified for children, even when such rationale would be considered entirely inappropriate for any other identity category. 
Article 40: I. States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused o f or recognized as having infringed the 
penal law to be treated in a manner consistent w ith the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, w hich reinforces 
the child's respect for the human rights and fundamenta l f reedoms of others and which takes into account the child's age and 
the desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society. 2. To this end. 
and having regard to the relevant provisions of international instruments. States Parties shall, in particular, ensure that: (iii) 
To have the matter determined w ithout delay by a competent , independent and impartial authority or judicial body in a fair 
hearing according to law. in the presence of legal or other appropriate assistance and. unless it is considered not to be in the 
best interest of the child, in particular, taking into account his or her age or situation, his or her parents or legal guardians". 
Emphasis added. 
Referring to the child who is imprisoned for a penal matter. Article 37 (c) does state that ' | e ]very child deprived of liberty 
shall be treated with humani ty and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner w hich takes into 
account the needs of persons of his or her age". 
Art ic les . 
" Article 29. 
" A r t i c l e s . 
" Article 2. Also according to Article 37(c), the state shall ensure that when detained, the child "shall be treated with 
humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person". 
Article 39. which refers to social reintegration for child victims, is the only time that the child"s dignity and respect 
(notably - j e / / - r e s p e c t ) is ment ioned: "[sjtates Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim o f any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse: torture or 
any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration 
shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child'. Emphas is added. 
autonomy, respect or privacy, but rather 'direction' and guidance' given by a family (read adults) 
to 'help' the child (read regulate the child) in her or his exercise of the child's heavily quaHfied 
rights in the Convention. 
c. What are the ImpUcations for the Rights of the Child? 
UNPOP's usage of discourses siniilar to those used in CRC, such as changing capacity', 
\ailncrabilit>', burdens to families, does not result in the relinquishment of autonomy rights for 
elders, as is required of children. Even when U N P O P refers to a similar discourse regarding 
'development', by noting in paragraph 15 that 'older persons should be able to pursue 
opportuniues for the full development of their potential,' the deployment of the term 
'development' does not, as it does in the CRC (discusscd in Chapter 6), become the basis for 
diminishing the elder's right to autonomy. This differential treatment of the identit)' categorj-
'elder' and 'child' appears to be based on the difference perceived between the 'adult' and the 
'child'. While children and elders are in a period of changing capacity, childhood as developing 
capacity' and clderhood as declining capacit}-, these conceptions of the time at the beginning and 
at the end of one's life fit into accepted norms about adults being capable and children being 
incapable. This difference is based on the central issue of 'capacit}''. This section explains that, 
unlike CEDAW and CRPD, U N P O P recognises elders as potentially lacking capacit)'. 
Nonetheless, for elders there is a presumption that the elder has capacit)', whereas for children 
there is a presumption that the child lacks capacit)'. The latter involves a very high burden of 
proof, if not practically a conclusive presumption, as a result of social views about the capacities 
of children." 
A consequence of differential views regarding the elder's and the child's capacit)', elder law 
focuses on enhancing participation and autonomy, whereas child law focuses on 'care' or 
protecting the child from the child's own immamrit)' until he or she reaches adulthood. As was 
discussed in Chapter 2, the graduation from childhood is normally premised on the child 
reaching a particularly age. Indeed, the child is defined in the CRC as 'ever)- human being below 
the age of eighteen years." An age-based classification (premised on the idea that the child 
" See generally 1 lillar>' Rodham, A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES. 2 1 . 33 
(Patricia Vardin and Illene Brady cds.. 1979): Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 
CHILDHOOD 475 (1999); Michael 1-reeman. The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights. 6(4) INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 433 (1998): Michael Freeman. The Future of Children's Rights. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 
i n (2000). 
" According lo Article 1 of the CRC. the child becomes an adult at 18 years of age or as otherw ise specified by law. 
obtains legal capacity at a certain age) has no counterpart in elder law. The closest conception of 
children's capacity that is not based on age, but rather on a case by case assessment of capacity is 
encapsulated in the 'evolving capacities' concept of the CRC" and in one of the most 
noteworthy interpretations of this principle, the GiUick decision.^' Both represent the idea that as 
a child matures, she/he should be given increasing responsibility and autonomy. Gillick related 
to the question of whether a minor could consent to her own medical treatment without parental 
permission. The House of Lords decided that, '[a]s a matter of law the parental right to 
determine whether or not their minor child . . . will have medical treatment terminates if and 
when the child achieves sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand fuUy what is 
proposed'.^' Even if GUHck, and to some degree Article 7 of the CRC, represent a more flexible 
and autonomy-enabling criteria for children (as opposed to a mere age-based criteria), there 
remains a presumption of incapacity, a hurdle that no other categoty of persons need clear. 
Further, given social views about children as incapable, the presumption of capacity becomes an 
even larger hurdle.'" Notably, the Gi/lkk decision has been subject to significant retraction in 
subsequent decisions in favour of lingering parental rights.'"' 
In recent human rights histoty', for no identity categoty' other than children has diminution of 
autonomy rights been the 'remedy' for alleged 'difference'. This contrast becomes even more 
striking when the problems identified amongst identity categories are substantially similar.''^ 
Even when similar discourses are employed (dependence, development, family) and when similar 
Generally speaking Ihe idea of evolving capacities is that the child gains responsibilities/autonomy as the child matures. 
Article 7: States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or. where applicable, the members of 
the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally re.sponsible for 
the child, to provide, in a manner consistent w ith the evolving capacities of Ihe child, appropriate direction and guidance in 
the exercise by the child of the rights recognised in the present Convention. Emphasis added. 
" Gillick V, It'esl Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 11985| All ER 402 (IIL). 
" Gillick V. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 11985] All ER 402 (ML). 
Hillary Rodham. A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES, 21. 33 (Patricia Vardin and 
Illene Brody eds.. 1979); Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475 (1999): 
Michael Freeman. The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights. 6(4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
433 (1998); Michael Freeman. The Future of Children's Rights. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 277 (2000). 
" fif R [1991] 4 ALII ER 177, CA and Re [1992] 4 All 627. CA. (especially Lord Donaldson) weaken the Gillick 
decision. From these, and subsequent cases, it is clear that although the parental right to veto treatment ends, parental 
powers do not 'terminate', as suggested by Lord Scarman in Gillick. Rather. Gillick competency grants the child an ability 
to con.sent but does not affect the pow er of the parent. That is, if a child is Gillick competent both she and her parent w ill be 
able to consent. As a result, a child can be legally treated in circumstances where they refuse/resist treatment. See generally 
MICHAEL FREEMAN, CHILDREN'S HEALTH AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; M i c h a e l F r e e m a n , The Child in Family Law. in 
LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD. 187-196 (Julia Fionda cd. 2001). 
" Yet. the contrasting approaches in human rights law is taken as self-evident. Tony Campbell author writes: ' |a]nd yet. it 
scarcely makes sense to apply some of the rights in the UDHR to small children. Has a child the right to many and found a 
family? The right to work? The right to democratic participation? The child has a present interest in none of these things. 
These interests and the rights they generate apply to mature individuals, not to people at all stages of their development and 
in some cases their decline'. Tom Campbell. The Rights of the Minor: As Person. As Child As Juvenile, and Future Adult, in 
CHILDREN, RIGHTS, AND THE LAW. 17 (David Archard et al. eds.. 1993). This statement represents the widely held belief that 
children are fundamentally different from adults and thus should not have the same human rights, in particular autonomy 
rights. At the same time however, it is generally believed that those who have declining capacity, only in exceptional 
circumstances should such rights not be available. The differential treatment is curious and left unexplained by Campbell. 
problems are identified (difference that is aUcged to originate in part from biological difference 
opposed to purely social discrimination, temporary' category opposed to a categor)- that one will 
be for one's entire life, a period of changing opposed to stable capacity'), the law's treatment of 
the child IS quite different. Probably the most notable is the CRC's failure to endorse equalitj' 
before the law. Indeed this has been identified as 'odd' ." Freeman argues that providing for 
equaHt)- before the law should be a prerequisite of any international human rights convention.''" 
Such a lack might be precisely because the categon- 'child' is unequal before the law, even at the 
level of 'formal cqualit)-'. Comparing discourse on ciders that uses a similar vocabular;- of 
dependency and (declining) capacity', the goal remains to ensure greater participation and protect 
autonomy rights to the greatest extent possible. This is simply not the case for children, who as 
a result of being cast in the CRC as 'immature' and thus 'incapable', are required to be dependent 
on those adults who are empowered by the CRC to act on behalf of the child (discussed in 
Chapter 7). 
III. CONCLUSION 
I'his chaptcr has sought to compare the 'rights stories' told in certain international human rights 
conventions and declarations about women, persons with disabilities, and elders with those told 
about children in the CRC. When the CRC is considered alongside other specialised human 
rights conventions and declarations (CEDAW, CRl'D, and UNPOP), there are remarkable 
differences in the 'problems' identified and remedies mandated for children, despite arguably 
remarkable similarities between the rights categories. Section I compared the separation of the 
child from the human family with other arguably analogous groups likewise identified as 
vulnerable, unequal, and disempowered: women and persons with disabilities. Section 11 
examined the analogy produced by UNPOP in describing elders as another categor)' in a state of 
transitioning capacit)'. 
More specifically. Sections I and 11 examined how discourses that relate to disempowerment 
(inequalit)', vutoerabilit)', and capacitj') are recruited in CEDAW, CRPD, and UNPOP, as 
compared to the CRC. Unlike CEDAW, CRPD, and UNPOP, the CRC locates the 'problems' 
that children face (in other words, the basis for having a specific human rights convention 
dedicated to the category- cliild) as the result of the internal, inherent, and fundamental 
immamritj'/incapacit)' that children possess. Unlike CEDAW, CRPD, and UNPOP, the CRC 
' Michael Freeman. The Future of Children's Rights. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 277. 289(2000). 
' Michael Freeman. The Future of Children's Rights, 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 277, 289 (2000). 
does not acknowledge 1) that children face discrimination as a result of their status as a 'child', 
and 2) that children arc cntided to equalit}' before the law, specifically on the basis of their status 
as 'children'. From this comparison, it is arguable that the categor}' 'child' is unique in being 
ascribed rights that fail to address the discrimination and powerlessness children experience 
because of social factors that exist external to the child. Instead, the CRC locatcs the 
^Inerabilit)' and powerlessness of the child as internal and inherent result of 'being' a 'child'. 
Even when the CRPD and UNPOP imagine that their respective subjects as potentially lacking 
van'ing degrees of capacit}', the aim of the rights and goals in the CRPD and UNPOP remain 
firmly rooted in the maximisation of participation and autonomy. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
human identities are not stable. In the contcxt of maturit}', it is imagined that once humans 
reach the penultimate level of development, adulthood, they stay on that plane for the rest of 
their Hves."^ Adulthood is assumed to be internally coherent. Yet, adults not only have varj-ing 
capacit)' over the course of their lives, they also may have degenerative capacit)', as discussed 
above, lilderhood too is a temporan- state where the court and the law determine capacity*. 
However, unlike childhood, no age-based classification for ciders is considered, much less 
deemed appropriate for consideration. During childhood one is presumed incapable; during 
elderhood one is presumed capable. Indeed, the goals of elderhood law are seen in maximising 
the autonomy of elders and minimising the intrusion to the elder's right to autonomy. An 
alternative 'rights-stor\ ' that explains the differential treatment of the elder as compared to the 
treatment of the child relates not to the issues of var\ ing capacity, but rather to the political aims 
relevant to disciplining the child (for example, hetcrosexuaHt)', gender, 'good' citizen) who will 
become the adult. The elder wiU simply not become anything else, in the sense of their role in 
societ)'. Elders cannot simply grow up, for they are 'grown'. Children are marginalised and wiU 
indeed have a place in societ)'; they will grow up. The entire aim of the child's marginalisation 
could be described as a proccss of becoming 'fully prepared to live an individual life in socict}''."''' 
The argument for the child's bundle of rights in the CRC seems implicitiy that in providing 
guidance and direction, the child is more enabled to exercise her/his rights when and as his/her 
capacities evolve into adulthood (as discusscd in Chapter 2). The abdication of the child's right 
to autonomy (an inherent nght by virtue of being classified 'human') to another category of 
persons (in other words, adults/parents/professionals/courts) is thereby made justifiable. 
Regardless, this concept of enabling fuUire emancipation is still the denial of nghts in the 
_ C H R I S J E N K S , C H I L D H O O D . 4 0 - 4 1 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
immediate where the only practical remedy is to merely grow-up.'' The problem that remains is 
that human rights are deemed fundamental and inalienable, even the CRC proclaims as much. 
In no other (human rights) context is 'protection', much less 'the protection of rights' still 
equated with such paternalism.''" Put another way: protection nowhere else yields being required 
to relinquish one's own rights for one's own protection. The United States Supreme Court 
Justice Brennan's once argued that romantic paternalism puts a person 'not on a pedestal, but in 
a cage'.® He of course was speaking about the category 'women' but the thesis queries whether 
such a critique might apply to adult - child relationships. When comparing rights accorded to 
the other identit)' categories described in this chapter (women, persons with disabilities, and 
elders), one must ask: what makes the category 'child' fundamentally different from aU other 
human categories to allow deviation from so-callcd 'fundamental rights'? If identity categories 
have been subject to hea\7 deconstructionist critique, how is it that the CRC more successfully 
evades critique for its engagement in univcrsalising die 'child' based on biological 'facts' of 
childhood? The next chapter engages with some critical perspectives on the category' 'child' 
emerging from the field of sociology that help identify- certain 'truths' about childhood that make 
possible the differential legal treatment of the categorj- 'child' described in this chapter. 
" Onora O'Neil l , Children s Rights and Children J Lives, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-RE-VISIONED. 31 (Rosalind 1-kman 1 add 
ed.. 1996). O'Neill argues thai if children do not like the rights given to them. the> should merely grow up For further 
d i s c u s s i o n see M I C H A E L F R E E M A N . T H E R I G H T S A N D W R O N G S OF C H I L D R E N . 5 - 8 ( 1 9 8 3 ) 
® See E v a B r e m s . Children's Rights and Universality, in DEVELOPMENTAL AND AUTONOMY RIGHTS OF CHILDREN-
E M P O W E R I N G C H I L D R E N . C A R E - G I V E R S , A N D C O M M U N I T I E S . 2 1 ( J a n C . M . W i l l c m s e d . . 2 0 0 2 ) r e p r o d u c e d i n S A R A D I L L O N 
INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (2010). She notes that -protection' used by bourgeois society over the working ' 
class, men over women, and colonial powers over natives to justify control. 
Fronlierov. Richardson U.S. 677 (1973). 
CHAPTER 5 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CHILD AS FUNDAMENTALLY 
DIFFERENT: TRUTHS ABOUT CHILDHOOD 
OUTLINE 
CHILDHOOD AS A SOCIAL CONSTUCT 
II. CLAIMS TO TRUTH ABOUT CHILDHOOD 
a. Truth #1: Childhood^State of Development 
b. Truth #2: Child=Uniquely Vulnerable, and Thus in Need of Unique 
Protection 
c. Truth #3: Childhood=Period Defined by Children's Needs 
III. BINARY OPPOSITIONS: HOW THE 'TRUE' CHILD IS CONSTRUCTED 
a. Adult - Child Binary 
b. Good Child - Bad Child Binary 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While assumptions underlying other identity categories (for example, 'woman' or 'persons with 
disabilities') have been deconstructed, the catcgor}' 'child' in the context of children's rights 
appears to remain comparatively intact. WTiilc a good deal of academic work has aimed to 
deconstruct the category' child in and outside the discipline of law,' this thesis argues diat 
dominant legal discourses about international children's rights remain dependent upon some 
fundamental categorj' 'child'. Ze'ev Falk notes that, '|t]here is a certain irony in the fact that at 
this "post-modern" time rejecting all other ideologies, the ideology of "children's rights" and 
"children's autonomy" has gained a lot of authority'.^ Karin Lesnik-Obcrstein argues that 'the 
child has a tendency to recur as a foundational or essential real, even in some queer and feminist 
theoretical writings which express an explicit commitment to questioning essentialist notions of 
identity'.' As noted in the previous chapter, even within the international human rights 
discourse, the CRPD in a point of contrast with the CRC includes in its Preamble a rejection of 
essentialist notions of identity, even while the CRPD embraced the categoty' 'persons with 
disabilities'.* The drafters of the CRPD appear to have recognised disability as a fluid, relational 
concept that changes over time, nearing a description of disability as a social construct. Similarly, 
could social views about children and their 'impairments' define the boundaries of what it means 
to be a 'child'? As discussed in Chapter 2, even the most consen'ative of children's activists 
would acknowledge that the legal definition of childhood is arbitraty.^ The more important 
question, however, addressed by this thesis is whether the CRC, by embracing a particular image 
of the categoty 'child' and portraying that image as biological or inherent to the categoty' 'child', 
functions to regulate what a child is required to be? Simply put, does the description of the child 
in the CRC sen'e as a prescription of what the categoty' 'child' must be? This thesis argues that 
in universaHsing a particular 'child', the CRC also contributes to the regulation of the categoty' 
'child'. 
See generally A L L I S O N J A M E S , C H R I S J E N K S . a n d A L A N P R O U T , THRORISING CHILDHOOD ( 1 9 9 8 ) : J o B o y d e n , Childhood and 
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IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD (Al l i son J a m e s and A lan Prout eds . . 1997): Bcrr j ' M a y a l l . ed . . CHILDREN'S 
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Considerable literature existing predominantly outside the discipline of law argues that the 'child' 
and childhood are social constructs/ ' A body of literature self-labelled as the 'new' sociological 
perspectives regarding the category 'child' encompasses 'a robust and complex body of 
interdiscipHnar)' work' . ' This 'new' sociology of childhood combined with the theoretical 
approach to childhood laid out in Chapter 3, combine to highlight particular ' truths ' accepted 
about the category 'child' in the CRC. This chapter attempts to import insights f rom the new 
sociology of childhood building on the theoretical perspectives outlined in Chapter 3 to examine 
the CRC's articulation of the category' 'child'. While discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, 
three key arguments regarding t ru th /knowledge/power function as a starting point for this 
analysis: 1) society participates in producing what appears to be merely described, 2) certain 
ways of thinking (or ideologies) structure which views are taken seriously and which are 
marginalised, and as such, 3) dominant ways of thinking dictate which children are to be 
problcmatised and which children ignored. As one author writes. 
[ajbout children, it might seem tliere are real 'facts' that can be established, a 'true 
knowledge' to be told . . . For example, we may consider 'facts' such as the 
finding that child prostitutes and some sexually abused children show 
'precocious' sexual development. However, such a 'fact ' can only be 'discovered' 
within certain social regards, in which there is a prescribed appropriate or normal 
age to be a thing called sexual - it is this which creates the reality of 'precocious 
sexual development'; which may be then variously represented, for example: as a 
' See generally PHILIPPE A R I E S . C E N T U R I E S OF C H I L D H O O D : A S O C I A L 1 I ISTORY OF F A M I L Y L I F E ( 1 9 6 2 ) : D A V I D A R C H A R D . 
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( 1 9 9 8 ) : ERIK F.RIKSON. C H I L D H O O D A N D S O C I E T Y { 1 9 7 7 ) : S a r a h L. H o l l o w a y & G i l l V a l e n t i n e . Spaiialily and the New Social 
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OF C H I L D H O O D : SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N , ( 1 9 9 2 ) : P H I L I P V E E R M A N , T H E R I G H T S O F THE C I I I I D A N D THE 
CHANGING IMAGE OF CHILDHOOD (1992); Gill Valentine. Angels and Devils: Moral Landscapes of Childhood 14 
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T H E C H A N G I N G S O C I A L V A L U E OF C H I L D R E N ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; N E I L P O S T M A N . T H E D I S A P P E A R A N C E OF C H I L D H O O D ( 1 9 9 4 ) - M A R T I N 
I I O Y L E S , T H E P O L I T I C S O F C H I L D H O O D ( I 9 8 9 ) . 
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personal pathologj- to be treated; a social problem to be tackled; or a 'turn on ' to 
be savoured." 
As argued in Chapter 2, how one answers the question 'what is a child?' will dictate how one 
constructs what is ' true' about childhood, and therefore what rights are appropnate for children. 
While the argument that childhood is a social construction is persuasive and over 40 years old, 
questioning the stability- of childhood m the context of law is particularly difficult because it 
questions certain ideologies masquerading as ' truth' . ' Drawing from Foucault, Chapter 3 
describes the dissemination of ' truth' as one of the most important vehicles of power.'" As a 
consequence, questioning ' truths' about childhood may be arduous precisely because it questions 
certain warrants to power; power that enables the nominations of certain truth-claims as 'real' 
and others 'absurd'. 
This chapter will investigate various ' truths ' /knowledges about children that have been identified 
in interdisciplinary and non-legal literamre. Section I explores literature that alleges that the 
category 'child' is a social construct. Section II then examines various 'truths' about childhood 
that could explain why children are treated so dissimilarly in the CRC as compared to other 
intemacional human rights documents, discussed in the previous chapter. Section 11 explores the 
question; 'what is inherent to the categorj' child'. This section will look specifically at the work 
of academics who have identified and agitated specific ' truths' associated with childhood and the 
conception of the 'universal' child. More specifically. Section II will examine the following 
'truths' about childhood; 1) childhood is a period of development," 2) children arc uniquely 
™lnerable and thus in need of unique protection, and .3) childhood is a time defined by 
children's needs.'^ Drawing upon the theory of binan' oppositions discussed in Chapter 3, 
Section III will examine how the ' truths' described in Section II are constructed. Section III 
argues that the child is constructed through both the adult - child binan", as weU as the bad-child 
- good-child binan . " To understand what a child is, one must understand what a child is not (in 
other words, an adult). Ultimately this chapter argues that certain 'truths' about children arc 
accepted by the CRC. These 'truths' in turn rationaLise the differential treatment of children. 
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The CRC mandates that \-ulnerabilit5' yields even greater dependency on the child's binar)-
opposite (in other words, adult), rather than greater protection of child's own ability to 
participate in societ}' and greater protection against social discnmination. At the risk of being 
redundant, this thesis argues that the assumptions underlying 'truths' regarding children remain 
largely unquestioned within law, even as these assumptions heavily affect the rights package 
conferred on cliildren, even as these assumptions stand apart from the critical interrogation of 
childhood in other disciplines, and even when such assumptions are considered unthinkable for 
all other identit}' categories in the context of international human rights. 
I. CHILDHOOD AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 
This section sur\-cys literamre that argues that the category 'child' is a social construct as 
opposed to some biological given, as is accepted in the CRC. Chris Jenks contends that 
childhood is a social construct that makes reference to a social status variably delineated by 
boundaries that differ through time and from societ)' to societ)'.*'" Allison James and Alan Prout 
argue that '[c]omparative and cross cultural analysis reveal a variet)- of childhoods rather than a 
single and universal phenomenon'." This literature contends that childhood relates to a 
particular cultural setting." As such, the child is viewed as socially constructed rather than 
biologically determined. 
As one way of illustrating the variet)' in childhoods, a group of authors examine how childhood 
has been viewed historically and how those views have changed with time. Philippe Aries 
famously claims that the characteristics ascribed to the child have changed dramatically over 
timc.'^ In his widely-cited passage, Aries claims that 1) there was no awareness of the idea of 
childhood in medieval societ)', for the concept did not exist,'" and 2) the essence of modern 
childhood was not discovered until the seventeenth cenmr)-." According to Aries, persons 
under seven simply 'did not count' as parents had little attachment to them because of high 
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mortality rates.^" When a person developed motor skills sufficient to perform most tasks, 
approximately around the age of seven, they were accepted into the world of adults, to a much 
greater extent than is the case today.^' Aries maintains as a general theme that there was less 
contrast between persons over seven years of age and adults than exists today.^^ As a result, 
persons approximately over the age of seven were dressed like adults and everything was 
permitted in their presence, including course language. Aries argues that these persons 'heard 
everything and |saw| ever\'thing'. Adults exposed children to sexual simations, which could also 
include the child.^' Under this theory, children could not be 'tainted' because no one thought 
that childhood innocence really existed?" C:hildren played and worked with adults, where 
education was carried out by apprenticeship/^ Therefore, according to Aries, what we call 
'childhood', a period of transition that is, as \'iviana Zelizer describes, 'economically worthless 
but emotionally priceless^"', did not exist. 
Aries contends that around the seventeenth century, notions about childhood began to alter as a 
result of various contemporary religious and philosophical forces. Children were increasingly 
seen as innocent, one with nature, fresh from God, unsullied, and so on.^ ^ Aries argues that as a 
result, children were increasingly treated as different from adults. For example, clothing began 
to differ depending on the child's age group.^" Further, the notion of 'soiling' the child through 
exposure to sexual references gained purchase.^' The aim for child-rearing became increasingly 
oriented towards preser\'ation of innocence and suppression of ignorance and weakness.™ 
Children came to be viewed as requiring special treatment, which included being 'quarantine |d|' 
before they were deemed ready to join the world of adults." Aries also argues that the change in 
attimdes towards children accompanied a shift in which 'parents began to realise the pleasure 
they got from children'.'^ Interestingly, Aries argues that this transformation in ideas about 
children saw the situation of children worsen as he describes the modern family as oppressive 
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and intolerant of children." He characterised education as quarantine, in contrast to a previous 
era in which children 'naturally' intermingled with adult societ)'." While Aries thought modern 
historj' saw the deterioration of the situation of children, others saw it as progress. Lloyd 
deMause argued that the 'further back in histor)' one goes, the lower the level of child care, and 
the more likely children are to be killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorised, and sexually abused'.'^ 
His is most cited for contending that 'the histor)' of childhood is a nightmare from which we 
have only recently begun to awaken'."" 
While Aries and deMause both acknowledge that the treatment of children changed drastically 
dunng the seventeeth cenmr)- in Europe, James Schultz contends that pre-seventeenth century-
adults were not quite as indifferent to or ignorant of childhood as Aries and deMause argue.'' 
Yet, the constant in these historical accounts of childhood is a fluency in the characteristics and 
understandings of childhood. In fact, CoUn Hej-wood and David Archard contend that 'a' 
childhood was never discovered.'* H e w o o d contends that no one period has managed to 
discover some 'supposed timeless quahties associated with childhood—least of all innocence and 
dependence ' ." Schultz, concurs with the Hst of scholars sur\-eyed thus far, James, Prout, and 
Jenks, that, [t]he knowledge of childhood is the culturally constructed meaning of childhood, as 
articulated in discourses, practices and institutions'."*" 
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L L O Y D D E M A U S E , The Evolution of Childhood, in THE HISTORY OF C H I L D H O O D . 1 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
" JAMES SCHULTZ, THE KNOWLEDGE OF C H I L D H O O D IN THE G E R M A N M I D D L E A G E S . 10 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
See generally D A V I D A R C H A R D . CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD. ( 2 d . E d . 2 0 0 4 ) : C O L I N H E Y W O O D . A HISTORY OF 
CHILDHOOD: CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN THE W E S T FROM M E D I E V A L TO M O D E R N T I M E S ( 2 0 0 1 ) . 
" COLIN H E Y W O O D . A HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD: CHILDREN AND C H I L D H O O D IN THE W E S T FROM M E D I E V A L TO M O D E R N 
TIMES. 40(2001) . 
* JAMES SCHULTZ. THE KNOWLEDGE OF C H I L D H O O D IN THE G E R M A N M I D D L E A G E S . 10 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . S c h u l t z c r i t i q u e s A r i e s f o r 
neglecting lo define his ' idea of childhood' and his 'awareness of the particular nature of chi ldhood ' . Schultz argues that 
Aries must mean only a modem idea of childhood, thus judging the past based upon m o d e m ideas, as opposed to seeing 
them as merely different. Considering the polarising perspectives outlined in Chapter 2. this chapter likewise queries how 
Schultz defines this "modem awareness ' of childhood, as he seems to assume that this conception of childhood not only 
exi.sts. but IS sufficiently understood such that it is not in need of a definition. Further. Both Heywood and Archard state that 
there has always been the concept of childhood (an empty shell of sorts), but the conception of childhood (how that shell is 
filled with meaning) has changed. It is interesting that in l l eywood ' s and Archard 's Iheorx- there has always been a 'concept 
of the child . but different 'conceptions' . Thus the concept of the 'chi ld ' is an empty shell that has existed throughout time. 
How this shell IS imbibed has varied according to cultural differences. The major problem seems to surround disceming 
what this empty shell actually means. There seems to be great analogy here with Butler ' s assessment that gender merely 
ma.squerades as sex. JUDITH BUTLER. GENDER TROUBLE. 8 (1990): ' ISjex by definition will be shov^ n to have been gender all 
a n n o I h i c cVi^ll _ i - i j . „ . . ® 
childhood IS a social construct, this view imports elements of universality. Thus 1 ley wood too supposes a timeless quality 
about children and their resiliency, rather than a quality attributable to any disempowered group. It would seem that the 
concep of the child itself acknowledges that there is something essential, natural, and universal about childhood See 
nZnf/ Gill Valentine. Spatialify and the New Soetal Studies of Childhood. 34(4) SOCIOLOGY 763 
(2000) (where the authors outline the difference between the Social Stractural Approach (childhood=structural ca tegorN^an 
enduring feature of the social structure of all societies. Thus while there is recognition that the conditions o f e h i l d h L d vaiy 
When thinking about the CRC, acknowledging the diversit)' within the category' 'child' contests 
the CRC's claim to a universal unitary category' 'child'. This thesis argues that the CRC embraces 
a normative and universal vision of childhood; one that is in characterised by notions of 
development and protection. Yet, the literature sun-eyed in Section I presents tension between 
conceiving the category 'child' as a social construct, and the CRC's reliance on at least a roughly 
construed universal 'child' (Chapter 9 will extend this problem to the diversity' within the 
category child today). If post-modern accounts of the category 'child' contend that the 'child' is 
a social construction,'" how then is the 'child' constructed? The next section explores the work 
of certain sociologists who have identified several 'truths' or assumptions made about childhood 
that appear to be embraced in the CRC's vision of childhood. 
II. TRUTH CLAIMS/KNOWLEDGE/TRUTHS OF CHILDHOOD 
If one is to accept that the category 'child' is a social construct as opposed to a biological given, 
what then is understood as 'true' regarding children? What are the fundamental characteristics of 
childhood? This section explores three basic 'truths' of childhood that arguably have particular 
relevance to the CRC: 1) childhood is a state of development, 2) the child is uniquely vulnerable 
and therefore in need of unique protection, and 3) childhood is a period defined by children's 
needs. These three assumptions about childhood that have been critiqued by certain sociologists 
are easily identifiable in the CRC. Indeed this thesis argues that these three assumptions are 
foundational to the CRC's vision of the category 'child'. 'ITie operation of these truths in the 
CRC wiU be discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
a. Truth #1: Childhood=State of Development 
The vision of the child as developing matches dominant knowledges about childhood: from 
psychological to 'common sense' understandings of childhood."*^ Developmental psychology, the 
study of the psychology of childhood, was one of the first branches of psychology to be 
established, precisely because childhood was seen as the prime location to investigate how 
between times and places - as the cultural, social and economic characteristics of societies v a n - childhood itself is seen as 
a universal category) and the Socia l ly Constructed child approach (reject taken-for-granted assumptions about childhood and 
the existence of social structure which shape an identif iable childhood form and 'are more l ikely to be of the v iew that 
children are not formed by natural and social forces but rather that they inhabit a world of meaning created my themselves 
and through their interaction with adults)). 
See generally S t u a r t A i t k e n a n d T h o m a s H e r m a n . Gender. Power and Crib Geography: Transitional Spaces and Polenlial 
Places. 4 G E N D E R . P L A C E A N D C L I L T U R E 6 3 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 
R E X S T A I N T O N R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y S T A I N T O N R O G E R S , S T O R I E S OF C H I L D H O O D : SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N , 
5 1 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
nurture impinged on nature; in other words, how we, as people, bccame socialised, civUised, and 
acculturated.*" The mainstream developmental approach to childhood, provided by psychologj' 
is based on the idea of natural growth/' ' This approach is essentially an evolutionary- model: the 
child-to-adult continuum represents a progression from simplicit}- to complexit}' of thought, 
from irrational to rational behaviour.'*^ The persuasiveness of this particular psychological 
reasoning is attributed to developmental psychologj^'s hea\'y reliance on ways of thinking already 
found particularly influential in natural sciences."" In this account, socialisation is portrayed as a 
process analogous to the creation of a compound out of base elements: 
Sodium + Chloride=Sall; 
Heredity + Enmrotimetil—Socialised Indifidual." 
However, some academics contend that, unlike the chemist, but like the alchemist, these 
psychologists have never had any clear idea of how their metaphorical process (the melding of 
nature and nurmrc) actually operates."'" These psychologists can only speculate in vague terms 
about the way sociaKsation may operate, let alone how it may fail, be reversed, break down, and 
so on."" The interplay between nature and nurture, unlike chemical elements, requires theoretical 
and moral resolutions and extrapolations, rather than some objective obsen'ation and 
description.^" This thesis embraces the argument that development does not signify' a 'natural' 
process, but makes reference to a socially constructed sense of change during childhood, which 
"" R E X S T A I N T O N R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y S T A I N T O N R O G E R S . S T O R I E S OF C H I L D H O O D : S H I F T I N G A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N 
( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
"" ALLISON JAMES and ALAN PROUT, A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood^ Provenance. Promise and Problems, 
in C O N S T R U C T I N G A N D R E C O N S T R U C T I N G C H I L D H O O D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y ISSUES IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D . 
10-11 (1997). 11 should be noted thai Ihere are compeling perspeclives wiihin Ihe discipline of developmenlal psychology 
lhat have moved away from the idea of childhood as merely a single and simple Irajeclorv towards adulthood. See for 
example R E X S T A I N T O N R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y S T A I N T O N R O G E R S . S T O R I E S OF C H I L D H O O D : S H I F T I N G A G E N D A S OF C H I L D 
CONCERN (1992). Nonetheless, this thesis argues that the CRC adopts the more mainstream or conservative developmenlal 
psychology approach thai envisions the 'child' as an adult-in-progress. as will be argued in Chapter 6. Gerison Lansdown 
argues that. '|l|heories in developmenlal psychology have moved bey ond these traditional prescriptive models to embrace a 
more cuhural. social and contextual understanding of how children grow up . However, these ideas have not sufnciently 
permeated the wider world to influence law. policy and practice impacting on children's lives' GERISON LANSDOWN THE 
E V O L V I N G C A P A C I T I E S OF THE C H I L D , 13 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
« ALLISON JAMES and ALAN PROUT. A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood^ Provenance. Promise and Problems. 
TO U T L W ? ^ ' ' ^ ' ^ R E C O N S T R U C T I N G C H I L D H O O D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y ISSUES IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D . 
N QQ?T T ^ ^ M C H I L D H O O D : S H I F T I N G A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N , 
CHILDREN'S S ' M "fCluldhood in Relaiion ,o ChUdren s Righis. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
" S 0 9 9 ^ ™ ™ " A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N . 
38 U W ^ R ™ ™ " ^ S H I F T I N G A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N , 
I S 0 9 9 ^ ^ ™ " A G E N D A S O F C H I L D C O N C E R N . 
39 a f m " " S H I F T I N G A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N . 
is encoded within a series of benchmarks made relevant by predominate discourses/knowledges 
placed on the child.^' 
While the process of development is argued to be no more than a stor\' or 'truth-claim', some 
maintain that it has become a story with such compelling plausibility it has overwhelmingly 
acquired the stauis of incontrovertible truth: development during the course of childhood is the 
way children really are!"^ 'Natural children' are then tracked and plotted as they 'develop' through 
the 'socialisation process ' into adulthood, which is itself taken for granted in the prevailing social 
order.^' The psychologists Rex Stainton Rogers and Wendy Stainton Rogers label this account 
of childhood development as 'developmentalist hegemony' on account of its potency." Jenks 
argues that while social sciences have critically addressed and debunked dominant ideologies of, 
for example, capitalism in relation to social class, colonialism in relation to race, and patriarchy in 
relation to gender, the ideology of development in relation to childhood has remained relatively 
Moving beyond psychology, our every day understandings of children and childhood have been 
more broadly monopoHsed by a knowledge industr)- manufactured by the practitioner and 
academic entrepreneurs working in the fields of education, anthropolog)', sociology', social work, 
and others.^'' The dominant forms of knowledge in some sense 'manufacmred' by these 
industries can be said to legitimate a particular set of discourses upon the child. Following 
Foucault, these 'legitimate' discourses can function to represent their knowledge as fundamental, 
invariable ' truths' about the namre of all children, past and present.^' This thesis argues that the 
CRC, and indeed its associated instimtions such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
L'NICEF, inter-governmental organisations, and NGCJS function as persuasive knowledge 
manufacturers, legitimating a particular set of discourses on the 'child'. The CRC produces and 
legitimates its vision of childhood as fundamental, invariable truth about the categorj' 'child'. As 
win be more thoroughly examined in the next chapter, the CRC assumes that there is a model of 
" CHRIS JENKS. C H I L D H O O D . 3 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
" REX STAINTON R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y STAINTON R O G E R S . STORIES OF C H I L D H O O D : SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N , 
38-39(1992). 
" REX STAINTON R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y STAINTON R O G E R S . STORIES OF C H I L D H O O D : SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N . 
51 (1992). 
" REX STAINTON R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y STAINTON R O G E R S . STORIES OF C H I L D H O O D : SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N . 
51 (1992). 
" CHRIS JENKS. CHILDHOOD. 4 (2005). See also Stuart Aitken and Thomas Herman. Gender, Power and Crib Geography: 
Transilional Spaces and Polenlial Places. 4 GENDER. PLACE AND CULTURE 63 (1997). 
" REX STAINTON R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y STAINTON R O G E R S . STORIES OF C H I L D H O O D : SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N , 
51 (1992). 
" REX STAINTON R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y STAINTON R O G E R S . STORIES OF C H I L D H O O D : SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N , 
51 (1992). 
childhood development that is universally descriptive of all children.^* The CRC's claim to 
'truth' that the child is developing masquerades as a description of 'how things are', rather than a 
production/prescription of 'how things must be'. 
The innocuousness of 'development' as a truth of childhood is undermined by a group of 
sociological and philosophical scholars. O n e author writes that the undeveloped child is 
incomplete, lacking fuU maturit)', and unfinished.^' In this way the child is defined negatively, in 
the sense of what the child lacks.™ Archard argues that the defining feature of childhood is that 
the child is unfinished relative to a human tehs'. 
|i]n the biologj-, the child is viewed as unfinished in his or her growth as a human 
animal; in the ethics, unfinished in the training of virtue; in the politics, 
unfinished in the education for adult life as a responsible citizen." 
Children are viewed as 'becoming' rather than being.''^ The focus of adults then is not on 
childhood in and of itself, but on how the desired characteristics of adulthood are acquired." 
Put another way, the fixation on childhood is on the process of development. Development 
teleology condemns children to being viewed exclusively as developmentaUy adaptive, hence 
correct, or developmentaUy defective, hence incorrect.'' ' The focus is then on what children 
'need'. As was argued in Chapter 4 and will be developed further in Chapter 6, because children 
are 'inherently' or 'biologically' immamre, children require or 'need' something quite different 
f rom adults. As will be argued in the next section and in Chapter 7, the vision of the 'child' as 
See E v a Brems , Children's Rights and Universality, in DEVELOPMENTAL AND AUTONOMY RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: 
E M P O W E R I N G C H I L D R E N . C A R E - G I V E R S , AND C O M M U N I T I E S ( J a n C . M . W i l l e m s e d . . 2 0 0 2 ) r e p r o d u c e d in S A R A D I L L O N , 
INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (2010). For a critique see Vanessa Pupavac. Misanthropv Without Borders: The 
International Children's Rights Regime, 25(2) DISASTERS 95. 101 (2001): Jo Boyden. Children's Experience of Conflict 
Related Emergencies: Some Implications for Relief Policy and Practice. 18(3) DISASTERS 254. 256 (1994). I he universal 
application of the CRC will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
2 JULIA F I O N D A . Legal Concepts of Childhood: An Introduction, in L E G A L C O N C E P T S OF C H I L D H O O D . 1 2 ( 2 0 0 1 ) . 
David Archard. Philosophical Perspectives on Childhood, in LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD. 43 (Julia Fionda ed.. 
2 0 0 1 ) . r e f e r r i n g t o H A R R Y H E N D R I C K . C H I L D R E N . C H I L D H O O D , A N D E N G L I S H S O C I E T Y . 1 8 8 0 - 1 9 9 0 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 
" David Archard. Philosophical Perspectives on Childhood, in LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD 43 (Julia Fionda ed 
2001). quoting Gareth B. Matthews. Socrates Children, m The Philosopher's Child: Critical Essays in the Western Tradition. 
2 1 ( S . M . T u r n e r a n d G a r e t h H . M a t t h e w s e d s . . 1 9 9 8 ) . See also P IERRE E R N Y . C H I L D H O O D A N D C O S M O S - T H E SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BLACK AFRICAN CHILD, 11 (1973): 'The child is distinguished from the adult by the fact that he|/she) 
has not yet reach maturity. He[/shel is still in a stage of development on the way to completion. From this reasons he[/she| 
cannot be described m his full and stable slate, since he[/she) is es.sentially a d>'namism. a tension, progress toward a more 
perlect slate. Neither the child nor his personality can be considered under any aspect but that of becoming' 
.nn r " ! f'"-''""'''- ''''''"'"P'"""^ Perspectives on Childhood, in LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD, 43 (Julia Fionda e d . 
2001); Alan ProuU C/HWM, ^ Participation: Control and Self-Realisation in British Late Modernity. 14(4) CHILDREN & 
oOCIETY j ( J 4 . 3 0 6 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
"L^r.'t ^ ' " ' l " , ' ' ' ' ' P'^'-^P'^ctives on Childhood in LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD, 4 3 - 4 4 ( Ju l ia F i o n d a ed. . 
developing enables the 'truth' that children 'need' adults who have responsibilit)' for/power over 
children. The child's 'need' for a 'responsible' adult significandy alters the child's rights, even 
rights that are considered to be fundamental for all humans. In the context of the CRC this 
thesis argues that the CRC's performance of the 'child' as a unique state of development is the 
basis for deviating from the 'equal and inalienable rights of all humans'."^^ 
Notably, whether rights are an adequate 'solution' for any subordinated categor)- has been widely 
discussed; however a full discussion will not take place here.'^ '^  Regardless of whether one agrees 
with the efficacy of rights, how these rights are constructed contribute to the production of an 
identit)' for the categon- 'child'. The identity or presentation of a 'true child,' places limits not 
only on the rights of the child, but also what is made possible during childhood for those marked 
a 'child'. Some argue that the CRC reinforccs and reifies the systematic oppression of young 
people.'' As will be discussed in Chapter 8, it is argued that the child becomes a site for 
progress, a reflection of the communit}''s progress and therefore an object of regulation.'"'' 
If the basis upon which we (read adults) 'know' children is an unessential, unnamral social 
construction, how can we (read adults) validate how children are talked about and therefore 
treated in the CRC? By portraying the cluld as incomplete/developing and therefore in need of 
his/her wiser counterparts (read adults, to be discussed briefly in the next sub-section and 
thoroughly in Chapter 7), the CRC not only justifies the restriction of some vcr\' basic rights, but 
entrenches a vasdy inequitable relationship between the child and his/her family and his/her 
communitj'. Quite simply, casting the child-as-developing allows the CRC (adults, states, 
institutions, discourses) to side step what would be considered unthinkable for any other 
category' of persons within the human family. 
" Preamble. 
" See generally Maria Grahn-Farley. Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag. The Critique of Normativity, and the 
Enchantment of Reason: A Theory of Child Rights. 57 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 867 (2003) : 'The rights of a 
person tell us more about that person's place in societ\' than about the rights themselves. Rights are signs of what the human 
has been made to not be. Rights are the void. Rights are emptiness. Rights are the emptiness that remains when a person is 
made to be less than human. The language of rights takes the place of the unspeakable pain and suffering that is inflicted on 
people, by people. Rights are the bandages on already-inflicted injuries. Bandages do not heal: they cover and hide wounds. 
Instead of seeing the harms inflicted, one sees the bandages. Instead of seeing the pain and suffering, one sees the right'. 
" REX S T A I N T O N R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y S T A I N T O N R O G E R S , S T O R I E S OF C H I L D H O O D : SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N 
( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" CHRIS JENKS, CHILDHOOD, 3 (2005) : Maria Grahn-Farley. Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag. The Critique of 
Normativity. and the Enchantment of Reason: A Theory of Child Rights. 57 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 867 (2003). 
b. Truth #2: Child=Uniquely Vulnerable & Thus in Need of Unique 
Protection 
As argued in Chapter 4, the child's \-ulncrability means something vastly different than 
•s-ulnerabiUt)- for any other identity' category'. The vulnerability of other identity categories, such 
as women and persons with disabiHties is not deemed the result of some biological or essential 
characteristic that these identity categories might possess. Rather, the vulnerability of these other 
categories is deemed the result of social discrimination. As such, inequalit)' and 
disempowerment are remedied, in theor)', by the shoring up of autonomy and participation 
through rights. According to the CRC and as was argued in Chapter 4, the child's \'ulnerabilit)-, 
however, is largely perceived as a result of the cltild's own immaturit}', not a result of social 
discrimination that the child might experience.® As a consequence, the child's \nilnerabilit5f is 
remedied by requiring the child to relinquish autonomy and participation to the categorj' 'adult'. 
This differential treatment, in other words, the unique requirement that children give away their 
autonomy and abilitj' to participation to a particular adult, is argued to be necessar)' because of 
the child's innate or biological immaturit)'/incapacit)'. The 'logical' extension of the image of the 
innately immature, passive child is an effective mandate that the child be completely reliant on 
adult protection. Again this is in stark contrast to, for example, ciders who also may have 
variable capacity', yet maintain the rights associated with participation and equality. The child 
simply does not require protection f rom the intrusion of others and the state into the child's 
exercise of autonomy. I'undamentaUy, the child needs protection f rom her or himself rather 
than protection against social discrimination. \ ' iewing children as vulnerable best seri-es the 
need for adults acting in children's 'best interests ' / ' for their own good' . Childhood is then 
viewed as a period that is entitled to 'special treatment', in other words, adult super\'ision.'" 
The focus becomes one of guarding the child, necessitating greater parental or state control of 
the child. It is then no surprise that many argue the proper place for childhood to be the home 
and the family or secondarily state care, where this protection can be provided." This sentiment 
It should be noted that this thesis does not adopt this position. Literature on child labour in partieular highlights the ways 
in which social discrimination operates to create not only vulnerability but also exploitation and abuse. See for example 
N G O G R O U P FOR THE C R C S U B - G R O U P O N C H I L D L A B O U R , T H E I M P A C T OF D I S C R I M I N A T I O N O N W O R K I N G C H I L D R E N A N D ON 
THE P H E N O M E N O N OF C H I L D L A B O U R ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 
Kenneth Nunn argues that ' | l |nsofar as African American boys and girls are concerned, it is somewhat inaccurate to speak 
of an 'end of adolescence' . . . The concept of a group of young people who were entitled to spccial treatment because they 
were impetuous and immature was never extensive enough to include African American ch i ldren . . . When adolescence 
began for while children in 1880 |in the US], African American children remained slaves'. Kenneth Nunn. The Child as 
Other: Racial Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System. 51 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 679. 679-680 (2002). 
See generally ieremy Seakbrook. The Decay of Childhood (1987). 
is reflected in the Chapters 6 and 7 will discuss in detail how protection in the context of 
the CRC translates to the requirement for the child to continually be 'in care'. It is parents, or 
the state who are empowered to act on the child's behalf and to protect the child. For the 
purposes of this section, however, this protectionist prescription is critiqued for imagining that 
relations between adults (whether parents or state officials charged with the care of the child) 
and children as rarely abusive, predominately unproblematic." It has been argued that the 
potential result is the 'protective exclusion of children in real life'.'" Jenny Kitzinger illustrates 
how the 'lock up your child' philosophy has the potential to make those confined more 
™lnerable." This 'locking up' methodolog)- is curious given that much abuse takes place within 
the home, and thereby increases children's isolation.'"^ Reforms which impose restrictions on 
children ('for their own good') are routinely turned against the very people they arc meant to 
protect (in other words, children) and divert attention away from the ways in which the 
oppression of young people can be socially constructed.'' Nonetheless, this brand of protection 
remains the dominant discourse regarding children's rights and is repeatedly embraced in the 
CRC. 
The mere existence of this protectionist ideolog}' as a goal is not problematic. Protectionism 
can, however, become problematic for two reasons: 1) it justifies the uncritical control and 
regulation of children,'" and 2) it seems to be the 'only show in town'. Protectionism is argued to 
currently monopolise any discussion about children and finds support across a wide-spcctrum of 
political opinion because it claims to put children first. No other 'stor^'' is comprehendible. 
Protectionism is characterised as progressive and enlightened, giving priority' to, protecting and 
promoting children's welfare, in contrast to their economic utiUt}', their duties and obligations." 
Preamble: 'Convinced that the family, as ihe fundamental group of society- and the natural environment for the growth and 
well-being of all its members and particularly children.' 
" Jeremy Scakbrook. The Decay of Childhood. 186 (1987). 
Jens Qvortrup. A Voice for Children in Slatislical and Social Accounling: A Plea for Children's Right to be Heard, in 
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80 (Allison James and Alan Prout eds.. 1997). 
" Jenny Kitzinger, iVho Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Against Sexual, in CONSTRUCTING AND 
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Alan Prout eds.. 1997). 
" Jenny Kitzinger. Who Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Against Sexual, in CONSTRUCTING AND 
RECONSTRUCTING C H I L D H O O D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y I S S U E S IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D . 1 6 7 ( A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d 
Alan Prout eds.. 1997). 
" Jenny Kitzinger. Who Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Against Sexual, in CONSTRUCTING AND 
RECONSTRUCTING C H I L D H O O D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y I S S U E S IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D . 1 6 7 ( A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d 
Alan Proul eds.. 1997). 
" Bob Franklin write that '[elven cocoons can stifle and oppress as well as comfort' . BOB FRANKLIN. The Case for 
Children "s Rights: A Progress Report, in T H E H A N D B O O K OF C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S : C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I C Y A N D P R A C T I C E , 4 - 5 
( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
" BOB FRANKLIN. The Case for Children's Rights: A Progress Report, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: 
C O M P A R A T I V E P O L I C Y A N D P R A C T I C E ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
The persuasiveness and political purchase of protectionism can be seen in the adoption the 1959 
Declaration, which was adopted more quickly than any other General Assembly Resolution in 
histor)'.'" This 1959 Declaration has but 10 'principles'. Unlike the CRC, the 1959 Declaration 
addresses only the protection of the child." While the CRC and its inclusion of qualified 
autonomy have met some resistance and took ten years to draft, the Declaration and its exclusive 
focus on protection did not. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 9, even the real life experiences of children marginalised by the 
CRC's prescriptions cannot seem to dislodge the story of children in need of a particular kind of 
'protection' (read regulation cnacted by certain adults and thus not self-empowerment). One 
author notes that instances such as the 1976 Soweto Riots in South Africa, cliild labourers, and 
street cliildren arc aU examples of children whose actions contest that children 'need' adult 
protection."^ Alternative tales of the lives and experiences of children that do not fit within the 
story told by protectionism do not seem to exist in the sense that they are not 'how things are' or 
'how childhood should be'. These stories do not exist in the sense that they are apparentiy not 
believed; they are not addressed, or seem as aberrant problems to be solved." These children 
must have their ' innocence' restored; they must return to their childhood, in other words, they 
must be put back under adult protection. The same bandage, 'protection by parents and the 
state for the child' is doled out, even when that protection does not exist or is not desired. 
Chapter 6 will discuss the ways in which the CRC constructs the child as immature, utilising a 
more persuasive vocabulan* of 'developing'. Chapter 7 will examine what is made possible by 
constructing the child as 'developing'. Chapter 7 wiU argue that the 'care' of some adult is made 
mandatory for the category- 'child'. Chapter 9 will explore those who are excluded or stigmatised 
by the CRC's vision of childhood. 
Declaration o f t h e Rights of the Child. Dec. 10, 1959. G.A. Res. 1386. U.N. GAOR. 14'" Sess., Supp. (No. 16). 
" Unlike the CRC. il should be noted thai the 1959 Declaration is not a binding legal documenl. which also would affect the 
speed of hs adoption. Nonetheless, the argument that the 1959 Declaration and its welfare principles was more palatable to 
the international community still seems persuasive given the lengthy and contentious drafting process of the CRC. 
CLAUDIA MITCHEL a n d JACQUELINE R E I D - W A L S H , RESEARCHING C H I L D R E N ' S P O P U L A R C U L T U R E : THE C U L T U R A L SPACES 
OF CHILDHOOD. 7 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Pariicipmion and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475, 484 (1999): "Of course, both in the 
UK and in the international context children are social participants - participating in homeworking. child labor, political 
protest, caring, keeping the family 'on the road', and so on. However, often these activities are either redefined by 
•concerned- adults as simply exploitative and requiring action to protect better the child or denied though not talking about 
them/non-recognition... The traditional response to children traps them in the position simply of being governed". 
c. Truth #3: Childhood=Period Defined by the Children's Needs 
Beyond simply 'needing' protection, the alleged precarious state of childhood (\'ulnerable, 
dependent, incapable, and developing) enables discussions about children to centre 
predominately around 'the needs of children' generally. The term 'needs' m the context of 
children (particularly as the 'needs' of children are expressed on behalf of children) has some 
interesting implications. Martin Woodhead writes specifically about the notion of 'needs', and 
how the term itself reflects the status given to children in twentieth-century Western societies.""" 
Woodhead argues that the authority of 'need' statements come not only from their apparent 
straightforward descriptive quality, they also covey considerable emotive force (accompanied by 
a sense of responsibility, even g u i l t ) . T h i s power comes pardy from the connotation of 
helplessness and passivity of any child who is 'in need', and pardy from the implication that dire 
consequences wiU foUow if the need is not met through appropriate inter\-ention. Woodhead 
asserts that this combination of descriptive and imperative authority provides a persuasive basis 
for defining policy and can be seen throughout legal texts."' Indeed, the CRC frequently deploys 
the term 'needs' in rcfercnce to the CRC's universal child. For example, the Preamble states that 
the child needs 'particular care', 'special safeguards', and 'special consideration'. Chapter 6 wiU 
explore the 'needs' of the category 'child' in the CRC. 
Woodhead asserts that 'needs' may also scr\e as a credible veil for uncertaint)' and even 
disagreement about what is in the 'best interest' of the child. Michael l-Cing and Christine Piper 
argue that the child is often only seen as 'a bundle of needs', yet parents and state agencies dispute 
the definition of such needs and the ability to provide for them."' These authors agree with a 
fundamental premise of this thesis that in any dispute regarding a child, 'the conflict is over whose 
conception of the child's needs should prevail As such, it is not a problem of designating institutions 
capable of enforcing children's as some would argue," but the problem is rather of generating 
" M A R T I N W O O D H E A D . Psychology and the Cultural Conslruclion of "Children "s Needs ", in G R O W I N G U P IN A C H A N G I N G 
SOCIETY. 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" M A R T I N W O O D H E A D . Psychology and the Cultural Conslruclion of • Children "s Needs ". in G R O W I N G U P IN A C H A N G I N G 
SOCIETY, 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" M A R T I N W O O D H E A D . Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children's Needs ". in G R O W I N G U P IN A C H A N G I N G 
SOCIETY. 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" M I C H A E L K I N G a n d C H R I S T I N E P I P E R . H O W THE L A W T H I N K S A B O U T C H I L D R E N . 6 4 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
" M I C H A E L K I N G and C H R I S T I N E P I P E R . H O W THE L A W T H I N K S A B O U T C H I L D R E N . 7 9 ( 1 9 9 5 ) , original emphasis. 
" See for example Robert Dingwall and John Eekelaar, Rethinking Child Protection, in S T A T E , L A W A N D THE F A M I L Y , 9 3 
(Michael Freeman ed., 1 9 8 4 ) ; Anonymous, The CRC as a Touchstone for Research on Childhoods. 6 ( 4 ) C H I L D H O O D 4 0 3 
( 1 9 9 9 ) ; Kirslen Backstrom. The International Human Rights of the Child: Do They Protect the Female Child?, 3 0 G E O R G E 
W A S H I N G T O N J O U R N A L OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W & E C O N O M I C S 5 4 1 , 5 5 6 ( 1 9 9 6 Cynthia Price-Cohen. Implementing the U.N 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 21 W H I T T I E R L A W R E V I E W 9 5 ( 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 0 ) ; P H I L I P A L S T O N and J O H N T O B I N . L A Y I N G 
THE F O U N D A T I O N S FOR C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
universaUy accepted 'needs'.'" It seems that the ambiguit)' of childhood is die source of such 
conflict." Indeed, Chapter 2 explored disagreement not only regarding the CRC, but also about 
what is considered 'appropriate' for chUdhood and therefore which rights are appropnate for 
children. In other words, Chapter 2 explored disagreement about what children need or, more 
specifically, what is a 'child'.'^ Nonetheless, the identification of needs appear to describe a 
timeless/universal cliild that is knowable from mere empirical study, whether by a psychologist, 
professional, or parent." 
Further, 'children's needs' also may ser\'e as a ver\- credible veil for adult agendas.'" Woodhead 
uses the equation 'X needs Y for Z to follow', but states that Z is rarely made explicit.'^ She 
argues that the first step in evaluating a 'need' statement is to identify the outcome (Z) and test the 
descriptive claim that some measure (Y) is necessary' to achieve i t ." In this process, Woodhead 
argues that one can find that statements about cMdren's needs convey an element of judgment 
about what is good for them and how this 'good' can best be achieved. The self-evident aspect of 
such statements imbues them with emotive force, implying an imperative for action." Chapter 6 
canvasses die ways in which the determination of the child's 'needs' dictate the rights that they are 
given. These claims to the know-ability of children's needs masquerade as if these needs are 
universal and universally accepted. The CRC is no exception. In the C^RC, the word 'need' is 
mentioned 14 times in relation to children." The Preamble states that. 
Recognising that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her 
personality-, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of 
happiness, love and understanding," 
M I C H A E L KING a n d CHRISTINE PIPBR . I l o w THE L A W THINKS A B O U T C H I L D R E N , 7 9 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
Nick Lee. The Challenge of Childhood: Distributions of Childhood's Ambiguity in Adult Institutions. 6 CHILDHOOD 455. 
4 6 5 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . 
JULIA FIONDA, Legal Concepts of Childhood: An Introduction, in LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD. 3 ( 2 0 0 1 ) : ' W e all 
imagine we know what childhood is and who children are. In basic lerms il may be seen as a biological or psychological 
phase of life somew here between infancy and adulthood. However, the fact that there is constant disagreement even at the 
level of public discourse over w here childhood begins and ends illustrates that childhood is not a concrete or objectively 
defined "truth' and is in fact a complex social construct. Or indeed a series of them'. 
® MARTIN WOODHEAD. Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children's Needs ". in GROWING UP IN A CHANGING 
S O C I E T Y . 4 0 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
See generally Martha Minow, Children's Rights: Where It'e'vi; Been, and Where We're Going. 68 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW 
1573 (1995); Berry Mayall, The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children s Rights. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 243 (2000); Fiona Raitt The Children's Rights Movement: Infusions of Feminism. 22 CANADIAN 
J O U R N A L ON F A M I L Y L A W 1 1 . 2 6 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
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S O C I E T Y . 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
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" MARTIN WOODHEAD, Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children s Needs ", in GROWING UP IN A CHANGING 
S O C I E T Y . 4 2 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
2 The needs of children were listed three times just in the Preamble. The needs of developing countries occun-ed thrice 
MARTIN WOODHEAD, Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children's Needs ". in GROWING UP IN A CHANGING 
S O C I E T Y . 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
Thus, X [the child] needs Y |a family environment) for Z |full and harmonious 
development]. 
It is important to note that the 'truths' presented by the Preamble regarding not only 
development, but also the family, are difficult to argue against. If children are in a state of 
development, then families pro\ide an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding. TTie 
CRC docs not state why development is the goal, nor does it explain how families enable 
development; both are assumed 'truths'; ideas so well-known and accepted they require no 
explanation or illustration, jenks has argued that childhood defined by the family environment 
and development is taken for granted. He argues that ']childhood]'s utter "thereness" seems to 
foster a complacent attitude about the widespread tendency to roudnise and namraHse 
childhood'.'"" Childhood, then, is taken for granted as necessar\', inevitable,"" and even 
'banal'.'"^ Chapter 6 will explore how the CRC constructs childhood as a state of development 
and will use Woodhead's equation to break down how 'development' is used in the CRC and 
what is made possible through its construction. Chapter 7 will examine the role of the family in 
the CRC, examining what is made possible through its construction. Both chapters aim to 
examine what is taken for granted, what is being assumed to be 'true', and the effect of these 
'truths'. 
The parade of hteramre that seems not to be accounted for by commentators on the CRC 
continues. Prout and |ames state that 'the immaturit}' of childhood is a biological fact of hfe but 
the ways in which this immaturity is understood and made meaningful is a fact of culture'."" 
Jenks acknowledges that children do practically 'need' their parents' material, physical, and 
emotional assets.""* However, he argues that these 'needs' are always reahsed within particular 
socio-historical, and cultural, settings."'^ Freeman has argued that 'childhood, like adulthood or 
old age, is to a large extent a social construct . . . a product of historical accidents and responses 
to particular pressure at particular times'."" AU people 'need' others in order to generate a 
meaningful environment for change, stasis, or and so on.; quite simply we cannot make sense 
CHRIS J E N K S , CHILDHOOD, 8 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
CHRIS J E N K S , CHILDHOOD, 8 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
John ilorton and Peter Krafll. Not Just Growing Up. Bui Going On: Materials. Spacings. Bodies. Situations. 4(3) 
CHILDREN'S G E O G R A P H I E S 2 5 9 , 2 6 0 ( 2 0 0 6 ) . 
ALLISON JAMES and ALAN 1'ROUT, A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance. Promise and Problems, 
in CONSTRUCTING AND R E C O N S T R U C T I N G CHILDHOOD: C O N T E M P O R A R Y ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL S T U D Y OF CHILDHOOD, 7 
( 1 9 9 7 ) . 
CHRIS J E N K S , CHILDHOOD, 4 0 - 4 1 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
MARTIN WOODHEAD. Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children's Needs in GROWING UP IN A CHANGING 
SOCIETY, 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
^ MICHAEL F R E E M A N , T H E R I G H T S AND W R O N G S OF C H I L D R E N , 6 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . 
alone.'"^ Adults, however, are assumed widiin social and liberal rights theor>' to operate widi a 
degree of basic rcciprocit}-, autonomy, and capacit}'."" In this way, children are viewed a 
uniquely 'needy' or uniquely 'dependent' by virtue of their immaturity. This immaturit}' is then 
aligned with the idea that children cannot have legal capacit}^ 
Rationality', immaturit)', or moral agency has been critiqued as a measure for legal capacity' for 
other identity' groups. Freeman notes tiiat feminist moral theory questioned the deeply held 
assumption that moral agcncy and full citizenship require a person to be autonomous and 
independent.'"' The argument that capacity is irrelevant to the grant of autonomy rights is 
premised on the idea that capacity for any human being, regardless of category (age, gender, 
sexual orientation, class, caste, ethnicity, nationality), cannot be the precondition for rights as 
even those who are considered as having 'capacity' would not meet such a condition. The 
rational autonomous man making decisions for himself does not exist. Feminists have criticised 
the rational autonomous man, as he too depends on other people to feed him and keep him 
clean, and even to keep him company."" Iris Young contends that one cannot imagine a society 
in which some people including children would not need to be dependent on others at least 
some of the time.'" In this way, aU humans have 'needs' and as such will be dependent. Young 
argues that that the exclusion of women, children, the working class, and the mentally disordered 
from the liberal order on the basis of their lack of autonomy is now only barely hidden beneath 
the surface."^ Yet, somehow the 'needs' of children, in other words, their alleged lack of 
autonomy, are viewed as fundamentally different from adults and result in the unique 
'protection'. As wiU be discussed in Chapter 6, these 'truths' of childhood construct the child as 
incapable, immature, but with the hope of 'developing' into being capable and mature. These 
'truths' of childhood have such a strong foothold in the CRC, that they defy opposition not 
based on some 'objective' merit, as such does cannot exist, but rather for poHtical reasons that 
are rarely addressed and seriously challenged. While this section sought to overview certain 
critiques of assumptions made about childhood that are also reflected in the CRC's vision of 
childhood, the next section seeks to examine the ways in which these 'truths' are constructed. 
Quite simply, binary opposition means, in the context of identity, that there is no identity that 
C H R I S J E N K S , C H I L D H O O D . 4 0 - 4 1 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
C H R I S J E N K S . C H I L D H O O D . 4 0 - 4 1 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . See generally M A R T H A N U S S B A U M . S E X A N D S O C I A L J U S T I C E ( 1 9 9 9 ) . 
™ Michael Freeman. The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights. 6 ( 4 ) I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L OF C H I L D R E N ' S 
R I G H T S 4 3 3 . 4 4 0 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
Berr>' Mayall . The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children's Rights. 8 I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L OF C H I L D R E N ' S 
R I G H T S 2 4 3 . 2 4 9 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . q u o t i n g J E A N G R I M S H A W . F E M I N I S T P H I L O S O P H E R S : W O M E N ' S P E R S P E C T I V E S ON P H I L O S O P H I C A L 
T R A D I T I O N S ( 1 9 8 6 ) . 
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stands alone; an identity and its associated 'truths' are created in relation to some other 
identity.'" Identity depends on difference because one identity cannot be unless it can be 
different from somediing else."" As such, to understand what is 'true' about the 'child', one 
must understand what the child is not. 
III. BINARY OPPOSITION: HOW THE 'TRUE' CHILD IS CONSTRUCTED 
The theoty of binaty oppositions is a theoretical tool, first introduced in Chapter 3, that helps 
explicate how the above mentioned 'truths' about the categoty 'child' are constructed, and more 
importantly how 'common sense' associations with specific identities are rebuttable (to be taken 
up in Chapter 9). According to the theoty of binaty' oppositions, the CRC does not (cannot) just 
relate to one child, or even the categoty 'child'. Rather, the CRC relates to a multiplicity of 
persons (and entities): the adult and the child.'" What it means to be a 'child' can only be 
understood by comprehending what it means to be an adult. Through the adult-child binaty', we 
come to understand what it means to be a 'good' child and a 'good' adult. The CRC does not 
just describe one child and one adult (the 'good'/normative), but simultaneously describes others 
(child=the juvenile, the parcntless, and so on; adult=the irresponsible, and so on.). This section 
will examine the adult - child and the good child - bad child binaty' oppositions at work in the 
CRC. This thesis argues that the adult — child binaty enables the performance of a 
normative/universal/'true' child and normative/universal/'true' childhood. 
Adult -Chi ld Binary'" 
The child's difference from the adult is the definition of what it means to be a child. What it 
means to be an adult is understood in terms of what it means to not be a child. As was argued in 
Chapter 3, no identity stands alone; an identity is created in relation to other identities."' 
Identity depends on difference because one identity it is only distinguishable because it is 
different from something else.'" To feel like an adult (wage-earner, burdened, responsible) 
requires differentiation from what stands as its opposite: the child (care-free, imaginative, and 
" JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E , 3 0 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
' " Jack Balkin, Deconslrucllve Practice and Legal Theory. 96 YALE LAW REVIEW 743. 748 (1987). 
1 he "adult" could refer to both the parent and the state, in the sense thai both are viewed as non-children, or rational, 
responsible, and so on. For the purpose of this thesis, adult will implicitly focus on the "parent", as the CRC most often 
envisions this coupling. See Chapter 7 for further discussion. 
The term "adult" in this section refers both to the parent/care-taker and the state/care-taker. While the .state and the parent 
have separate functions, rights, and responsibilities under the CRC. both "adults" are constructed in opposition to the child. 
" ' JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 3 0 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
' " Jack Balkin. Deconstructive Praclice and Legal Theory. 96 YALE LAW REVIEW 743. 748 (1987). 
irresponsible). '" The identities o f the opposition enable, and therefore fundamentaUy depend 
upon each other's existence. Neither term of the opposition can be ongmal and fundamental 
because both are related to each other in a system of mutual dependences and differences.'^" 
Nonetheless, this binarj- relation is not equitable.'"' Rather the relationship between the two 
terms of the opposition is laden with values that assume that one has dominance over the other: 
one is normal the other abnormal, one is simple the other is complex, one is the rule the other is 
the exception.'-" The binan' opposition coupling includes 1) a subject: an agent that is viewed 
positively in dominant discourses (for example, rational) and 2) the 'other': the abnormal, tiie 
undesirable, even'thing the subject is not (for example, irrational).'"' In the adult-cluld binar}', 
'adultness' is associated with privileged or valued characteristics such as rationality or 
mindfulness, whereas childishness is associated with irrarionaHt)- or recklessness. Archard argues 
that the child's nature is defined negatively not so much in terms of what it is in and of itself but 
rather in terms of what the child lacks.'"" The child lacks mamrit}', lacks 'adultness'. 
The internal coherence of either identity- requires an oppositional construction of maturit)-. 'ITiis 
oppositional bmar\- maturit)- system therefore Limits possibilities for autonomy and dependency 
for children, as well as for adults. This mamnt\- matrix violently forecloses internal incoherence, 
which is demonstrated by the fact that when people 'do' their maturity incorrectiy, they are 
punished bv cultures and laws. Examples of children doing their maturir\' 'wrongly' include 
when children exercise criminal intent to murder or when girls (in particular) display 'mature' 
sexualit)'.'"^ In both instances, these persons no longer remain children, but are often made into 
adults.'"' Binary oppositions ser\-e a particular political ideologj- and are enforced through the 
Yanghee Lee. IS Candles, in 18 CANDLES THE UNCRC REACHES THE AGE OF MA.IORITY. 12 (Jane Conner se t a l . eds., 
2007): 'For a very long time, there existed the implicit binarism of the psychological model which viewed children as 
immature, irrational, incompetent, asocial and acultural. On the other hand, adults were viewed as mature, rational, 
competent, social, and autonomous' . 
Jack Balkin. Deconslruclive Practice and Legal Theory. 96 YALE LAW REVIEW 743. 751 (1987). 
Sarah L. Holloway & Gill Valentine. Spaliality and the New Social Studies of Childhood. 34(4) SOCIOLOGY 763. 765-
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Women and Children First and Last: Parallels and Differences Between Women's and Children's Studies, in CHILDREN'S 
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CHRIS JENKS. CHILDHOOD, 120 (2005). Jenks points out the radical disruption that occurs lo the category "child' when 
children commit violent crimes. Also during the drafting of Artriele 37. the USA delegate stated that "it was implicitly 
understood that a child committing an offence which, if committed by an adult, would be criminal could be treated as an 
a d u l t ' . SHARON DETRICK, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD , A G U I D E TO THE "TRAVAUX 
PREPARATIORES", 4 6 5 - 4 6 6 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
For example: State of Florida v. Lionel Tate. Case No. 4001-1306 (Fla. 4lh DCA). Tate was convicted for first-degree 
murder and sentenced lo life imprisonment w ithout the possibility of parole for. al the age of 12. battering a girl to death In 
sentencing Tate to life imprisonment. Judge Lazarus of Broward County Circuit Court said that 'Itlhe acts of l.ionel Tate were 
not the playful acts of a child. The aets of Lionel Tate were not bom out of immaturity. The acts of Lionel Tate were cold 
callous and indescribably cruel ' . The .sentencing was overturned on appeal to one year ' s house arrest and 10 year probation. 
requirement of internal coherence of each of the oppositional terms. Children must act like 
children, or quite simply they are made into adults. 
Michael King argues that the entire children's rights movement relies upon the clear distinction 
between children and adults.'^' The movement, he argues, assumes that it possible and 
meaningful to make this distinction. One is simply a child or an adult.'^" In the CRC, the 
assignment of roles and identities is laid out through the allocation of particular rights given to 
the adult and the cliild. While Chapters 6 and 7 wiU thoroughly explore the relationships within 
the family and between the parents and the state, this sub-section wiU briefly sur\'ey how these 
two identities (adult - child) are constructed in the CRC. The Preamble starts off by recognising 
that 'aU members of the human family' have 'inherent dignity' and 'equal and inaKenablc rights'. 
However, the CRC quickly moves to distinguish the child from the rest of the 'human family'. 
Article 1 sets out strict qualifications for a child: those under 18 years of age, unless specified 
otherwise by law. In the Preamble itself, the CRC begins to describe the normative child. The 
Preamble normatively outlines the following for the child: 1) the child requires a family for 
development; 2) the 'child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in societ}'', 3) 
'childhood is entitied to special care and assistance', and 4) 'the child, by reason of his physical 
and mental immaturin', needs special safeguards and care'. Accordingly, the child is cast as 
developing, unprepared for individual Hfe, in need of adult assistance, and physically and 
mentally immature. 
Article 3 states that parents arc the adults who are to have prtmar}- responsibilit)- to 'assist' and 
'care for' the child. The adult's right and dutj' is spelled out more explicidy in Article 5; '[sjtates 
Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents'. The child has the 'right' to 
know and be cared for by her/his parents, according to Article 7; to freedom of 'thought, 
conscience and religion' but parents have the 'right and dut)-' to direct the child in the exercise of 
the child's 'freedom' under Article 15; parents are responsible for the upbringmg and 
development of the child according to Article 18; any assistance from the state that is aimed at 
the child is to be given to the parents, who have primar)- responsibilit)- under Article 27; and 
children must develop respect for their parents in the course of their education according to 
Article 29. As such, the adult, according to the CRC, is devekjped, prepared for individual life. 
In the famous case in the United Kingdom involving the death of James Bulgar is another illustration. See MICHAEL FREEMAN. 
The James Bulger Tragedy: Child Innocence and the Construction of Guilt, in THE MORAL STATUS OF CHILDREN: ESSAYS ON 
THE RIGHTS OF THE C H I L D . 2 3 5 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 
Michael King. The Child. Childhood, and Children J Rights Within Sociology. 15 KlNO"s LAW JOURNAL 273 (2004). 
Michael King. The Child Childhood and Children s Rights Within Sociolog\\ 15 KING'S LAW JOURNAL 273. 282 (2004). 
capable o f assisting, physicaUy and mentaUy mature, responsible, capable o f possessing 'duties', 
and requires respect (specificaUy from die child) in excess o f that given to all members o f die 
human family for merely being human. 
I he vision o f the child in the C R C is defmed dirough this adult - child opposition. At the same 
time, this opposition functions to situate the adult over the child, where the child is deemed 
lesser. It is notable that the explicit normative aim o f childhood is to become an adult.'"' In this 
way, only by engaging m a performance appropriate for a child (m otiier words, acting like a 
child, and not acting like an adult) is the child enabled to become an adult. This thesis argues 
that while the CRC purports to guard the interests and rights o f children around the world, die 
CRC's protection and rights stop where the line between adult and child is at risk o f becoming 
unclear.'™ This thesis argues diat maintaining the adult -child binar}- is one o f the primary' 
functions o f the CRC. This line o f argument will be taken up further in Chapter 9. What is clear 
here is diat the territor)- o f both being an adult and a child is clearly demarcated in the CRC. The 
CRC rests on the child - adult binan', rests on the difference between adulthood and childhood 
as fundamental. The normative child is cannot be an adult. The normative child is to be the 
good child, the non-adult. 
b. Good Child - Bad Child: Child= Innocent & Passive but also Demonic & 
Subversive 
The 'good' child is by definition the non-adult because the 'good' child does not demonstrate 
adult-like qualities: independence, responsibility', sexuaHt)', and subjectivity'. While holding onto 
the picture o f childhood characterised by innocence, passivity, dependence, and \-ulnerabilit3', 
this is not the only picmre o f the child that is presented in the CRC. IronicaUv, children are also 
characterised as evil, primitive, and therefore in need o f discipline. T o understand the 'natural' 
child, one must understand what the 'namral' child is not. This process defmes yet another 
binarj- opposition o f what it means to be a 'good' child (innocent, passive, and dependent) or a 
'bad' one (knowledgeable, independent, and active). '" Jenks describes two dominant ways of 
Preamble: 'Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society'. 
Maria Grahn-Farley. Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag. The Crilique of Normativiw. and the Enchantment of 
Reason: A Theory of Child Rights. 57 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 867 . 9 0 8 ( 2 0 0 3 ) . 
Some authors also include in this binary, the view that one child is connected lo nature and rural life, whereas the other is 
connected 10 modernity and urban areas. See Karen Nairn el al.. Destabilizing Dualisms: Young People's Experiences of 
Rural and Urban Environments. 10( 1) CHILDHOOD 9. 9-42 (2003). Indeed the Apollonian child is portraved as connected 
with the natural environment. 
thinking and talking about the child: the Dionysian child and the Apollonian chi ld . '" These two 
versions of the child form a binar\' frame that is the basis for what is or is not appropriate and 
even 'natural' for being a child. This binan' opposition delineates what a 'good' child must be, 
and what he/she must not be. 
The Apollonian child is angehc, naturally good, innocent, asexual, the best of human nature 
untainted by the world; such children play and chuckle, smile and laugh. '" The Apollonian child 
is perceived as pre-Eve and her apple, pre-'the Fall'."'' Under this construction children are not 
curbed or beaten into submission, they are encouraged, enabled, facihtated. This can be seen for 
example in the CRC's Preamble when it speaks of 'happiness' and love' as childhood's proper 
environment. Innocence has a very specific face: lack of knowledge of sexuahtj' and desire for 
any t\pe of sexual expression. Because the child does not possess any sexual knowledge, 
children are dcmed access to certain information'", such as preventing children from seeing or 
hearing 'corrupting' influences. For example, the CRC's Article 17(e) requires the state to 
protection children from 'information and material injurious to [the child's] well-being'. The 
implicit motivation for the article seems to be protecting the child's innocence, in this case their 
'well-being'. The Committee to the CRC in its General Comment 4, paragraph 28 states that in 
light of certain articles of the CRC, including Article 17, 'State parties should provide adolescents 
with access to sexual and reproductive information, including on family planning and 
contraceptives, the dangers of early pregnane)', the prevention of HIV/AIDS and the prevention 
and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs)' ." ' Importantly General Comment 4 
fiirther notes that, 'In addition. States parties should ensure that they have access to appropriate 
information, regardless of their marital status and whether their parents or guardians consent. ' '" 
Nonetheless, paragraph 32 notes that the cMd's marnrit)- and the child's best interests, both 
assessed by an adult determination of what is or is not appropriate for childhood and thus hinge 
upon adult assumptions, dictate the child's access to information. More fundamentally, imphcit 
in the assessment that certain information and material will be injurious to the child's well-being 
CHRIS JENKS, CHILDHOOD . 74 (2005) . Jenks argues thai , '[t lhese images are informat ive o f the shift ing strategies that 
Western society has exercised in its increasing need to control, sociahse and constrain people in the transition towards 
modernity". 
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General C o m m e n t N o . 4: Ado lescent health and deve lopment in the context o f the Convent ion on the Rights o f the 
Child, paragraph 28. Ju ly 1. 2003. Commi t t ee on the R igh ts o f the C h i l d U N . Doc . CRC /GC /2003 / 4 . 
General C o m m e n t N o . 4: Adolescent health and deve lopment in the context o f the Convent ion on the R ights o f the Ch i l d , 
paragraph 28. Ju ly 1. 2003. Comm i t t e e on the R ights o f the C h i l d U N . Doc . CRC /GC /2003 / 4 . 
is the ApoUoman child, for how else could certain information and material being inappropriate 
for any human but the unknowing, innocent child. 
Interestingly and contranly, Article 34 places an obHgation on the state to prevent 'the exploitative 
use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices' and 'the exploitative use of 
children in pornographic performances and materials'. The CRC at least contemplates that not 
all child prostitution and pornographic performances are exploitative, whereas the Optional 
Protocol prohibits 'the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography'."" Notably, 
166 states have ratified this Optional Protocol.' 1 139 
Isitzinger points out that in the name of protecting innocence, denying children access to 
knowledge and power actually increases their -sulnerabilit}' to abuse."" It is the notion of 
innocence which, for example, discourages educating children about incest, lest they 'corrupt' the 
few years of innocence that should be ever}' child's right.''" The idea of innocence appears 
premised on the idea that children have no interest in their sexualit)' (until or unless they are 
'corrupted').'"'' In the name of innocence, children's own expressions of sexuaHt)' such as 
masturbation or consensual sexual activity are repressed; children are denied control of their own 
bodies, including the denial of contraceptives or abortions.'"" One of the implications of 
childhood being characterised by innocence is that it stigmatises the knowing (non-innocent) 
child. The romanticisation of childhood innocence excludes those who do not conform to the 
ideal. Kitzinger notes that if the violation of innocence is the criterion against which the act of 
sexual abuse is judged then the violation of a 'knowing' child becomes a lesser offence than 
violating an 'innocent' cluld.'^^ 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Chi ldren. Child Prosti tut ion and Child 
Pornography. Article 1. Jan. 18. 2002. A/RES/54/263. h t tp ; / /www2.ohchr .org/engl ish/ law/crc-sale .htm. 
https:/ / treaties.un.ore/Paees/ViewDelails .aspx7intdsi! no^ lV-11 -c&chapte r=4&lang=en . 154 states have ratified the 
Optional Protocol relating to Child Soldiers. h t tps : / / t reat ies .un.org/Pages/VievvDetai ls .aspx7mtdsg_no-IV-l 1-
c&chapter=4&lang=enht tps: / / t reat ies .un.ore/Paees/VievvDetai ls .aspx7src=TREAl Y & m t d s g n o = l V - l 1-
b&chapter=4&lane=en. 
Jenny Kitzinger. H'ho Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Against Sexual, in C O N S T R U C T I N G A N D 
R E C O N S T R U C T I N G C H I L D H O O D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y I S S U E S IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D 161 (All ison James and 
Alan Prou teds . . 1997). 
"" Jenny Kitzinger. Who Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Against Sexual, in C O N S T R U C T I N G A N D 
R E C O N S T R U C T I N G C H I L D H O O D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y I S S U E S IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D . 1 6 1 (All ison James and 
Alan Prou teds . . 1997). 
Jenny Kitzinger. H'ho Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Against Sexual, in C O N S T R U C T I N G A N D 
R E C O N S T R U C T I N G C H I L D H O O D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y I S S U E S IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D . 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 (Allison James 
and Alan Prout eds.. 1997). 
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R E C O N S T R U C T I N G C H I L D H O O D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y I S S U E S IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D (All ison James and Alan 
Prou teds . . 1997). 
Jenny Kitzinger. H'ho Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Against Sexual, in C O N S T R U C T I N G A N D 
R E C O N S T R U C T I N G C H I L D H C W D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y I S S U E S IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D . 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 Allison James 
and Alan Prou teds . . 1 9 9 7 ) . 
The chcrub-faced Apollonian child is not simply charactensed by asexual innocence; he/she also 
lacks ability and autonomy. This cherub is merely a passive object.'"'^ Kitzinger contends that, 
looking at the dramatic imbalance o f power and the socially sanctioned routine subordination o f 
children means that they are often made objects o f victimisation.'*' However, contrary' to the 
notion of the child being merely a passive victim, at some stage many children rebel against total 
dictation with all the resources they have available.'"" Despite instances o f children 
demonstrating agency, this Apollonian child is viewed as merely passive.'*" As such, the 
perception o f the child as innocent and passive justifies the child being denied access to 
information, justifies the child's inabiht)' to have control over their own bodies, and justifies 
other people acting on children's behalf '*" 
The Dionysian child or the 'inherentiy bad' child, who like this prince o f wine, revelr}', and 
nature, represents the idea that children possess an innate evil or corruption, is buttressed in the 
doctrine o f Adamic original sin.'^" I f adults allow these children to stray away (from adults), 
these children's inherent evil will mobihse.'^' The Dionysian child can be seen in even the early 
stages of the international children's rights movement. In urging the international community' to 
focus on child protection, J ebb , who drafted the 1924 Declaration, argues that, 
|i]f [children] are allowed to grow up stunted or neglected or strangers to moral 
values, or are ignored in their miser\- by the more fortunate, they will inevitably 
'"'Jenny Kilzinger. IV/io Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Against Sexual, in CONSTRUCTING AND 
RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD ( A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d A l a n 
Prouteds., 1997). 
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Prouteds.. 1997). 
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Alan Prout eds.. 1997). Here Kitzinger is referring to sexual abuse, but his analysis could be applicable more generally, for 
example against curfews. 
Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475. 477 (1999). Roche argues that 
children that lake on serious responsibility are rendered invisible and mule by adults because many adults are not used to 
dealing with children as equals, do not see children's contribution as 'serious', and refuse to see themselves (adults) as 
having the same power dimension in the lives of young people as racism or sexism. 
Though children are given the right to information in Article 13. that right is limited by the parents' right to guide and 
direct the child's exercise of the rights in the CRC in Article 5. and by Article 17(e) discussed above: Chapters 5 and 6 will 
more fully discuss how adulls are empowered to acl on behalf of children. Chapter 7 will discuss the regulation of the 
child's body. 
Jenny Kitzinger, Who Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the .Struggle Against Sexual, in CONSTRUCTING AND 
RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD ( A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d A l a n 
Prout eds., 1997). See also BOB FRANKLIN. The Case for Children's Rights: A Progress Report, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE, 4 - 5 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
Jenny Kitzinger. Who Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Against Sexual, in CONSTRUCTING AND 
RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD ( A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d A l a n 
Prouteds.. 1997). 
grow up to hate and destroy, and tomorrow's world can only end up in disaster, 
politically and economical ly. '" 
Adults are required to impart these moral values and to ensure the child is not stunted. This 
Dionysian child loves self-gratification and pleasure, and therefore requires moral guidance 
through physical and disciplinarj' direction. This headstrong and stubborn subject has to be 
broken, but all for his or her own good.'^' The Dionysian child can also be seen in die CRC in, 
for example Article 28(2)'s, which does not ban corporal punishment while at school. In the text 
of the CRC'" , corporal punishment is not banned, at school nor at home; the Dionysian child 
may be 'smacked' back into line. Article 40 (3)(b) and (4) speak to situations where children who 
have infringed penal law should be dealt directing away from judicial proceedings. However, the 
Article includes 'whenever appropnate and desirable' and 'proportionate both to their 
circumstance and the offence' and thus encapsulate die Apollonian child who should be given 
'care, guidance and super\-ision orders; counselling; probation; foster care; education and 
vocational training programmes and other alternatives to institutional care' and those Dionysian 
children for whom pnson is appropriate and d e s i r a b l e . I n Article 5 it is the parents' 
responsibility' to guide and direct the child in application of the child's right to freedom, 
expression, religion, amongst others. Article 5 mandates that the adult to forever'^*" guide the 
child, including guide the child against the child's own potential wrong doing. Article 3 
mandates that the child will always be in 'care' of an adult, and as such this child should never 
stray. Chapter 7 will discuss further what wiU be argued that the CRC's requires an adult for 
ever)' child for the duration of childhood. In this way, the child can never stray away, from 
adults. 
This sub-section describes the performance of the child in the CRC through the utilisation of the 
good child - bad child opposition. The extent, to which a person is a good child, is precisely the 
extent to which the person is not a bad cliild. Indeed the good child - bad child binar\' has a lot 
in common with the adult - child binar\', where the attributes of the 'bad' child arc also the 
Y V E S B E I G B E D E R , T H E R O L E A N D S T A T U S OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L H U M A N I T A R I A N V O L U N T E E R S A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N S 1 9 5 
( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
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R E C O N S T R U C T I N G C H I L D H O O D : C O N T E M P O R A R Y I S S U E S IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D . 1 6 7 ( A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d 
A l a n P r o u t eds . . 1 9 9 7 ) . 
The Committee has condemned corporal punishment, yet the CRC itself does not. General Comment No. 8; The Right of 
the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishmem and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment. U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/GC/8 (Mar. 2. 2007). para. 11: available at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/comments htm 
Article 40 (3)(b) and (4). 
Article 5 contains that cavcat that the adult may only guide the child 'in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities 
of the child . See Chapter 7 for a critique of the concept of "evolving capacities' in the CRC. 
attributes of the 'adult'. The normative chad is not to be an adult. The normadve child is to be 
the good child, or the non-adult. In this way, the child is better able to become an adult. 
Chapter 3 discussed how the terms of a binar)- opposition are not equal, even though they 
equally depend on each other for their meaning. These oppositions (good child/bad child and 
adult/child) simate the adult over the child, where the child is deemed lesser. This construction 
of the good child/bad child binarj' makes sense in the context of ensuring the appearance of 
difference between the categories 'adult' and 'child'. For it is tiiis difference between the 
categories 'adults' and 'children' that is fundamental to rationalising international human rights' 
differential treatment of those classified 'adults' and those classified 'children', discussed in 
Chapter 4. Yet, this thesis argues that the rights given to the child and the 'truths' told in the 
CRC about 'childhood' relate not to any biological or internal characteristics that the 'child' 
might possess, but rather to upholding the adult — child binan-. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Employing Foucault and Butler, this thesis argues that there is no unitarj' identit}' behind the 
category 'child'. To begin unpacking 'truths' about childhood that would justif)' such differential 
treatment in the context of international human rights discussed in Chapter 4, this chapter 
canvassed a particular stream of child sociology. The first section argued that childhood is a 
social construct. Section 11 argued that certain 'truths' about childhood underpin dominant 
perceptions of the child. Although these 'truths' wiU be discussed further in Chapters 6, 7, and 
8, Section II alluded to how these 'truths' arc embedded in the CRC's construction of the child. 
It was argued that childhood is characterised by three 'truths': 1) childhood as a time for 
development, 2) children as uniquely \-ulnerable and thus in need of unique protection, and 3) 
childhood as a time of being particularly 'needy'. 
Section 111 discussed the ways in which the normative 'child' is constructed through the adult -
child binar)', as well as the good-child - bad-child binar\'. This section argued that the CRC gives 
the child rights and protection only to the extent that those rights and protection do not blur the 
appearance of these strict binaries. While tiie identit}' of the adult is equally dependent on the 
identity of the child, the child is constructed as lesser. The CRC's adherence and acceptance of 
this child - adult binar)', means that it too constructs the child as lesser. Further, the CRC is an 
adult-centric version of rights for children. Richard Delgado, a critical race theorist, has argued 
that a dominant group (here the categor)' 'adult') creates its own stones to remind itself and 
others of the dominant group's status, and provides that stor)' as a shared reaKt>', where the 
dominant group's own superior position is seen as natural . ' " Childhood's 'difference' may be 
understood m terms of power, though Jenks has argued that the grounds of power are not purely 
aged-based (necessarily involves consideration of race, class, gender, caste, and so on).'^" Jenks 
argues that the altruism or care that an adult feels towards a child too is a social construct. This 
care, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, can be read as ideological and thus the appearance of care 
has the ability to disguise the possibility of control, j enks argues that dependency then is seen 
not as spontaneous loving bonds, but mechanisms that serve a particular version of the status 
quo. By accepting the 'truths' described in this chapter, the CRC also sustains the adult - child 
binary, where status quo power relations of adults positioned over children remains the norm. 
Simply put, these 'truths' about childhood rationalise the hierarchical relationship of adults over 
children. The next two chapters will discuss in particular how the ' truths ' that the child is 
'developing' and thus requires 'care', operate in the CRC. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A 'TRUTH' OF THE CRC: THE DEVELOPING CHILD 
"A substantially similar version of this chapter was published, see Ashleigh Barnes, The CRC's Performance of the Child as 
Developing. 14 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 3 9 2 ( 2 0 1 2 ) . 
OUTLINE 
I. PREAMBLE 
II. ARTICLE 6: RIGHT TO LIFE 
III. ARTICLE 18: STATE RECOGNITION THAT PARENTS HAVE PRIMARY 
RESPONSIBLITY FOR THEIR CHILD(REN) 
IV. ARTICLE 27: RIGHT TO ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING 
V. ARTICLE 29: FOCUS OF EDUCATION 
VI. ARTICLE 32: RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM EXPLOITATIVE AND 
HAZORDOUS WORK 
VII. ARTICLE 23: RIGHTS OF THE CHILD WITH DISABILITY 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The CRC appears to assume that there is a universal model of childhood development.' The 
CRC uses the word 'development' eighteen times, fourteen of which refer to the child's 
development. Childhood as the site of development was accepted without discussion in the 
drafting of the Convention.' The acceptance of childhood as a state of development is neither 
explained in the Convention nor by the drafters, excepting perhaps this statement in the 
Preamble: 'bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, the 
child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care'."* 
Childhood characterised as a unique state of development resulting from the child's immaturity 
is presented as a 'truth' in the apparentiy too obvious to necessitate discussion. As 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, children are assumed immature, and thus in need of development. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the performance of the child as developing matches dominant 
knowledges about childhood, including certain psychological and even 'common sense' 
understandings of childhood.^ The Convention's version of childhood as a unique period of 
development makes possible, even necessar)', the unique protection of childhood. Put another 
way, the construction of childhood as a period of development makes 'care' by adults necessary 
for all children, as wiU be discussed in Chapter 7. In this chapter, and the following, this thesis 
will examine two 'truths' of the CRC: 1) childhood is a state of development, and 2) children 
require the 'care' of certain adults.' This chapter will discuss how the notion of 'development' 
operates within the Convention. Chapter 7 discusses how the child's development justifies the 
child's 'need' for protection or 'care'. 
The agitation of a universal identity, or a categorisation based upon alleged 'natural' 
characteristics, has occurred in the context of gender, race, sexual orientation, and so on, to 
expose the unnaturahiess of and difference within a category. In an attempt to explore a similar 
'SEE E v a B r e m s , Children's Rights and Vniversality. in DEVELOPMENTAL AND A U T O N O M Y RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: EMPOWERING 
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CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (2010) . Eor a critique see Vanessa Pupavac. Misanthropy Without Borders: The International Children's 
Rights Regime. 25 (2 ) DISASTERS 95 . 101 (2001 ) : Jo Boyden. Children's Experience of Conflict Related Emergencies: Some 
Implications for Relief Policy and Practice. 18(3) DISASTERS 254 . 256 (1994) . The universal application of the C R C will be 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
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Article 18(2) states. "Iflor the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting Ihe rights set forth in the present Convention. States 
Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of their cbild-rearing 
responsibilities and shall ensure the developmenl of institutions, facilities and services for Ihe care of children . 
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•TRAVAUX PREPARATIORES ' ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
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5 1 ( 1 9 9 2 ) 
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children's rights law "is enslaved to child welfare and child development experts . 
cntiquc o f the categorj- 'child', a variety o f theoretical tools discussed in Chapter 3 will be 
recruited to make the argument that the category 'chad' is not based on a set o f natural or 
fundamental characteristics shared by those aged 0-18; the operating presumption about the 
child in the CRC. Indeed, the category' 'child' is a grouping deemed by the international 
community to be sufficiendy and collectively umque to justify the creation o f a singular categoty 
in the context o f international law, regardless o f gender, class, ethnicity, nationality, and so on. 
While other fields o f study have agitated the 'naturalness' o f the 'developing child' some fort)' 
years ago,^ as discussed in Chapter 5, international legal discourse on the child and rights o f the 
cliild remains stuck on the 'developing child'. 'I'his chapter focuses on the concept of 
'development', arguing it as one o f the most influential and universally subscribed 'truths' about 
childhood." This chapter argues that tlie term 'development' holds important interpretive value 
for other dominant discourses/'truths' regarding childhood. The term 'development' 
encapsulates, explains, and even 'cures' (in other words, provides the means to surmount) the 
child as passive, incapable, dependent, \'ulnerable, subversive, and in need o f discipline. The 
term 'development' accounts for the 'need' for adult intenention in the lives o f both the 
Apollonian and Dionysian child, outlined in Chapter 5. While the terms \-ulnerabi!ity, incapacity, 
dependence and passivity lack a certain concreteness (and result in a never-ending discussion),' 
development (and the child's need for it) is virtually unquestionable.'" Notably, the discussions 
' See generally PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; DAVID ARCHARD. 
CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD (I""* e d . 2 0 0 4 ) : D A V I D A R C H A R D . CHILDREN. FAMILY AND THE S T A T E ( 2 0 0 3 ) : M i c h a e l 
Freeman. The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Righls. 6(4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 433 
(1998): ERIK ERIKSON. CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1977): Sarah L. 1 lollow ay & Gill Valentine. Spatiality and the New Social 
Studies of Childhood. 3 4 ( 4 ) SOCIOLOGY 7 6 3 ( 2 0 0 0 ) : JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD ( 1 9 7 4 ) . A l l i s o n J a m e s . 
Confeclions. Concoctions and C o n c e p t i o n s . 10(2) JOURNAL OF THE ANTHROPOLOGY SOCIETY OF OXFORD 83 ( 1 9 7 9 ) : 
ALLISON JAMES, CHRIS JENKS, a n d ALAN PROUT. THEORISING CHILDHOOD ( 1 9 9 8 ) : A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d C h r i s J e n k s , 
Constructing Childhood Sociologically, in AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILDHOOD (Mar \ Jane Kehily. ed.. 2004): ALLISON JAMES 
AND ADRIAN JAMES, CONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: THEORY POLICY, AND SOCIAL PRACTICE ( 2 0 0 4 ) : CHRIS JENKS. Constituting 
the Child, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD - ESSENTIAL READINGS (1982): Chris Jenks. Child Abuse in the Postmodern 
Context: An Issue of Social ldeniit)',20)Cm\.m\OOD 111 (1994): Chris Jenks. The Post-Modern Child. ;>i CHILDREN IN 
FAMILIES: RESEARCH AND POLICY ( J u l i a B r a n n e n & M a r g a r e t O ' B r i e n , e d s . , 1 9 9 6 ) : B E R R Y M A Y A L L , TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY 
FOR CHILDHOOD: THINKING FROM CHILDREN'S LIVES (2002): Alan Prout. Children's Participation: Control and Self 
Realisation in British Late Modernity. 1 4 ( 4 ) CHILDREN AND SOCIETY 3 0 4 ( 2 0 0 0 ) : ALAN PROUT. T H E FUTURE OF CHILDHOOD, 
TOWARDS THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF CHILDREN ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; JENS QVORTRUP, I 'arieties of Childhood, in STUDIES IN 
MODERN CHILDHOOD: SOCIETY. AGENCY, AND CULTURE ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; JENS QVORTRUP. CHILDHOOD AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON AN 
INTRODUCTION TO A SERIES OF NATIONAL REPORTS ( 1 9 9 3 ) : R E X STAINTON ROGERS a n d W E N D Y STAINTON ROGERS, STORIES 
OF CHILDHOOD: SHIFTING AGENDAS OF CHILD CONCERN, ( 1 9 9 2 ) . - PHILIP VEERMAN. T H E RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND THE 
CHANGING IMAGE OF CHILDHOOD (1992); Gill Valcnline. Angels and Devils: Moral Landscapes of Childhood. 14 
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING SOCIETY AND SPACE 581. 581 -599 (1996); Gill Valentine. Boundan' Crossings: Transitions 
from Childhood to Adulthood. 1 ( 1 ) CHILDREN'S GEOGRAPHIES 3 7 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; VIVIANA ZELIZER. PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD; 
THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; N E I L POSTMAN. T H E DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD ( 1 9 9 4 ) : MARTIN 
HOYLES. T H E POLITICS OF CHILDHOOD ( 1 9 8 9 ) . 
MARTIN WOODHEAD. Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children's Needs ". in GROWING UP IN A CHANGING 
SOCIETY ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
See Chapter 2 for an overview of such discussion. 
See for example R E X STAINTON R ( X ; E R S a n d W E N D Y STAINTON ROGERS, STORIES OF CHILDHOOD: SHIFTING AGENDAS OF 
CHILD CONCERN ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; CHRIS JENKS. CHILDHOOD ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; D a v i d A r c h a r d . Philosophical Perspectives on Childhood in 
LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD (Julia Fionda ed.. 2001): Berr> Mayall . The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to 
Children's Rights. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 2 4 3 . 2 4 5 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
that led up to the drafting of the CRC were not about whether a child should be construed as 
developing, but rather about identifying parties in the best position to guide the child through 
this 'golden' but dangerous t ime." Further, the discussion surrounding the drafting of the CRC, 
and the Convention itself, does not centre on whether the child's alleged state of development 
should affect the child's bundle of rights, but rather on the extent to which the child's 
development should affect the child's bundle of rights.'^ 
This chapter posits that the derogation of 'fundamental ' rights, which are allegedly available to aU 
humans on the basis of their humanness, for children requires conceptually sturdy ground on 
which to stand. This chapter argues that justifying the child's bundle of rights on the basis of the 
persuasive (and scientific) 'truth' of 'development' has greater pohtical purchase than other 
possible 'tmths' established in the Convention (for example, that children are immamre). 
Ultimately, this chapter argues that the CRC's construction of the child as developing, through 
its mediated allocation of 'rights' to children, sustains and supports a hierarchy of power of the 
state (as a back-up parent) and the parent over the child. T'his hierarchy of power is made 
'ok'/condonable/even 'necessarj ' through the deployment of knowledges regarding the child's 
'development'. Further, this hierarchy of power makes possible the regulation and control of 
childhood to be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. This thesis argues that the CRC is a highly 
persuasive knowledge manufacmrer, legitimating a particular set of discourses on the child. The 
CRC produces and legitimates its performance of childhood as a fundamental, invariable truth 
about the category 'child'. In this way, the CRC's claim to 'truth' (child=developing) arguably 
masquerades as a description of 'how things are', rather than a production/prescription of 'how 
things must be'. 
In an attempt to unpack the operation of 'development' in the Convention, this section will 
utilise Woodhead's 'needs equation'. As was discussed in Chapter 5, Woodhead argues that 
childhood is predominantly concepmahscd in terms of needs; a term that he argues conceals a 
" OERISON LANSDOWN. THE EVOLVING CAPACITIES OF THE CHILD, X ( 2 0 0 5 ) : - A s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t c h i l d d e v e l o p m e n t a n d 
evolving capac i t i es of the ch i ld Convent iona l chi ld deve lopment theory innuence current Ihmkmg based on f ive k ey 
assumptions: 1) Chi ld deve lopment i s a un iversa l process , 2 ) Adul thood has normat ive status. 3 ) Deve lopmem goa l s are 
universal. 4 ) Deviat ion from the norm ind ica tes r isk for the chi ld . 5 ) Chi ldhood is an extended period of dependence m 
which children are pas s ive rec ip ients o f adul t protection, t ra in ing , w i sdom and gu idance rather than contr ibutors to their 
social environments ' . 
" See for example E v a B r e m s , Children S Rights and Universality, in DEVELOPMENTAL AND AUTONOMY RIGHTS OF 
CHILDREN: E M P O W E R I N G C H I L D R E N , C A R E - G I V E R S , A N D C O M M U N I T I E S ( J a n C . M . W i l l e m s e d . , 2 0 0 2 ) r e p r o d u c e d i n S A R A 
DILLON, INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S RIGHTS ( 2 0 1 0 ) : F r a n c e s E. O l s e n . Children's Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to t^te 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON L A W AND THE FAMILY 1 9 2 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; P e 
Miljeteig-Olssen. Advocacy of Children's Rights-The Convention as More than a Legal Document. 12 HUMAN RIGHTS 
QUARTERLY 1 4 8 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
complex practice of latent assumptions and judgments about children " His equation, 'X needs 
Y for Z', is a method for analysing and breaking down w h o needs what and why, questions often 
difficult to ascertain in a complex social context diat contain what are perceived as basic 'truths' 
about children. The potency of this method lies in its simplicit}'. It offers an opportunit}' to 
deconstruct assumptions, rooted in axiomatic language. As applied to the CRC, X [the child] 
needs Y [a particular thing that is secured in the form of a right] for Z [to accomplish some 
measure].'"' This analysis will be used even when the 'need' is implied. 
T o examine the CRC's 'child', this chapter explores the shape of rights given to the child. When 
these rights diverge from the nghts given to (or emphasised for'^) all other humans, diis chapter 
examines the justification provided by the CRC. These justifications illuminate the CRC's 'true' 
child. In a sense, this thesis is seeking to understand Pinocchio's goal: what it means to be a 
'real' ]child], in this case a 'real child' according to the CRC. The chapter argues that to be a 
'true' or 'real' child, a person nominated a child must be 'developing'. This chapter then seeks to 
explicate how tiiis ' truth' of the 'child-as-developing' facilitates a particular hierarchy of power 
surrounding the child." Each section below examines specific articles in the Convention that 
" MARTIN WOODHEAD. Psychology and Ihe Cultural Conslruclion of "Children's Needs ". In GROWING UP IN A CHANGING 
SOCIETY. 37. 40 (1990). Woodhead maintains that children might be better served i f ' ch i ldren ' s needs" were outlawed from 
all professional discourse, policy recommendations, and popular ps\chology. As discussed in Chapter 4. Woodhead argues 
that 'needs' often serve as a very credible veil for uncertainty and even disagreement about what is 'in the best interest' of 
the child. 
MARTIN WOODHEAD, Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children's Needs ". in GROWING UP IN A CHANGING 
SOCIETY. 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" It was noted during the drafting of the Convenlion, 'there are still those who believe that a convention on the rights of the 
child was not necessary - that children's rights w ere, if not totally, at least adequately covered by existing human rights 
instruments applicable to all, and that it is dangerous or unwarranted to pinpoint children as a special and separate category 
of human beings. We can recall that it was not because of the Convention that children were singled out as a special group, 
but because of the realisation, seventy years ago. that children's specific needs and vulnerability demanded particular 
responses from the international community. We can note in that regard thai global human rights instruments were not 
draw n up with children in mind, that they have been developed over a period of decade, and thai as a whole they therefore 
contain a number of inconsistencies and certainly do not reflect current know ledge and experience w ith regard to children's 
issues. But in addition . . . is the usefulness for promoting knowledge and understanding of children's issues". SHARON 
D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X PREPARATIORES ' . 2 9 
(1992). Germany suggested that '(ajll states shall ensure a) that all human rights recognised by Ihem also apply to children, 
b) that general human rights as enshrined in the ICCPR even apply to children, if a state party to the present convention is 
not a party to the Covenant'. Germany argued that many of the rights in the Inlcmalional Covenants already apply to 
children, were included again specifically in the draft convention, but on the other hand not all the rights guaranteed by the 
Covenants appeared in the draft convention, for example the right of self-determination, the equal rights of men and women, 
the ban on slaveo'. the right of person arrested or detained to be brought promptly before a judge, even though they also 
should apply lo children. The delegate said that this seleclive double-regulation of rights w ould create problems and even 
contradictions with the Covenants and a general clause ensuring the application of general human rights to children should 
be substituted for the present Article 1. Au.stralia said that to do so was totally new. bringing into question the whole 
approach of the Convention to existing rights, ll may well have been a better way to proceed had it been introduced vears 
before, but that had not happened and now its acceptance would only serve to delay adoption of the Convention. Ultimately 
G e r m a n y w i t h d r e w i t s p r o p o s a l . S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D A 
G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X PREPARATIORES ' . 1 3 1 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
Thomas Hammarberg. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and How to Make ll Ifork. 12 HUMAN RIGHTS 
QUARTERLY 97. 101 (1990): 'The triangular relationship between the child, the guardians, and the stale was of course a 
sensitive problem during the drafting". 
reference the child's development. The goal is to examine how development operates (in other 
words, what the term 'development' makes possible) within each of those articles. 
As a reminder, this thesis does not endeavour to engage in black letter law analysis. If so, an easy 
counter-argument would be that rights given under other international conventions, such as the 
ICESR and ICCPR, would be applicable to children. Though this counter argument has met 
disagreement, even by the drafters of the CRC," this paper does not look to engage in such an 
analysis. Rather, this paper seeks to examine the story told about the 'child' by the CRC. As 
such, die rights that are included and excluded, as well as rights that are modified in this 
Convention, are all of interest. The specific bundle of rights, and therefore the unique bundle of 
issues and needs identified for the 'child' in the CRC, teU as verj- specific tale about childhood, 
contrasting with the story told of adult right holders in other conventions." 
I. PREAMBLE" 
The Preamble reads. 
the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personalit}', 
should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love 
and understanding . . . taking due account of the importance of traditions and 
cultural values of each people for the protection and harmonious development 
of the child. 
Applying Woodhead's 'needs equation' to these two sentences,^" 
" SHARON D E T R I C K , T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES'. 130 (1992) . No te in par t icular the G e r m a n delegates s ta tements that the C R C ' s ' se lect ive double regulation 
of rights [for children] wou ld cause p rob l ems and even contradic t ions wilh other international covenan t s ' . 
" SHARON D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES'. 130-131 (1992) : ' I n d e e d the G e r m a n delegate expressed concern that certain r ights f rom other h u m a n 
rights conventions were included in the C R C while o thers were not (cit ing the right to self -determinat ion, the ban on slavery, 
the equal rights of men and w o m e n , the r ight o f a person arrested or detained to be brought prompt ly before a j u d g e ) . The 
delegate pointed out that this select ive double- regula t ion of r ights would create p rob lems and even contradict ions with the 
other human rights convent ions . Ul t imate ly the G e r m a n delegate argued that there should be a general c lause not ing the 
applicability of general h u m a n r ights to chi ldren. The Austral ian delegate argued lhat if the German delegate s suggest ion 
was followed, this would be a w h o l e new approach to the Convent ion , and would derail the entire process, particularly at 
such a late stage in the d ra f t ing process . Ul t imate ly the G e r m a n delegate wi thdrew its proposal . Given this discussion, one 
could argue that even under a b lack letter law analys is it is uncertain the ef fec t of the C R C ' s selective "double- regula t ion . 
" The legal s ignif icance o f the P reamble as compared to the art icles themse lves will not be discussed here, as this thesis 
investigates the p e r f o n n a n c e of the child in the Convent ion in its entirety, rather than its impor tance to black letter law. 
MARTIN W O O D H E A D . Psychology and the Cultural Construction of ••Children S Needs in G R O W I N G U P IN A C H A N G I N G 
SOCIETY ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
X 
needs 
Y 
for 
Z 
the child a family environment (defined 
as an atmosphere of happiness, 
love and understanding) that 
takes into account traditions 
and cultural values 
full and harmonious 
development 
According to this statement, the result required for the child is 'full and harmonious 
development'. During the drafting of the Convention, no discussion took place as to what was 
meant by any of these three terms: 'full', 'harmonious' or 'development'.^' As will become a 
theme, the non-discussion of the usage of the term 'development' in relation to the child is 
consistent throughout the drafting of the Convention. Apparentiy, the term was too obvious to 
require discussion. 'I'he terms 'fuU' and 'harmonious' are interesting adjectives used to describe 
the child's development. What do 'full' and 'harmonious' mean (much less their modified noun, 
'development')? Harmonious could mean 'appropriate' or 'agreeable'. Yet, what is 'appropriate' 
for the cliild's development? Is there agreement/could there be agreement regarding what is or 
is not suitable for the child's development? Gerison Lansdown argues that there is no such 
agreement." Lansdown contends that, 
|i|t is clear that a universal, prescriptive and deterministic conception of a linear 
process of child development applicable to all children is inadequate to reflect 
the complex realities of children's acquisition of competencies. Indeed, the 
concept of child development, as wcU as the concept of childhood itself is, to a 
ver\' large extent, a social rather than a biological construct.^' 
How one defines 'harmonious' would likely depend on one's vision of what cliildhood should 
be. Given that the Preamble notes that the aim of childhood is where 'the child should be fully 
prepared to Hve an individual life in society', one definition of 'fuU' Hkely implies the time at 
wliich the child graduates from childhood into adulthood. Outside of the legally delineated time 
defmed in Article 1 of when the child graduates, what does a fully developed child look like? 
'Full' seems to imply the point at which the child fully reaches its binar\- opposition: adulthood/a 
state of responsibilit)'. If the answer is an adult, what then does an adult look like? The picmre 
drawn of the child in this article is that the child is inherently incomplete, lacking, and 
insufficient, and thus requires development. By attaching 'full' and 'harmonious', the CRC not 
To see what was discussed see S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A GUIDE 
T O T H E ' T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S " . 1 0 2 - 1 1 0 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
^^ G E R I S O N L A N S D O W N , T H E E V O L V I N G C A P A C I T I E S OF THE C H I L D . 1 0 - 1 3 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
G E R I S O N L A N S D O W N . T H E E V O L V I N G C A P A C I T I E S OF THE C H I L D . 1 0 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . citing M A R T I N W O O D H E A D . Is T H E R E A P L A C E 
FOR C H I L D W O R K IN C H I L D D E V E L O P M E N T ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 
only makes adulthood the normative aim of childhood, but indicates that the development 
process itself has to meet certain norms of what is or is not appropriate for childhood. In this 
way, the process of development becomes an object of regulation (it must be full and 
harmonious); the child becomes a site of regulation. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, Berry 
MayaU argues that the perceived 'need' to monitor children's development has led to 
unprecedented sun'eiUance of childhood, whether at school or at home.^ "* 
Here, the child seems to 'need' two things: 1) to develop, and 2) a family environment. More 
specifically, the child needs the f a m i l y ^ r h i s or her development. As was pointed out in Chapter 
5, 'needs' statements (here the child needs full and harmonious development) carry authority not 
simply due to their straightforward descriptive qualit\^^^ Woodhead contends that 'needs' 
statements convey considerable emotive force, inducing a sense of responsibility, and even 
feelings of guilt if those statements are not followed. This power, she argues, comes pardy from 
the connotation of helplessness and passivity of any individual who is 'in need' and partly from 
the implication of the dire consequence that will follow if the need is not met through 
appropriate inter\'ention.^' Here, if the child does not have a family environment in line with 
traditions and cultural values, the child will not develop, fuUy or harmoniously. If the child does 
not have a family, the child's development will be tumultuous and incomplete. Given that the 
Preamble notes the aim of the childhood as a preparatory stage where 'the child should be fuUy 
prepared to Uve an individual life in society'; the undeveloped child would be a 'dire 
consequence'. The aim of childhood (development into a normal adult) would not be reached. 
The child is in danger of remaining uncivilised, a savage, if children, 
are allowed to grow up stunted or neglected or strangers to moral values, or are 
ignored in their misery by the more formnate, they will inevitably grow up to 
hate and destroy, and tomorrow's world can only end up in disaster, poHtically 
and economically. 
As a consequence of these rapidly accumulating 'needs' assessments, the family becomes the 
'proper' place for childhood. The portrayal of the child as developing makes possible and even 
necessary the family. In the Convention, die family and the community comprise hierarchical 
BEN^' Maya l l . The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children's Rights. 8 I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L OF C H I L D R E N ' S 
RIGHTS 2 4 3 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
" M A R T I N W O O D H E A D , Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children's Needs in G R O W I N G U P IN A C H A N G I N G 
SOCIETY. 4 0 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" M A R T I N W O O D H E A D , Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children's Needs". in G R O W I N G U P IN A C H A N G I N G 
SOCIETY, 4 0 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
" Y V E S B E I G B E D E R . T H E R O L E A N D S T A T U S OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L H U M A N I T A R I A N V O L U N T E E R S A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N S . 1 9 5 
( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
relationships of adults over children, as will be argued m Chapter 7.-" For example, traditions, 
cultural values, and parent's^' judgment trump the child's right to information, thought, and 
religion,'" and even the right to be free from abusive traditional practices or as the Convention 
more lighdy puts it 'traditional practices that are prejudicial to the health of children'." Although 
this point will be further discussed in Chapter 7, by making the family a requirement of 
childhood, the CRC solidifies and rationalises the hierarchical relationship of adults (in particular 
parents and the state as a back-up parent) over children. The CRC's Preamble appears to 
indicate that the child and her/his development are in need of regulation (the parties to this 
regulation are discussed further in Chapter 7). 
II. ARTICLE 6: RIGHT TO LIFE 
The first article that includes the word development is the right to Life in Articlc 6, which states. 
1. State Parties recognise that every child has the inherent right to life. 
2. State Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the sur\'ival and 
development of the child. 
Analysing Articlc 6 according to Woodhead's model. 
X Y Z 
the child needs the state for the child to be able to 
sur\-ivc and develop and 
thus to be able to enjoy the 
right to hfe 
This article relates to the child's inherent right to life. Yet, the required result is the 'sur\'ival and 
development' of the child. What docs development mean, alongside sur\'ival? Further, how 
exactly do 'sur\-ivar and 'development' relate to the right to life? During the drafting of this 
See for example Articlc 18. which states that parents have the priman- responsibility for ensuring the upbringing and 
development of the child. Additionally, many of the articles that mandate the state to provide assistance to the child require 
such assistance to be provided to the parent. 
® The words 'parents' and 'care-givers' are used interchangeably. The terms 'adulf and 'parents ' are used interchangeably 
m this thesis, and mean to refer to those vi ho have responsibility for the child. The issue of the Convention giving 
preference to biological parents will not be pursued here. 
" See Article 14(2). and 17(e). 
" See Article 24(3). particularly when read with Article 18: '[s]tate parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures 
with a v,ew to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children'. Interestingly, given that the Convention 
presents children as vulnerable, in need of protection, etc.. the stale is not required to ensure the abolishment of traditional 
practices^ Further, given that corporal punishment is widely practiced, one wonders if children were allowed to participate 
di^ ^g traditional practices and 'smacking' might be different. But then again, 'smacking' 
probably could be justified under the need for development, in particularly as outlined in Article 29, to develop respect for 
one s parents. See Chapter 7 for further discussion. 
article there was concern expressed that the concept of sur\'ival was not legally defined and could 
be 'harmful' to the concept of the right to development.'" The Italian representative noted that, 
the two words "survival" and "development" had come to acquire the special 
meaning of ensuring the child's survival in order to realise the fuU development 
of his or her personaKt}', both from material and spiritual points of view." 
This 'special' meaning was not elaborated upon by the Italian representative and arguably is not 
obvious from the Convention or the discussions that took place during the drafting of the 
Convention. 
In a commentarj' on Article 6, Manfred Nowak takes a positive view of the coupling of the right 
to life/survival with development in Article 6, arguing that such coupKng illustrates that the right 
to Hfe was interpreted in a comprehensive manner ." Though Nowak does not expound on what 
he means by 'comprehensive', he does goes on to argue that concept of development in the CRC 
would be better understood through Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to 
Development (UNDRD).'^ Article 1 of the UNDRD defines the right to development as, 
an inalienable human right by virme of which evcr\' human person and all 
peoples arc entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social 
cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fuUy realised." 
Nowak argues that the right to development has been characterised as a participatory process 
which ultimately leads to the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms." 
While similar vocabularies arc being used in the CRC and the UNDRD, a vasdy different 
paradigm of rights is being articulated. As discussed in Chapter 4, throughout this chapter, and 
as again will be discussed in Chapter 7, far from full participation in economic, social, cultural 
and political development, the child's development in the CRC relates litde to full participation 
even m matters that directly relate to the child. 
" SHARON D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S O F THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE ' T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES'. 1 2 0 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" SHARON D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N O N T H E R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE " T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES'. 1 2 3 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
' ' M a n f r e d N o w a k , Article 6: The Right to Life. Survival and Development, i n A C O M M E N T A R Y ON THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
CONVENTION O N THE R I G H T S OF T H E C H I L D . 2 ( A n d r e A l e n e t a l . e d s . . 2 0 0 5 ) . 
" D e e l a r a t i o n o n t h e R i g h t t o D e v e l o p m e n t U . N . G A O R , 4 1 s l S e s s . . S u p p . N o . 5 3 . a l 1 8 3 . U . N . D o c . A / R t S / 4 1 / 1 2 8 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . 
' ' M a n f r e d N o w a k . Article 6: The Right to Life. Survival and Development, i n A C O M M E N T A R Y O N THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
CONVENTION ON THE R I G H T S OF T H E C H I L D , 4 7 ( A n d r e A l c n e t a l . e d s . , 2 0 0 5 ) . 
" M a n f r e d N o w a k . Article 6: The Right to Life. Sur^-ival and Development, i n A C O M M E N T A R Y ON THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
CONVENTION ON T H E R I G H T S OF T H E C H I L D . 4 7 ( A n d r e A l e n e t a l . e d s . , 2 0 0 5 ) . 
Interestingly, while the right to life under the CRC refers to 'sur\4val and development,' the 
ICCPR requires only freedom from arbitrary- deprival of life.'" Article 6 of the CRC seems to 
suggest that unhke adults, children must universally struggle to survive. This conclusion is 
reinforced by die CRC Preamble, which states that children around the world are living in 
exceptionally difficult circumstances. As discussed m Chapter 4, given that the Convention does 
not recognise that children suffer from social discrimination" and at the same time recognises 
that children are fundamentally immarnre, the child's struggle to sur\ ive appears to be a result of 
the child's inherent immaturity', at least as understood in the Convention. The child needs die 
state to ensure her/his sursival and development, as if the latter is an obvious and necessar)-
corollan- to the child's right to Hfe. This pairing conjures up images of the Apollonian child, too 
innocent and too passive to worr)' about life being arbitrarily deprived by the state."^' It is this 
ApoUonian child that needs to be encouraged (towards development) and protected (to survive). 
While the ICCPR refers to the deprivation of life , the CRC's Article 6 carries with it more 
positive obligations relating to survival and development.'" What the state is required to do in 
the name of 'survival and development' is unclear. The inclusion of a positive obligation, while 
potentially viewed as 'progressive', correspondingly permits greater control. By requiring the 
state to ensure the child's development and survival, the child becomes an object of regulation 
by the state. As states are charged with this task of ensuring sur\'ival and development, the state 
is at once given the power to define what both 'survival' and 'development' mean, as well as 
define what measures need to be taken to ensure that the state's definitions of 'sur^-ival' and 
'development' are realised. In this way. Article 6's use of development envisions the child as a 
virmally helpless and innocent object requiring state inten'ention. While the Preamble's usage of 
development authorised the control of children by the family (in other words, parents), in Article 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 6. Dec. 16. 1966. S. Treaty Doc No 95-20 6 I L M 368 
(1967). 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
See Maria Grahn-Farley. Beyond Right and Reason: Pierre Schlag. The Critique ofNormolivitf. and the Enchantment of 
Reason: A Theory of Child Rights. 5 7 U N I V E R S I T Y OF M I A M I L A W R E V I E W 8 6 7 . 9 1 0 ( 2 0 0 3 ) : 'The C R C does not connect the 
fact that children are not living under the CRC ' s imagined conditions for a child but under various limitations placed on 
children for being children. The CRC is inconsistent on its own terms. The C R C imagines and is based on the child's mental 
and physical immaturity and its need of extra protection due to its immaturity' . 
CHRIS JENKS, CHILDHOOD. 69-73 (2005) . As outlined in Chapter 5. Jenks argues that the Apollonian and Dionysian 
images of the child are informative of the shifting strategies that Western society has exercised in its increasing need to 
control, socialise and constrain people in the transition towards modernity. 
S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S O F T H E C H I L D , A G U I D E T O T H E ' T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES'. 121 (1992) . It was noted that right to survival carried with it more positive obligations than the right to life 
such as prolonging the child's life. The right to life was argued to be so important that its inclusion should be necessaty and 
should be extended to positive obligations on the stale. The representative of Venezuela felt that the inclusion of paragraph 2 
would dminish the concept of the right to life conferred on all human beings in existing international instruments and 
requests thought be given to that. 
6 the child's state of development enables the state to exercise greater control and regulation of 
childhood; an argument that will be made throughout this chapter and the next. 
III. ARTICLE 18: STATE RECOGNITION THAT PARENTS ARE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CHILD(REN) 
Article 18 provides that, 
1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle 
that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and 
development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have 
the primar)' responsibUit)' for the upbringing and development of the child. The 
best interests of the child will be their basic concern. 
2. For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the 
present Convention, States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents 
and legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and 
shall ensure the development of instimtions, facilities and ser\'ices for the care of 
children. 
3. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of 
working parents have the right to benefit from child-care services and facilities 
for which they are eligible. 
According to Article 18, 
X Y Z 
the child needs responsible adults that are for the child's 
assisted by the state development and 
upbringing 
The result or goal of Article 18 is the child's development and upbringing. Immediately (and 
again) these words portray the child as incomplete. In this conception, a responsible adult is 
required to oversee the development and upbringing of the child. During the drafting of this 
article the focus of the discussion related to ensuring that parents had the primar}' role in the 
development and upbringing of the child, and thus minimising state inter\'ention in the 
relationship between the parent and child."" Additionally, the discussions revolved around not 
simply protecting the position of the parent in relation to the child, but also minimising the 
state's obHgation in relation to providing for the child." In this way, Article 18 buffers parents 
from state intervx-ntion. \'et, while Article 18 talks in terms of responsibility, 'responsibility for' 
another person is an enactment of power, and as such responsibility represents a right held by an 
" SHARON D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE - T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES' , 2 6 5 - 2 6 7 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
SHARON D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE " T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES' . 2 6 5 - 2 6 7 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
adult to exercise power over the child. This responsibilit)' endorses the adult to determine and 
dictate what is or is not m die best interests of the child. Parents' 'responsibilit}'' over the child 
arguably trumps the child's right to information, thought, and rel igion," and even the right to be 
free from 'traditional practices that are prejudicial to the health of children'. Article 18 secures 
the hierarchical matrix of the parent over the child, with the state as a reluctant backup over the 
parent, to be discussed in Chapter 7. 
One can imagine if CEDAW included, for example, the 'responsibilit)'' of a woman's husband to 
pro\'ide for the woman (the subject of the convention) and therefore had responsibilit)' for all of 
her financial matters.''^ 'Responsibilit)' for', in the context of man and woman, becomes more 
easily equated with 'power over'. In a convention that addresses the rights of the child, it is 
telling (and indeed supportive of this chapter's argument) that the Convention contains rights of 
those who are given control over children. Indeed, during the drafting of this article, the 
American delegate noted that it was 'strange' for an international human rights convention to 
place 'responsibilities' on private individuals (in other words, parents) when a convention can 
only create binding obHgations for rarif)-ing states.'" If 'responsibilit)' for' is read as the right to 
ha\'e power over another human, this article is indeed 'strange'. However, when viewed in line 
with the right to family privacy for adults, as in provided for in the ICCPR Article \1 this 
article may in fact be less about obligating parents, and more about recognising the parents' right 
to privacy."" 
The child's state of development in Article 18 again makes nccessar)' the hierarchical relationship 
between the parent and the child. Ultimately this thesis will quer)' that if the vision of child 
development articulated in the CRC is but one version of childhood, then why is the hierarchical 
relationship between the parent and the child relationship necessan-? For the moment, however. 
Article 18 is notable in that the rights of those who arc on the upper side of this power equation 
(in other words, adults) are included in a convention tiiat is supposed to address the rights of 
children. Interestingly, parents appear in almost ever)' article as a right holder, further enmeshing 
* See Article 14(2). and 17(e). 
" If one views the child as fundamentally different from adults, and thus inherently immature, one would argue thai analogy 
to the category "woman' would be irrelevant. This thesis rejects the idea that there exists some fundamental, universal, 
inherent 'child'. Thus, as there is no essential woman, there too is no essential child. 
S H A R O N D E T R I C K , T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 2 7 0 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
"'Article 17( 1): -No one shall be subjected lo arbitrao' or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlaw ful attacks on his honour and reputation'. 
"" See generally Bruce Hafen and Jonathan Hafen. Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. 3 7 H A R V A R D INTERNATIONAL L A W J O U R N A L 4 4 9 . 4 5 0 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
'responsibility for ' with a right to exercise power over children."' The rights of the child seem to 
be mediated by the protection of parental rights. 
IV. ARTICLE 27: RIGHT TO ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING 
Article 27 enumerates that, 
1. States Parties recognise the right of every child to a standard of living adequate 
for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development . 
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary 
responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the 
conditions of living necessaty for the child's development. 
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, 
shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the 
child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance 
and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and 
housing. 
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovety of 
maintenance for the child f rom the parents or other persons having financial 
responsibility for the child, both within the State Party and f rom abroad. In 
particular, where the person having financial responsibility for the child lives in a 
State different f rom that of the child, States Parties shall promote the accession 
to international agreements or the conclusion of such agreements, as well as the 
making of other appropriate arrangements. 
As such, according to Article 17, 
X Y Z 
the child needs parents, supported by the state, to for the child's 
ensure an adequate standard of living physical. 
mental. 
spiritual, moral 
and social 
development 
Similar to Article 6's right to life, the right to adequate standard of livmg is heavily Hnked to the 
child's development. Further, development in Article 27 uniquely includes a laundty' Hst of the 
specific areas in which the child needs to develop: physically, mentally, spiritually, morally and 
sociaUy. 'Adequate' attaches to the Uving conditions necessaty for the child's physical, mental, 
spirinial, moral and social development.™ Why is this laundty Hst necessaty for the child's right 
to an adequate standard of Uving? The focus on this iterated, standardised aspect of 
" Parents are rights holders 16 limes whereas children are 22 times (most of which include rights to protection). 
Asbjom Uic Article 27: The Right to an Adequate Standard of Uving. in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, 17 ( A n d r e A l e n el al. eds . . 2006) . 
development seems to underline the assumed precarious nature of being a child. Reference to 
development here not only casts the child as incomplete/immature, development is portrayed 
yet again as an essential 'truth' of the child. The child as immature/incapablc could be seen to in 
mm underscore the child as in need of development, thus underscore children's difference from 
adults. Yet, is the standard of living that is adequate for a sLx-year-old different from a fift\'-year-
old? The assumption is always: yes. The needs of the six-year old, who is immarnre and must 
develop mamritj', will be quite different from a fift\' year old, who is mamre and does not require 
any further process of development. However, are the basic needs of aU children, those which 
would make possible an 'adequate' standard of living, really that much different from adults? Put 
another way, are the needs of all six-year olds so similar, as well as the needs of all fift}'-year olds? 
After all. Chapter 5 argued that childhood is a set of experiences neither more nor less internally 
coherent than those of adults.^' A comparison of Article 27 with the ICESCR's Article 11 gives 
insight into how the CRC answers this question in the affirmative. While Article 11 of the 
ICESCR has been interpreted to focus on housing and food. Article 27 of the CRC has been 
interpreted to focus on development. Asbjorn Eide writes that Article 27 means that the 'child 
shall enjoy conditions which facilitate its development into a fully capable and well-functioning 
adult person'.^' Article 27, Like Article 11 of the ICESCR, mandates the right to an adequate 
standard of living.^' However, unHkc the ICESCR, a motivating reason for having such a right is 
included in the CRC: the child's development. By contrast, the right to an adequate standard of 
Living in the ICESCR is self-explicit, requiring no further justification.^'' 
Additionally, the means for realisation of the right to an adequate standard of living differs under 
the two conventions. In the CRC, the focus is providing parents with assistance to provide for 
" See generally Tom Campbell. The Rights of the Minor: As Person. As Child. As Juvenile, and Future Aduh. in CHILDREN, 
RIGHTS, AND THE LAW ( D a v i d A r c h a r d et al. eds . . 1 9 9 3 ) . 
" Asbjom Eide. Article 27: The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD. 17 (Andre Alcn et al. eds.. 2006). The usage of the term ' i f in relation to a 
person is a usual and possibility insightful reference, which may indicate some sort of sub-human status ascribed lo the 
category 'child'. 
" International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Article 11. Dec. 16. 1966. S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19. 6 
l.L.M. 360 (1967). 993 U.N.T.S. 3: Article 1 1 : ' 1. The Stales Parties to Ihe present Covenant recognise the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of l iving for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and lo the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. 1 he States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of this 
right, recognising to this effect the essential importance of international co-opcration based on free conscnt. 2. The States 
Parties lo the present Covenant, recognising the fundamental right of everyone lo be free from hunger, shall lake, 
individually and through inlemalional co-operalion. the measures, including specific programmes, uhich are needed: (a) To 
improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific 
knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian svstems in 
such a way as to achieve the most efficient dcvelopmem and utilisation of natural resources: (b) Taking into acco'unt the 
problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, lo ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in 
relation lo need . 
" I C E S C R . Article 11. 
the child " while in the ICESCR the focus is much more pragmatically focused on how to make 
food and shelter more readily available.^'' It would appear that Article 27 further embeds die 
dependency of the child's rights on a conception of development. As children arc 
incomplete/immature and thus require development, and indeed per Article 27, require 
development in a variety of personal and physical manifestations, the child needs parents to 
secure their right to an adequate standard of living. Again development justifies the positioning 
of adult responsibilin- over the child." As such, the inclusion of multiple areas of the child's 
'development' (in other words, inclusion of the multiple areas of the child's deficiencies) in this 
article could be construed to justify- the child's 'need' for an intermediary to secure the child's 
tight to an adequate standard of living. 
In this regard, most of the discussion during the drafting of this article focused on the extent of 
the obligation placed on the state to provide assistance, and not whether the child should also be 
provided direct, rather than mediated, assistance by the state.^" Article 27 insists that the 
caregiver has the primary responsibilit)' for ensuring this standard of Hving, and that the state 
'shall take appropriate measures' to assist those responsible for the child. It bears repeating that 
under the ICESCR Article 11, the right holder does not require any such intermediary. As was 
argued with regard to Article 18, 'responsibility for' the child could be construed as a grant of 
power over the child, as it requires the child to be dependent on the responsible adult. Giving 
parents' 'primary responsibility' in the context of Article 27 has been interpreted to, 
protect parents . . . against excessive state inter\'ention . . . [and] indicate that 
parents . . . could not expect the State always to inter\'ene, because the provision 
of the conditions of li\Tng necessar\' for the child's development is primarily [the 
parents'] responsibly.^' 
" Article 27(2-4). 
' ' ICESCR. Article 11(2). 
" David Cowan and Nick Dearden. The Minor as (a) Subject: ihe Case of Housing Law. in LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD 
(Julia Fionda ed.. 2001). These authors note that the political agenda in the welfare system which seeks to reinforce the 
dependence of the child is I) to restrict access to declining resources, or 2) to disciplinc/punish those who cannot or will not 
fit within the nomis of childhood. One could argue that because of the political purchase of the temi -development. the 
laundry list of areas in which the child must develop was included to underscore the importance of providing for the child s 
standard of living particularly given that children experience poverty at higher rates compared to adults. Another 
interpretation, the one taken in this thesis, is that development is employed to justify authorising certain adults as the means 
by which children are to acquire an adequate standard of living. Certainly, the child's right to adequate standard of living 
could be secured in other ways. Indeed, requiring children to rely on adults to provide for them could also be the cause for 
children's higher rates of poverty. Chapter 9 discusses the ways in which this paradigm of relying on adults is inapplicable, 
unhelpful, and at times abusive for certain children. 
" SHARON D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE - T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES ' , 3 7 1 - 3 7 7 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" Asbjom Hide. Article 27: The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITEIJ NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . 1 9 ( A n d r e A l e n e t a l . e d s . . 2 0 0 6 ) . c i t i n g S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
CONVENTION ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE " T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 5 9 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
In his commcntan- on this articlc, Eidc argues that under Article 27 the child is the nght holder 
and the parent is the duty holder.'^ " Yet he does not conceptualise the state's obligation not to 
inten-cne in the parents' exercise of primar\' responsibilit}' as a 'right' the parents hold." As 
argued in relation to Article 18, this Article also includes the parent's right to privacy. The child 
is made dependent on the parent, rather than being provided direct assistance to secure adequate 
housing for her or himself What about children who do not or cannot rely upon any adult? 
Such a discussion will be taken up on Chapter 9. 
One could argue that because of the political purchase of the term 'development', the laundr)' list 
of areas in which the child must develop was included in Article 27 to underscore the 
importance of providing for die child's standard of living, particularly given that children 
experience poverty at higher rates compared to adults. Another interpretation, the one taken in 
this thesis, is that development is employed to justify- authorising certain adults as the means by 
which children are to acquire an adequate standard of living. Certainly, the child's right to 
adequate standard of living could be secured in other ways. Indeed, requiring children to rely on 
adults to provide for them could also be the cause for children's higher rates of povert}'. Chapter 
9 discusses the ways in which this paradigm of relying on adults is inapplicable, unhelpful, and at 
times abusive for certain children. 
V. ARTICLE 29: FOCUS OF EDUCATION 
Article 29 states that. 
1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to: 
(a) The development of the child's personalit)', talents and mental and physical 
abilities to their fullest potential; 
(b) I'he development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural 
identit}', language and values, for the national values of the countr\' in which the 
child is living, the country' from which he or she may originate, and for 
civilisations different from his or her own; 
(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit 
of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality' of sexes, and friendship among all 
peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; 
(e) The development of respect for the natural environment. 
Asbjom Eide. Article 27. The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE C H I L D . 1 9 ( A n d r e A l e n c t a l . e d s . , 2 0 0 6 ) . 
Asbjom Eide. Article 27: The Right lo an Adequate Standard of Living, in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, 19 ( A n d r e A l e n el al. eds . , 2 0 0 6 ) . 
2. N o part o f the present article or article 28 shall be construed so as to interfere 
with the liberty o f individuals and bodies to estabKsh and direct educational 
institutions, subject always to the observance o f the principle set forth in 
paragraph 1 o f the present article and to the requirements that the education 
given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be 
laid down by the State. 
As such, 
the child needs 
of: 
to be directed to the development 
1. 
2. 
3, 
4. 
T h e child's self 
respect for human rights 
respect for the child's parents 
respect for her/his own 
cultural identit)', language and 
values 
5. respect for national values 
6. respect for her/his country 
7. respect for other civilizations 
8. respcct for the environment 
- > t o be directed to prepare for 
responsible life 
for ????—does not 
say 
Article 29 is one o f two articles that address the child's education.'^ The curriculum posited by 
the Convention in this article seems strange when compared to other human rights conventions. 
According to the General Comment No. 1 by the Committee to the CRC, the goal o f Article 29 
'is to empower the child by developing his or her skills, learning and other capacities, human 
dignit)', self-esteem and self-confidence'. This article seems to embrace education as a 
developmental concept that represents progress o f the child towards the acquisition o f full adult 
rationality in distinct incremental stages, each appropriate to a certain age band, each defined in 
terms of a particular set o f abilities and skills, and each representing a clear advance upon the 
preceding stage." Four o f the five paragraphs in Article 29(1) focus on education that ensures 
development. The other is aimed at 'preparation', depicting the child as incomplete and unready 
for 'free societ)''. T h e first aim o f education, therefore, appears to ensure the development o f 
the 'child's personality, talents, and mental and physical abiUties to their fuUest potential'. This 
article designates the child as m a state o f incompleteness, the remedy for which is education, a 
perspective discussed further in Chapter 8. 
Article 28. ,, ,. j j -»nAi\ 
" David Arcliard. Philosophical Perspectives on Childhood, m LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD. 46 (Jul,a F.onda ed.. 2001). 
I'his article describes goals that reach beyond the role of education as a response to 
developmental incompleteness or empowering the child, in the words of the General Comment 
No. 1. Outside of the critique describing children as merely 'incomplete', this article's 
educational aims arc not just focused upon 'developing' the child 'potential', but also about 
fostering the child's rcspect for other people, entities, and ideas. The next developmental aims 
arc about developing the child's respect 1) for human rights, 2) for the child's parents, culture, 
country-, national values, and other civilisations, and 3) for the 'natural environment'. In the 
context of Chapter 3's theoretical lens, these educational aims could constitute thinly veiled code 
words that aim to discipline the subject. Under this lens, fostering respect for this particular list 
has nothing to do with developing the child's 'potential' but could instead function to place 
normative limits on the rights of the child. Requiring the child to acquire rcspect for this list of 
culmral values arguably contributes to the child's submissive positioning in the CRC. In this 
view, the assertion of these educational aims demonstrates the breadth and arbitrariness of what 
is justified m the name of 'development' ." As a first example, the child needs to kam respect for 
her/his parents (the child's more powerful binary- opposite). During the drafting of the 
Convention, the Yugoslavian and Canadian delegates proposed the addition of respect for 
parents, which was adopted without comment.'^ Respect for parents was not in the original 
draft."' Again thinking of CEDAW, how would an article about the need for women to respect 
men (women's more powerful binan- opposite) be perceived? Such a unilateral requirement 
would most likely be an impossibility-. Notably, not once in the Convention are parents or any 
adults required to 'respect' children.'^ 
Second, that children's education is to be directed towards fostering (again this word) 'respect' 
for the 'namral environment'm a treat}- about children's rights seems misplaced, in the sense that 
" Minow argues in. Manha Minow. Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, in 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS RE-VISIONED. 44 (Rosalind Ekman Ladd ed.. 1996): "However appealing [the justification that care and 
custody is provided when a child is incompetent and rights and autonomy when they are competent] may be as a normative 
theory, it fails to describe the current legal universe. It seems bizarre to justify the variable treatment of 'young people 
currently manifested in the patchwork of legal regulations as though it expressed careful judgments about their competencies 
for various tasks and responsibilities. Why would an eighteen-year-old be competent to consent to her abortion but not 
entitled to miss school from her doctor's appointment without parental permission? Why would the seventeen-\ ear-old be 
competent to be treated as an adult in criminal court but not competent to sign a contract?' 
" S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE ' T R A V A U X 
P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 0 6 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
S H A R O N D E T R I C K , T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE ' T R A V A U X 
P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 0 6 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" Article 5 of the CRC only articulates tha t . ' [s](a(fs Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents 
or. where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or 
other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child 
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognised in the present Convention'. Emphasis 
added. 
it is not required explicitly of any other category of persons.® The value of engendering respect 
for the natural environment is itself not in discussion here. What is of interest instead is that the 
development of this particular form of respect is uniquely required of children. Nowhere in the 
ICCPR or in the ICESCR is respect for the namral environment enshrined. Rather, states are 
required to respect the right of peoples to dispose of natural resources as part of the right to self-
determination.''' Notably, this requirement does not includc teaching those peoples to respect 
their environment. Through the lens of this thesis, it could be argued that the inclusion of this 
pedagogical goal was to encourage educators to ensure that the ApoUonian child is exposed to 
his/her 'namral' environment (in other words, nature), or conversely, to ensure that the 
Dionysian child is taught to restrain from harming his/her 'namral' environment. The inclusion 
of this educational aim from the beginning of the drafting of the CRC is curious, particularly as it 
arguably preceded environmentaHsm becoming more of concern to the international 
Third, Article 29's focus on developing the child's respect for human rights is also notable in the 
sense that human rights conventionally focus on protecting the individual from the state. 
ICCPR, for example, obhgates the state to respect human rights, procuring protection from the 
state. Article 29 of the CRC, by contrast, is about teaching the right-holders (in other words, 
children) to respect human rights, their culture, and other culmres. The CRC presents a very 
different conception of the child rights holder, as compared to the adult rights holder. The 
CRC's requirement that the child should learn respect for what the CRC is supposed to be promding 
the child, again makes sense only if the child is envisioned as vacuous, as developing. 
Fourth, Article 29 requires the inculcation of respect for one's state, or 'national values'. As in 
the previous paragraph, rights generally focus on the protection of individuals from the state, in a 
sense the obligation of the state to respect the individual. However, in the CRC, it is the child 
that must learn respect for his/her state. By mandating that the child learn respect for her/his 
state, the state becomes included and entrenched in the CRC's hierarchy of power. Where 
" The original text read ' in ha rmony with na ture ' . SHARON DETRICK, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
THE C H I L D , A G U I D E T O THE " T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 0 0 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" A r t i c l e I Paragraph 2 & 3 o f the ICCPR slates: ' ( 2 ) All peoples may . Ibr their o w n ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources w ithout p re jud ice to any obl igat ions arising out o f international economic co-operat ion, based upon the 
principle o f mutual benef i t , and international law. In no case may a people be depr ived of its own m e a n s of subsis tence. 
{3)The Stales Part ies to the present Covenan t , including those having responsibil i ty for the adminis t ra t ion o f N o n - S e l f -
G o v e m i n g and Trust Terr i tor ies , shall p romote the realisation o f the right o f se l f -determinat ion, and shall respect that right, 
in conformi ty with the p rov i s ions of the Char ter of the United Nations". 
™ The initial draf t stated that the child should be educated i n ha rmony with na ture ' . The final draf t stated that the chi ld 
should be educa ted to deve lop ' respec t for the natural env i ronmen t ' . SHARON DETRICK, THE UNITEDNATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE ' T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 0 0 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
human rights typically restrict the state's power over the indi\-idual, the CRC requires the teaching 
of the right holder respcct for the state. 
In a fmal analysis. Article 29 does not include any rights for the child. Article 29 does not require 
states and/or parents to fmance a child's education or for the state to make available education, 
as is done in Article 28. The child has no right to an education or curriculum of her or his own 
choice. The article does not include the right of the child to be respected at school, by the state, 
or by parents. Instead, the article appears to function in a paternalistic manner, helping an 
ignorant, incomplete child to learn respect for her/his parents, the natural environment, human 
rights, and the state. As elsewhere, it is the term 'development' in Article 29 that justifies the 
curriculum and focus of the child's education. While 29(l)(a) relates to the child's development, 
29(l)(b-e) relate to the development of respect, a goal that seems scantily connected to the 
child's development, much less any right the child might possess. Through the interpretive lens 
of this thesis. Article 29 would seem to underline the parent-state hierarchy that surrounds the 
child, conveying a strikingly consistent narrative of abrogated, mediated rights, justified by the 
child's need for development. Important to this argument is the conflation of the child as 
developing/lacking/incomplete, making the superior positioning of the adult over the child 
'necessar\''. 
VI. ARTICLE 32: RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM EXPLOITATIVE AND 
HAZORDOUS WORK 
Article 32 asserts that, 
1. States Parties recognise the right of the child to be protected from economic 
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to 
interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. 
2. States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and educational 
measures to ensure the implementation of the present article. To this end, and 
having regard to the relevant provisions of other international instruments. States 
Parties shall in particular: 
(a) Provide for a minimum age or minimum wages for admission to employment; 
(b) Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of 
employment; 
(c) Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective 
enforcement of the present article. 
According to Woodhead's 'needs equation', 
X Y Z 
the child needs protection f rom economic for development 
exploitation and performing work and education 
that is hazardous 
Article 32 is pccuKar especially when read in relation to comparable rights in the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR. Of ten , the CRC is portrayed as a hybrid of these two covenants, modified to 
accommodate what the CRC deems unique to the category' 'child'. The focus of the CRC's 
nghts relating to work, including their conception and construction, tell a verj' different tale for 
the 'needs' of the child as opposed to the 'needs' of the working adult ." Comparison with the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR is particularly interesting given that this article, unlike most other 
articles, asserts that state parries must take into consideration the 'relevant provisions of other 
international instruments'. '^ This unusual mechanism within the CRC raises several questions. 
Why were other international instruments expHcitiy mentioned in this case, and how was the 
determination made as to which were considered relevant? Why must states 'in particular' focus 
on that which is Hstcd in 32(2)(a-c)? Does that mean that states may ignore that which is not 
listed in Article 32(2)? I 'our points will be made here. 
First, and fundamentally, this article does not include the right to work, as found in the 
ICESCR's Article 6. The child does not have the right in the CRC to ' the opportunit j ' to gain his 
[or her] living by work which [she/] he freely chooses or accepts'.^' The denial of such a right 
could have serious implications for children as they are again forccd to be dependent on parents 
or the state, l-urther, the focus on protecting the child's development underlines the immaturity-, 
incapacit)', and 'special status' of the child, who is as a result made in 'need' of both the parents 
and the state for support. Might the inclusion of the right to work have been viewed as 
encouraging children to work, and thus be incongruent with the prevailing identit)' of the child as 
dependent and at the same time incongruent with the prevailing identity of the adult as 
responsible? This thesis argues that the right to work was not explicitly included as it did not 
match the CRC's prevailing image of the child. 
" Al though already stated, ihis chapter does not engage in a black letter law analysis. Rather , this chapter focuses on the 
slory told about the chi ld in the C R C by the C R C ' s al location of rights. 
This w a s included on the .suggestion of the representa t ive of the International Labour Organisat ion. SHARON DETRICK. THE 
U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N O N THE R I G H T S O F THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 2 2 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" Articic 6 o f the I C E S C R : ' I. The States Part ies to the present Covenant recognise the right to work , which includes the 
right of eve r j ' one to the oppor tuni ty to gain his l iving by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropr ia te 
steps to sa feguard this right. 2. The s teps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenan t to achieve the full real isat ion 
of this r ight shall inc lude technical and vocat ional gu idance and training p rogrammes , policies and techniques to achieve 
steady economic , social and cultural deve lopmen t and full and product ive emp loymen t under condi t ions sa feguard ing 
fundamenta l polil ical and e c o n o m i c f r e e d o m s to the indiv idual ' . 
Second, while the CRC does not prohibit all child labour, Article 32 refers to four t)-pcs of 
prohibited work; 1) economic exploitation, 2) work that is 'likely to be' hazardous, 3) work that 
interferes with the child's education, 3) 'work that is harmful to the child's health or physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral or social development' . This article speaks nothing about what would 
qualif)' as economic exploitation, nor what would be harmful to the child's various streams of 
development. At what point does doing chores around the house or babysitting for j'ounger 
siblings become exploitative? At what point does working for the family business become 
exploitative? Indeed during the drafting of this article one speaker noted that the establishment 
of a minimum age of employment should not prevent the 'participation of children, under the 
direction of their parents and so as not to interfere with their education, in culmraUy related 
family hunting, fishing, or agricultural activities not regularly employing unrelated workers'.^" 
This speaker also noted that this article was not intended to prohibit family subsistence 
activities.^^ Additionally, most curious is that Article 38 of the Convention does not prohibit 
children between the ages of 15-17 from being directly involved in 'hostilities'. Military sendee 
for the state, including direct combat, is not considered by the CRC to be at odds with the child's 
'development ' nor is it considered 'hazardous'. It seems that if the child is working for the 
family, working for the state's militan^, or engaged in some 'cultural' activity, there is less concern 
about the conditions of the child's labour. 
Third, although the ICCPR does not refer to the right to work, it does include the right to be 
free from slavery and /o r serv-itude (related to economic exploitation).^' Interestingly however, 
die powerful words, 'slaven'' or 'servitude', are left out of the C R C . " The implications of this 
omission abound. For example, although there is a prohibition on trafficking,'" the absence of a 
specific prohibition on slaver)- is notably as slavery could have analogy for a child whilst in care, 
quite separate f rom the issue of being illegally abducted. Additionally, though the CRC includes 
S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N O N THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L U . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 2 2 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N O N THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D , A G U I D E T O THE - ' I R A V A U X 
P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 2 2 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
' ' Article 8 of the ICCPR. a non-derogable right: • I. No one shall be held in slavei>'; slaver\' and the slave-trade in all their 
forms shall be prohibited. 2. No one shall be held in servitude. 3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or 
compulsory labour: (b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with hard labour may 
be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a 
competent court: (c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include: (i) Any 
work or service, not referred to in subparagraph (b). normally required of a person who is under detention in con.scquence of 
a lawful order of a court, or of a person during conditional release from such detention; (ii) Any service of a militan' 
character and. in countries where conscientious objection is recognised, any national service required by law of ' 
conscientious objectors; (in) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the 
community; (iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations'. 
Notably, the CRC does not include anv non-derogable rishts 
" A r t i c l e 35. ' ® " 
a prohibition on all forms of exploi ta t ion/ ' the prohibition against slaver)' has been rccognised as 
jus cogeni'" or at least is universally condemned, and therefore could be a more effective tool in 
combating some of the situations in which children find themselves whilst 'in care' of a legal 
guardian. Was this prohibition so clear that it was not deemed necessarj' to include? Ts slaver}' 
not a particular problem for children and their development? O r would the inclusion of this 
prohibition challenge some of the extreme contexts in which children are required to live, 
considering 1) the few rights given to children to challenge their dependency, and 2) the few 
restrictions on the parents ' dominance over the child? Could making such a linkage be an 
extremely effective tool against such exploitation and deprivation of nghts, as slaverj' has such 
political purchase?" Would it not be an effective tool to challenge the presumption that the 
parents will hape the best interests of the child as their basic concern? O r is that precisely the 
problem? It seems that the inclusion of a prohibition on slaverj' and ser^-itude does not match 
the CRC's image of the family as happy and safe, and therefore was deemed unnecessary'. 
Fourth, even in the event that the child does work, the child, under the CRC, is not given 
fundamental safeguards associated with the right to work such as the right to 'fair wages', equal 
pay for equal work, or 'equal opportunit) ' of promotion'."^ Would providing such rights in the 
Convention be viewed as a feared encouragement to work, a contradiction to the prevailing 
image of childhood in the CRC? Article 7 of the ICESCR secures not only fair wages and equal 
opportunit}' for promot ion, but also '|r]est, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours 
and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays'. The child's right to 
'rest, leisure, and play' is an entirely separate article that provides for no other safeguards 
" Article 32; Article 34; Article 36. 
Arrest Wan-ants Case was ihe first time the International Court of Justice mentioned the temi. See Case Concerning the 
Arrest Warrant of! I April 2000 {Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 Februar>' 2002. 41 ILM 
536. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also provides that if a treaty conflicts w i t h j u j cogens then the treaty is 
void. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 53. May 23. 1969. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Neither the case nor the 
Vienna Convention offers examples of norms of jus cogens. The International Law Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
1980 YILC. Vol. 34 II. Article 40 does identify the prohibition of slaver>' as an example ofjus cogens. Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Nov. 2001. International Law Commission. Supplement No. 10 
(A/56/10). chp.lV.E.I . http;//w WW.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddb8re04.html. 
A sort of backlash to Bruce Hafen and Jonathan Hafcn. Abandoning Children to Their .Autonomy: The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 3 7 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 4 4 9 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . T h u s , the C R C is no t 
abandoning children to their rights, but arguably, in some cases, not providing protection for children against their parents 
even in extreme circumstances. 
Article 7 of the ICESCR; 'The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular; (a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a 
minimum, with; (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular 
women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men. with equal pay for equal work; (ii) A 
decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenam; (b) Safe and 
healthy working conditions; (c) Equal opportunity for eveo 'one to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher 
level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; (d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation 
of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. as well as remuneration for public holidays'. 
regarding their work."' Indeed 'rest' and 'leisure' in all other international conventions refer to 
working conditions.""* In his commentar}' on Article 31, Paulo David notes that the CRC is the 
first international human rights instrument that rccognises the right to engage in play and 
recreational activities.'^ He goes on to state that, 
[t]he CRC being drafted during the eighties, it probably largely benefited from the 
significant body of research that developed during the previous decades within 
academic, professional and other circles providing evidence on the central role 
that play has on the development of children. . . Consensus usually exists in the 
recognition that play can impact positively on children's physical and 
psychological development."' 
Why do children need a separate article to ensure their right to 'rest, leisure, and play', when they 
did not get (at least in the CRC) the right to equal pay for equal work, much less freedom from 
slaver}'? Again the idea may be that the drafters of the CRC did not want to in any way 
encourage child labour, leading to an emphasis on play instead of, for example, competitive pay. 
Article 32 together with Article 31 (re-) project the view that childhood is a 'golden age' where 
children should have Kttie responsibilit)- in order to enjoy themselves. 'I'his appears to 
particularly be the case when read together with other articles that deny (or decmphasise) 
children's responsibilit)' (for example, right to work) and capacit)' (for example, certain criminal 
procedural rights)."' These articles denote the Apollonian child, frolicking without worry or care. 
Not only arc children then incapable of responsibilit)', they are encouraged not to 'worry' about 
responsibilit}'. The CRC's combination of deletions and additions in Articles 32 and 31, as 
compared to the ICCPR and the ICESCR has strong implications about the 'namre' of the 
childhood as a safe, warm environment where children 1) have no cares but to rest and play, 2) 
should not have to work, and 3) have responsible adults to provide for them. VXTiile some might 
argue that this article is aimed at protecting the child, it equally and importantly assumes that m 
order to development the child must engage in non-paid activities, and as such cements the 
child's dependency on adults. By envisioning tine child in this way, the CRC is at the same time 
" Article 31. 
" Paulo David. Article 31: The Righl lo Leisure. Play and Culture, in A CoMMtNTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
C O N V E N T I O N O N T H E R I G H T S O F T H E C H I L D , 3-4 (Andre Alen et al. eds.. 2006). 
Paulo David. Article 31: The Right to Leisure. Play and Culture, in A C O M M E N T A R Y O N T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
C O N V E N T I O N O N T H E R I G H T S O F T H E C H I L D . 2 3 (Andre Alen el al. eds.. 2 0 0 5 ) . 
Paulo David, Article 31: The Right to Leisure. Play and Culture, in A C O M M E N T A R Y O N T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
C O N V E N T I O N O N T H E R I G H T S O F T H E C H I L D , 23 (Andre Alen et al. eds.. 2006), citing J E A N P I A G E T . P L A Y . D R E A M S , A N D 
I M I T A T I O N IN C H I L D H O O D ( C . Gatlegno and F. Hodgson irans.. 1962). 
' ' Freeman explains how this conception of children is utilised to deny children rights. See Michael Freeman ed 
C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S , V o l u m e s I a n d II ( 2 0 0 4 ) : M I C H A E L F R E E M A N . T H E R I G H T S A N D W R O N G S O F C H I L D R E N ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; M i c h a e l 
Freeman \hy,t Remains Important to Take Children's Rights Seriously. 15(1) I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F C H I L D R E N ' S 
R I G H T S J ( Z U 0 7 ) . 
justifying the 'need' for a responsible adult. Chapter 9 will explore in detail various children who 
arc left out of this vision of childhood. 
VI. ARTICLE 23: RIGHTS OF THE CHILD WITH DISABILITY 
The only other article that deals with development. Article 23, focuses on the child with 
disabilit)', describing as a goal that this child achieve 'the fullest possible social integration and 
individual development, including his or her cultural and spiritual development'. This article 
asserts that. 
1. States Pardes rccognise that a mentally or physically disabled child should 
enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignit}', promote self-
reliance and facilitate the child's activc participation in the communit}'. 
2. States Parties recognise the right of the disabled child to special care and shall 
encourage and ensure the extension, subject to available resources, to the eligible 
child and those responsible for his or her care, of assistance for which application 
is made and which is appropriate to the child's condition and to the 
circumstances of the parents or others caring for the child. 
3. Recognising the special needs of a disabled child, assistance extended in 
accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article shall be provided free of 
charge, whenever possible, taking into account the financial resources of the 
parents or others caring for the child, and shall be designed to ensure that the 
disabled child has effective access to and receives education, training, health care 
ser\'ices, rehabilitation services, preparation for employment and recreation 
opportunities in a manner conducive to the child's achieving the fuUest possible 
social integration and individual development, including his or her cultural and 
spiritual development 
4. States Parties shall promote, in the spirit of international cooperation, the 
exchange of appropriate information in the field of preventive health care and of 
medical, psychological and functional treatment of disabled children, including 
dissemination of and access to information concerning methods of rehabilitation, 
education and vocational ser\'ices, with the aim of enabling States Parties to 
improve their capabilities and skills and to widen their experience in these areas. 
In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing 
countries. 
Accordingly, 
X 
needs 
Y 
for 
Z 
the child with 
disabnit}' 
the state to provide 
assistance to the child with 
disabilit)' and to the child's 
parent 
the promotion of self-
rehance, facilitation of the 
child's active participation 
in the community', and 
the achievement of the 
fuUest possible social 
integration and individual 
development 
Article 23(2) is unique withm the CRC. It states that for the child with disabilit)', assistance 
should be given to 'the eligible child and those responsible for his or her care'. This is the only 
article in the CRC that explicitly prowdes for assistance from the state to be given to the child 
and to the parent, as opposed to simply the parent, as done in Article 27 (standard of living) or 
Article 18 (parent's responsibility for the child). Notably, the original text of this article made no 
mention of providing assistance to the child's family.'"' Most of the discussions during the 
drafting of this article focused on providing support to the child. Not until 1982 (three years 
into the drafting process) was the child's family included upon the suggestion of Argentina and 
the United Kingdom." Furthermore, while tliis article refers to the child's development, it also 
states that the child should live in conditions that 'promote self-reKance and facilitate the child's 
active participation in the community' and the 'fullest possible social integration'. The Polish 
delegate, in conjunction with the Australian, Canadian, British, and American delegates, pushed 
for the inclusion of self-reliance, activc participation, and dignity." This language was accepted 
without discussion.'" Certainly, no other article so exclusively focuses on the unqualified 
promotion of self-reKance and full social integration for the child. This article seems to reflect 
the approach in the CRPD more so than other articles within the CRC: promoting participation 
and self-reliance in the instance of dependency, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
One must ask: why was the child with disability given more autonomy as compared to other 
children and more equality as compared to the adults responsible for the child with disability? It 
would seem that due to the likeliliood of increased dependence of the child with a disability on 
parents and the state, the aim was to ensure respect for this more \-ulnerablc child's autonomy. 
Yet, how is it that this approach did not become applicable to the entire category 'child'? 
Adopting this thesis' theoretical lens, one possible explanation is that somehow children with 
disability are deemed to have less capacity to buck the hierarchical relationships that surround 
the child in the CRC's version of childhood. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
" S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES'. 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 ( 1992 ) . The or ig ina l a r t i c l e d id t ake into cons ide ra t ion the c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f the c h i l d ' s parents . 
S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 3 3 2 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
P R & A ^ T I O I ^ ™ ' 3 3 2 ^ 3 T 3 ' ( N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
julia Fionda writes that the undeveloped child is incomplete, lacks full maturitj', and is 
unfinished.'^ In this way the child is defined negatively, in the sense of what the child lacks." 
Children are viewed as 'becoming' rather than being.''' The focus of adults then is not on 
childhood in and of itself, but on how the desired characteristics of adulthood are acquired.'^ 
Put another way, the fixation on childhood is on the process of development, assimilation, and 
normalisation. Development teleology condemns children to being \'iewed exclusively as 
developmentally adaptive, hence correct or developmentaUy defective, hence incorrect."" The 
focus is then on what children 'need'. The CRC tells its story of the child. The 'nature' of the 
child as portrayed in the CRC rests on a foundational 'truth-claim': children are in a state of 
development. The CRC performs the child as passive, dependent, objects of care and love, 
requiring the child to be developed towards adulthood. Thus, adults must have responsibiUt}-
for/control over the child for the duration of childhood. 
As was argued in Chapter 4, because children are 'inherentiy' or 'biologically' immamre, children 
require or 'need' a different rights package then do adults. As was argued briefly in Chapter 4 
and win be argued in greater detail in Chapter 7, the CRC's \'ision of the 'child' as developing 
enables the 'need' for adults who have responsibiKt}' for/power over children. The child's 'need' 
for a 'responsible' adult significantiy alters the child's rights, even rights that are considered to be 
fundamental for all humans. This thesis argues that the CRC's performance of the 'child' as in a 
unique state of development is the basis for deviating from the 'equal and inalienable rights of aU 
humans'." By portraying the child as incomplete/developing and therefore in need of his/her 
wiser counterparts (read adults, to be discussed in Chapter 7), the Convention not only justifies 
the restriction of the some ver}' basic rights, but entrenches an inequitable relationship between 
the child and his/her family and his/her communit)'. Casting the child-as-developing allows the 
Convention (adults, states, institutions, discourses) to side step what would be considered 
unthinkable for any other categorj- of persons within the human family. This chapter argued that 
the CRC presents a rationality' that children are in a state of development and that this state of 
development justifies a hierarchical relationship with the adults charged with the task of 'caring' 
for those deemed a child. Children must, under the Convention, rely on adults for financial 
® JULIA F I O N D A . Legal Concepts of Childhood: An Introduction, in L E G A L C O N C E P T S OF C H I L D H O O D . 1 2 ( 2 0 0 1 ) . 
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2001), 
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" Tom Campbell. The Rights of the Minor: As Person. .As Child As Juvenile, and Future Adult, in CHILDREN. RIGHTS, AND 
THE LAW. 17(David Archard el al. eds.. 1993). 
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support, yet defer to them about the child's right to freedom of religion, thought, expression, 
education, in sum the assessment of what is in their best interest, as will be discussed in Chapter 
7. The CRC dictates the abdication of a wide spectrum of possibilit}- for autonomy and choice, 
all in the name of the child's development. This abdication does not square with the lives of 
certain children. Chapter 9 pursues troubling questions about children forced into roles of 
responsibility, and about irresponsible adults. 
Further, adults are assumed to have at heart the child's best interest. As with the notion of 
development, the alleged altruism that adults feel towards a cluld is equally a social construct; the 
appearance of care disguises the possibilit}' of control under the appearance of care.'" 
Dependency that results from the child's state of development when viewed through the lens of 
power developed in Chapter 3, relates not to the spontaneous loving bonds, but mechanisms 
that scr\'e to sustain particular versions of the status quo ." In this conception, the CRC 
becomes not about 'protecting' children or providing children with rights, but rather portraying a 
particular 'truth' about children to enable the sustainment of status-quo, propping up the adult-
child binar)' opposition where children are the Other. In this way, the CRC is fortifies and 
rationalises the adult's and the state's abilitj' to interi ene in the lives of children on the basis of a 
'truth', and in ways that can have nothing to do with 'protecting children' but rather about 
entrenching the position of adults over children, with the goal of moulding children into what 
adults and societ)' thinks this categor)- of persons should be. Under this lens of power, 
development bccomes an instrument of social and cultural reproduction.'"" The child's 'need' 
for development justifies almost anything and evades virmally all critical inquir}-, as is indicated 
by the notes in this chapter relating to the drafting of the articles considered. The notion of 
development may obscure critical, yet fundamental, questions such as 1) what is meant by 
development, 2) why is it necessar)', and 3) what is made possible by development. 
At best development creates a credible veil for uncertainty and even disagreement about what is 
m the 'best interest' of the child, all without critical inquir\- into the idea of speaking 'for' 
children."" At worst, it unquestioningly legitimises power hierarchies. To note again, tiiis thesis 
does not argue that chHdren should be treated as adults. Rather this thesis argues that the 
foundation upon which the differential treatment of children rests requires thorough and critical 
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inquin-, to gauge whether the differential treatment is justified. If all humans arc born free, then 
how do we explain that some (here children) are less free than others? As I'reeman has argued 'a 
true rethinking of children would also address citizenship rights . . . the |CRC], unsurprisingly, 
did not do so.'"^ As such, chUdrcn remain 'aHens','"' 'serfs',''"' 'passive spectators','"' and 
'savages'.""^ While this chapter examined how 'development' operates in the CRC, the next 
chapter explores how 'care', the second assumption or 'truth' of childhood, operates in the CRC. 
^ Michael Freeman. The Future of Children S Righis. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 277. 287 (2000). 
' GERALDINE V A N BUEREN. THE INTERNATIONAL L A W ON THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 141 ( 1998 ) . 
^ Ulrick Beck. Democralisalion of the Family. 4 CHILDHOOD 151. 161 (1997). 
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CHAPTER 7 
A 'TRUTH' OF THE CRC: THE CHILD REQUIRES 'CARE'* 
• Portions^of this chapler were included in a publication on trafHcking, s . . Ashleigh Barnes. The Trafficking ofOnldrer,: A 
Coun^er-Narranve ,o The CRC s Cons,rue,ion of Tare'. 1 INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW ( f o r t h c o m i n g 
OUTLINE 
I. C H I L D H O O D AS A PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT REQUIRING 'CARE' 
a. State - as Back-up 'Care' 
b. Family - as Ideal 'Care' 
II. CRC'S D E F I N I T I O N OF A FAMILY - PARENT POSITIONED OVER 
CHILD 
III. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS RELATE PRIMARILY TO KEEPING T H E FAMILY 
INTACT 
IV. W H E N T H E 'FAMILY' BREAKS DOWN - RESTRICTIONS O N PARENTAL 
RIGHTS 
V. CONCLUSION 
As was introduced in Chapter 5, and argued specifically in relation to the C R C in Chapter 6, the 
CRC constructs the child as 'developing' towards a state o f maturit)'/adulthood. The child is 
constructed in the CRC as lacking capacity- because o f the child's inherent, natural, biological 
state o f immaturit}'. In this construction, the child's inabilitj- to excrcise autonomy/capacity' does 
not relate to social discrimination that the child faces, but rather the child's own biological 
immaturit)'. Chapter 5 argued that tins understanding o f children as lacking capacity'/maturit}-
based on a set o f biological 'truths' about cliildhood is best understood through the adult - child 
binan-, where adults are assumed mature/capable and children are assumed immarnre/incapable. 
As was argued m Chapter 4, unlike other categories o f persons whose rights are dealt with in 
specific conventions/declarations, the child as an immature rights-holder is protected, not 
through shoring up the child's autonomy and abilitj' to participate, but rather by requiring the 
child to be in 'care' (in other words, have an adult be responsible for the child). Again, the only 
justification lies in a view o f children as biologically immature/incapable, requiring children to 
rely on other groups to act on their behalf m procuring and interpreting rights.' Consequently, 
the CRC widens its 'subject' to include a more complicated triad o f interested parties: 1) the 
parent", who is protected and respected, and who has rights, responsibilities, and duties, 2) the 
state as the supra-parent, who can override the parent in exceptional circumstances and 3) the 
child, who is protected and given a degree o f autonomy, but only in accordance with the parents' 
and/or the state's perception o f the child's best interests and capacities. 
The CRC imagines the child to be in a particular positional matrix: within the family or in some 
similar form of 'care'. This chapter argues that the configuration o f family or 'care' is defined in 
the CRC as an adult positioned over the child. As such, it will be argued that the child is given 
only those autonomy and protection rights that buttress the adult's position in the family relative 
to the child. The CRC's depiction o f the family and 'care' docs not reflect some objective 
description o f the family, the child, or the parent, but rather the adult - child binan- and the 
specific lines o f power that it mandates. This hierarcliical family is made a marker o f childhood 
through not only the CRC's naturalisation and idealisation o f the family, but also through the 
particular allocation o f rights given (and not given) to children, as well as the rights and 
responsibiUties given to the state and the parent. In formulating the rights o f the child within die 
hierarchy o f the family/care, the CRC makes mandator)' this normative context, arguably limiting 
I O^nora O'Neill. Children s Rights and Children S Lives. In CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-RE-VISIONED, 39 (Rosalind Ekman Ladd ed. 
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having eare ot the child . the term 'parent' is used most often in the Convention and best relleets the type o f relationship 
envisioned by the Convention. 
the ability of many children to enjoy many of the rights in the Convention (for example, freedom 
of religion). Furthermore, the CRC's allocation of autonomy and protection rights is thus not 
only remarkably different from adult human rights discourses, but also inapplicable for children 
who do not 'enjoy' such 'care'. The child and therefore the child's rights are constructed in the 
positional matrix of the family based upon certain 'truths' about the family, the parent, the state, 
and about the child that limit the rights the child may enjoy. Thus, any discussion about the 
rights of the child in the C^RC cannot simply regard the construction of the child as axiomatic. 
The 'child' is not an originarj' term, its meaning flows from the adult - child binar\'. Neither 
term can be understood in isolation. Instead, this triad, this normative context is examined to 
understand the outer limits of the so-called 'rights of the child'. Section I will examine how the 
Convention requires and defines 'care'. Section II wiU explore how the CRC defines the 'family' 
as the adult positioned over the child. Section III will make the argument that the child is only 
given rights that not only support the cohesion of the family, but also the position of the parents 
over the child. Finally, Section IV wiU examine the limitations on the rights of parents. 
I. CHILDHOOD AS A PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT REQUIRING 'CARE' 
The word 'care' appears thirty-one times in the Convention. The word 'care' in relation to the 
child appears nventy'-three times, three times in the Preamble alone: 1) 'childhood is entided to 
special care and assistance', 2) |b|earing in mind that the need to extend particular care to the 
child', 3) 'the child . . . needs special safeguards and care\ Article 3 (2) obligates states to ensure 
'protection and care as is necessar)' for (the child's] well-being'. Article 7 gives children the right 
to be cared for (as far as possible) by his or her parents. Article 19 obligates states to protect 
children from all forms of abuse by those charged with the child's care. These are but a few of 
the many references to the forms of 'care' necessan' to protect the child. 'Care' appears to be a 
fundamental right of the child in the CRC. As discussed in Chapter 6, Woodhouse argues that 
'need statements' directs attention away from the particular adult value-position from which such 
statements are made.' When 'need statements' are projected onto children they acquire 
objectivity'. Yet beneath the 'veneer of certainty'', Woodhouse argues that there lies a 
complicated array of personal and culmral values alongside empirical claims about childhood.'* 
As discussed in Chapter 6, Woodhead utilises die equation 'X needs Y for Z to follow' as a 
metiiod for distilling and analysing who needs what and why, questions often difficult to 
' MARTIN WOODHEAD. Psychology and ihe Cultural Construction of "Children's Needs ". /« GROWING Up IN A CHANGING 
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ascertain in the social matrix. As appHed to the CRC, X [the child] needs Y [a particular thing 
that is secured in the form of a nght| for Z |to accomplish some measure]/ According to the 
CRC, the child needs 'care' for her or his 'full and harmonious development' . ' Woodhouse 
argues that abandoning the verbiage of 'needs' would require professionals to make explicit their 
judgments and unveil their assumptions for external scrutiny.^ As noted in the previous chapter, 
neither the Convention nor the Travaux PreparaHores unpack their assessment of the category' 
child as 'physically and mentally immamrc'. More specific to this chapter, neither the 
Convention nor the Travaux Preparations explicate why 'care' and the Convention's definition of 
'care' are the CRC's 'solutions' to the child's alleged immaturit}'. Indeed, beyond mere 'needs', 
the CRC also states that the child is 'entitied' to care, (in other words, has the right to care). One 
could argue that the language of entitiement or rights further entrenches the child's 'need' for 
care, placing it beyond scrutiny, as such an entidement cements the knowledges/claims-to-truth 
of developmental psychology and the common sense assumption that children require 'care' as 
'truths' in law. Isjiowledges produced by certain more traditional stains of developmental 
psychology and law come together to reinforce each other.® The child is immamre and therefore 
the law 'entities' the child to 'care'. 
Nonetheless, Jenks argues that the care or the altruism that adults feel towards a child is a social 
construct: asserting instead that 'care' disguises control,' obHgating forms of dependency. For 
Jenks, care and dependency, necessitated bv the 'truth' of the developing child, describe not the 
loving bonds between the child and those who 'care' for the child, but rather describes 
mechanisms of dependence that ser\'e to sustain particular versions of stams quo.'" Jenks argues 
that 'care' itself is hegemonic; it possesses the moral high ground, defies opposition and exercises 
a continual control over the Other (here the child), all in the name of 'what is best for the 
cliHd'." In this way, dependency is realised as a product of social construction and development 
through dependency becomes an instrument in the process of social and cultural reproduction.'" 
' MARTIN WOODHEAD. Psychology and the Cuhural Construction of "Children's Needs in GROWING UP IN A CHANGING 
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In this view, the category 'child' does not create or cause institutions, discourses, or practices, but 
the CRC creates or causes the category 'child' by dctennining the characteristics that a particular 
subject should (and should not) have. This thesis subscribes to the idea that by asserting that the 
child is 'entitled to' and 'needs' 'care', the CRC depicts childhood as only occurring in 'care', 
thereby making 'care' and thus dependency markers of childhood. 
To illustrate the centralit\' of 'care' and dependency, a combination reading of Article 3(2) and 
Article 3(3) suggests that the child will always be in some form of care. Article 3(2) requires 
states to 'ensure the child . . . protection and care'. Article 3(3) requires states to ensure 
'institutions, services, and facilities responsible for the care or protecdon of the child' comply 
with particular standards. The assumption is that children arc or should be in the care of either 
their parent (Article 3(2)) or the state (Article 3(3))." The blanket requirement of 'care' for the 
CRC's child is further demonstrated in Article 20, which states that a child 'temporarily or 
permanentiy deprived of his or her family environment,' shall be entitled to special protection 
and assistance where states shall ensure alternative care. The obligation on the state to provide 
care in the event that care is 'lost' arguably demonstrates not only 'care' as the normative aim, 
but also that the child has no choice but to be in 'care'. 
Yet, what does 'care' entail according to the CRC? If the child must be located within a context 
of 'care', one must then understand the CRC's construction of 'care': what parties are included in 
the CRC's version of 'care', what are their positions relative to each other, and how this affects 
the child who is forcibly placed within this context? Unpacking the CRC's definition of 'care' is 
paramount to understanding the rights given to the child by the CRC. The CRC emisions two 
tjpes of care: 1) family and 2) the state. The CRC envisions the child to be m the care of parents 
as the rule, with the state providing care in exceptional cases. 
a. State - as Back-up 'Care' 
The state is to only provide care in the instance tiiat the family breaks down. According to 
Article 20(1), the child 'shall be entitled to protection and assistance provided by the state'. 
More specificaUy states are to 'ensure alternative care for tiie child', according to Article 20(2). 
Article 5 expUcitiy requires states to 'respect the responsibiUties, rights and duties of parents'. 
Article 9 states that chUdren 'shall not be separated from his or her parents' without certam 
" Article 7( 1) also refers to Ihe chi ld 's Tight to know and be cared for by his or her parents'. 
procedural safeguards met. Article 18 states that 'parents or, as the case ma)' be, parents, have 
the priman- responsibility' for the upbringing and development of the child'. Though the role of 
the state will be discussed in great detail below, it is noteworthy that the state nominates itself as 
a back-up carer or protectorate, an odd positioning of the state in the context of human rights, 
which normally placc limits on the state's rights. Notably, the 'special' protection and assistance 
that the state is to provide children, is unlike any given to adults, indeed would be unimaginable 
for most (capable) adults: the state is charged with parent-like powers over the child. 
b . Family - as Ideal 'Care ' 
The CRC envisions the family as having primary' 'care' of the category' 'child', and describes the 
family as the ideal form of care of the category 'child'. The Preamble characterises the family in 
relation to the child in three noteworthy ways. First, the Preamble naturalises the family, 
emphasising the family as fundamental, but also particularly important to childhood: 'convinced' 
that the family is 'the Jundamental group of society and the natural environment for growth and 
well-being of all its member and parlictilarly children'.'"* During the drafting of the Convention 
the United States delegate articulated that the United States 'attached great importance to the 
family as the namral and fundamental group unit of society' and that the 'family should be 
explicidy protected . . . to emphasise |its| importance and relationship to all other rights 
contained in the Convention'.'^ This sentiment was accepted by the parties, with this language 
inserted aU but verbatim into the Preamble. Stating that the family is a fundamental group of 
society is standard international human rights language."' However, stating that a particular 
group prospers in the family environment is exceptional to children. Notably, all such language 
(in other words, the family is 'fundamental' and 'natural') is absent f rom CEDAW. Given the 
historical relationship between both the categories 'woman' and 'child' and the family, how these 
Emphasis added. 
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two Conventions relate their respective subjects to the family offers interesting msights." One 
could imagine if such language was included in CF.DAW: the family is 'the fundamental group of 
societ)' and the natural environment for growth and well-being of all its member and particularly 
womati• In labelling the family as 'natural', the CRC legitimates the family through, seemingly, 
scientific or objective reasoning. Then the CRC uniquely states that this natural family is 
particularly fundamental for children. As discussed in Chapter 3, knowledges masquerade as 
universal 'truths'.'" Similar to the 'developing child' discussed in Chapter 6, the family is 
constructed to have some natural essence. Arguably, the process of naturalising the family puts 
it beyond question, as it acquires the status of Truth. 'I'his namral/fundamental-ness of the 
'family' as the form a 'care' required by the child, legitimates and puts beyond question the 
CRC's family, including its definition (to be discusscd below). 
Second, the Preamble draws upon developmental psychology to justifj' its normative position 
that 'the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a 
family emironment'}'' The Preamble links the 'namral family' with 'the child-as-developing'; one 
legitimates and reinforces the other. As discussed in Chapter 6, the emotive force portrayed in 
this form of 'needs' statement combines with the language of 'development', premised on the 
idea that the child is in the scientifically proven state of development to further underline the 
'truth' that the family is the 'namral' place for childhood in the CRC. Thirdly, to further 
legitimate the family in the Convention, the Preamble characterises the family as a place of 
'happiness, love, and understanding'. As discussed in Chapter 5, the CRC is now drawing on 
visions of Apollonian childhood to cast the family as a safe and harmonious place for the CRC's 
developing child. The family is construed as the mechanism by which both societ)' and children 
will progress. This discourse (fundamental, natural, necessar)' for full and harmonious 
development, happy, full of love and understanding) creates at the outset of the Convention an 
irrefutable descnption of 'truth' about the family. Hence, our 'true' (immarnre) child requires 
'care', and our 'true' family becomes the namral place of childhood. 
While feminist scholarship has cntiqued the idea of 'protection of the fanuly' as a thinly veiled 
poUcy of proppmg up a particularly hierarchy within the family, the poHcy of protecting the 
" See for example Frances E. Olsen . Itvlh of State Intervention in the Family. 18 (4 ) UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF 
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family as a normative aim persists in the CRC.^" N o r m a l Fields ques t ions whe the r the protected 
space of familial and communit} ' ha rmony and innocence ever existed.^' T h e g rowing concern 
with the domain of chi ldhood as threated, invaded, and pol luted by adults ' wor ld , as opposed to 
a period of temporally restricted economic and bureaucrat ic t ransact ions, enables the focus on 
preserving innocence through social values of endur ing love and care.^^ Similarly, Olsen argues 
that the family is viewed as a, 
|a| warm nurmran t enclave governed by an ethic of al truism and caring - a haven 
protect ing its member s f r o m the dangers of an authori tar ian state and f r o m the 
anarchistic intrusions of private third parties.^' 
She notes that only in exceptional situations is the family viewed as otherwise: 'a centre of 
oppression, raw will and authorit}', violence and brutaUtj', where the power fu l economically and 
sexually subordinate and exploit the powerless.'"' Olsen obsen ' e s that the nuclear family could be 
seen as 'a seething ho thouse or an oppressive s tructure that will often b e c o m e destructive of 
individual members'.^^ Freeman also argues that 'a dangerous and false consensus lurks in the 
shadows ' of so called 'pro-family anti- inter\ 'entionism' (in o ther words , those opposed to state 
intervention into the family on the basis of children's rights).^' F reeman argues that a 'simplistic' 
suppor t for n o n - i n t e n x n t i o n in 'families' based on arguments such as privacy, masks the 
conflicts and abuses that occur within the family.^^ He writes, ' |o]ne only has to substitute 
'husband-wife ' for 'parent-child ' . . . to realise the untenabilit) ' of [protecting only the family unit 
and not the individuals w h o make up the family].^' 
Notably, only one article in the entiret)' of the C^onvention, Article 19, addresses the issue of 
when the family does not leave up to the ideal of being happy, loving, and understanding. 
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Though this articlc will be discussed at greater length later in this chapter, it is noteworthy that 
even when the Convention envisions instances of 'abuse, neglect or negligent treatment' of the 
child by a parent in Article 19, the CRC mandates protection of the child, including 'support' for 
those who have the care of the child. Put another way Article 19 treats abuse, neglect, and 
negligent treatment between parent and child as fundamentally different from actions between 
strangers, focusing on 'support' rather than for example civil or criminal action. As such, the 
'truths' found in the CRC about the family/'care' (child=developing, childhood requires care, 
family=natural) again places limits on the rights of the child. The 'truths' associated with the 
family/'care' limits both the child's right to autonomy, as was discussed in Chapter 6, as wcU as 
the child's right to protection. C^onsidering the importance placed on 'family' in the CRC, the 
CRC's defimtion of family becomes important to further understanding the ways in which the 
CRC's 'family' places limits on the rights of the child. 
II. THE CRC'S DEFINITION OF A FAMILY - PARENT POSITIONED OVER 
CHILD 
This chapter argues that term 'family' in the CRC equates to 'parental control'. While the 
Convention does not expHcitly define the term 'family', the Convention describes only two 
family members: parents and children. As examples. Article 2(1) states that the child shall enjoy 
rights without discrimination, and Article 2(2) states that the child shall enjoy rights without 
discrimination on the basis of the child's 'parents, parents, or family members'. This chapter 
asserts that the coupUng or binar\- of the adult - child seen throughout the Convention 
emphasises die role of the family for the rights of the child. The Unkage of these two members 
is in essence die formation the family. For the CRC's child, the presence of an adult (preferably 
a parent) is the assumption of die family context. The child without an adult is family-less. This 
chapter argues that the family in the CRC is defined as, not just the presence of an adult and a 
child, but rather the presence of an adult positioned over •i. child. Sb; points will be made. 
First, interestingly in the discussions that took place during the drafting of the Convention, the 
terms 'family'/'care' and 'parent' becamc ahnost synonymous. It is not that the terms 'family' 
and 'parent' are synonymous, but rather that 'family' and 'parental control' were used 
synonymously. For example, regarding Article 5, die Canadian delegate noted the concern that, 
' ' Onora O'Neill Children's Rights and Children's Lives, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-RE-VISIONED, 30 (Rosalind Ekman Ladd 
ed., 1996): 'Among family members where ties are even closer than simple friendship, it is suggested, the language of rights 
should give way to models that stress connection, care, intimacy, and relationship ralher than separateness. individuality, and 
independence'. 
in protecting the family from the state, the family must not be given arbitrary control 
over the child. Any protection from the state given to the family must be equally 
balanced with the protection of the child within the fainily. 
The Canadian delegate argued that the Convention was a 'delicate balance between the rights of 
the child and the correlative rights of the parents'.^' In the first two sentences die delegate refers 
to the family and the child, and in the third refers to the parents and the child. Further, the 
Canadian delegate expressed the fear that 'the family' must not be given arbitral ' control over 
the child. As the family is only made up of parents and children, the Canadian delegate must 
have meant that the parents must not be given arbitrary' control. 'Parental power' becomes 
interchangeable with the term 'family'. 
Similarly, when discussing Article 10, the Australian delegate suggested that the original text 
('[t|he parents shall have the right to specif)- the place of the child's residence unless, guided by 
his best interest, a competent state organ is authorised, in accordance with national law, to decide 
in this matter') should be deleted because a provision concerning parental rights had no place in 
a human rights convention for children.'^ The United States delegate, though stating agreement, 
insisted that family reunification should be included.'' Another speaker pointed out that it was 
not the rights of parents that were being emphasised by family reunification, but rather the best 
interests of the child.'"* Here, parental control becomes 'family', which even equates with the 
best interests of the child. 'Family' in the Convention describes a positional matrix in which the 
adult is positioned over the child. The nebulous best interests principle is then used as a further 
rationalisation, or another term that helps defy' criticism of the adult's claim to power over the 
child.'^ The Convention then appears to support, not parental rights (in other words, the right 
of the parents to have control over their child), but rather the more politically effective best 
interests of the child and the family. By expHcidy naturalising the 'family', the Convention 
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implicidy naturalises the parents' power over the child. As such, the idealisation, the 
naturalisation, the protection, and the ensuring of the family could in turn, equally describe the 
idealisation, the naturalisation, the protection, and the ensuring of the power dynamics of the 
parent over the child. Olsen notes that impUcit in law, is not just respect for the 'family' ." She 
argues that laws shape and reinforce the roles of those who make up the family by assigning 
power and responsibilit)' within the family." Barbara Woodhouse describes the dangers of 
viewing the family as a single 'entity', including the subjugation of women's will to husbands, the 
requirement that a child exist in an abusive family situation, and the condoning of domestic 
violence." She notes that treating the family as a 'unit' bestows power on the strong members of 
the entit)'." As the discussions above indicate, it is then not just the 'family' that the CRC is 
supporting; the CRC is supporting a particular power structure within the family of the parent 
positioned over the child. 
Second, the CRC gives primary' responsibilit)' over the child to the parent. Article 3(2) mandates 
that the rights and duties of the parent must be taken into account when ensuring protection and 
care of the child. This article reaffirms the importance of the role of the parent and mandates 
the consideration of parent's interests. Article 5 obligates states to respect the responsibilities, 
tights and duties of parents and even members of the child's extended family and communit)', to 
provide direction and guidance to the child in the child's excrcise of every right in the Convention. 
Such sweeping oversight could encumber the child's abilit)' to exercise her/his rights in the 
Convention. The parent's 'duty' or 'responsibilit}'' to guide the child m the exercise of ever\' 
right in the CRC locates the parent over the child and results in the child being expHcitiy 
dependent on such guidance. The child's rights become conditioned upon the parent's 
'direction'. 'Responsibility for' becomes a grant of power to the parent over the child, where 
parents are empowered to impose their beUefs and opinions on the child. 
Similarly, Article 18 notes that 'both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringmg 
and development of the child'. This article not only locates the parent over the child as the 
parents have 'responsibilitj' for'/control over the child, but also can be read to legitimise the 
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dominance of the parent. Article 18 states that, '[t]he best interests of the child will be their (in 
other words, the parents') basic concern'."" This has two possible effects: the article dictates 
what the parents' concerns must be (normative), and/or when read in the context of the entire 
Convention, could also solidify the dominant role of parents by justify ing the parents dominant 
role by explaining what the parents' primary concern is (descriptive). When read as the latter. 
Article 18 has a potential legitimising affect, as parents, of course, will have the best interests of 
the child as a primary consideration in the exercise of their position of dominance. This 
description of the parent is yet another 'truth' projected by the CRC; a 'truth' with is at odds with 
the experience of many children whose parents do not or cannot act in their best interest."" 
Third, in addition to requiring the child to be subject to the 'direction' and responsibilities of the 
parents in relation to the child, the Convention further simates the child as dependent on the 
parent for the child's even-day physical needs. As discussed in Chapter 6, the child is required to 
attend school and is not envisioned by the CRC as normally engaged in paid work. Further, 
parents are to provide for the child according to Article 18 and all state assistance is to be 
directed through the parents according to Articles 24 and 27. Article 24 states that the realisation 
of the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is mediated through the child's 
parents. Article 27 states that the parents have primar)- responsibilit)', which the state must 
assist, for securing an adequate standard of living for the child. In both articles, without parents 
there is no one who holds primary- responsibilit;-, and there is no one for the state, who has 
secondan- responsibilit)-, to assist. Indeed the state must then step in as a back-up parent and 
exercise such responsibUit)'. In the normarivitj- of the CRC, a child simply cannot exercise such 
responsibilit)' on her or his own behalf It may be argued that the CRC obligates states under 
Article 20 to fmd or act as the parent/parent, and as such the child never requires direct 
assistance to support her or himself Certainly there arc academics who argue that the only right 
a child is entitled to is the right to an autonomous parent."^ As w-ill be discussed in Chapter 9, 
there are many children in both the developed and developing world who have no parent as 
envisioned in the CRC, whether a family or as provided by the state. The child, who is 
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responsible for him or herself (much less others), is not contemplated in this article, or anj-where 
else in the Convention. As such, the CRC makes the family/adults necessar)' for the realisation 
of certain rights in the Convention. If the child desires assistance from the state, she/he must be 
part of a family, in other words, the child must have a parent. 
Yet even within the CRC, there are other, incongruent constructions of the adult - child 
relationship. As discussed in Chapter 6, Article 23(2) is unique within the Convention. Article 
23 mandates that assistance be given to 'the eligible child [with disability-] and those responsible 
for his or her care'. Notably, this is the only article that explicitly provides that assistance offered 
by the state should be directed towards the child as well as the parent. This article also states 
that the child should live in conditions that 'promote self-reliance and facilitate the child's active 
participation in the community'. One must ask: why might the drafters have given this child 
more subjectivit}' and autonomy as compared to other children? It would seem that because of a 
greater HkeUhood of dependence of the child with a disabilit)', the aim is to ensure the respect for 
the child's autonomy. Why is this approach not more globally applicable for the child in the 
CRC? If the CRC desires to couple the child with the parent, as the defmition of family, why not 
put the two members of the family on more equal footing? This child, envisioned to require 
greater reliance on 'care' might have presented less of a 'threat' to what this thesis describes as 
maintenance of the adult - child binary', and the positioning of the parent with active control 
over the needs and best interests of the child. During the drafting of Article 23, the Polish 
delegate proposed that the terms 'self-reliance', 'active participation', and 'dignit}'' be included in 
Article 23."' These otherwise controversial terms, at least in relation to the CRC's child, were 
included without discussion.'"' The discussions focused not on the balancing of parental control 
versus the child's autonomy rights, but on who would bear the financial responsibility to realise 
the obligations under Article 23. Again this article is the only article in the CRC that envisions 
the child and parent on a more equal plane. 
Fourth, not only does the CRC make children dependent on parents for dieir ever)-day physical 
needs (with die exception of Article 23)," certain articles seem to go further and make children's 
inner Hfe (for example, thought, conscience) subject to parental control. While Article 5 already 
empowers parents to 'guide' and 'direct' the child's exercise of aU the rights m the Convention, 
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Articlc 14 reiterates the parental right to 'guide' and 'direct' the child specificaUy in relation to the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This extension of die grant of parental 
discretion could represent an even greater intrusion into the child's exercise of rights under the 
CRC. Eva Brems notes the confusion over not only the inclusion of the parental right to guide 
and direct the child in Article 14, but also how this inclusion altered the child's rights under the 
ICCPR.'" Notably, the discussion during the drafting of Article 14 did not relate to the 
protection of the choice of religion vis-a-vis state, as is the focus of other international human 
rights conventions."' Rather, disagreement focused on the existence of a child's own right, vis-a-
vis his or her parents. Originally the draft article put children on equal footing with that of the 
parents; 
[t]he state parties shall equally respect the library' of the child and his parents and 
where applicable, parents, to ensure the religious and moral education of the 
child in conformit)' with convictions of their choice."*" 
Such equaHt)' was ultimately rejected by the drafters.'" \^an Buercn explains that the 
disagreement over the extent of the child's right, in particular to religious freedom, risked 
obstructing the drafting and adoption of the entire C^lonvention.^" Brems argues that it is not 
self-evident to recognise cliildrcn as autonomous bearers of this right, since several international 
conventions, specifically Art 18(4) of the ICCPR and Article 13(3) of the ICESCR, recognise the 
right of parents to ensure the religious education of their cliildren in conformity with the parents' 
own conviction.^' Even the Committee for the CRC emphasises that 'the human rights of 
children cannot be realised independentiy from the human rights of their parents, or in isolation 
from societ)' at large', in relation to Article 14." The specific inclusion of the parents' right to 
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direct the child in Article 14 reflects greater oversight given to parents in the child's right to 
religion than in other conventions. By requiring states to 'respect' the rights and duties of 
parents to provide this t) pe of direction to the child, the CRC is forcing dependency on parental 
decisions extending to the of views the child should hold and what religion the child should 
practice. For many, such 'direction' is uncontroversial. Brems states that the child's capacit}' to 
choose one's religion is 'probably' acquired at a later age, thus justifj ing greater parental 
oversight of the 'incapable' child. Yet, if we were to substitute any other identitj' categor)' to 
dislodge the 'obviousness' of such power given to the adult over the child (male - female, master 
- slave, coloniser - colonised), one wonders whether such oversight could withstand scrutiny. 
Fifth, continuing an investigation of the CRC's construction of the parent positioned over the 
child. Article 28, addresses the child's 'right' to education. Interestingly, the child's 'right' to 
education, includes that such education is compulsor\' according to Article 28(l)(a). A right is 
exceptionally coupled with a positive obligation to exercise this right on the part of the right 
holder.^' Not only is the child required to attend, at least primarj' school, the child's right to 
education is further limited by the parents' right to choose the child's education. In parallel, this 
regulation applied to adults would equate to adults having the right to work, then being required 
by law to work, and havmg the type of work dictated by another categor}' of persons. 
Nonetheless, Article 28 is also lauded as a major step in rights of the child as it does not make 
the child's right to education explicitly subject to the wishes of the parents." Notably, no 
discussion took place on the issue of whether Article 28 altered, or should alter, the parent's right 
to choose the child's education under international human rights law." Article 28 cannot be 
interpreted in isolation.^"^ When necessarily read in light of Article 29 and Article 5, both 
arguably modify any increased emancipation with respect to a child's independent right to 
choose his or her education in Articlc 28, returning the child to the dominant CRC paradigm: 
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dependent upon parental 'guidance' for the exercise of rights." Under Article 29, it could be 
argued that if parents do not believe that a particular education facility- sufficiendy develops 
respect for the parents, cultural identit}', language, and values, the parents could choose to send 
the child elsewhere. Further, Article 5 mandates that in the child's exercise o f all rights in the 
Convention, the state will respect the direction and guidance of the parents. It would seem that 
this direction and guidance would include the right to choose which school the child should 
attend. When read within the context of the entire Convention, can Article 28 be said to chip 
away at the broad parental discretion over education? The step that appears lauded within the 
CRC is the move from an explicit parental determination of education to an implicit one, thus 
not altering in any way parental control over the child's choice in education in the guise of 
'responsibilit)' for'. Van Bueren has argued that Article 12, the child's right to express her or his 
views in all matters regarding the child, helps ensure that the child's education is in accordance to 
the child's own beliefs/opinions.^" As argued in Chapter 2, the child's right to express her or his 
views is still subject to an adult determination of the child's maturit)'. It is first for the parent to 
make such a determination. It could be said that the child has only the right of review of the 
parent's determination of the child's capacit;- in the instance the state feels such review is 
necessar}'. Ultimately the cliild remains subject to an adult's preference for the child's education 
or/and subject to an adult's assessment of the child's capacity. 
Finally, numerous articles in the CRC relate only to children who are assumed to be in a family. 
For example. Article 5 states that the parents, extended family, and the community's 
responsibilities must be protected. Article 7(2) states that children have the right to know and be 
cared for by his or her parents. Article 9 elaborates the right not to be separated from the family. 
Article 9(3) states the right to maintain personal contact with the family and to gain essential 
information regarding whereabouts of the family. These articles assume that the child has such 
persons in his/her family, and therefore, these articles are only applicable if the child has a 
family. Article 10 provides for reunification of families and deals with parents who are located in 
a different state from that of the child. Article 22(2) states the obligation of the part}' and the 
UN to help trace and reunify families. Obviously, the child must have a family to enjoy such 
right to state assistance for reunification or separation. Article 29 states that the focus of 
education should develop respect for 'parents,' in addition to cultural identity, language, values. 
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and national values. Again the assumption is that there exist parents for which respect should be 
developed. 
By assuming that children are in a family, the CRC only makes available rights for and duties 
owed to children who are in a family context. Many of the rights enumerated in the CRC simply 
do not make sense for children without a parent/family. The Convention is presented as a 
description of childhood, where all children Hvc within families. In this construction, the child 
must first meet the cjuaKfications for being a child; in this case the child must have a family, 
before rights can be extended. The rights of the child are mediated through the 
requirement/restraint of being in a family as defined as the child who is subject to parental 
authority. Children are only given rights that relate to maintaining the family environment 
(including a right not to be separated from the family), an environment defined by the child who 
is subject to parental authority. Similar to the idealising of the family as a place of 'happiness, 
love, and understanding'. Freeman has argued that envisioning the protection of parental rights 
as the means to afford protection of the child, assumes that childhood is a golden age and that 
adults already relate to children in terms of love, care, and altruism.^' Benjamin ShmueH and 
Ayelat Blecher-Prigat argue that two presumptions underlie this particular parent - child 
relationship; 1) that children lack maturity and 2) that the 'natural bonds of affection lead parents 
to act in their child's best interests.®' Freeman further contends that idealising adult-child 
relations only emphasises that parents have the best interests of the child at heart and results in a 
laisse^aire attitude towards the family, discussed above." Alancn and Mayall characterise the 
parent - child relationship as asymmetrical, where children are subordinated to adults/parents." 
Martha Minow argues that the trivialisation of children's rights fails to recognise the position of 
power parents generally have over children.' ' She contends that, 
too often, the \'ulnerability of children is forgotten in a culture that assigns 
responsibility for their care, in the first instance, to the private sphere of 
particular parents. This pattern exonerates anyone but the child's parents from 
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responsibility for the care and needs of the child and shields the child from 
public view/'"' 
Certainly the CRC sidesteps the need to justify' the vast possibilitj' of control given to the family, 
in other words, parents. Why does the Convention use the term 'care', even when referring to 
those adults who abuse and neglect the child in Article 19, as opposed to the term 'custody'? 
This chapter argues that the term 'care' is altruistic, disguising notions of possession and control 
upheld by the CRC. This thesis argues that 'care' demands dependency of the child on adults, 
rationalised by childhood as a biological state of development. The CRC's requirement of 
dependency reinforces vulnerability. 'Care' by parents and 'development' for/immaturity of 
children makes sense according to the adult ~ child binan-. The CRC's 'claim-to-truth' regarding 
the family (natural and ideal), the child (developing and immamre), and parents (always acting 
according to the child's best interests), disguises the political choices being made in the 
designation of such 'truths'. In mm, these versions of 'truth' place Umits on what it means to be 
a child, making dependency and therefore vulnerability markers of childhood. 
i n . CHILDREN'S RIGHTS RELATE PRIMARILY TO KEEPING THE FAMILY 
INTACT 
The CRC promotes keeping the family together, a bias that reinforces/increases parental control. 
This section will examine a variety of articles in the CRC that reinforce the structure of the 
family. For example. Article 22 obliges states and even the United Nations to cooperate to trace 
and reunify- families of refugee children. Under Article 7(1) the child has the right to know and 
be cared for by his or her parents. Notably, the opposite of these articles is not included: the 
right not to be traced, not to be known, or not to be cared for by parents. Article 16 which 
includes the child's right to privacy, a right that would seemingly shed light on Article 7, contains 
the same language as it corollaty- in the ICCPR." During the drafting of Article 16, one delegate 
expressed concern that Article 16 might have 'repercussions on the rights of parents to guide and 
educate their children and consequently have repercussions on the family, the basis of society'." 
As discussed above, not only does this delegate define the family as the ability of parents to guide 
and educate their children, the delegate designates such an arrangement as a fundamental and 
essential truth: 'the basis of society'. By putting forth these 'truths' and thus circumventing 
or 
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discussion regarding their implications, the representative noted that children generally ate 
treated differendy than adults under domestic laws and as such the working group should take 
note." I'he justification for differential treatment is the inherent difference of childhood. The 
adult - child binar\' justifies the understanding that a child's right to privacy should be 
fundamentally different from an adult's right to privacy. The adult - child binan' rationalises the 
'education' and 'guidance' of children by adults. It is noteworthy that Article 16 is also subject to 
Article 5's provision for parents to 'guide' and 'direct' the child in her or his exercise of the right 
to privacy. Quite possibly, though not discussed or acknowledged during the drafting of the 
Convention, the CRC's inclusion of autonomy rights for children, while intending to make 
children both subjects as well as objects of the law, at the same time ensured that even children's 
autonomy rights were also frrmly subjected to parental control. 
In addition to lacking the right to refuse knowledge of one's own parents, the child does not 
have the absolute right to know her or his parent. The right to know one's parents is dependent 
on the parent's desire to know the chUd. Article 7 (1) only includes the right to know and be 
cared for by parents 'as far as possible'. While the child, regardless of her or his wishes, must 
know the parent, the parents however may choose whether they want to know their child. The 
inclusion of the language 'as far as possible' reflected the drafters decision that the child's right to 
know her or his parents was predicated on the wishes of the parents.''" During the drafting of 
Article 7, the Eg)-ptian delegate, on behalf of ten other countries, articulated the view tiiat part of 
the right to identity' was the right to know one's parents. ' ' The Egyptian delegate also noted that 
knowing one's parents was also justified on the basis of the child's 'psychological stability'.™ The 
issues of 'secret adoption' or closed adoption (where the parents remain unknown to their child 
based upon the parents' wishes) was raised and accepted as an impediment to the child's absolute 
right to know her or his parents.^' Egypt, and all the delegates, eventually accepted that the child 
had to the right to know her or his parents only 'as far as possible'. This means tiiat the child is 
obligated, even against his or her wishes to know, reunite, and be cared for by her or his parents. 
The parent's duties and responsibihties, while pnman', are dispensable according to the parent's 
wishes. Although It is not obvious from the explicit wording of Article 7, when read in Ught of 
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the Travaux Preparaliores, it bccomes clear that children have no choice but to be in a particular 
family, whereas parents do have such choice. Here, it is not the best interests of the child that 
dictate 'as far as possible' but rather parental preference. 
Similarly, Articlc 9(1) provides the child the right not to be separated from the child's parents 
against the parent's will. Article 9(3) and (4) state that the child has the right to maintain 
personal contact and that both the child and the parents have the right to know the whereabouts 
of another member of the family. Once more, it is notable that the child does not have the right 
to 'divorce', remain in an undisclosed location, and refuse personal contact with his or her parent 
in the Convention. The child may be separated from and not have contact with parents, but not 
according to the child's wishes. Article 9 presents not only the idea that the child cannot 
determine his or her own best interests, but also contains another interesting layer. The child 
may only be separated against the parents' wishes if the following procedural hurdles are met: 1) 
the decision must be necessary' for the best interests of the child, 2) determined by a competent 
authorit}', 3) subject to judicial re^ew, 4) in accordance with applicable law and procedures. 
However, if the separation is according to the parents' wishes but against the child's wishes, 
there are no similar procedural hurdles included in the Convention. 
During the drafting of Article 9, the Norwegian delegate suggested that separation, even in the 
event that parents wish to separate, should only occur if the state determines that separation is in 
the best interests of the child, thus limiting the right of the parents to divorce or separate from 
their child.^^ Thorough discussion took place on how to resolve the issue of which family 
members may separate, and when." Ultimately it was accepted by all parties, and was included in 
the Convention the procedural hurdles Hsted above only apply when the state is considering 
separating children from parents against parents' will. The child, however, docs not have a 
comparable right to separate if such separation is against the parents' wishes; she or he only can 
hope for the issue to come before the state, the state meets those procedural hurdles, and the 
state fmds that such separation is in accordance with the best interests principle. Further, if the 
parent desires to separate from the child against the child's wishes, the child does not have to 
right to those same procedural hurdles, not even a best interests of the child determination. It 
seems that this article merely supports the parental right to leave whenever the parent so desires, 
and the parental right to have custody of the child with as Htrie state inter\'ention as possible. 
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Parental rights, here, are dressed up in the discourse of best interests of the child, but appear to 
clearly support parental preferences. One could argue that it cannot be in the child's best 
interests to stay with parents that do not want them. Nonetheless, how is this not true in the 
reverse, when a child docs not desire to stay with a parent? Put another way, how is it in the 
child's best interests to force the family to stay together when the parent is unwanted. Certain 
assumptions are being made; roles and responsibilities are assumed and supported. Most 
importandy certain 'truths' about children (immature and therefore cannot act according to their 
best interests much less care for themselves) and parents (responsible and wiU always act in the 
child's best interests) are being made. Chapter 9 aims to dislodge these 'truths' as but claims-to-
truth by arguing that the C^RC's version of the category' 'child' and the category 'adult' does not 
accord with the experiences of many humans who are nominated into these binary categories. 
Notably, even Articlc 19, which addresses abuse by parents, does not specifically provide for 
separation, although the article does empower the state to take 'aU appropnate legislative, 
administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child' from abuse by parents. 
These 'protective measures' should 'provide necessan- support for the child and those who have 
the care of the child'. Obviously such support could include separation, yet there seems to be 
reluctance to provide such a right explicitly to children, even when the state has determined that 
abuse has occurred. It seems that Article 19 treats abuse perpetrated by those who care for the 
child as less serious than abuse perpetrated between strangers. By less serious, it is meant that 
'physical or mental violence, injur)-, or abuse, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual 
abuse' between any other individuals would give rise to criminal or civil action. However, Article 
19 appears to caU for 'support' for both the child and the perpetrator. This reading is supported 
and reflected in the discussions that took place during die drafting of Article 19. The discussion 
during the drafting of this article focused on the need to providing non-punitive measures for 
parents or parents who abuse their children. For example, die Ukraiman delegate stated that 
Ukraine would not support a proposal that was principally focused on judicial and punitive 
measures. NX-Tiile agreeing, the delegate from the Defence for ChUdren argued that implicit in 
the term 'judicial mvolvement' was the provision of ser^-iccs for prevention and foUow-up. 
Ultimately, paragraph (2) of Article 19 makes clear the t>-pe of 'protective measures' the state 
should offer m the instance of child abuse by parents: prevention, identification, reporting, 
referral, investigation, treatment, and foUow-up. While the expUcit limitation on pumtive action 
against parents who abuse or neglcct their children cannot be found m Article 19, the language 
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of Article 19 as well as the discussions during the drafting of Article 19 indicate that while similar 
abuses between strangers and children as well as between adults give rise to criminal or civil 
action, between parents and cliild, the focus should rather be on reconciliation. 
Article 19 is hailed as a major step forward for rights of the child as the first acknowledgment of 
the positive role of the state to interfere in the family in the instances of abuse. Yet, Article 19 
appears to be a small step in the direction of 'special care and assistance' ." Considering the 
dominant position given to parents m the CRC, Article 19 is the only article out of 54 articles 
that addresses any sort of abuse that may occur as a result of the parent's dominant position in 
the family over the child. Further, as noted above, this article does not explicitiy provide for 
separation, instead that 'necessan' support' to be given to the family. While reconciliation and 
support may be necessar)' in certain circumstances, the seemingly predominant, if not exclusive 
focus on reconciliation and support in Article 19 harkens back to some assumption that the 
parent-child relationship, even in the instance of abuse, is fundamentally different from aU other 
relationships. O'Neill notes that, 
|a]mong family members where ties are even closer than simple friendship, it is 
suggested, the language of rights should give way to models that stress 
connection, care, intimacy, and relationship rather than separateness, 
individuaHt)', and independence." 
While reconciliation and support may be positive in instances of abuse and neglect between 
parents and children, the question still remains why this assumption is not 'true' for the abuse 
and neglect between all humans, regardless of their relationship. The family is viewed as 
fundamentally different from all other relationships because of the many 'truths' of the family 
and parents accepted in the Convention: the family is the 'namral' place for children; the family 
environment is 'an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding;'^^ the best interests of the 
child will be the parents' 'basic concern'.™ These 'truths' place limits on the rights of the child, 
and as such these 'truths' relegate childhood to a state of dependency, and thus, arguably greater 
\'ulnerabilit)'. At the risk of being repetitive, it is important to note that children were not 
involved in the drafting of the Convention. One wonders whether this article would be so 
" Preamble of CRC. 
Onora O'Neill. Children "s Rights and Children "s Lives, in C H I L D R E N ' S R I G I I T S - R E - v i s i O N E D . 3 0 (Rosalind Ekman Ladd 
ed. 1996). 
" Norma Fields. The Child as Labourer and Consumer: The Disappearance of Childhood in Contemporary' Japan, in 
CHILDREN AND THE POLITICS OF C U L T U R E , 9 - 1 0 (Sharon Stephens ed.. 1 9 9 5 ) ; Frances E . Olsen. Mvth of State Intervention 
the Family. 1 8 ( 4 ) UNIVERSITY OF M I C H I G A N J O U R N A L OF L A W 8 3 5 . 8 3 9 ( 1 9 8 5 ) : Martha Minow. Bevond State Intervention in 
the Family: For Baby Jane Doe. 1 8 UNIVERSITY OF M I C H I G A N J O U R N A L OF L A W R E F O R M 9 3 3 . 9 4 8 ( 1 9 8 5 ) 
C H R I S JENKS , CHILDHOOD, 4 1 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
in 
'forgiving' of parents had children been involved. Certainly such 'forgiveness' is not obligated in 
the context of children and strangers," and between adults. The rights that children find in the 
CRC trend towards bolstering, rather than limiting parental rights. The rights that children find 
in the CRC trend towards limiting, rather than bolstering their own rights. These limitations are 
accordance with certain 'truths' about childhood, justif)' the regulation of childhood, where 
dependency and vulnerabiht}' become markers of childhood. 
IV. WHEN THE 'FAMILY" BREAKS DOWN - RESTRICTIONS ON PARENTAL 
RIGHTS 
Before discussing limitations placed on parents in the exercise of their parental rights, it should 
be noted again that human rights for children give rise to vastly different rights, obligations, and 
responsibilities than human rights for other, vulnerable (adult) groups, as was argued in Chapter 
4. Human rights traditionally protect persons from the power of the state by guaranteeing an 
adult certain autonomy rights. The human rights of children are protected in the CRC by 
systemically empowering adults to protect the child. The rights of children appear to bestow 
third part}' private individuals (in other words, parents) with 'duties' and responsibilities.®' It 
does so to such an extent that this thesis argues that 'care', 'needs' and 'protection' ser\-e as terms 
of art diat reflects parental control over children. Here the child is only protected from the state 
through the parent and the parent's right to have primar}- responsibility- for the child. In the 
instances where the 'family' malfunctions, the child does not acquire her or his own autonomy 
rights that will protect the child from the state and private third parties. Instead, according to 
the CRC, the state is empowered to function only as a pscudo- or back-up parent, in the instance 
that the state determines such (self-) empowerment as necessary according to Article 20. 
Further, the only right the child has to be protected from the state, once in the care of the state is 
for the state to review its treatment of the child, accordmg to Article 25. It seems that nghts of 
the child in the CRC Hmit not the state inter\'ention into the Ufe of the child, but rather Hmit 
state inter\'ention in the parents' exercise of their parental rights. 
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Although the parent is located above the child in the construction of the CRC's family, it is 
important to note in turn the restrictions placed on parental rights, as these restrictions sketch 
more comprehensively the relative roles of the parent and the state in the rights of the child. 
First, the Convention is praised as a challenge to the monopoly of power parents traditionally 
held on deciding the best interests of the child by obliging the state to inter\'ene in Article 19, 
thereby making the decisions of the parents reviewable."' Second, parents are subject to 
restrictions in their dominant role in the family by two principles; 1) the best interests of the 
child, and 2) the evolving capacities of the child. As Article 19 has already been examined above, 
this section will examine the best interests and evolving capacities prmciples. These two 
principles arc argued to have, 
profound significance for the triangular relationship between the child, the family 
and the State. The Convention, for the first time in international law, establishes 
a direct relationship between the child and the State that challenges the 
presumption that parents have rights of ownership over the child."^ 
According to Article 3(1), the best interests of the child are 'a priman- consideration'. ITie 
original text stated that 'in all actions concerning the child . . . the best interests of the child 
would be the paramount concem'P During the discussions that took place when drafting Article 3, 
issue was taken with the words 'the' and 'paramount'."'* A number of delegations questioned 
whether the best interests of the child should be the primar)- consideration in all actions 
concerning the child. It was noted that there arc situations in which the competing interests of 
justice or of societ)- at large should be of at least equal, if not greater importance than the 
interests of the child."^ The language of Article 3(1) was changed to include the phrase 'a 
primary' consideration'. The significance of this alteration is that not only is the opinion of the 
child not determinative even in matters that concern the child, but also even the best interests of 
the child are not determinative."' The category' 'child' involves other competing interests that 
must be taken into account. While the delegates mentioned only justice and societ)', one could 
also imagine that the 'family' and the parents must be considered as well. Nonetheless, the best 
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interests principle is a mode of interpretation in all matters concerning the child.*" I'hus, parents 
are at all times restricted in matters concerning the child to take into account the best interests of 
the child as V primary- consideration under Article 3. Additionally, Article 18 states that the best 
interests of the child will to be the parents' basic concern. Article 9(1) also allows for separation 
of the child from the 'parents' if necessary' for best interests of the child. Article 9(4) states that 
if personal contact with 'parents' is contrarj' to best interests of the child, such contact will not 
be permissible. 
Notably, the best interest principle docs not mean 'best rights'.®* Freeman argues that it may 
seem incongruous that in a convention about rights, best interests should feature so 
prominendy.*' The best interest principle is paternalistic, as it is -i-iewed from an adult 
perspective; Article 3(1) makes no reference to the child's views.'" I'he best interests principle is 
not a right that a child may claim. The expression that '[something] is not in my best interests' 
by the child will not trump the parents' determination of the best interests of the child, although 
some academics argue that the child's views plays a significant role in the determination of the 
child's best interests." The only expression that can overturn a parents' assessment of the child's 
best interests is the state's determination of the best interests of the child. It is not for the child 
to determine his/her own best interests. It is first for the parent to do so, making this 'right' 
more like a mere self-imposed restriction on the rights of parents that results in broad discretion 
for parents.'^ The child is then left to depend on the state's determination of the child's best 
interests. Either way the child is dependent on others (/adults) to determine the child's best 
interests. This gives the parent and the state the autiiorit)' to substitute their perspective for that 
of the child. If the best interests principle challenges the monopoly of power parents 
traditionally held over children, it seems to do so to only a small degree: 1) the right of review of 
the decisions made by parents by {another adult j ) the state, if the state determines such review is 
necessary, and 2) the right to have {another adult/) the state make its own determination of the 
best interests of the child. The child is given only the right to have a greater number of adults 
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(the state) review the parent's decisions and actions towards the child, those other adults (the 
state) deem such review necessar)'. 
Notably, the best interests principle is argued to be indeterminate." One author states that 
asking what constitutes the best interests of the child is Hke asking about what is the meaning of 
Ufe, for the Hst of interests are infinite." Different societies at different times will not agree. 
Freeman uses the example of corporal punishment, and how ^aews have changed throughout 
histon-, but also between different cultures t o d a y \ ' a n Bueren argues that the flexibility of best 
interests principle desires to cope with the demands of justice m each case when rights collide." 
On the other hand. Freeman argues that this principle can also be a smokescreen: a mere 
reflection of 'dominant meanings' (for example, heteronormativit)-). Freeman rightly notes that 
given the complexity of the best interests pnnciple, a lengthy debate during the drafting stages of 
Article 3 on the meaning of this pnnciple would be cxpected." As with so many other 
foundational concepts (the child as developing, the child as immature, and so on) the 'delegates 
were happy to accept the concept without debating its meaning or its problems'. '" The best 
interests principle underlines the child as both an object of law and provides a 'smokescreen' for 
parent and state control. 
The second limitation on the parent's dominant role within the family, and another tenet of the 
CRC, is the principle of the evolving capacities of the child. Article 5, which mandates state 
parties to respect the rights of parent to provide direction and guidance, requires parents to 
provide such direction and guidance 'in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the 
child'. While neither the Convention nor the Travaux Preparations define the evolving capacities 
principle, at its most basic the principle acknowledges the child's gradual accumulation of 
maturit)' and thus provides for a gradual accumulation of capacity/autonomy. Gerison 
Lansdown writes that the evolving capacities principle recognises, 'the changing relationship 
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between parents and children as they grow up, and focuses on capacit)' rather than age as the 
determinant in the exercise of human rights' ." In turn, the parent has less claim to exercise 
responsibilit)' over and capacity' on behalf of the child. While the evolving capacities principle 
aims to balance the rights of the child with the rights of the parents,'™' the focus in Article 5 
nonetheless appears to be about the parent's rights and duties, as opposed to the evolving 
capacities of the child. While the state is required to 'respect' the rights, responsibilities, and 
duties of the parent, the parent nor the state is required to 'respect' the evolving capacities of the 
child, but rather provide guidance and direction 'in manner consistent with the evolving 
capacities of the child'. The evolving capacit)' principle is also embodied in Article 12(1) where a 
child capable of forming an opinion shall be able to express it, and where due weight is given to 
expression based on age and maturity' of the child. Article 14(2) pro\ades parents with the right 
to direct freedom of thought, conscience, or religion. However, parents are restricted to the 
extent that they may only do so 'in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child'. 
Like the best interest principle, this is not a right the child gets to claim under her/his own 
perception of his/her own capacity'. Rather, the parent gets to determine the child's capacit)', 
subject to review by the state, only if the state deems such review necessary. 
Lansdown contends that understanding the evolving capacities of the child requires coming to 
grips with the 'vet)' essence of childhood'. Lansdown continues that understanding the evolving 
capacities principle, 
necessitates bringing together what is known about childhood from many 
perspectives, mcluding child psychology', physiology, anthropology, sociology', 
law and early childhood development, in order to help understand how children's 
rights can be most effectively realised and the role diat cliildren themselves play 
in that proccss."" 
As argued m Chapter 6, the CRC reflects these knowledges and posits that children are in a state 
of development, and thus acquire competencies over the duration of childhood. Lansdown 
contends diat the evolving capacities prmciple provides the basis for an appropriate respect for 
children's agency without exposmg them premamrely to the fuU responsibilities normaUy 
associated with adulthood.'"' ImpHcit in concept of evolving capacities is the tacit commitment 
to a particular version of childhood, replete with assumptions about childhood, discussed m 
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Chapter 5: development is a universal process, adulthood is a normat ive goal, and childhood is 
unique penod of dependency where children are objects of adult protection.'"^ Further, given 
social views about children as incapable, the presumption of capacity becomes an even larger 
hurdle.'"" Notably, the Gil/kk decision has been subject to significant retraction in subsequent 
decisions in favour of lingering parental tights.'"^ 
The evolving capacities principle is also inherendy and admittedly mdeterminate. The 
Convention, while defining the category' child as those below the age of eighteen years, 
contemplates that children will reach various stages of maturity throughout childhood. 
However, it seems that the indeterminacy of the evolving capacities principle works against die 
category' cliild as they begin from a position where they arc presumed incapable, and as discussed 
in Chapter 4, are largely viewed as incapable. Again given that the evolving capacities principle 
was a new conccpt under international law, and given vagueness of the term, some discussion by 
the drafter would be expccted. Yet, none took place; the evolving capacities of the child must 
have been too obvious to require discussion. 
I"inally, the evolving capacities pnnciple requires that which would today be unimaginable for 
other human rights holders. These articles require a child prove that she or her has acquired 
mamrity by demonstrating that she or he makes 'good' decisions. Many adults would not pass 
such a (rather subjective) test. Further, these articles uphold the much-crit icised idea that to 
have legal capacity, one must be autonomous and independent. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
capacity cannot be the precondition for rights regardless of category (age, gender, sexual 
orientation, class, castc, cthnicity, and so on), because even those who are considered as having 
'capacity' would not meet such a condition. The rational autonomous man making decisions for 
himself, in his own interests does not exist. I 'cminists have criticised autonomy as precondition 
for rights by noting that the man m the ivory tower depends on other people to feed him and 
" " G E R I S O N L A N S D O W N , T H E EVOLVING C A P A C I T I E S OF THE C H I L D , X ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
Hillar> Rodham. A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES, 2 1 . 3 3 (Patricia Vardin and 
lllcne Brody eds.. 1979); Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Participation and Citizenship. 6 CHILDHOOD 475 (1999) ; 
Michael Freeman. The Sociology of Childhood and Children's Rights. 6 (4 ) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
433 (1998) ; Michael Freeman. The Future of Children's Rights. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 111 ( 2000 ) 
& fi 11991 ] 4 ALII ER 177. CA and Re IV \ 1992] 4 All 627. CA . (especially Lord Donaldson) weaken the Gillick 
decision. From these, and subsequenl cases, it is clear that although the parental right to veto treatment ends, parental 
powers do nol 'temiinate'. as suggested by Lord Scamian in Gillick. Rather. Gillick competency grants the child an ability 
to consent but does nol affect the power of the parent. That is, if a child is Gillick competent both she and her parent will be 
able to consent. As a result, a child can be legally treated in circumstances where they refuse/resist treatment. See generally 
MICHAEL FREEMAN. CHILDREN'S HEALTH AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; M i c h a e l F r e e m a n . The Child in Family Law. in 
LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD, 187-196 ( Ju l i a F i o n d a e d 2 0 0 1 ) 
keep him clean, and even to keep him company.""^ These preconditions are nonetheless required 
of the child in the C R C . 
It could be argued that it is not in fact the child's rights/the child's opinion per se that limit the 
power o f parents over children, but rather the state's supra-parental power. O n one level, 
parents are guided in their own view o f what a child's rights should entail by appropriating their 
perception o f the best interests o f the child and the evolving capacities o f the child on behalf o f 
the child. Arguably, tJie parent's determination carries with it a considerable amount o f weight, 
with the parent given rarely reviewable respect, responsibilit)', and power under the CRC. O n 
another arguably higher level, the parents are not limited by strict deployment o f child's rights, 
but rather by the state's perception o f the best interests o f the child and the evolving capacities 
of the child. T h e child's challenge to parental monopoly o f power over the child in the C R C 
amounts to merely the authorisation o f the state/other adults to review the parents' decisions. 
Notably, both the best interests o f the child and the evolving capacities o f the child principles, 
and therefore the child's claims to protection and autonomy, are mediated through and 
conditioned upon the perceptions o f those who are positioned over/hold power over the child: 
adults. In this way the Convention again provides for the child's complete dependency on the 
parent (and where applicable the state). T h e child's abilit}' to exercise his/her rights is dependent 
upon these adults' (parents and where applicable the state) right to determine the child's best 
interests and the child's capacities, under the presumption o f the child's incapacit}'. 
Central to unpacking the family in the C R C is an understanding o f the role o f the parent (power 
to direct, guide, protect, and so on) and the limitations placed upon the role o f the parent (best 
interests principle, evolving capacities principle, and the state as a supra-parent). This 
conception o f 'care' then allows for the location o f the child widiin this mandatory family matrix 
as die submissive, dependent member . T h e child is located in and dependent upon the family 
under the parent by virtue o f the powers given to the parent over the child. Then, the state, as 
the supra-parent, is given ultimate (though reluctant) power over the child. This power and 
nghts aUocation results in further restraining the rights o f the child by forcing the child into this 
hierarchical family strucmre. This analysis continues to suggest discrepancy between the child as 
a nght-holder m the C R C and the practical conscquence o f provisions that confer upon other 
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R . G H T 7 2 4 3 , 2 4 9 ( 2 0 0 0 ) , q u o ^ g JEAN G R . M S H A W . FEMINIST PHILOSOPHERS: W O M E N ' S PERSPECTIVES ON PHILOSOPHICAL 
TRADITIONS ( 1 9 8 6 ) . 
parries (parents and the state) the right to exhaustively determine the child's maturit}'/capacity to 
exercise these rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Unpacking how the 'family' is constructed in the Convention offers insight into the CRC's 
construction of the categorj- 'child'. Unpacking how the terms 'family', 'care', 'parents', 'best 
interests' and 'evolving capacities' operate in the Convention aids the understanding of how the 
categon' 'child' is made possible. The family represents another 'truth' acccpted by and deployed 
in the Convention. This chapter has sought to argue that the CRC relegates the child to the 
context of a family/'care'. At the same time, the CRC also mandates the child, not to a family of 
equals, but to a family where the child is subject to parental control. This adult - child 
relationship places limits placed upon children's rights beyond those placed on adult rights. The 
family (dictated by adult preferences), garbed in the rhetoric of the rights of the child (for 
example, right not to be separated) and even the best interests of the child, places clear restraints 
on the child's rights. Indeed, the rights of the child are mediated through the 
requirement/restraint of being in a family. The child's immaturity justifies the CRC's version of 
'care' and 'special assistance': the family as defined as the parent, who has control over the child. 
Section 1 sought to explore the CRC's normative framework of 'care' is as first a family, and 
when the family breaks down, the state is to provide such 'care'. 
Section 11 and 111 explored further how the parent is constructed in the Convention as the 
dominant member in the family. The parent's dominance is fortified in the CRC by gi\'ing 
parent responsibiUt)' over child, by only providing state assistance via the parent for the care of 
the child, and finally by promoting family cohesion. The assumption made by the CRC is that 
first there always exists a parent and secondly that the parent will take into account the best 
interests of the child and the evolving capacities of the child, or at least not violate them 
egregiously, when exercising the parent's duties (in other words, providing direction, guidance, 
adequate standards of living to the child, and so on). By giving the parent such responsibilities 
and power, the CRC presumes the parent to be the opposite of the child: mature, responsible, 
and possessing sufficient judgment. Finally, Section I\' argued tiiat the power that the parent 
holds over the child is checked, not by the opinions and wishes of the child, but rather by the 
state m its determination of the best interests of the child and the evolving capacities of the child. 
As with the parent, the CRC assumes that the state is mature, responsible and possessing 
sufficient judgment in its parental capacity. These truths about the parent and the state justify-
the child being subject to two layers of control. These assumptions contribute to an 
inteq^retation of the CRC that seems not only to be quite an idealistic view of the family, the 
parent, and the state, but also quite a narrow and paternal view of the child. 
While the notion of capacit;' as a precursor to rights and the public - private dichotomy have 
been heavily criticised in other contexts, these notions still are exceptional influential in the 
context of children's rights. The CRC describes a child that is immature, and asserts that 
immaturity' to require a different set of rights for children, as argued in Chapter 6. Then, because 
of his or her immaturity, the child requires 'care'. The CRC defines the ideal 'care' as a family, as 
the family/care is a place of happiness, love, and understanding. Ennew states that, 
[t]he unhappy child does not have an adult to depend on - to be powerful on its 
behalf or, if it needs to be rescued, to put it back into childhood which, in 
ideological terms, stands for happiness, play innocence and some kind of 
essential goodness in human namre."" 
This family/care is then defined as a child who has an adult positioned over him or her. The 
adult, who is responsible, will have the best interests of the child forever in mind, and will take 
into account the child's burgeoning capacities. Further, the state will have the capacit}' and 
willingness to inter\'ene in such a way that respects the family (in other words, parent), and at the 
same time will consider the best interests of the child as a primary- consideration. While the CRC 
appears to be describing the 'true' child, the 'true' family, the 'true' parent, and the 'true' state, 
the CRC makes the family/'care', vuhierabilit)-, and dependency markers of childhood. The 
child is only given rights diat support the CRC's definition of a family/care: the hierarchical 
relationship of the parent over the child. This story of childhood dictates which children, 
childhoods, and issues faced by children will be ignored, and which will be problematised and 
stigmatised (see Chapter 9 for further discussion). The positional matrix portrayed in the CRC is 
hierarchical. UnUke other human nghts discourses that seek to redress hierarchies; the CRC 
remforces and even sustains the incquahties benvecn adults and children. UnHke any other 
human rights discourse that offers protections from the stale, the CRC offers children protection 
imm themselves, as if children suffer subjugation, inequahty, disenfranchisement, and abuse from 
themselves. Furtiier, the CRC offers greater protection for those who have control over children, 
notably under the rhetoric of 'family' and best mterests of the child, as if adults require more 
protection of their parental rights. Unhke the defmition of the famUy m the CRC's Preamble 
where aU members of the human family have equal and inalienable nghts, the child finds 
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him/hersclf in this family characterised by inequality and with rights that are alienable because 
this person has been nominated by the CRC as a 'child' based on assumptions of what is 'true' 
about childhood. While tliis chapter and the previous one, have examined the truths that the 
child is developing and that the child requires 'care', the next chapter will discuss the ways in 
which such truths are realised. In other words, the next chapter will explore the ways in which 
the cMd is moulded into the CRC's vision for childhood. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE DOCILE BODY: DISCIPLINING THE CATEGORY 'CHILD' 
IN THE CRC 
OUTLINE 
JURIDICAL POWER IN THE CRC 
a. Corporal Punishment 
b. Incarceration 
II. DISCIPLINARY POWER IN THE CRC 
a. Compulsory Education 
b. Mandatory Care 
III. CONCLUSION 
According to the vision of the categorj' 'child' articulated in the CRC, childhood is always in a 
state of 'becoming' (in other words, developing).' As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the CRC's 
production of the categor)' 'child-as-devcloping' justifies the relegation of the child to a particular 
context of 'care', defined as a family, subject to parental control. Though discussed to a lesser 
extent in Chapter 6, the C^RC's 'child-as-developmg' paradigm also justifies the relegation of 
childhood to school in Article 28. The conception of the 'child-as-developing' in the CRC has 
clear foundations in the rise of the ' innocent ' and 'dependent ' 'child' in Western industrialised 
states where 'progressive' reformers advocated for the removal of 'children' from the labour 
market and their placement into the home and school.^ Zelizer argues that, the 'pricelessness' of 
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The Sociology of Childhood in Relation to Children s Rights. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN S R>GHTS 243^ 243-
259 (2000); Jo Bovden. Childhood and the Policy Makers: A Comparative Perspective on the Globalisation of Chd^^^ in 
CONSTRUCTING AND R E C O N S T R U C T I N G C H I L D H O O D : CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE S O C I O L O G I C ^ STURDY OF C H I L D H O O D 
(Allison James and Alan Prout eds.. 1997); CHRIS JENKS, CHILDHOOD (2005); Norma Fields, The Child as Labourer and 
Consumer: The Disappearance of Childhood in Contemporary Japan. - CHILDREN AND THE POLITICS OF CULTU^^^^^^ 
Stephens ed.. 1995); MARTIN WOODHEAD, Psychology and the Cultural Construction of Children s Needs . in GROWING 
UP IN A CHANGING SOCIETY. 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
the 20"' centuty child developed hand in hand with the expulsion of the child from the public 
sphere.' Ennew contends that, 
modern recognition of children constructs children out of societ)', mutes, their 
voices, denies their personhood, limits their potential - the sociability of the 
street has given way to the privacy of the family, the 'filling up' of children's time 
and the scheduling of their lives/ 
Rose goes even further to argue that, 
|c|hildhood is the most intensively governed sector of personal experience 
existence. In different ways, at different times, and by many different routes 
varj-ing from one section of societ}' to another, the health, welfare, and rearing of 
children have been linked in thought and practice to the destiny of the nation 
and the responsibilities of the state. The modern child has become the focus of 
innumerable projects that purport to safeguard it from physical, sexual and moral 
danger, to ensure its 'normal' development, to actively promote certain capacities 
or attributes such as intelligence, educabilit)', and emotional stability.^ 
The CRC's narrative of the 'child-as-developtng' is not just about regulating the child to the 
'islands' of 'care' and school.'' These 'islands', as Rose notes, are to ensure the child's 'normal' 
development. Whether a child is Apollonian or Dionysian, the CRC tells us that the child must 
be disciplined to be moulded into its binar\- opposite: the adult. The 'child' in school and at 
home is to be produced as a fumre productive adult/citizen. While becoming an adult is the 
goal of childhood, the model child is a non-adult, immature and developing, and therefore 
dependent. 
As such, the CRC empowers certain actors, particularly school officials and parents or 'carers', to 
carr)' out this work of producing the future productive adult citizen.' Parents, child-care 
institutions, and schools interact with children and childhood based upon specific conceptions of 
a 'child' and childhood." Mayall has argued that the power held by adults to organise the main 
sites of childhood (school and home) defines children's experiences, revealing what Mayall terms 
' V i v i A N A Z E L I Z E R . PRICING THE P R I C E L E S S C H I L D : T H E C H A N G I N G S O C I A L V A L U E OF C H I L D R E N ( 1 9 8 5 ) . 
' Judith Ennew. Outside Childhood: Street Children's Rights, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE 
POLICY AND PRACTICE. 125-143 (Bob Franklin ed.. 1995). 
' C H R I S J E N K S , C H I L D H O O D , 6 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . q u o t i n g N I K O L A S R O S E . G O V E R N I N G THE S O U L : T H E S H A P I N G OF THE P R I V A T E S E L F . 
1 2 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . 
' Alan Prout. Children's Participation: Control and Self-Realisation in British Late Modernitv. 14 (4 ) CHILDREN & SOCIETY 
304 . 313 (2000 ) . citing Gill Valenline. Angels and Devils: Moral Landscapes of Childhood. 14 ENVIRONMENT AND 
P L A N N I N G : S O C I E T Y A N D S P A C E 5 8 1 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
' As discussed in Chapter 7. see for example Articles 3 and 5 for how the C R C empowers -carers", both the .state and parents. 
As will be discussed in Section 11 (a), see also Articles 28 and 29. 
( 1 W G J ' " ' ' ^ D A H L B E R G e t a l . . B E Y O N D Q U A L I T Y IN E A R L Y C H I L D H O O D E D U C A T I O N A N D C A R E : P O S I M O D E R N P E R S P E C T I V E S . 4 3 
children's minorit)' status.' Structuring the ever)'day life and the social reproduction of the 
categor)' 'child' are inextricably i n t e r tw ined .However , this power is finite. Although this thesis 
will not fully explore this issue (this chapter focuses on the production of the category' 'child' by 
the CRC), adults, in their role as parents, are also regulated and controlled by the state through 
the production of 'good parents'. This chapter does not argue that teachers' and parents' 
dominant position in the adult — child binan- order means that these adults are always powerful. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, under a Foucauldian conception of power in societ)', a person never 
simply holds power. Power is not a zero sum game. That is, teachers and students, parents and 
children, exist in relation to one another and exert resistance." Other actors and institutions also 
regulate each other through a system of monitoring, as discussed in Chapter 7 (the 'good/unfit 
parent'; the 'good/unfit teacher'). Instead, adults employ a range of techniques to establish 
themselves as more able to exercise power, as was argued in Chapter 3.'^ 
The 'child-as-developing' justifies the exercise of both juridical power (through corporal 
punishment and forms of incarceration) and disciphnar\- power (through constant surveillance in 
'care' and at school). In this way, islands of 'care' and 'education' become the means through 
which the CRC's normative childhood is enforced and produced. Through its construction of 
the 'child' as developing and 'in care', the CRC makes possible the regulation and control of 
'childhood.' As discussed in Chapter 3, this process of moulding is what Foucault refers to as 
the technologies of govcrnmentaUtv" calculated preoccupation with acti\nties directed at shaping, 
channeUing and guiding the conduct of persons through the production, dissemination, and 
utilisation of knowledge.' ' According to Foucault, law is a potent technology of governmentalit}' 
due to both its juridical (punishment-power to enforce) and disciphnarj' power (productive/form 
of knowledge/truth). F^oucault argues that it is not through the resort to juridical mechamsms 
(for example, physical punishment or mcapacitation) that the comphant subject (or docile body) 
is forged, though these forms have not disappeared. Rather, the constimtion of the modern 
subject of discipHne is achieved through new and different techmques: spatial distributions, 
' BERRY M A Y A L L . T O W A R D S A SOCIOLOGY FOR CHILDHOOD: THINKING FROM CHILDREN'S LIVES. 2 0 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
BERRY M A Y A L L . T O W A R D S A SOCIOLOGY FOR CHILDHOOD: THINKING FROM CHILDREN'S LIVES. 2 0 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
" See for example Jenny Kitzinger. Who Are You Kidding? Children. Power and the Struggle Agams, SexuaUn 
CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD, 1 6 1 
(Allison James and Alan Prout eds.. 1 9 9 7 ) : Jeremy Roche. Children: Rights and Panic,potion . . 
CHILDHOOD 4 7 5 . 4 7 7 ( 1 9 9 9 ) : B E R R Y M A Y A L L . T O W A R D S A SOCIOLOGY FOR CHILDHOOD: THINKING FROM CHILDREN S L ^ S 
(2002). As Proul emphasises, children have access to power resources thai they can draw on to counterbalance he adults 
dominance: children L social agents. Alan Proul. Children i Participation: Control and Self-Real,sat,on ,n Br,t,sh Late 
Modernity. 1 4 ( 4 ) CHILDREN & SOCIETY 3 0 4 . 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . 
S E . generally Al l ison James and Alan Prout eds.. CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY 
ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD. 1 6 1 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 
" JUDITH BUTLER. GENDER TROUBLE, 2 6 - 2 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
hierarchical observ^ations, normalising judgments, constant sur\-eiUance, and examinations." 
'i'his disciplining/moulding of the child occurs, in part, through the disciplinary- technique of 
constant sur\'cillancc: by tcachers and staff and by parents or parental figures at home." 
Building on Foucault, Butler contends that although juridical notions of power found m law 
appear to regulate political life only in negative terms (through prohibition, regulation, control, 
and so on), the subject is actually positively formed, defined, and reproduced by these structures 
in accordance with its requirements." 
This chapter argues that the exercise of juridical power has a more prominent role in disciplining 
the CRC's child (as compared to adults). Yet the potency of disciplinary power over the child in 
the Convention is in no way diminished. The CRC enables the exercise of juridical and 
disciplinary power, through its condoning of corporal punishment, its requirement of 
compulsory education and 'care' for aU children. Through the exercise of these powers, the CRC 
is able to produce and enforce its normative conception of childhood. The CRC purports to 
merely describe, accommodate, and even protect the 'true child' or the 'true family'. Instead, the 
CRC produces the category 'child' according to a normative framework of what childhood 
should be. This chapter will map the ways in which the CRC produces or fosters 'disciplinary' 
and 'juridical' processes governing the production of the child as a future adult. This chapter 
examines these processes in the context of the CRC's treatment of corporal punishment and 
confinement, in 'care' and schooling respectively. Section I wiU discuss the operation of juridical 
power in the Convention, specifically the corporal punishment of children and what this chapter 
is terming the 'incarceration' of children through the restrictions placed on the child's liberty. 
Section 11 wiU examine the operation of disciplinary power in the Convention, specifically while 
in 'care' and while at school. 
I. JURIDICAL POWER IN THE CRC 
Juridical power, the power to pumsh, plays a more prominent role in the CRC as compared to 
other human rights instruments for adults. This section argues that the CRC allows for greater 
use of corporal pumshment against children and greater restrictions of children's Hberty as a 
Fo r further d i scuss ion ^EE M I C H E L F O U C A U L T , D I S C I P L I N E A N D P U N I S H M E N T , T H E B I R T H OF THE P R I S O N . 1 3 5 - 2 2 8 ( A l a n 
Sheridan trans.. 1995); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, 19(1990). 
I'^'Zl'"""'' /'"'•''"P'"'"" Comrol and Self-ReaUsalion in British Late Modernitv. 14(4) C H I L D R E N & SOCIETY 
304 (2000): -On the one hand, there is an increasing tendency to see children as individuals with a capacity for self-
reahsation and within the limits of social interdependency, autonomous action; on the other, there are practices directed at a 
greater surveillance, control and regulation of children'. 
L L T T V N " J " " ' ' ' ' • ' ' ( " " " " G MICHEL FOUCAULT. Right of Death and Power over Life, m THE 
H I S T O R Y OF S E X U A L I T Y . V O L U M E 1: A N INTRODUCTION ( Robe r t Hu r l e y trans. . 1 9 8 0 ) . 
method of punishment as compared to all other international human rights discourse on adult 
tights.'^ The treatment of corporal punishment and confinement in the CRC permits or enables 
actors to exert juridical power in relation to the 'child'. This exertion of power regulates and 
produces the vision of the categor\- 'child' in the CRC. 
a. Corporal Punishment 
The CRC does not explicidy prohibit corporal punishment. The drafters of the CRC did not 
direcdy discuss its usage." Nonetheless, Article 19 (abuse of children while in care), Article 37 
(prohibition against torture) and Article 28(2) (right to education) shed light on the corporal 
punishment of children. The discussion of whether corporal punishment can ever be in the best 
interests of the child will not be examined." This section focuses instead on whether the CRC 
allows adults to use corporal punishment against children. This section argues that the CRC 
allows for the greater use of corporal punishment as compared to all other human rights 
conventions and declarations, as a means of producing and then governing the categor)' 'child'. 
While adult human rights documents contemplate the use of corporal punishment within the 
limited context of criminal sanctions,^" the CRC contemplates the use of corporal punishment by 
parents and school officials of children. Empowering one t)pe of person (adult) to exert 
physical force over another (child) produces a relationship between the two; the nexus being the 
one's ability to apply legitimate force to the other. The definition of corporal punishment 
appears to have two elements; 1) 'reasonable' physical violence by an adult directed towards a 
child diat 2) aims to provide direction to/correction of the child.^' Shmueli states that. 
" See Chapter 4 for more d iscuss ion on the compar i son between the in lemat iona l d iscourses on adu l t ' s r ights and ch i ld ren ' s 
rights. 
" SEE generally S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE 
' T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" While some argue that Ar t i c l e 3 (best interests of the ch i ld ) is a lso re levant , the best interests pnnc ip le is an indeterminate 
concept as argued throughout this thesis . Freeman has argued ' l o l f course, what is in a chi ld 's best interests is va ue- laden. 
and 10 some extent indeterminate . But it may be a rgued that there are some g ivens and thai v io lence against a child may be 
considered one matter upon wh ich there should be consensus . The best interests pr inciple can. of course, c loak pre jud ices . 
Michael Freeman, Upholdmg ihe Dignity and Best Interests of Children: Inlemational la« and the Corporal Pumshment of 
Children. 73 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 211 . 216 (2010 ) . A s such, depending on how one v i e w s ' b e s t interests 
will dictate how those interests wi l l be def ined . For examp le , some might argue that ' spar ing the rod is to the detriment of 
the chi ld ' s deve lopment : wh i l e others wi l l a rgue that corporal punishment v io la tes the ch i ld ' s phys ica l dignity^ See for 
example Peter Newe l l , Ending Corporal Pumshment of Children, in REVISITING CHILDREN S RIGHTS 115 (Deidre FoHre 1 ed. , 
2000); Susan H. B i t ensky , The Child's Right to Humane Dise.pline Under the U.N. Convention on the f ^ h M : 
The Mandate Against all Corporal Punishmen, of Children. 4 LOYOLA POVERTY LAW J o t m N ^ 47, 47-53 ( 1 9 9 ^ . Jennifer E. 
Lansford. The Special Problems of Cultural Difference in Effects of Corporal Punishmen,. 73 LAW & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 89. 8 9 - 1 0 6 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; A n g e l a Bar tman , Spare the Rod and Spa,I the CInId? Corporal Pun.shmen, ,n Schools Around 
•he World. 13 INDIANA INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 283. 283- 297 ( 2002 ) for example or such 
oveiview Andre R. Imbrogno. Corporal Punishment in America's Public Sch^sand'^^UN. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child: A Case for Non-ratification. 29 JOURNAL ON LAW & EDUCATION 125, 125 (2000) . 
See for example Art ic le 7 o f the ICCPR. „ , , . j . , n K,r, . .K.. 
Angela Bar tman, Spare the Rod and Spoil the Child^ Corporal Punishmen, in Schools .Around Ihe H orld. 13 INDIANA 
INTERNATIONAL & C O M P A R A T I V E L A W R E V I E W 2 8 3 , 2 8 5 - 2 8 6 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
corporal punishment occurs when a parent or educator hits a child with the 
purpose of educating [the child]. It usually consists of a light blow with the open 
hand on the buttocks or hand because the child has misbehaved, deviated f rom 
the right path, failed to comply with the authorit)''s wishes and instructions, or 
failed to accept that authorit)'.^^ 
The Committee on the CRC defines corporal punishment as. 
any punishment in wliich physical force is used and intended to cause some 
degree of pain or discomfort, however Hght. Most involves hitting ("smacking", 
"slapping", "spanking") children, with the hand or with an implement - whip, 
stick, belt, shoe, wooden spoon, etc. But it can also involve, for e.xample, 
kicking, shaking or throwing children, scratching, pinching, burning, scalding or 
forced ingestion (for example, washing children's mouths out with soap or 
forcing them to swallow hot spices).^' 
As the text of the CRC is itself silent on corporal punishment, at issue is whether corporal 
punishment amounts to a violation of the CRC under Article 19, 37, and 28(2). Article 19 
prohibits 'physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, 
maltreatment or exploitation . . . [by adults)'. Article 28(2) requires states to 'take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with the child's 
human dignit}''. By condoning the possibiHt)' of corporal punishment under the rubric of 'school 
discipline', the Convention inherentiy defines the child's 'human dignity' as something invariably 
different f rom the adult's.'" Article 37 states that 'no child should be subjected to tormre or 
^^  B e n j a m i n S h m u e l i . Corporal Punishment in Educational Systems I "ersus Corporal Punishment by Parents: A 
Comparative View. 73 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 283 . 2 8 1 - 2 8 2 (2010 ) . c i l ing E l i zabe th T . G e r s h o f f . and Susan 
H. B i l ensky . The Case Against Corporal Punishment of Children: Converging Evidence from Social Science Research and 
International Human Rights Law and Implications for U.S Public Policy. 13(4) PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC POLICY AND LAW 231. 
232 (2007) . T h e au thors de f ine corpora l p u n i s h m e n t a s the u.se o f phys ica l force , n o m a i l e r h o w l ighu wi th the intention of 
caus ing the chi ld to expe r i ence bodi ly pain so as to cor rec t o r pun i sh the ch i ld ' s b e h a v i o u r . Such phys i ca l force typical ly 
inc ludes hi l l ing ch i ld ren with e i ther a hand or an ob jec t . In the Un i t ed Sta les , co rpora l p u n i s h m e n t is k n o w n by a variety of 
e u p h e m i s m s , inc luding spank , s m a c k , s lap. pop . beat , padd le , p u n c h , w h u p / w hip. and hit . A s f o r co rpora l p u n i s h m e n t and 
school , see IRWIN HYMAN. READING. WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK. 10 (1990 ) . H y m a n d e f i n e s co rpora l pun i shmen t by 
t eache r s as ' t he inf i ic l ion o f pain or c o n f i n e m e n t as a pena l ty fo r an o f f e n s e c o m m i t t e d by a s t u d e n t ' . 
T h e c o m m e n t per ta ins spec i f ica l ly to Ar t ic les 19. 28(2) . and 37. It w a s a d o p t e d by the C o m m i t t e e at its fo r ty - second 
sess ion in G e n e v a in M a y and June o f 2006 . C o m m . on the R igh t s o f the Ch i ld . G e n e r a l C o m m e n t N o . 8 : T h e Right of the 
Chi ld to Pro tec t ion f r o m Corpora l P u n i s h m e n t and O the r Crue l or D e g r a d i n g F o r m s o f P u n i s h m e n t . U . N . D o c . C R C / C / G C / 8 
( M a r . 2. 2007) . para . 11; ava i lab le at w w w 2 . o h c h r . o r g / e n g l i s h / b o d i e s / c r c / c o m m e n t s . h t m . See M i c h a e l F r e e m a n . Upholding 
the Dignity and Best Interests of Children: International law and the Corporal Punishment of Children 73 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 211 . 2 1 6 (2010) . 
See the Separa te O p i n i o n o f J u d g e Sir Fi tzgera ld F i t zmaur i ce in Tyrer v. the United Kingdom ( 5 8 5 6 / 7 2 ) . J u d g m e n t of 25 
Apr i l 1978. para . 7 -11 . f y r e r . a 15 yea r old boy w a s ' b i r c h e d ' by a p o l i c e m a n , in p r iva te in the p r e s e n c e o f h is fa ther and a 
doc tor . He w a s m a d e to take d o w n his pan t s and u n d e r w e a r and bend o v e r a table , ( p a r a . 9 - 1 0 ) T h o u g h th i s w a s ru led by the 
E u r o p e a n Cour t o f H u m a n Righ ts to violate Ar t ic le 3 (ban on tor ture o r to i n h u m a n o r d e g r a d i n g t r e a t m e n t o r pun i shment ) . 
Sir F i tzgera ld F i t zmaur i ce a rgued that : ' T h e fact thai a cer ta in fo rm o f p u n i s h m e n t is an u n d e s i r a b l e f o r m o f p u n i s h m e n t 
d o e s not au tomat i ca l ly turn it into a d e g r a d i n g one . Such p u n i s h m e n t d o e s no t . in the case o f a j u v e n i l e a t ta in a level of 
degrada t ion needed to cons t i tu te it a b reach o f art. 3. un less o f cou r se .seriously a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s are presen t over 
and a b o v e the s imple fac t o f the corpora l cha rac t e r o f the p u n i s h m e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , it d o e s not i n v o l v e the level o f 
degrada t ion requi red to cons t i tu te a b reach o f art. 3 o f the E C H R . w h e n inf i ic ted unde r p r o p e r res t r i c t ions a n d s a f e g u a r d s in 
c o n s e q u e n c e o f a regular ly^pronounced jud ic ia l s en tence , t rad i t iona l ly s anc t i oned fo r ce r t a in o f f e n c e s by the law o f the 
c o m m u n i t y to w h i c h the o f f e n d e r be longs , and by its pub l i c o p i n i o n . . . assuming that corporalptmtshment does involve 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'. It appears, similar to the best 
interests principle, that the state is left to determine whether corporal punishment amounts to 
'degrading punishment', is 'inconsistent with the cliild's human dignit)"', or amounts to 'physical 
or mental violence'. 
While there is no clear prohibition on corporal punishment in the CRC and further that the 
corporal punishment of children is arguably acknowledged in Article some academics infer 
that corporal punishment is banned under the CRC."'' The basis for such a conclusion is that the 
CRC Committee has noted numerous times that 'the use of corporal punishment does not 
respect the inherent dignit)' of the child nor the strict Umits on school discipline | found in Article 
28]'.^' The Committee on the CRC has argued that, 
corporal punishment is invariably degrading. In addition, there are other non-
physical forms of punishment which are also cruel and degrading, and thus 
incompatible with the Convention. These include, for example, punishment 
which belitdes, humiliates, denigrates, scapegoats, threatens, scares or ridicules 
the child.'® 
Further, the Committee has explained in its General Comment No. 8 that Articles 19, 28, and 37 
do not leave room for any level of legahscd violence against children and that, '[c]orporal 
punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of punishment are forms of violence and States 
must take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to eliminate 
some degree ofdegradalion. it has never been seen as doing so for a juvenile lo anything approaching the same manner or 
extent as for an adult'. Emphas i s added) . 
" Article 28(2)- ' s tate part ies shal l take a l l appropr ia le measure to ensure that school d isc ip l ine is administered m a manner 
consistent with the ch i l d ' s human d ign i ty . . S e e also SHARON DETRICK. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF THE C H I L D . A GUIDE TO THE ' T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' , 3 8 2 - 3 9 9 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
Alice Farmer and Kate St inson. Failing the Grade: How the Use of Corporal Punishment in U.S. Public Schools 
Demonstrates the Need for U.S. Ratification of the Children "s Rights Convention and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. 5 4 N E W Y O R K L A W S C H O O L L A W R E V I E W 1 0 3 5 . 1 0 3 5 - 1 0 6 9 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
" For a full d iscuss ion of the C R C C o m m i t t e e ' s approach to corporal punishment see Michae l Freeman. Upholding the 
Dignity and Best Interests of Children: International law and the Corporal Punishment of Children. 73 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 211 , 220 -228 (2010 ) . In part icular , see Comment 8 and Comment 1. C R C Commit tee . General 
Comment No I on the Aims of Education (UN Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1. 2001 . para. 8; Commit tee on the Rights of the Chi ld . 
42d Sess. . General Comment No. 8. The Right of the Chi ld to Prolection from Corporal Puni,shmenl and Other Cruel or 
Degrading Fonns of Punishment (Ar ts . 19: 28 . Para. 2 ; and 37) . For the argument that General ^ m m e n t s by a Commit tee 
are considered authori tat ive interpretat ions of a treaty NIGEL WHITE. THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEMS; TOWARDS 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 178 ( 2002 ) . not ing that ' the dec is ions and v i e w s of the HRC are the most authoritat ive 
interpretation of its provis ions" . . , , ^ . . . r j 
The comment perta ins spec i f i c a l l y to Ar t i c l e s 19. 28 (2 ) . and 37. It w a s adopted by the Commit tee at its for^ ' -second 
session in Geneva in M a y and June of 2006 . Commit tee on the Rights of the Chi ld . General Comment No 8. The Right of 
the Child to Protection from Corpora l Punishment and Other C m e l or Degrading Fomi s of Punishment . TJ.N. D o c ^ 
CRC/C/GC/8 (Mar . 2 . 2007 ) . para . 11; ava i l ab l e at www2.ohchr .org/english/bodies/crc/commenls.htm. See also Mich^^tl 
Freeman. Upholding the Dignity and Best Interests of Children: International law and the Corporal Punishment of Children. 
73 L A W AND C O N T E M P O R A R Y P R O B L E M S 2 1 1 . 2 1 6 ( 2 0 1 0 ) . 
thcm'.^' The Committee has recommended prohibition of all corporal punishment , including by 
parents ." Further, only Singapore has issued a declaration on the use of corporal punishment, 
one that several states have o p p o s e d . " Singapore's declaration reads. 
The Republic of Singapore considers that articles 19 and 37 of the Convention 
do not prohibi t . . . thejudicious application of corporal punishment in the best interest of the 
child}'' 
Notably, despite the CRC Committee 's recommendations and the objections by certain states to 
Singapore's declaration," corporal punishment of children is widespread. O f the 193 state 
parties to the CRC, only 29 currcndy outlaw all corporal punishment of chi ldren." While some 
argue that the Convention impUcitiy prohibit corporal punishment, '^ one hundred and sixty-sLx 
states allow some level of corporal punishment of children, and as such interpret corporal 
punishment not to amount to 'degrading punishment ' , nor to constitute 'physical or mental 
violence', nor to be 'inconsistent with the child's human dignity', in the words of the CRC. 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the subsequent practice of states 
parties in the application of the treaty shall be taken into account in the interpretation of a 
treaty."' As such, because the CRC does not explicitly ban corporal punishment , the practice of 
state parties suggests that corporal punishment is not prohibited under the Convention. It 
would seem that the CRC Committee's recommendations do not reflect lex lata, and quite 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. 42d Sess.. Cieneral Comment No. 8. I'he Right of the Child to Protection from 
Corporal Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment (Arts. 19: 28. Para. 2; and 37). For the argument 
that General Comments by a Committee are considered authoritative interpretations of a treaty see NIGEL WHITE. THE 
UNITED NATIONS SYSTEMS: TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1 7 8 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . n o t i n g t ha i ' t h e d e c i s i o n s a n d v i e w s o f t h e H R C 
are the most authoritative inlerpretalion of its provisions". 
R A C H E L H O D G K I N a n d P E T E R N E W E L L . I M P L E M E N T A T I O N H A N D B O O K FOR T H E C O N V E N T I O N O N THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D , 
237-255 (1998). 
A number of states have interpreted Singapore's declaration as a reservation and objected to it as contrary to the object and 
purpose of the Convention. See. e.g.. CRC, adopted Nov. 20. 1989. 1934 U.N.T.S. 383 (Germany registered its objection to 
Singapore's reservations on Sept. 4. 1996): CRC. adopted Nov. 20. 1989. 1935 U.N.T.S. 449 (Belgium regi.stered its 
objection to Singapore's reservalions on Sept. 25. 1996); CRC. adopted Nov. 20. 1989. 1936 U.N.T.S. 369 (Italy registered 
its objection to Singapore's reservations on Oct. 4. 1996); CRC. adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1946 U.N.T.S. 350 (Netherlands 
registered its objection to Singapore's reservations on Nov. 6. 1996); CRC. adopted Nov. 20, 1989. 1949 U.N.T.S. 387 
(Nonvay registered its objection to Singapore's reservalions on Nov. 29. 1996); CRC. adopted Nov. 20. 1989. 1948 U.N.T.S. 
433 (Finland registered its objection to Singapore's reservalions on Nov. 26. 1996); CRC. adopted Nov. 20. 1989. 1949 
U.N.T.S. 388 (Portugal registered its objection to Singapore's reservalions on Dec. 3. 1996). 
Emphasis added. 
" A global study presented lo the General Assembly recommends such prohibition: PAULO PINHEIRO. REPORT OF THE 
I N D E P E N D E N T E X P E R T FOR THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S S T U D Y ON V I O L E N C E A G A I N S T C H I L D R E N , 5 . ( 2 0 0 6 ) d e l i v e r e d l o t h e G e n e r a l 
Assembly. U.N. Doc. A/61/299 (Aug. 29, 2006), available at: blip;// www.violencesludy.org/IMG/pdf/English-2-2.pdf. 
See generally Michael Freeman. Upholding the Dignity and Best Interests of Children: International law and the Corporal 
Punishment of Children. 73 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 211. 250 (2010). For updated research, see Global 
Iniliative lo End All Corporal Punishment of Children homepage: hllp:// www.endcorporalpunishmenl.org/pages/frame.hlml 
(la.sl visited March 30, 2012) (listing twenly-five countries that have completely abolished corporal punishment). 
See for example Susan H. Bitensky, The Child's Right to Humane Discipline Under the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
the Child: The Mandate Against all Corporal Punishment of Children. 4 L.OYOLA POVERTY LAW JOURNAL 47 (1998). 
Vienna Convention on the Law ofTrealies. Article 31 (3) (b) May 23. 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
possibility do not even reflect kx ferenda. While all forms of corporal punishment of children is 
banned in only 25 states, corporal punishment of children by educators/teachcrs is banned in 90 
states." There seems to be a stronger argument to be made that the corporal punishment of 
children by educators has reached the level of kx ferenda, though not quite kx lata}'' ShmueH 
rightfully notes that this difference in the regulation of corporal punishment on the basis of who 
is administering the corporal punishment, rather than what is being administered seems 
strange: if it is the right of the child to enjoy dignity' and not be harmed bodily or 
emotionally, this should be a general right, irrespective of whether the person 
inflicting the punishment is a parent or a teacher. If the arguments in favour of 
mild corporal punishment as an effective and not-so-harmful way of educating 
are true, it is also open to question why mild corporal punishment should be 
prohibited in the educational system yet given license in the family sphere." 
As discussed in Chapter 7 the public - pnvate distinction remains strongly intact in the case of 
the child, offering a veil of impunity in the guise of a right to family privacy.*' Thus the conduct 
of parents is given less scrutiny as compared to the actions of other adults in relation to each 
other. Focus on 'who ' is acting as opposed to 'what' is being done, reflects the sustainment of 
parental power over the child, in support of the adult - child binaty-. It is curious that the CRC, 
which purports to address ' the exceptionally difficult conditions' of childhood and acknowledges 
" Elizabeth T. Gershoff. and Susan H. Bitensky. The Case Against Corporal Pimishmem of Children: Converging Evidence 
from Social Science Research and Inlernalional Human Rights Law and Implications for U.S. Public Policy. 13(4) 
PSYCHOLOGY PUBLIC P O L I C Y A N D L A W 2 3 1 , 2 3 2 ( 2 0 0 7 ) . 
' ' Despite tlie UN Committee on Economic. Social, and Cultural Rights assessments that: 1) 'Given the principle of the 
dignity of the individual that provides the foundation for international human rights law . . . and in the light of Article 10.11 
and 10.3 of the Covenant, the Committee recommends that the physical punishment of children in families be prohibited, m 
line with the recommendation of the Committee on Ihe Rights of the Child', and 2) 'corporal punishment is inconsistent with 
the fundamental guiding principle of international human rights law enshrined in the Preambles to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and both Covenants: the dignity of the individual. Other aspects of school discipline may also be 
inconsistent with human dignity, such as public humiliation. Nor should any form of discipline breach other rights under the 
Covenant such as the right to food'. Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. General Commern 13: The Right 
to Education (Art. 13). U.N. Doc. E/C.12/I999/I0 para. 41 (Dec. 8. 1999) and Comm. on Econ Soc. and 
Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. P 36. U.N. Doc. E/C.I2/ l /AddJ9 (June 5. 
2002). They made a similar recommendation to Malta in 2004. recommending thai Malta consider an explicn prohibition on 
corporal punishment within the family. Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. Concluding Observanons: 
Malta PP22 40 U N Doc E/C I2. l /Add.l0l (Dec. 14. 2004). See generally Upholdmg the Digmty 
and Best Interests of Children: International la»- and the Corporal Punishment of Children. 73 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 211. 231-232 (2010). . , 
" Benjamin Shmueli, Corporal Punishment in Educational Systems l ersus Corporal Pumshment by Parents: A 
C o m p a r a » v c (•/<?».. 7 3 L A W A N D C O N T E M P O R A R Y P R O B L E M S 2 8 3 ( 2 0 1 0 ) . ., ^ „ . ^ , ,TN</OO 
« Dana Pogach and Lior Barshak. Between Private and Public: Criminal Lawand theFamdy Following Cr. A. 4596m 
Anon V. State of Israel. 20 LEGAL STUD.ES 7. 14-15 (2003): Benjamin Shmueli. « hat Has ' 
Children s Rights^ A Case Study on a Ban on Corporal Punishment. 11 WISCONSIN WOMEN s LAW JOURNAL I " ^ 88 
(2007): 'Dana Pogach .summarizes her feminist critique regarding the need for lega L T o n to f 
members may lead to a revolution in basic concepts, similar to the revolution w^ieh took place m the status of 
women. Pogach expressly states the possibility of applying lessons leamed in the context » f ° P " ^ 
relationship because of the similarities between the two relationships. Parent-child relationships bo ^ 
of weak versus strong, mavbe even more so than relationships between men and w o m e n . ^ d i m ^ ft^ address the 
allocation of power within both society and the family from a perspective that is not necessarily gender-based . 
that 'the child needs special consideration . . . care and assistance',"' at the same time does not 
ban the physical assault of children. Indeed, no such discussion of whether corporal punishment 
should be banned took place during the drafting of the Convention."^ The Convention does not 
prohibit such assault within the context of the 'care' (private or public),"' and does not prohibit 
its usage in the context of the child's schooling."" Further, because the preservation of the family 
is so highly regarded (as discussed in Chapter 7 and mentioned above), the result is that children 
can experience physical assault to a much greater extent than would be legal for adults."^ For the 
category 'child', the administration of corporal punishment is always carried out by adults, acting 
on behalf of the state, or by parents. Such 'correction' is an effective reminder of one's place in 
the hierarchy of adult - child relationships, where a 'child' is left less able to resist 'justifiable' acts 
of assault."' Brownlie and Alderson argue that a legal prohibition of 'smacking' would prove 
insufficient, as there also e.xists a need for a societal shift in what is considered acceptable 
behaviour towards children."^ These authors argue that this societal shift would sideline care-
givers' views on the issue, and instead allow more explicit focus on the power imbalance between 
children and parents."" Such 'correction' plays a unique role in moulding the category child. 
Under current human rights standards, only the child may be disciplined outside of the criminal 
law context through corporal punishment. 
b. Incarceration 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the child is required to always be in 'care' according to the CRC, 
either in the 'care' of the child's parents or in the 'care' of the state. The CRC does not 
contemplate such 'care' as an undue deprivation of the child's liberty. This chapter queries 
whether such restrictions placed on the child through the requirement of 'care' could be 
considered a violation of the child's liberty. In the context of the CRC, such restrictions are 
rationalised on the basis of the CRC's vision of the child as 'devcloping/becoming' and thus in 
Preamble . 
See S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D A G U I D E T O THE ' T R A V A U X 
P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' . 4 5 8 - 4 7 8 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
" 'The Convent ion does address abuse of the chi ld by the chi ld ' ! ! parents in Ar t i e l c 19. but f a i l s to de f ine such abuse . See 
Chapter 7 where Art ic le 19 is d iscussed more fu l l y . 
" Art ic le 29. 
5 9 ' ^ 5 9 1 0 5 ^ 2 0 1 ^ 0 ) ' ' ' ' " ^ Discipline. 1 4 U . C . D A V I S J O U R N A L OF J U V E N I L E L A W & POLICY 
"' See Dana Pogach and Lior Barshak . BetM-een Private and Public: Criminal Law and the Familv. Following Cr A 4596/98 
Anon. V. Siaie of Israel. 2 0 L E G A L S T U D I E S 7 . 1 4 - 1 5 ( 2 0 0 3 ) . 
4 7 9 " « U 2 ( ) ( ) 6 ) ' ' B e y o n d Ami-Smacking Rethinking Parent-Child Relationship. 13(4) CHILDHOOD 
479" 4 8 M 2 0 0 I ) ' Anderson, Beyond Anti-Smacking Rethinking Parent-Child Relationship. 13 (4 ) CHILDHOOD 
need of govemance/'care'. Article 37(b) states that 'evety child shall not be depnved of his or 
her libert)- unlawfully or arbitrarily'. Notably unlike the ICCPR, the CRC does not include an 
explicit 'right to Hbert}' and security of person'."" Discussions during the drafting of Article 37 did 
not focus on whether the child has or should have the right to Ubertj'.^" Arguably, it could be 
assumed that the child has the right to liberty under other human rights conventions. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be confusion over how the CRC's provisions interact with other 
human rights documents.^' In placing boundaries around and prohibitions on the places that 
children may go, 'care' places a laundn- Hst of 'thou shall nots' on the child.^^ Generally, the right 
of parents to dictate and restrict the child's Hberty is widely acknowledged and accepted, largely 
based on the idea that parents are charged with the task of having responsibility for children, 
who are characterised by incapacin*. This was discussed in Chapter 5, 6, and 7. 
At issue here is the child's right to Hbcrt)' versus the parental rights to custody and care. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, the CRC requires the child to be in the 'care' of some adult at all times. 
Further, those adults are authorised to 'direct' and 'guide' the chUd' exercise of rights in the CRC. 
Chapter 7 argued that 'responsibility for' the child is an enactment of 'power over' the child. 
Assuming the child has a right to liberty-, at first glance, the parental right to place limits on 
where the child may go could amount to false imprisonment or a violation of the child's right to 
libert}- if that child was an adult. How is this restriction on the child's liberty, then, justified? 
The geographical boundaries placed on the children are often defined by parents' assessment of 
the child's safety." While parental actions that amount to abuse and neghgent treatment may be 
subject to state inter\'ention under Article 19, the CRC gives parents a large amount of discretion 
to regulate the child's space; with the exception that the state is obligated under Article 28 to 
require children to attend school. This scction will briefly examine two t\-pes of restrictions on 
the child's geographical boundaries: 1) home and 2) school. Prout contends that children move 
from one of tiiese 'islands' of childhood to another." In this way, the child's geographical 
" William A. Sdiabas and Helmut Sax. Arude J7: Prohibition of Torture. Death Penalty, l i f e Imprisonment, and Dcpnvalion 
of Liberty, in A C O M M E N T A R Y ON THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D , 3 9 - 4 0 (Andre Alen el al., 
eds., 2 0 0 6 ) ; S H A R O N D E T R I C K , T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES ' . 4 6 2 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
SHARON D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE T R A V A U X 
PREPARATIORES". 4 5 8 - 4 7 8 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . ^ . T „ 
" SHARON D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E TO THE T R A V A U X 
' C N G O U L D E R L ' d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K . F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 1 5 - 1 6 ( 2 0 0 9 ) : M I C H E L F O U C A U L T , T H E H I S T O R Y OF S E X U A L I T Y . 
VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION. 84 (Robert Hurley irans.. 1980). ^I- J R 
" Gill Valentine. "Oh Yes I Can. " "Oh No You Can 7 Children and Parents Understand,ngs ofK.ds Competence to 
Negotiate Public Space Safelv.29Am]PODE 65 0991). , , ^ . , r-„„ f 
« Alan Prout. ChiLn s Participation: Control and Self-Realisation in 
3 0 4 . 3 1 0 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . citing Gill Valentine. Angels and Devils: Moral Landscapes ofChtldhood. 1 4 E N V I R O N M E N T AND 
PLANNING: S O C I E T Y A N D S P A C E 5 8 1 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
boundaries arc restricted by parents outside of school and then by the state by mandator}- school 
attendance.^^ 
In an effort to agitate the CRC's dominant conception of 'care' and thus re-examine the child's 
right to libert}-, this section will explore some of the jurisprudence f rom the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR).^' The E C H R not only provides some interesting analogies beUveen die 
restrictions that the state places on private adults and those placed on children by the CRC, but 
also deals directly with the issue of parental restrictions on the child's Hbern-. The ECHR has 
found that Kberty covcrs the physical liberty of the pe r son , " and that liberty is a fundamental 
right in a democratic societ)'.^" T o demonstrate that the appHcant's right to liberty has been 
violated under Article 5 of the European Convention, an appHcant must establish both an 
objective and subjective element: 1) confinement in a particular restricted space for a not 
negligible length of time^' and 2) the detainee must not have vaHdly consented to the 
confinement in question.'" For the subjective element, the Court has found that confinement 
does not just include imprisonment, but that 'deprivation of liberty may . . . take numerous 
forms'/"' The Court 's determination of the threshold of what amounts to a deprivation of liberty-
provides particular insight into how the restrictions on the child's libert\- might be viewed as 
problematic. The Court states that when determining whether certain restrictions amount to a 
violation of a person's right to Uberty-, the Court must look at the 'degree and intensity' of the 
" It is noted that homcschooling would alter this analysis somewhat. Nonetheless, the fundamental argument is that the 
child, by being required to be in 'care' and/or 'at school' is always restricted physically. 
" See generally http://vvw w.echr.coe.int/echr/homepage. The F.CHR is the focus as it has dealt specifically with the issues to 
be discussed here in case law. The Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 08. High! to Liberty and Security of 
Persons, does not refer explicitly to the category 'child'. See ICCPK General Comment No. 8: Right to Liberty- and Security 
of Person (Art 9) 0(,mi m i . OnWne: 
hnp://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(sy mbol)/f4253fv572cd4700cl2563ed00483bec?0pendocument. General Comment No. 
17 of the Human Rights Committee recognizes "the right of every child, without any discrimination, to receive from his 
family, society and the State the protection required by his status as a minor" (para.l). The Committee then notes that the 
rights provided in Article 24 are not the only rights available to the child, but al times the ICCl'R gives children greater 
protection (e.g. death penally may not be imposed on minors). In other instances, the child is protected by greater 
restrictions, 'provided that such restriction is warranted - of a right recognized by the Covenant' (e.g. right to publicize a 
judgement in a criminal case), "from which an exception may be made when the interest of the minor so requires' (para. 2). 
Paragraph three notes that the measures to be adopted 'in light of the protection needs' of children' are for States to 
determine. Paragraph six slates thai proleclion of the child lays primarily on the family, until 'parents and Ihe family 
seriously fail m Iheir duties, ill-lreal or neglect the child'. Only then mav the stale intervene to restrict parental authority. 
See ICCPR General Comment No. 16: Rights of Ihe Child (Art. 2 j ' ;04/0l / l989. Available online' 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ccOfirec391478b7cl2563ed004b35e370pendocument. The combination 
reading of these two general comments by the Human Rights Committee supports the jurisprudence of the ECHR. as 
discussed in this section. Further, these general comments refiect the understandings found in the CRC of the child's 
•developing/becoming rationalizing 'protection/care'/govemance 
^^ Engel V Netherlands A 33 (1976): I EHRR 706 para 58 PC. 
Winten^erp v Netherlands A 33 (1979); 2 EHRR 387 para 37: Storck v Germany 2005-V: 43 EHRR 96 para 102. 
Storck V Germany 2005-V: 43 EHRR 96 para 74. ' 
® Storck V Germany 2005-V: 43 EHRR 96 para 74. 
" Gu^zardi v Italy A 39 (1980): 3 EHRR 33 para 95 PC. The applicant re.stricted to a remote island for 16 months. He could 
rnove about on the island and did have wife and child. He had to report twice daily and had a curfew. The Court found that 
the applicant s right to liberty under Article 5 had been violated. 
restrictions, with attention to the tj'pe, duration, effects, and implementation o f the restriction.'^ 
When considering 'degree and intensit)'' in Raimondo, the E C H R found that, while the applicant 
was subject to a curfew, had to notif j ' the police whenever he left his home, could not leave his 
home berween 9pm and 7am without a valid excuse, no violation o f the appHcant's Hbert}' had 
occurred." The Court reasoned that the appHcant was able to maintain a relatively normal daily 
balance between work and home.''* In Gu:^rdi , the applicant was restricted to a remote island 
for 16 months. He could move about on the island and his family was allowed to accompany 
him. He had to report twice daily and had a curfew. The Court found that given the 
geographical restriction to the island, the applicant's Hbert)- was sufficiently restricted. 
'Care' for the category 'child' is required under the CRC until the child reaches majorit}', which is 
either when the child reaches 18, unless otherwise specified under domestic law.'^ Further, 
schooling can be up to twelve years, for eight hours a day five to six days a week. The CRC's 
requirement to attend school at particular times o f the day places hmitations on the t\pes o f 
employment that the child may pursue (assuming the child is o f legal age to engage in 
employment). One could make analogy with the threshold set in Koaimotido and Gu^rdi to 
children whose 'normal daily balance' is dictated by a requirement to attend school and otherwise 
be subject to the discretion o f their parents. As Prout has argued, school and home become the 
islands o f childhood."'" What is considered 'normal' for a child's 'daily balance' is viewed as 
fundamentally different for adults. Because o f the 'nature' o f childhood, its \-ulnerability, its 
immaturit}^ parents and educators to large degrees dictate the child's libert)'. Valentine argues 
that being 'unable or unwilling to trust their children to manage their own safet}' in pubHc places 
most parents actively control and restnct their children's use o f space' ." It seems that it is 
vimially unquestionable that the CRC affords parents and the state the 'right' to regulate the 
geographical boundaries o f childhood, in ways that would be unimagmable for other (human) 
identity' categones. Put another way, the CRC enables parents and the state to heavily restnct the 
child's Hbert)', m ways that could amount to false impnsonment or mcarceration for other 
(human) identity categories. It seems that there is htde contention about whether the first 
" Guzzardi V haly A 39 ( 1 9 8 0 ) : 3 E U R R 33 p a r a 9 2 - 9 3 P C . 
Raimondo V Italy Kl%\m ( 1 9 9 4 ) : 18 E I I R R 2 3 7 pa ra 39. 
Raimondo y haly M%W\ ( 1 9 9 4 ) : 18 E H R R 2 3 7 pa ra 39. 
304, 310 (2000 ) , c i t ing Gi l l V a l e n t i n e . Angels and Devils: Moral Landscapes of Cluldhood. 14 ENVIRONMENT AND 
^ . g o L , 2 9 ANTtPODE 65 . 72 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . V a l e n t i n e a l so n o . e s , ha , p a r e n t s w, l l f o - M y s t ruc ture Ihe . r 
ch iUren-s t i m e to p'^evenl chHdren f r o m p l a y i n g in pub l i c s p a c e s w i th adul t - P ^ - ^ ™ 
Children or Time for Adulis^. in CHILDHOOD MATTERS: SOCIAL THEORY. PRACTICE AND POLITICS ( ( Jens Q v o r t r u o p et al. 
eds., 1994). 
element (objective clement: confinement in a particular restricted space for a not negligible 
length of time''*) would be met for restrictions placed on the categor)^ 'child', if applying the 
standards set for adults, particularlj' in light of the CRC requirement that children attend school 
and be in 'care'. 
The second element of a right to liberty' under the ECHR deals with capacity- (in odier words, 
mandating that the detainee must not have validly consented to the confmement in question). 
As with most discussions of children's rights, an analogy based on claims to adult capacity would 
be considered more controversial. The discussion remrns to the familiar questions of whether 
children possess 'capacit}-' and whether the child's alleged lack of capacit)' justifies such parental 
and state restrictions on the child's libert)'. Chapter 2 establishes the dominant perception that 
children lack capacit}'. As such, according to the CRC parents are authorised to exercise consent 
on the child's behalf Therefore, parental restrictions on the child's libert}- appear to fall within 
Article 5. Indeed, the ECHR has held that Article 5 was not intended to apply to parental 
restrictions on the child's right to libert)-, provided that such restrictions were imposed legally 
and for a 'proper purpose' ." Further, the ECHR gives specific exception to the right to libert}-
for 'the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational super\'ision'.™ The 
Court has found that parents have the right 'to decide where the child must reside and also 
impose, or authorise others to impose, various restrictions on the child's libert)'' in accordance 
with the right to family life under Article 8." In Neilsoti, the applicant's mother consented to the 
child's hospitalisation for the protection of the child's health, and not merely to keep the child 
away from his father. Thus Article 5 was not considered by the Court as the mother's decision 
was deemed a responsible exercise of her custodial rights in the interests of the child. The Court 
held that Article 8 provided a broad range of parental rights and responsibilities in regard to the 
care and custody of children. On the matter of the child's own views, the majorit)' considered 
that 'he was stiU of an age at which it would be normal for a decision to be made by the parent 
even against the wishes of the child'.^^ Fortin notes, given that the child was 12 years old, this 
reflects a 'peculiarly authoritarian view of the parental role ' ." Some argue that the rationale for 
the court's decision in Nielson is that there is an impHed limitation to the right to libert)- in Article 
Slorck V Germany 2005-V; 43 F.HRR 96 para 74. 
® D A V I D H A R R I S , L A W OF THE E U R O P E A N C O N V E N T I O N ON H U M A N R I G H T S , 1 2 7 - 1 2 9 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
European Convention on Human Rights Article 5( 1 )(d). 
'' Neitsen v Demark A 144 (1988); 11 EHRR 175 para 61 PC. 
^^ Neilsen v Demark A 144 (1988): 11 EHRR 175 para 72 PC. 
" J A N E F O R T I N . C H I L D R E N ' S R I G H T S AND THE D E V E L O P I N G L A W . 1 0 1 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
5 that follows from the conjunction of Article 5 and 8 (right to private and family life) as regards 
the 'responsible' exercise of parental rights in the interests of the child.'"' 
Nei/son reflects the basic principles found in the CRC. First, as discussed in Chapter 4, 6, and 7, 
parents are given 'responsibilit}- for' the child. As discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, the responsibility' 
given to parents over the child is justified in the CRC on the basis of the child's immaturit}'. This 
responsibility enables parents to make decisions on behalf of the child, including the setting of 
geographical boundaries for the child. Second, as was discussed in Chapter 7, parental rights are 
restrained by, as the ECHR calls it, 'proper purpose'. 'Proper purpose' is represented in the CRC 
as the best interests of the child. Further, according to Article 12 of the CRC, the voice of the 
child is included to the extent to which the child has demonstrated maturit}'. As a result, parents 
are granted a high degree of control over the geographical restrictions placed on the child (in 
other words, the child's libert\) under the CRC justified by the child's lack of maturity/legal 
capacit)', so long as those restrictions arc 'in the best interests of the chUd', as well as 'consistent 
with the evolving capacities of the child'. Notably, the evolving capacities principle only comes 
before the courts in matters that are deemed 'serious', such as medical treatment or birth 
control," not about, for example, curfews. Further, Article 19 only addresses abuse and neglect, 
not whether a child should be able to have greater geographical range. As such, the child's 
libert)' is largely dictated by parents, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the 
exceptionally vague and indeterminate 'best interests of the child' and 'evolving capacities of the 
child'. 
This thesis has sought to dislodge the truth that children are immature and therefore incapable, 
while at the same time querying why capacity, a heavily critiqued notion in the context of all 
other human rights discourses, is perceivcd as a precursor to children having autonomy rights, as 
weU as certain protection rights (in particular against their parents and against the state). Further, 
this thesis has, wherever relevant, compared children's rights and their justifications (for 
example, nght to 'care' because the child is biologicaUy immamre) with adult nghts and their 
justifications (for example, nght to equality because of social discrimination). Here, as an 
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interesting analogy, in a case before the ECHR involving the placement of a pensioner in a 
nursing home'. Judge Loucaides notes the dangers of applying a test that involves an assessment 
of the applicant's 'interests' as opposed to the applicant's wishes.^'' The majority found that 
placing the pensioner in a nursing home was not a violation of Article 5's right to Hbert)', as such 
a placement was in the interests of the pensioner; as the appHcant would now have access to 
necessary' healthcare and live in hygienic conditions. ' ' Judge Loucaidcs in his dissent notes the 
dangers in relying too heavily upon an 'interests' test (whether the action was intended to ser\'e 
the interests of the person concerned), because such a test could be abused by the state or 
'scheming relatives'. While Judge Loucaides' position has merit that this thesis has pointed to in 
the context of children's rights, one wonders whether Judge Loucaides would also fmd 
overemphasis on an 'interests' test problematic for a child. It seems that curtailing the child's 
liberty by parents and by state mandated education is roundly accepted. One wonders why these 
analogous dangers (the substitution of other interests m the name of the pensioner's interests) 
somehow do not apply to children (the substitution of other interests in the name of the best 
interests of the child). The ("RC is willing to assume that the best interest of the child wiU be the 
parents' basic concern. This is particularly curious when, as Valentine has pointed out, 
statistically children arc more at risk in the pri\-ate space from people they know than in the 
pubHc sphere.'" Finally, Harris et al. argues that 'certainly any trend whereby the scope or 
application of Article 5 is curtailed must be treated with great caution given the importance of 
the right to liberty.'" Such caution does not seem to apply to the categor)' 'child'. The child is 
not given a right to libert)- in the CRC and the child's Uberty is restricted in ways that would be 
unimaginable for other (human) identity categories. The 'child' is a kind of suspended subject 
who is 'becoming' an adult (in other words, developing) and thus needs governance (in other 
words, 'care' by adults) to do this successfully. Only then wiU she or he become a true (adult) 
subject with fuU rights and Liberties. 
This section has sought to argue that juridical power plays a greater role in regulating and 
governing the category 'child' under the CRC as compared to adults. Wliile some have argued 
that corporal punishment is oudawed under the CRC, no such expUcit ban can be found in the 
CRC, or inferred from the Travaux Preparaliores of the CRC. Further, given that states widely 
practice corporal punishment against children, there is no customarj- international law that would 
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suggest that the CRC should be interpreted in manner preventing corporal punishment. The 
restriction on the child's Hbert)' represents another form of juridical power that plays a greater 
role in regulatmg the categorj' 'child'. While many argue that such restrictions are 'necessar)'' 
because of the child's immamrity/incapacity and in light of certain parental rights, the 
foundations upon which these arguments rest become tenuous when one questions the child's 
alleged incapacity. Chapter 9 will further discuss the implications of such assumptions about 
children (as incapable) and parents (as always responsible and always acting in the child's best 
interests). 
II. DISCIPLINARY POWER IN THE CRC 
If identities are constructions or claims to 'truth', Foucault argues that such a fabricated 'reality' 
is produced by a specific technology of power: disciplinar)- power."" The primary' function of 
disciplinary' power is normalisation through the imposition of homogeneity. At the same time 
disciplinan' power individualises by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to 
fix specialties and to render the differences useful by measuring these difference to others.®' 
Control of behaviour, body, appearance and activities are all elements of what Foucault caUs a 
small penal mechanism and which he conceives as an integral part of all disciplinary systems."" 
As Foucault underlines, the minutest details of behavior are subject to normalising sanction, and 
all transgressions, all moves away from the rule, all forms of deviance can be singled out and 
penalised."' Foucault argues that '[t]he chief function of the disciplinan' power is to 'train', and 
sur\'eillance ser\'es as one of the primar)- instruments to achieve that purpose."" For Foucault, 
Jeremy Bentham's 'Panoptican' is emblematic of the functioning of disciplinar)' power: 'the 
major effect of the Panoptican is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility tiiat assures the automatic functioning of power'."' DiscipHnan- power is argued by 
Foucault to be more effective than juridical power because its power does not actuaUy need to be 
enforced. DiscipUnary power is automatic in that the mdividual subject to discipline assumes 
that the guard m the tower is watching and modifies his or her behaviour accordingly."' 
DiscipUnary power does not aim to pumsh subjects for their transgressions of a pre-given law. 
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but rather for failure to attain an evolving and immanent normalit)', to function in a manner 
deemed positive and productive." Foucault argues that 'the operation of disciplinar)' 
normalisation consists in trj ing to get people, movements, and actions to conform to (a] model, 
the normal being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that which is 
incapablc of conforming to the norm'."" A subject does not create or cause institutions, 
discourses, or practices, but laws (along with other discourses/institutions) create or cause the 
subject by determining the characteristics that a particular subject should (and should not) have."' 
a. Compulsory Education 
The CRC enables the exercise of discipHnar)' power through mandating compulsorj' (priman') 
education in Article 28(a) for all children. Education becomes a way in which the CRC's 
normative child is produced. School, a technologj' of disciplinar}- power, plays an important role 
in the disciplining of the child, aimed at achieving the reproduction of norms for childhood.'" 
School enables the disciplinan' gaze over the child, a constant measuring of the child's academic 
and behavioural performance. This section argues that the notion of disciplinan' power 
illustrates how children are turned into 'proper' students. Through the techniques of 
distribution, surv eillance, and assessment, children learn to comply with certain norms of what it 
means to be a child. 
Foucault maintains that in the 18"'' centun', with the introduction of a system of universal 
education, normalit}' as a means of coercion became characteristic of education." Children do 
not attend school merely to spend time there. While the requirement to attend school operates 
as a restriction on the child's right to libert}' discussed above, school also performs an important 
disciplinary- function. In this perspective, children are moulded into what is deemed appropriate 
for proper students and proper children. They learn certain behaviour, skills, competences that 
arc desirable and competences which are undesirable. The child's abilitj' to comply is rewarded 
and encouraged; the child's inabilitj' or unwillingness to comply is met with negative awards and 
thus discouraged. Robin Usher and Richard Edwards argue that the power of normalisation is 
that It appears to be neutral; and in such neutralit)' appears an objective procedure for 
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ascertaining inherent 'natural' capacities.'^ The sur\'cillance by adults of children is a mechanism 
that is inherent to teaching, and increases its eff iciency." Whilst under the gaze, the school child 
is enjoined to perform a homogenising norm; the specification of the discipUnar)- gaze actually 
practices a greater individuahsation of the subject of discipline. Foucault argues that 'instead of 
bending aU its subjects into a single uniform mass, [disciplinary' power] separates, analyses, 
differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient 
single units'.'" Individuals are turned into numbers and their relative distance from the norm is 
ranked hierarchically in the disciplinar\' regime. 
School is seen as a fundamental space for the child's development into adults.'^ According to 
the CRC, 'education of the child shall be directed to . . . the development of the child's 
personalit}', talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential'"' and 'the 
preparation of the chUd for responsible life in a free society''.'^ The task of education is 
understood as one of 'bringing out', of helping to realise one's potential, so that subjects become 
fully autonomous and capable of exercising their individual and intentional agency." Ian Hunter 
argues that 'state schooling made self-realisation into a central disciplinary objective'." The 
normative project of education consists in making children into proper students through 
inter\'ention and transformation."" Through constant and studied repetition these norms are 
intemalised by the student and manifested in her or his conduct."" According to Foucault, 
sun-eiUance is a tool for ensuring children's control over their own actions and their adherence to 
norms and regulations, as well as for reinforcing a hierarchical power structure in which children 
and adults are inscribed. A 'poUtical anatomy' defines how one may have a hold over others' 
bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one 
wishes, with the techniques, speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline 
produces subjected and practiced bodies, 'docile' bodies.'"" Disciplinar)- power operates on the 
level of the body, with die aim of using, transforming and improving it. Techniques of 
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discipKnan- power are used to construct obedient, constrained and self-controlled students, such 
as distribution, sun-eillance, assessment, comparison, ranking, and a number of means aimed at 
producing children's 'docile' bodies, m other words, good students. Foucault contends that 'the 
novice's perfection and merit ultimately consists in considering it a fault to do anydiing without 
having received an explicit order to do it'.'"' 
The CRC's norms of immarnritj- and development, discussed in Chapter 6, as well as 
dependency (on adult 'care'), discussed in Chapter 7, arc imposed on the body of the child 
through education. Educational practices are determined by specific conceptions of a child and 
childhood.'"" Further, Article 29 includes other norms that the child is to 'develop': 1) respect 
for human rights, 2) respcct for the child's parents, 3) respect for the child's cultural identity, 
language and values, 3) respect for the national values of the country in which the child is living, 
4) respect for the child's country from which she or he may originate, 5) respect for other 
civilisations different from the child's, 6) respect for the natural environment. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, these educational aims are thinly veiled code words that aim to discipline the subject 
by mandating what a proper child should be. I'ostering respect for this list may have less to do 
with developing the child's 'potential' and more to do with placing limits on the child in the 
name of 'respect'. Article 29 is a proscription about creating docile citizens. Further, requiring 
the child to leam unilateral respect for this Kst contributes to the child's submissive positioning 
relative to adults (parents and the state) in the CRC. Education becomes one of the means 
through which the CRC's normative child and thus status quo hierarchies of power are 
reproduced. 
b. Mandatory Care 
School IS not the only place where children are subject to disciplinary power. The child too is 
subject to it at home, or in 'care'. Some acadcmics argue that children have been increasingly 
domesticated over die course of the past two cenniries.'"^ Whether this is accurate for all 
children, it is argued by some that there has at least been an increase in the belief that the home 
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is where childhood should occur.""^ As discussed in Chapter 7, this sentiment is reflected in the 
CRC, whereby the CRC makes 'care' mandatory for childhood under the CRC. Chapter 7 
argued that the 'care' proposed by the CRC is firsdy and preferably in a family, defined as a 
parent in a hierarchical position over the child. If family-care is not available or is grossly 
insufficient, the state is obligated to provide 'care' under Article 3. As such, this section argues 
that the CRC's 'child', who is always in the 'care' of some adult, is also always under the 
disciplinary gaze of a parent. Shmueli and Prigat argue that 'monitoring has become associated 
with good parenting, and the sur\'eillance of children has been framed in a language of safety, 
protection, and care'."" These authors argue that today's children are the 'most watched over' 
generation in recent memory and that the monitoring of children has bccome a 'central 
characteristic of modern childhood'.'"" Charlene Elliot argues that sun'eiUance has become a 
technique of care,"" where the body of the child 'needs' to be mapped, monitored, and 
controlled."" While Elliot focuses on the 'obese child', her arguments can be applied to other 
'problems' identified for children. 
Certainly one of the most persuasive 'problems' of childhood, is the child at risk. The child 
alone is considered to be dangerous and inherently associated with risk. '" Often pedophiles, 
child pornographers, commercial predators, drugs and alcohol are identified as the dangers 
children and childhood face. Allowing children free time and/or time in public spaces without 
parental supervision is deemed as creating a safety risk."^ Valentine argues that despite the fact 
that statistically children are more at risk in private space from people they know, children are 
constructed as 'vulnerable' and 'innocent' in pubHc spaces. '" Valentine points out how the 
'stranger-danger' discourse heightens parents' awareness of risks to children in pubUc spaces. 
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Valentine, quoting Katz, refers to this as 'terror talk': 'terrorizing contentions concerning 
violence against children in the public arena - from abductions and molestations to armed 
assaults and murders - weigh heavily on the public imagination' . '" As such, children must be 
sequestered in the home, subject to parental supervision/sur\'eillance. Prout argues that since 
1970s there has been a sequestering of children in the family and a decline in children's 
autonomous movement m the neighbourhood."^ Prout argues that these trends have had a 
double cffect. First, children are excluded from public space, where they were seen increasingly 
as 'out of place', and as a result are subject to greater regulation and control ." ' Second, special 
locations that concentrate groups of children together for activities under adult sun'eiUance have 
proliferated.'" As such, Prout contends that children move from one 'island' of childhood to 
another, enabling the space of childhood to be more specialised."" In this way, the adult charged 
with responsibiht}' for (in other words, over) the child ensures that the child is correctly 
performing her or his role as a child (which includes proper gender, sexual orientation, class, 
race, and so on). Similar to the CRC's requirement for education, 'care' too becomes a means 
through which the CRC's normative cliild and thus status quo hierarchies of power are 
reproduced. The 'natural' family structure'" and the 'compulsory'' school'^" are two of the 
foremost devices in the CRC for moulding the category- child. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Prout argues that in a world that is perceived as shifting, complex, and uncertain, the child may 
operate as a vessel or repository for nostalgic longings for stabilit}' and certainty' or a figure with 
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CHRIS JENKS, CHILDHOOD, 77 (2005) . As Foucault suggests, what has emerged ' into prominence is the family considered 
as an element mtemal to population, and as a fundamental instrument in its government ' . See David Cowan and Nick 
Dearden. The Mtnor as (a) Subject: the Case of Housing Law. in LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD. 99 (Julia Fionda ed.. 
redemptive possibility.'"^ As children arc seen as 'unfinished' or 'developing', Prout contends 
that children appear as a good target for controlling the future, or at least a target that still retains 
wide social credibility'.'^' The health, welfare, and rearing of children have been linked to the 
destiny of the state.'^"* The child then becomes the focus of numerous projects that purport to 
safeguard the 'child' from physical, sexual, and moral danger, to ensure the child's 'normal' 
development.'^^ As such, it is argued that childhood has become the most intensively governed 
identity categoty'.'^' The way in which 'we' treat 'our' children becomes indicative of the state of 
our social structure, a measure of our achievement of civilisation.'^' These beliefs inform the 
'need' to increase control, socialise, and constrain children.'"" As John O'Neill writes, 
[w]e are compelled to care about the well-being and prospects of other peoples' 
children as a condition of preser\'ing our nationhood . . . [A] call to recast the 
ground of public discourse on the collective status of children . . . to recover . . . 
traditions of common intent essential to sustain our nationhood into the next 
129 century. 
In drafting the 1924 Geneva Declaration, J ebb argued that, 
[i]f [children] arc allowed to grow up smnted or neglected or strangers to moral 
values, or are ignore in their misen' by the more formnate, they will inevitably 
grow up to hate and destroy, and tomorrow's world can only end up in disaster, 
politically and economically."" 
As such, education and 'care', and even corporal punishment will emancipate 'the whole of 
humanity from ignorance, poverty, backwardness, despotism . . . [and] produce enUghtencd 
citizens, masters of their own destiny'."' Notably, while participation and equahty for other 
special (adult) human rights identities will enable the progress of society (as discussed in Chapter 
4), sequestering, 'spanking', teaching and watching children wM enable the progress of society. 
'"Alan Proul, Children's ParUcipation: Control and Self-Realisation in British Late Modernity. 14(4) C H I L D R E N & S O C I E T Y 
' ° AtofproTcA/W/-™ I Participation: Control and Self-Realisation in British Late Modernity. 1 4 ( 4 ) C H I L D R E N & S O C I E T Y 
' ° C H R B S ; C H I L D H O O D . 6 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . q u o l i n g N I K O L A S R O S E . G O V E R N I N G THE S O U L : T H E S H A P I N G OF THE P R I V A T E S E L F . 
1 2 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) 
C H R I S J E N K S , C H I L D H O O D . 6 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . q u o l i n g N I K O L A S R O S E . G O V E R N I N G THE S O U L : T H E SH APING OF THE P R I V A T E S E L F , 
1 2 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) 
C H R I S J E N K S . C H I L D H O O D . 6 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . q u o t i n g N I K O L A S R O S E . G O V E R N I N G THE S O U L : T H E SH APING OF THE P R I V A T E S E L F , 
1 2 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . 
C H R I S J E N K S . C H I L D H O O D . 6 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
C H R I S J E N K S . C H I L D H O O D , 6 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
JOHN O ' N E I L L . T H E M I S S I N G C H I L D IN L I B E R A L T H E O R Y , v i i - x ( 1 9 9 4 ) . LO-; 
Y V E S B E I G B E D E R . T H E R O L E A N D S T A T U S OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L H U M A N I T A R I A N V O L U N T E E R S A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N S , 1 9 5 
( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
' " R o b i n U s h e r a n d R i c h a r d E d w a r d s . P O S T M O D E R N I S M A N D E D U C A T I O N . 2 4 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
Children bccome a conduit through which nationhood is prcser\'ed and sustained. More 
accuratcly, the disciplining or ensuring of the 'normal' developing of children by adults is one of 
the foremost devices in how the current liierarchies of power arc sustained. Without the control 
of cluldren, how would proper gender, class, and sexuaHty be reproduced? Without the 
regulation of childhood, how would strucmres of power be sustained? How else would 
'respectful' citizens be made? In a sense, controlling childhood becomes controlling the future. 
The regulation of childhood is the regulation of the future, where status quo hierarchical 
relationships are maintained."^ 
The two 'truths' that this thesis has identified in the Convention are 1) the child-as-developing 
and 2) the chUd-as-within-a-specific-family-context (in other words, where adults are positioned 
over children). This thesis went on to discuss the implications of these two 'truths': how these 
truths operate in the Convention and what these truths make possible (a vastly different bundle 
of rights for those who are identified as children). As discussed in Chapter 3 and 5, these 'truths' 
masquerade as neutral descriptions of subjects (objective statements about what the child 
fundamentally is), opposed to prescriptions (political statements about what the child should be). 
Butler argues that identit)' categories are not the cause or basis, but rather the effects of institutions, 
practices discourses, with multiple and diffused points of origin.'" These 'truths' ser\'e the basis 
for activities that are directed at moulding the subject. According to a Foucauldian critique, the 
developmental and thus requirement of 'care' and education framework in the CRC operates as a 
regime of 'truth' or a system of beliefs and procedures used to construct a norm and the normal 
for childhood. As discussed in Chapter 3, these norms govern behavior and thinking, and work 
to exclude certain ways of acting or being. Alternative 'truths' are marginalized, diversitj' is 
reduced to abnormalit)'. The dcvelopmental/'care'/education framework determines who and 
what a child is, and which children and what concerns will be disregarded. Establishing the truth 
about children also means specifically that certain children's needs are taken into consideration 
while others are disregarded. 
Chapters 1, 3, and 5, argue that the categor\- 'child' is neither 'normal' nor 'natural', but instead 
always moral and political."'' As such, while the CRC claims to merely represent the universal 
childhood, the CRC instead produces that which the CRC has labelled the 'true' childhood. 
Vulnerability and dependency are made 'real' through the CRC. The CRC's exercise of 
LEE EDELMAN, N o FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE. (2005). Ede lman d i scusses this idea of conlrolling 
the presenl through a v iew to the future, specif ical ly with the ' ch i ld ' as the cenlral figure. 
JUDITH B U T L E R . G E N D E R T R O U B L E , v i i i - i x ( 1 9 9 0 ) . O r i g i n a l e m p h a s i s . 
" " C H R I S J E N K S . C H I L D H O O D ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
disciplinan- and juridical power ultimately produces that which it claims to merely represent. '" 
The CRC not only produces the subject, but further conceals its productive namre to legitimate 
the law's own regulator}' hegemony.'"' Hence, 'the universal child' did not create or cause the 
CRC: its institutions, discourses, or practices. The CRC creates or causes the child by 
determining the characteristics that a particular subject should (and should not ) . ' " Simply put, 
the subject is an effcct of institutions, discourses, or practices, not the cause. The docUe body is 
achieved through the production and enforcement of the normative child. The so-called 'rights 
of the chUd' represents the effects of particular power relations. The production of the 'child' is 
based on chronological age, the maker of differentiation that is imbued with distinctive qualities 
of capacit)' and maturit\- that then allows the structural production of the categories 'adult' and 
'child' and legal-social categories. In the domains of political and Hnguisric representation, the 
qualifications for being a ccrtain subject must furst be met before representation can be extended. 
To quaHfj' for the rights under the CRC, the child must be 1) developing and 2) in 'care'. 
Corporal punishment, 'care', and mandatory education become techniques of both juridical and 
disciplinary' power. Can these 'truths' be contradicted and should they be? If these foundational 
Truths, upon which the C,RC rests, are contradicted as merely claims-to-truth, how does the CRC 
justify the bundle of rights allocated to those nominated a 'child'? This thesis argues that the 
'claims-to-truth', upon which the CRC depends, require questioning, particularly given the 
fundamental nature of so-called human rights. The question that remains is how to desolidif)-
these 'truths' found in the CRC. 
Foucault and Buder both utilise the technique of genealogy', which investigates local, 
discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a universal 'truth'.*'"' 
The technique of genealogy is based on the desire to escape from the pen asive features of 
orthodox history, such as assumptions of linearity, teleology, evolution. '" Simply put, the aim is 
to disturb the obviousness of presendy 'understood' knowledges.""' Foucault described his 
method as an effort 'to question over and over again what is posmlated as self-evident, to disnirb 
people's mental habits'."" The second important element to the use of genealog)' is to desolidif)' 
S A R A S A L I H . J U D I T H B U T L E K . 1 0 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E . 5 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
' " S A R A S A L I H . J U D I T H B U T L E R , 1 0 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . 
B E N G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K . F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 3 2 ( 2 0 0 9 ) : JUDITH B U T L E R , GENDER T R O U B L E . 4 4 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
B A R R Y S M A R T . F O U C A U L T . M A R X I S M , A N D C R I T I Q U E . 7 5 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . 
M I C H E L F O U C A U L T . Q U E S T I O N S OF M E T H O D : A N INTERVIEW WITH M I C H E L F O U C A U L T . IDEOLOGY AND C O N S C I O U S N E S S . 6 
(1981 )• -it wa.sn'1 a s a mai le r of course thai mad people came to be regarded as menia l ly i l l : it wasn ' t self-evident that the 
only thing to be done with a cr iminal was to lock him up; it wasn ' t self-evident that the causes of i l lness were to be .sought 
through the individual examinat ion of bodies ' . 
M I C H E L F O U C A U L T , P O L I T I C S . P H I L O S O P H Y , C U L T U R E : I N T E R V I E W S A N D O T H E R W R I T I N G S 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 4 . 2 6 5 ( A l a n S h e r i d a n 
trans. Laurance Kritzman ed.. 1988). 
or deconstruct an identity' by enquiring how in this case, the child, has become so widely 
accepted as an ontological given.'"^ Believing that certain political stakes are served in the 
construction of identit)', one must consider what configuration of power constructs exist, and 
therefore what forms of power restrain and regulate the subject. Chapter 9 furthers this 
investigation. 
JUDITH B U T L E R , G E N D E R T R O U B L E , 3 - 4 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
CHAPTER 9 
A GENEALOGY OF THE CRC 
OUTLINE 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM CRITIQUES OF THE CRC AS EXCLUDING 
THE NON-WESTERN CHILD 
II. NORTH-SOUTH-EAST-WEST: THE EXPULSION OF CERTAIN 
CHILDHOODS FROM THE CRC 
a. Child as Head of the Household: The Fictitious Responsible Parent -
Irresponsible Child 
i. Parents with Substance Abuse Problems 
ii. Parents with HIV/AIDS 
iii. Street Children 
b. Girl-Child: Gender-Neutrality and The CRC's Performance of the Family 
& Culture as Happy and Safe 
i. Debating the Efficacy of the CRC's Gender-Neutral 
Language 
ii. Does the CRC Adequately Protect the Girl-Child from Inter-
Family/Inter-Cultural Discrimination 
iii. Application to the Developed World Girl-Child 
III. CONCLUSION 
The CRC's performance of childhood is exclusionar\-.' The CRC embraces a particular version 
of childhood and in doing so stigmatises childhoods that do not live up to the CRC's normative 
framework, vi'hilc also ignoring certain problems of the childhoods that do. F.lsbeth Robson 
maintains that. 
while acknowledging that conceptualising childhood is problematic, there needs 
to be less emphasis on northern myths of childhood as a time of play and 
innocence and more attention on defending children's rights to work as well as 
to be supported in their work under appropriate circumstances.^ 
Ennew contends that. 
[t]he [CRC] was drafted with a particular t) pe of childhood in mind, and treats 
chrldren outside this model as marginal. The means that children's right as a 
concept within the human rights field does not fully engage with the whole range 
of human beings who are defined as children. A number of articles target 
children - such as street children - for particular attention, with respect to child 
labour and sexual exploitation for example - but this in itself can be seen as a 
marginalising process. These and other articles may be ambiguous or 
contradicton' in the face of the real experiences of these children. 
Olga Nieuwenhuys maintains that, 'perhaps the greatest injustice done to children is claiming 
ownership over what childhood is or ought to be'." These quotations hint at the ways in which 
the CRC's performance of childhood results in marginalisation. Chapter 6 and 7 discussed the 
norms of childhood in the CRC, and the current chapter endeavours to explore how a varietj- of 
childhoods are marginalised by the CRC's normative framework. Chapter 3 engaged the 
theoretical works of Foucault and Buder, arguing that 'objective truths' are impossible. Instead, 
Chapter 3 argued that there are dominant 'knowledges' cemented by modalities of governance. 
Methodologically, this chapter aims to engage in a (limited) genealogy of the CRC. The 
genealogical approach is useful as a means to question dominant 'knowledges', and the means by 
which they became dominant. The genealogical approach enables the challenging of so called 
'objective facts'. As discussed in Chapter 3, Foucault and Buder both employ the technique of 
gencalog)', which examines 'local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the 
' While it may be argued thai some of the issues of exclusion would be resolved if one were to look to the C R C ' s Commit tee 
and how it has interpreted the text of the Convent ion. See for example Harris-Short. S. ( 2 0 0 3 ) -Intemalional Human Rights 
L a w Imperialist Inept and Ineffect ive? Cuhural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child" 25 HUMAN 
RIGHTS QUARTERLY 130. Nonetheless , the thesis primarily considers the construction of the child in the text of the C R C . 
Steering clear of the soft- law versus hard-law debate, given the importance place on the text of the CRC. the thesis limits its 
focus primarily to the text of the Convention. 
' Elsbeth Robson Hidden Child Workers: Young Carers in Zimbabwe. 3 6 ( 2 ) ANTIPODE 227, 227 ( 2004 ) . 
' J ud i th Ennew. Ouiside Childhood: Street Children's Rights, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE 
POLICY AND PRACTICE. 2 1 3 ( B o b F r a n k l i n ed . . 1995) . 
" O l g a N i e u w e n h u y s , Editorial: Is There an Indian Childhood. 16 CHILDHOOD 147. 151 ( 2009 ) . 
claims of a universal 'trutli'.^ Simply put, the aim of a genealogy' is to disturb the obviousness of 
presently 'understood' knowledges/' Foucault described his method as an effort 'to question 
over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people's mental habits.' ' This 
chapter seeks to question 'over and over again' the CRC's self-evident, essential, and universal 
child, as 'developing' and thus in need of 'care'. Believing that certain political interests are 
ser\-ed in the construction of identity, this chapter then considers what configuration of power 
constructs exists, and what forms of power restrain and regulate the subject. 
This chapter furthers the argument that the Convention protects the child and her/his rights 
only to the extent that those rights and that protection do not rupture the adult-child binarj', and 
thus do not undermine the hierarchy of power described in Chapter 7, where adults are 
positioned over the child. By calling into question the 'essence' of the identity 'child' put forth as 
'truth' thorough a genealogy, one is able to investigate the powers that are ser\-ed in a particular 
'truth'. Part I explores literature that critiques the CRC as being exclusionary of children in the 
global south. Importantly, Part I argues that those same critiques can be deployed and are just as 
appHcablc to the both 'western' and 'non-western' world. Part II focuses on two excluded 
childhoods: 1) the child as head of the household, and 2) the girl-cliild. Through examination of 
the child who is head of the household. Part 11(a) agitates the 'truth' that children are 
irresponsible and adults arc responsible. Part 11(b) critically examines the family and one's 
culture as a 'happy' and 'safe' environment by examining the ways in which the girl-child is 
excluded from (or put below the priorities of family and culture in) the Convention. As a whole, 
this chapter argues that in universaHsing the child and thus sustaining certain power relations in 
the construction of this fictitious category 'child', the CRC expels certain childhoods from the 
international human rights discourse. 
I. LESSONS LEARNED FROM CRITIQUES OF THE CRC AS EXCLUDING 
THE NON-WESTERN CHILD 
The critique that the CRC is in essence 'western' can be distilled into two main arguments. First, 
some have argued that the notion of rights, including children's rights, is based upon western 
notions of 'libert)'.* While this viewpoint has been critiqued as un-nuanced and over reliant on 
' B E N G O U L D E R a n d PETER F I T Z P A T R I C K , F O U C A U L T ' S L A W . 3 2 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
' B E N G O U L D E R a n d P E T E R F I T Z P A T R I C K , F O U C A U L T ' S L A W , 1 1 9 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
' M I C H E L F O U C A U L T . P O L I T I C S , P H I L O S O P H Y , C U L T U R E : I N T E R V I E W S A N D O T H E R W R I T I N G S 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 4 , 2 6 5 ( A l a n S h e r i d a n 
trans, l.aurance Kritzman ed., 1988). 
See for example Maria Grahn-Farley, Neutral Law and Eurocentric Lawmaking: A Poslcolonial Analysis of the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 3 4 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I ( 2 0 0 8 ) , 
the western - non-western binaries,' this chapter docs not focus on the issue of rights as 
'western'.'" This section will instead focus on a second argument: the CRC's conception of or 
vision for childhood is western. Numerous academics have critiqued the CRC's universaHsation 
of the category' 'child' on the basis that the CRC's 'universal' child is a western conccption of 
childhood." Rnnew has argued that 'in the drafting process, the resulting text and in its 
implementation, [the CRC] takes as its starting point Western modern childhood, which has been 
' See for example John Tobin. Increasingly Seen and Heard: the Conslitulional Recognition of Children I Rights. 21 SOUTH 
AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 86 (2005); John Tobin. Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human 
Rights Treaty Interpretation. 2 3 HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 1 ( 2 0 1 0 ) 
See for example John Tobin. Increasingly Seen and Heard: the Constitutional Recognition of Children's Rights. 2\ SOUTH 
AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 85.92-93 (2005). Tobin notes that "despite its alleged western bias, it still remains the 
most ratified international human rights treaty. Moreover the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990. 
while recognising the duties as well as the rights of a child, largely mirrors, and in some cases extends the rights under the 
Convention.. . The point to be made, therefore, is that the recognition of children as rights bearers is not itself a concept that 
is either foreign to or necessarily inappropriate for developing or transitional states. It therefore remains an issue but not an 
insurmountable obstacle to the transformation of international standards into national constitutions". 
" For examples of academics who critique the CRC for being exclusionary see generally Erica Burman. Local. Global or 
Globalised? Child Development and International Child Rights Legislation 3 CHILDHOOD 45. 45-66 (1992); Olga 
Nieuwenhuys. Editorial: Is There an Indian Childhood. 15 CHILDHOOD 147. 147-153 (2009); Vanessa Pupavac. 
Misanthropy IVithout Borders: The International Children's Rights Regime. 25(2) DISASTERS 95. 95-112 (2001); Annette 
Ruth Appell. Child-Centred Jurisprudence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Exploring the Connections and Tensions. 45 
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 703. 703 (2009) (speaking about how childhood in the United States is based on a Western 
conception of childhood, and arguing that the CRC largely matches such a conception); Sonia Harris-Short. International 
Human Rights Law: Imperialist. Inept and Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 25 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 130. 130 (2003) (based on an empirical student of the discussion of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, argues that the Convention is still subject to cultural imperialism); John Tobin. Increasingly Seen 
and Heard: the Constitutional Recognition of Children S Rights. 21 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 8 6 . 8 6 
(2005) (discussing the ways that the CRC and the children's rights paradigm is in some ways western, but in other ways 
not); Sonia Harris-Short. Listening to "the Other": The Convention on the Rights of the Child. 2 MELBOURNE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 304. 334 (2001) (argues that the Committee has "with only very limited exceptions, presented 
non-Western cultural values and practices in an entirely negative light"); Paolo G. Carozza. From Conquest to Constitutions: 
Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights. 25(2) HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 281. 31 1 (2003); 
PHILIP ALSTON. The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights, in THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD; RECONCILING CULTURE AND 1 IUMAN RIGHTS ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; J u d i t h E n n e w . O u t s i d e C h i l d h o o d ; S t r e e t 
C h i l d r e n ' s R i g h t s , in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS; COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE ( B o b F r a n k l i n e d . . 
1995); John Tobin. Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty Interpretation. 23 HARVARD 
HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 1. 1 -50 (2010) (discussing this issue in relation to both human rights generally and the CRC 
specincally)- Michael Freeman. The Future of Children S Rights. 14 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 277, 282 (2000); Jo Boyden. 
Childhood and the Policymakers: A Comparative Perspective in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD; 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD. 144 ( A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d A l a n P r o u t e d s . . 1 9 9 7 ) ; J o 
Boyden. Children's Experience of Conflict Related Emergencies: Some Implications for Relief Policy and Practice. 18(3) 
DISASTERS 254. 255 (1994); Maria Grahn-Farley. Neutral Law and Eurocentric Lawmaking: A Postcolomal Analysts of the 
U.N Convention on the Rights of the Child. 3 4 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1. 1 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ( " T h e c o l o n i a l 
legacy of international law is not simply a matter of inclusion or exclusion. Nor is it only a matter of neutrality or non-
neutrality Even though the CRC was drafted, adopted, and ratified with the possibility of the inclusion and involvement ot 
almost e'very country in the world, the colonial structure is still present, not in the substantive legal outcorne but in the 
legislative process i tself . ) ; Frances E. Olsen. Children's Rights: Some Femtnist Approaches totheUmtedhattons 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON LAW AND THE FAMILY 192, 2 1 5 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ( T h e c o n c e r n s 
of p o T r o d e m feminism ttat bear most closely on the Convention on the Rights of the Child include the whole notion of a 
universal document to deal with all children, throughout the world; the concern that such an effort will almost inevitably 
result in a western oriented document that merely purports to be universal'^); R ^ STAINTON ROGERS and WENDY STAINTON 
ROGERS. STORIES OF CHILDHOOD; SHIFTING AGENDAS OF CHILD CONCERN. 51 ( 992),- M i c h a e l F r e e m a n The Sociology of 
Childhood and Chtldren s Rights. 6 ( 4 ) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN S RIGHTS 4 3 3 . 4 3 3 - 4 4 4 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; B e r y M a y a l l . 
The Sociolo^ of Childhood in Relation to Children S Rights. 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CHILDREN s RIGHTS 243. 243-
25 « T o l ? d e f and the Poltcy Makers: A Comparat.ve PerspecUve on the Globalisation of Childhood in 
CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD; CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOT^OGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD 
(Allison James and Alan Prout eds.. 1997); CHRIS JENKS, CHILDHOOD (2005); Norma Fields. The Child as Labourer and 
Col.Zer The Diiauoearance of Childhood in Contemporary Japan, in CHILDREN AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE (Sharon 
LTphens ed.. 1995); MARTIN WOODHEAD. Psychology and the Cultural Construction of "Children S Needs in GROWING 
U P IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
'globalised' first through colonialism and then through imperialism of international aid'.'" One 
of the fundamental assumptions made in the CRC is that childhood is a universal state of 
development." As such the CRC assumes that there is a model of childhood that is universally 
applicable, that there are universal needs, and that there is consensus both domestically and 
internationally on how to realise those needs." Pupavac argues that the CRC assumes that there 
is a model of childhood development that is umversally applicable.'^ Chapter 6 supported this 
assertion by exploring the ways in which the dominant 'knowledge' of the 'child-as-developing' is 
foundational to the CRC construcdon of childhood. Further, Chapter 7 discussed that die 
'truth' of children as developing rationalises the developing child's dependency on adults." As 
discussed in both Chapters 6 and 7, by constructing the child as immature the CRC enables two 
further constructions: 1) the child-as-developing, and 2) the child is in need of (adult) 'care'. 
First, As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, it has been argued that childhood studies (and its 
recognition of childhood as a social construct) in the west has been hindered by the formidable 
power of disciplinary strongholds, in particular developmental psychology, that monopolise and 
solidif\' their 'irrefutable truths' about childhood by presenting them as natural 'facts ' ." MayaU 
has argued that 'the child development industry has cornered the market in knowledge about 
children'." As argued in Chapters 4 and 6, the CRC does not recognise the category 'child' as a 
social construct. Instead, the CRC universaHses the 'child-as-developing'. As such, the CRC 
further naturalises the western conception of childhood as a period of development, by 
institutionalising this particular and western version of childhood in an international human 
rights convention." As discussed in Chapter 3, the law, here the CRC, facilitates the operation 
J u d i t h E n n e w . Outside Childhood: Street Children's Rights, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE 
POLICY AND PRACTICE. 2 0 2 ( B o b F r a n k l i n e d . . 1 9 9 5 ) . 
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must be ' . 
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RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: C O N T E M P O R A R Y I S S U E S IN THE S O C I O L O G I C A L S T U D Y OF C H I L D H O O D ( A l l i s o n J a m e s a n d A l a n 
of knowledges, m other words, childhood development, enabling the further deployment of 
'truth' of childhood as a period of development and thus a period of unique dependency.^" 
Burman argues that the naturalisation of particular norms occurs through treating 'expertise' 
(what has been referred to here as 'knowledges'), such a developmental psychology', as culturally 
neutral (what has been referred to here as objective or apolitical). Burman contends that 
international policy (grounded in development psycholog}'), which informs rights of the child 
discourse, is in fact highly political. The move from the naturalisation of childhood as a state of 
development (the dominant expertise or knowledge about childhood) to the globalisation of that 
development follows almost imperceptibly.^' Notably, the 'child-as-developing' was made the 
universal norm for childhood in the CRC; yet there was no discussion of this concept anywhere 
in the negotiations that led to the CRC.^^ Quite possibly, childhood, as a period of development, 
was too obvious a 'truth' to necessitate discussion. 
Second, in constructing the child as immarnre and 'developing,^' the CRC largely envisions the 
child as lacking capacit)'/agency. Nieuwenhuys argues that despite decades of childhood smdies 
noting that children are neither merely objects nor victims, dominant western disciplines have 
effectively ignored the idea that children may also be active agents.^" The CRC envisions the 
child as primarily an object/victim.^^ Chapter 6 explored the ways in which the child is made 
dependant on adults and the family for the realisation of certain rights, as the immaturit}' of 
childhood at the ver\' least dictates guidance from adults in the exercise of the child's right, and 
at most requires total reHnquishment of certain rights. Chapter 4 examined the instances where 
the CRC privileged the protection of child, not through empowering children but radier by 
making the child an object of 'care' (m other words, empowering an adult to act on their behalf). 
For example, the Preamble's defimtion of chUdhood as a rime for 'happiness, love and 
Prout eds . . 1997) : V a n e s s a Pupavac . Misanlhropy Without Borders: The International Children s Rights Regime. 2 5 ( 2 ) 
DISASTERS 9 5 . 101 ( 2 0 0 1 ) . 
BEN GOULDER a n d PETER FITZPATRICK. FOUCAULT'S LAW. 2 7 - 2 8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . T h e a u t h o r s g o to g r e a t l e n g t h to a r g u e , in 
response to Hunt and W i c k h a m that the l aw . accord ing to Foucaul t . ac tua l l y does not recede mto unimportance m m o d e m t y . 
Erica Burman . LoeaL Global or Globalised? Child Development and International Child Rights Leg,slat,on 3 CHILDHOOD 
^ " • ^ s T e g e m m l l y S H A R O N D E T R I C K . T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S C O N V E N T I O N ON THE R I G H T S OF THE C H I L D . A G U I D E T O THE 
T R A V A U X P R E P A R A T I O R E S ' ( 1 9 9 2 ) . • T V A U X P E P R A T I O R E S ' ( 1 9 9 2 ) . . . . u U I J K f k - I k . r l 
' ' See Chapters 4. 5. 6 and 7 for further d iscuss ion . The Preamble 'bears in mind . . . the chi ld, by reason of his |or her ] 
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care ' . , u ^ , . 
' O g a N i e u w e n h u y s , Ed„or,al: Is There an Indian CMldhood. 16 CHILDHOOD 147 152 (2009 ) . In her final sentence. 
N i e u w e n h u y s par t ic ipates in perpetuat ing this v ic t im-objec t menta l i ty by stat ing. ;h>;^openmg o u r . . . own histor ies and 
cu t u r w r c a n learn from India how to rescue our eh,ldren from m o d e m chi ldhood . Her final words of the art ic le 
Ta m a portrait o f the (g loba l sou th ' s ) chi ld as the pr incess locked in a tower wa i t ing for (g obal sou h s ) adul ts to take ur 
L r d j u m p on horseback and rescue their own chi ld . Th i s rendit ion of chi ldhood is an all too s imi l a r song about the 
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understanding' arguably imagines children free from work.^'" As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
child's right to rest, leisure and play also invokes a picture of a care-free existence, and limited 
labour. In aiming to limit and regulate child labour, the CRC stigmatises certain societies that 
depend on the child's economic contribution to the family.^' 
As discussed in Chapter 7, in addition to mandating children's dependency on adults, die CRC 
implies a certain normative arrangement for how that dependency should take place. The CRC 
implies that biologically-based relations between parents and children 'are more fundamental and 
natural than other sorts of family or community' relations'.'" Again the CRC stigmatises societies 
where such arrangements arc not the norm. As discussed in Chapter 5, certain authors have 
argued that the CRC constructs childhood through binaries, characterising children who are 
alternatively: 1) undesirable, who must be addressed/rectified or 2) desirable and thus ignored.® 
'I'his binary was discussed in Chapter 5 in terms of the good/'ApoUonian' child versus die 
bad/'Dionysian' child. T o rectifj' the undesirable childhood, disciplines compete for 
inter\'ention, staking claims that their discipline (developmental psychology, labour studies, 
medicine, law, and so on) has the only good solution.™ Nieuwenhuys argues that this process 
marginalises and stigmatises the even day Kfe of a vast majority of children." Pupavac argues 
that societies in the global south are 'cast as child abusers because their children's experiences 
violate the image of childhood held in the West'.'^ It is argued that the result has been the 
empowerment of 'external (Western) governmental and non-governmental actors driven by a 
moralit)' of conviction to act as moral agents on behalf of children in the non-Western world'.^' 
These critiques of the CRC's universaHst approach (in other words, the CRC's universal categor\-
'child') hinge on the argument that the CRC has extremely limited applicability in the global 
south. It seems that while the CRC's version of the category 'child' as developing and thus in 
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need of 'care' is argued to have limited applicabilit)- to the global south, there appears consensus 
that the 'child' as developing (and the responsible/capable adult, responsible/capable state) is 
fully applicable to the west, as critique of the exclusionan' effect of the Convention seems to 
focus on the non-western world.''' It is unfortunate that there appears to be litde critical 
engagement regarding the ways in which the vision o f the categor)- 'child' in the CRC is 
exclusionan-, even in the west. The idea that the CRC's western version of childhood is just as 
inapplicable to the children living in the west would seem to strengthen the arguments of those 
critiquing the CRC's inapplicability- to the global south. This chapter argues that the contention 
that certain childhoods and therefore certain children (and certain adults) are stigmatised by the 
CRC applies equally to the developed world. Nieuwenhuys' deployment of binaries, the 
'undesirable/desirable' childhood proves useful in making the same critiques of the western 
world. Indeed this argument was previewed in Chapter 4 when speaking about the Dionysian 
For authors who critique the CRC as being western see Erica Burman, Local. Global or Globalised? Child Development 
and International Child Rights Legislation 3 CHILDHOOD 45. 45-66 (1992); Olga Nieuwenhuys, Editorial: Is There an Indian 
Childhood. 16 CHILDHOOD 147. 147-153 (2009); Vanessa Pupavac. Misanthropy Without Borders: The International 
Children S Rights Regime. 25(2) DISASTERS 95. 95-112 (2001): Annette Ruth Appell. Child-Centred Jurisprudence and 
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about how childhood in the United Stales is based on a Western conception of childhood, and arguing that the CRC largely 
matches such a conception); Sonia Harris-Short. International Human Rights Law: Imperialist. Inept and Ineffective? 
Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 25 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 130. 130 (2003) 
(based on an empirical student o f t h e discussion of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, argues that the Convention is 
still subject to cultural imperialism); John Tobin. Increasingly Seen and Heard: the Constitutional Recognition of Children's 
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Convention on the Rights oftlie Child. 2 MELBOURNE INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 304. 334 (2001) (argues that the 
Committee has 'with only very limited exceptions, presented non-Western cultural values and practices in an entirely 
negative light'); Paolo G. Carozza, From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin .American Tradition ofthe Idea of 
Human Rights. 2 5 ( 2 ) HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 2 8 1 . 3 1 1 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; PHILIP ALSTON. The Best Interests Principle: Towards a 
Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights, in T H E BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND 1 IUMAN 
RIGHTS (1994): Judith Ennew. Outside Childhood: Street Children's Rights, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: 
COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE (Bob Franklin ed.. 1995): John 1 obin. Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach 
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and Apollonian cMd. This binar)' is, as argued in Chapter 4, found throughout the Convention, 
and results in certain children and parents being labelled undesirable and thus in need of 
inten-ention, and others desirable and thus not in need of inter\'ention, as discussed below in 
Section II. 
This paper stipulates that the 'universal child' is not merely exported from the west to the global 
south. The CRC's 'universal child' is 'exported' or 're-imported' as a 'colonising force' even 
within the west ." This chapter contends that the CRC's universal child is exclusionarj' and 
therefore inapplicable not just to the global south, but also to the west. By stating that these 
critiques are equally useful when examining the west, this chapter does not simply mean than the 
child envisioned by the C^RC is also forced upon lower socio-economic groups or other racial, 
ethnic, and religious minorities. Rather, this chapter intends to describe the vision of the child as 
developing and in need of 'care', the child as only an object or victim, the child as only good or 
bad, and the adult as capablc and willing to be responsible, and the state as capable and willing to 
be responsible if the adult is not is exclusionary', even within the west world and even within 
majorit}' cultures. There is no doubt that certain children and adults in the west are unable to 
live up to the normative childhood described in the Convention. The ways in which certain 
children in the west arc excluded, stigmatised, or silenced is an area that, while surveyed in some 
domestic academic work, has been seemingly unexplored in the context of international 
children's nghts. As specific examples of childhoods excluded by the CRC', Section 11(a) 
explores instances within both the west and developing world where the child as 
irresponsible/adult as responsible is inapplicable. Section 11(b) explores instances within both 
the developing and developed world where the family is indeed unhappy and unsafe. 
" It is also notable lhal the only functioning slate lhat has not ratified the CRC is from the wesU the United Stales. Many 
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II. NORTH-SOUTH-EAST-WEST: THE EXPULSION OF CERTAIN 
CHILDHOODS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSE ON 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
As discussed in Chapter 3, identity categories are fictional, drawn to fit powerful political 
ideologies."^ As such, identities categories arc exclusive.' ' Burman argues that the discourse of 
rights necessarily invokes general claims.'" For Burman, the discourse of rights functions as an 
appeal to general entitlements, 'the generality of which is used to strengthen demands for [the 
particular rights] application m a specific simation'. ' ' Burman questions how these general 
statements (in other words, this discourse of rights) are applicable to children in particular 
contexts. This chapter contends that the CRC, in universaHsing the child, will be inapplicable to 
children who do not or cannot live up to the CRC's normative identity 'child' (in other words, 
developing and 'in care'). By embracing a particular version of childhood as normative, the CRC 
expels incompatible versions of childhood (for example, street children), which are in mm 
pathologised and stigmatised. Non-normative versions of childhood, according to the 
Convention, require inter\-cntion; these children must be rescued. On the other hand, 
childhoods deemed normative (for example, children who are 'in care' of a family) are deemed 
relatively unproblematic, with the result that problems faced by these children are often ignored. 
As such, the description of 'inapplicable' childhoods intends to convey an evaluation of the CRC 
as unhelpful in combating certain types of vulnerability not addressed in the CRC, a critique this 
section win explore. 
This chapter sur\'eys numerous authors who have commented on various children they argue to 
be problematiscd or ignored by the CRC's vision of the child: the street child, the girl child, the 
'knowing' child (in the context of crimmal law), the 'sexual' subject-child (versus the asexual 
child), the care-taker, the non-Western child, and (to some extent) the child soldier. With such a 
Kst, one is tempted to conclude that the CRC's normative childhood appHes to vety' few 
'children' indeed. Burman rightfuUy questions whether the CRC's general statements can even 
be made about children and whether childhood is generaHsable, aU highly charged questions.*' 
"JUDITHBUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE. 5 (1990). , , , „ „ ,c-
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Indeed, questioning the usefulness of the rights found in the CRC and questioning the CRC's 
version of childhood is (not so) oddly met with strong resistance. Burman points out that, 
[a]U too often professionals, activists, and policy-makers get so caught up in the 
pain, distress and needs they work with that the answers to these questions are 
either assumed or dismissed as irrelevant to practice, as academic luxuries for 
sociologists and philosophers to muse upon.'" 
Certainly, the question of 'what is a child' is continually dismissed as either an academic luxur}' 
or, as Jenks argues, a question already adequately answered.''" As discusscd in Chapter 3, Butler's 
concern with the 'rush to decision-ism and to strong normativit; ','" which fails to consider what 
is meant by some of the vcrj' basic terms it assumes, is applicable to the CRC's catcgor)' 'child'.'" 
Ironically, the ten year drafting period for the CRC was indeed no rush. Nonetheless, the 
discussions that led up to the CRC failed to engage in this tA'pe of questioning. This questioning 
of the 'child' behind the CRC's rights discourse is indeed 'painful', as doing so puts into question 
not only the CRC's acceptance of 'developing child' but also entrenched (adult, culmral, and 
state centric) lines of power. This thesis argues that the deconstruction of the identity' 'child' in 
the Convention would mean the deconstruction (or at least reconsideration) of the required 
dependency of childhood, and thus the current roles of parents and state as having 
responsibility /control over the child. By privileging the family, the state and even culture, the 
CRC often makes an explicit choice to underline (as opposed to undermine) the unique forms of 
\'ulnerabilit5' proscribed to childhood. By casting the parent as responsible and the family, 
culture, and traditions as happy and safe, the CRC fails to be helpful and applicable to the many 
of those who the CRC categorises as a 'child'. 
a. Child as Head of the Household: The Fictitious Responsible Parent -
Irresponsible Child 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the CRC privileges the family, and therefore the family strucmre in a 
variety- of ways. Chapter 7 also argued that the Convention defines the family as a child in 'care' 
of a responsible adult, thereby pathologising childhoods where the child is responsible for the 
parent, responsible for her or himself, and /o r responsible for other children. The CRC does not 
'^^ Erica Burman. Local. Global or Globalised? Child Developmenl and Inlernalional Child Rights Legislation 3 CHILDHOOD 
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contemplate these circumstances as 'appropriate ' for childhood. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
according to Article 3, the child is envisioned as always in the 'care' of some adult, whether the 
parents or state. In this way, the Convent ion provides no support or protection for a childhood 
that 'lacks' a responsible adult, other than expelling it to the realm of iUegalit}'. Throughout the 
world, in both the west and global south, the independent child undoubtedly exists.''^ Note that 
this section wiU focus on parents w h o are incapable of being responsible for the child, and not 
those who are capable but unwilling. Even if this thesis were to assume all parents are willing, 
the percentage of children w h o live with parents who are not able to exercise responsibilitj' for 
their children remains sufficiently high to be concerned about their exclusion f rom the 
Convention. O n e could argue that, at least in the west, the Convention does provide for 
children without a responsible parent as the Convention mandates states to inten-ene in such 
situations under Article 3, as states in the west have the resources to enable the state to provide 
for /be responsible for those children without parents. This response assumes a variety of 
factors: 1) that the state is willing to inter\'ene, 2) that the simation in state care a n d / o r state 
inten'ention would be 'better ' than the child's current situation, and 3) that the child would 
rather be in state care. As to the first factor, indeterminacy reigns. Even if the state is willing to 
inten'ene, given the disagreement over the best interests of the child principle, that the child's 
opinion cannot dictate decisions regarding the child, and given the limited resources of ever)' 
state, the issue of 'inter\-ention' and when to inter\'ene, the child is left \-ulnerable to decisions 
that differentially interpret the child's best interests. 
Chapter 2 established that the extent to which one agrees with the idea that the child's wishes 
should dictate decisions made regarding the child and the child's care, will var}' quite drasricaUy 
depending on one 's view of the 'true' image of the child and therefore one's view of what rights 
the child should have. If we are to question the ' fundamental ' child, we must re-examine the 
idea that children cannot a n d / o r should not have the definitive say in matters that relate to them, 
as is the case for aU other humans. Even if one was to disagree (and the CRC certainly does) 
with the argument that the child should have a defmitive say in matters that relate to h im/he r , 
one would be exceprionaUy hard pressed to controvert the idea that states and parents are 
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unwaiing or unable to provide the CRC's childhood to all children. Even if we were to cling to 
the CRC's ideal childhood, is it fair to require children to keep up their side of the (obligator)-) 
contract found in the CRC (dependency), even when adults and the state do not hold up dieirs 
(responsibilit)-, provide a happy, understanding and safe environment)? The first obvious 
counterargument is that conventions such as the CRC are intended to be aspirarional. 
Nonetheless, in our aspirational state, we too often fail to consider that some children will not 
and cannot have a responsible adult. While we might cling to this version of childhood, and 
perhaps deem it most appropriate for most children, failing to provide for those children that 
exist outside of adults aspirations (who are arguably most vulnerable, not because of their 
'childness', but because of the social discrimination against children) seems to be a glaring 
inconsistency. Put another way, the cliild's state of dependency is not aspirational, but rather 
required. It is only adult (parent and/or state) responsibilitj' that is aspirational. 
A second counterargument is that the real issue for the CRC is enforcement; we must condemn 
states and parents who do not provide for their children in the ways envisioned in the CRC's 
ideal cliildhood, as required by Article 3. The response to this argument is a weU-rchcarscd one; 
states make conventions and international law. Conventions are poHticaUy negotiated, state-
centric codes. They arc created to lack enforcement mechanisms and are intended to be (most 
often) aspirational. This thesis favours pragmatic responses to both counterarguments; we 
cannot afford to pragmatically ignore excluded childhoods on the basis that international 
conventions are merely aspirational, nor can we ignore the pragmatic reality that international 
conventions are state-centric in nature, and may never facilitate enforcement in tiie way 
envisioned by positivist conceptions of law. Blending pragmatism and aspiration, this thesis 
contends that withholding criticism of the CRC's 'child' in the hope for better enforcement at 
some point in histor)- comes at the expense of the category 'child' today. It is essential that we 
inquire into the implications of our aspirations, even (particularly) those that claim to seek to 
'protect' the 'cliild'. Nor should we demand that children wait for our aspirations to be fulfilled, 
yet demand their dependency. For, the CRC's version of childhood (the child as in the care of 
firstiy parents, and if not parents the state - all of which arc responsible and caring) is not only 
impossible to obtain, but there is no commitment from states to universally obtain those 
conditions for all children. Article 4 (realisation to the maximum extent to their available 
resources) implies that at least some of the obKgations under the Convention are currently 
impossible. Nonetheless, the CRC does not provide for those children where there are simply 
not enough responsible adults or state agencies to provide for and be responsible on behalf of 
the child. Further, that states maybe be unwilling to provide for certain 'undesirable' children is 
yet another issue.''^' States are unwiUing or unable to ensure this version of childhood (in other 
words, unwilling or unable to be responsible for all children within the state's jurisdiction). 
Parents are likewise unwilling or unable to ensure this version of childhood (in other words, not 
all parents are responsible for therr children). Yet, according to the CRC's visions of childhood, 
all children are required to be dependent on adults, as was argued in Chapter 7. This section will 
explore three childhoods in which the CRC normative framework is inapplicable, three 
childhoods that are, as Foucault says — 'local, discontinuous, disqualified, |and| illegitimate . . . 
against the claims of a universal "truth"'."" These childhoods do not include responsible and 
capable adults, or children in a state of dependency, but children who are agents, not objects, 
exercising capacitj' for themselves and in caring for others, children who are excluded by the 
allocation of rights in the CRC. 
i. Parents with Substance Abuse Problems 
Backett-Milburn notes that, as of 2003, over a million children in the United Kingdom (UK) 
lived with parents having either alcohol and/or drug use problems."" Based on her inter\'iews 
with children aged fifteen years or older, Backett-Milburn focused on how children 'get by' in 
such situations. While her research focuses on alcohol or drug misuse, one could imagme that 
her obsen-ations could have relevancy to situations where parents have emotional or 
psychological problems. Backett-Milburn argues that the ways in which these children 'get by' 
not only demonstrates the agency of children, but also chaUenges the 'compulsive urge to refer 
to childhood as a umtarj' phenomenon', in other words, as lacking agency." Agitating the odier 
unitar)' phenomenon, that adults/parents are responsible, Backctt-Millburn discusses how a large 
majonty of the children that she interviewed said that their substance-misusing parents had not 
always looked after their basic needs. Half of those interviewed described themselves as the 
^ See for example Kenneth Nunn. The Child as Other: Racial Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System. 51 
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is somewliat inaccurate to'speak of an 'end of adolescence . . . . The concept of a group of young people who were enm lo 
special trcalment because they were impetuous and immature was never exlens.ve enough to mclude Afr, an Amencan 
children ' Mason goes further lo argue that children were divided ,mo four classes na ura children, apprentices. 
i l l e g i l i L e children and slaves; each with a different status recognized by descending levels of protection and provisions 
ri h t e X h ™ f o r c e d by colonial courts'. Mary Ann Mason The US and the ,nternat,onal Chtldren s Rtghts 
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active carcrs, looking after themselves, their parents, and/or siblings.®" Other described their 
siblings as the carers. Contrar)' to the idea that children lack agency, children inter\'iewed stated 
that they were in charge of the following tasks: 1) taking care of basic needs (cooking food, 
cleaning the home, washing dishes), 2) protecting themselves and/or siblings from danger 
(calling on neighbours or extended family), and 3) protecting the substance misusing parent 
(making sure parents did not harm themselves while high).®' 
CJiven the number of children who have parents with substance misuse problems in the UK 
alone, Backett-Milburn's research offers insight into a version of childhood and adulthood that is 
not contemplated in the Convention. For example. Article 3's best interests principle has as its 
basis the child as an object/victim, not an agent, as discussed extensively in Chapters 6 and 7. 
As such Article 3's implication of the 'best interest' of these children would be aimed at getting 
them into the care of a responsible adult or inter\-ening in a way to assist the adult to resume the 
responsible parental role. One could argue that in a countrj- like the UK, these children should 
become wards of the state or that the state should provide programs for rehabilitation for the 
parent. Obviously these arguments assume that rehabilitation is possible or discounts any 
possibility that these children would rather stay in their current arrangement, and assumes that 
state care is 'better'. One would have to define what 'better' means and one could imagine that 
the child and the state agent might have quite differing opinions.®^ By way of further example of 
the Convention's inappHcabilit)' to these children, Article 24 (right to health) and Article 27 (right 
to adequate standard of living) mandate the state to assist the parent to realise these rights for 
children. Again, as discussed in Chapter 6, the provision of assistance to the child is not 
contemplated in the CRC. Assistance for children is to always be realised through adults. In 
instances as described by Backett-Milburn, the remedy would be, according to the Convention, 
removal from this home and to another that has a responsible adult or intervention into the 
home such as providing drug treatment ser\-ices on the basis of neglect (accordmg to Article 19), 
rather than empowering the child to be responsible. 
Beyond the rights allocated to them in the CRC, these children might deem it more appropriate 
to be prodded the following rights: 1) the right not to be labelled (with its ensuing 
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discriminatory and violent practiccs); 2) the right to work and to do so in fair conditions and for 
fair wages; 3) the right to have one's own support systems (which do not privileged the modern 
concept o f family in which many children do not exist); 4) the right to appropriate and relevant 
services (which middle class adults do not necessarily know what is best); and 5) the right to be 
protected from harm inflicted by 'caring' social agencies.^' Though potentially too obvious to 
state, Backett-Milbum is discussing a state in the west, where children find themselves without a 
responsible adult, but who do not have access to 'effective' state inten-ention. Further, there is 
no reason to assume that these circumstances would be different in other states in the west. 
Notably, no such discussion took place in the negotiations that took place in the led up to the 
CRC. Through Backett-MUburn's research we begin to see the relevance and importance o f 
deconstructing the CRC's binar\- that assumes the adult to be responsible and the child to be 
irresponsible, even in the west. 
ii. Parents with HIV/AIDS 
Nicholson highlights the ways in which the HI\VAIDS epidemic impacts children with parents 
who are sick or have died from this disease." Before discussing Nicholson's research regarding 
HIV/AIDS in South Afr ica , " it is important to note that although HIV/AIDS is a problem o f 
particular relevance to portions o f the global south, Nicholson's analysis is also relevant to 
children in the developed world. Additionally, her arguments arc not just applicable to children 
whose parents have H I \ 7 A 1 D S (in both the global south and the west), but also could be 
applicable to children with parents who have any chronic disease or psychological disorder. 
Nicholson argues that certain children in South Africa need to be allowed to work and that diese 
children desperately need laws that protect them as labourers.^'' Nicholson contends that the 
Soudi African government simply cannot administer a social welfare program that would 
adequately cover the basic needs o f all o f its children." It could be further argued that even 
" Judith Ennew. Outside Childhood: Street Children S Rights, m THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE 
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developed states, such as the United States, do not cover the basic needs of all of the children in 
Its jurisdiction.^' In this example, Nicholson describes a child that does not have a responsible 
adult or a responsible state, yet the child remains obligated to dependency and thus must look 
for extra-legal means to survive. This, according to Nicholson, results in the child either 
engaging m exploitative work (outside of the reahns of regulation with no legal protections that 
legal workers would otherwise possess) or in criminal activity' to support themselves and dieir 
families.^' Nicholson describes these children as grossly underpaid and as working in 
exceptionally hasardous conditions, illegally and thus outside regulations that would otherwise 
protect them (equal pay, constraints on working conditions, and so on as discussed in Chapter 
Further, Nicholson argues that these children, often orphaned by HIV/AIDS, are further 
stigmatised by the infection status of their (deceased) parents, and presumed prone to criminal 
tendencies and violence.''' It seems that Article 2's non-discrimination principles do not apply to 
these children. One wonders how not only the stigma attached to HIV/AIDS, but also the 
stigma of being an 'independent' child (in other words, a parentiess child) combine to create 
assumptions about the child's presumed criminal and violent tendencies. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, under a conception of the Dionysian child, the 'bad' child, when left alone (without 
adults), wiU be consumed by innate evil.''^ More importantly, one wonders how the stigma of 
being an independent child translates to mean that this child does not receive the protections 
('care' or 'special assistance') given to those who are not flaunting prescriptions of childhood 
(immaturity- and dependency). In what ways arc these independent children made into adults 
(for example, arrested), without the rights and 'responsibilities' of adulthood (for example, the 
right to counsel in Article 37)?" Nicholson argues that in the case of these children, the focus 
shifts from the problems of povertj' to the 'solution' of legal criminal action. This stigmarisation 
' ' As of 2010. 22% of all children in the US lived below the poverty line. Interestingly, of those in families 21% experience 
poverty; of those not in families, 49.8% experience poverty. 13.7»/o of adults between' 18-64 years old experience poverty. Of 
those over 64 years of age. 9% experience poverty. See; 
http;//www.census.gov/hhesAvww/poverty/data/incpovhlth/20l0/table4.pdf. UNICEF. in its Measuring Child Poverty Report, 
notes that in the 35 richest states. 30 million children live in poverty. The United States ranks second, after Romania. 
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As discussed in Chapter 6. Article 37 does not provide the right to counsel (rather legal or 'appropriate' assistance). 
of the independent child fits easily into the conception of the 'bad' or Dionysian child, who if 
left alone wiU be consumed by deviant forccs. As mentioned in the previous subsection, Article 
24 (right to health) and Article 27 (right to adequate standard of living) are not available to these 
children, who may not have or may not want an adult to act on their behalf. Amongst other 
solutions, Nicholson argues that these children should be legally allowed to work, and that these 
children require the safeguards and protections provided to all other legal workers. In addition 
to requiring ways in which the child can support her/himself, this child also might require other 
protections that a head-of-the household might require, for example the abiht)' to enter into 
contracts (to rent a house), to have those contracts enforced, to have privacy of family life 
respected, and so on. Beyond the rights allocated to them in the CRC, these children may also 
deem it more appropriate to be provided the following rights: 1) the right not to be labelled (with 
its ensuing discriminator)' and w l e n t practices); 2) the right to work and to do so in fair 
conditions and for fair wages; 3) the right to have one's own support systems (which do not 
privileged the modern concept of family in which many children do not exist); 4) the right to 
appropriate and relevant ser\'ices (which middle class adults do not necessarily know what is 
best); 5) the right to be protected from secondarj- exploitation (media, human rights, fundraising 
departments, N C O S who exploit the Vulnerability'' and weakness of children, mrning children 
into victims to gamer support); and 6) the right to be protected from harm inflicted by 'caring' 
social agencies." The CRC does not include such safeguards and rights. Again these same 
arguments can be deployed in the west regarding parents with chronic mental or physical illness, 
as weU as HIV/AIDS. These excluded childhoods are mtended to highlight that CRC 
normatively does not contemplate anytiung other than the adult as responsible, and the child as 
irresponsible. The CRC does not envision a child 'outside' of care, by the state or by a parent. 
The child without the responsible adult is stigmatised, and made an object of 'canng' 
intervention. If this child's concerns faU outside the regime the aims to find dus child a 
responsible adult, these concerns are not addressed. A responsible adult must be found, 
regardless of this being unwanted or an impossibilit)'. 
iii. Street Children 
Street children can also ser^'e to contradict die CRC's umversal 'child' as lacking mamnty. Street 
children exist, often without a responsible adult, and often are mature enough to surN-ive on their 
" Judith Ennew. Ou,s,de Childhood: S,ree, Children S Riglns. ,n THE HANDBOOK OF C H I L D R E N ' S RIGH TS : C O M P A R A T I V E 
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own.'^ Nevertheless, Ennew contends that the place for cluldhood is considered 'inside': inside a 
societ)', inside a family, inside a pnvate dwelling^'" Ennew argues that consequendy street 
cliildrcn are societj^'s 'ultimate oudaws' placed 'outside childhood'. As children are increasingly 
conceptualised as \'ulnerable and in danger f rom influence outside the private world of the family 
so they are increasingly banished f rom the streets." Street children are then pathologised, and 
the answer for inten-enrion into the lives of street children remains focused on 'removing' 
children from the street. As such, Ennew goes through each article of the CRC and analyses the 
articles as applicable to the street child. 
As Nicholson argues above, Ennew contends that street children are discriminated against in 
violation of Article 2, as these children are assumed guilty of violence and criminal activity.^' She 
argues that their best interests are not a consideration, as required by Article 3; rather 'cleansing 
the streets of their presence' is the priorit)-, with Uttie consideration as to 1) the means in which 
they are 'collected' and 2) where these children end up . ' ' Ennew sur\'eys various other articles, 
discussing how they are irrelevant to the experiences of street children, and argues that these 
focus instead on removing these children and less on the issues faced by street children, 
l innew's work reinforces the childhood without a responsible adult as problematic. Obtaining 
and ensuring this adult-over-child relationship is the priority The 'other ' problems faced by 
children outside of this clear boundarj- (childhood as under the responsibiUt}' of an adult), are 
ignored. In this way, Ennew echoes the work of Nieuwenhuys in arguing that children who live 
outside of the CRC's normative context (the private family or public care, in other words, under 
adult super\'ision; geographically restricted to the home or school) are constructed as 'problems'. 
Street children are classified as undesirable and must be rectified. 'ITius, the Uves of street 
children require intcr\-ention, and removal f rom the streets is the only solution. 
Accordingly, E^nnew drafts her own nghts for street children: 1) the right not to be labelled (with 
its ensuing discriminator^' and violent practiccs); 2) the right to work and to do so in fair 
conditions and for fair wages; 3) the right to have one's own support systems (which do not 
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privileged the modern concept o f family in which many children do not exist); 4) the right to 
appropriate and relevant services (where middle class adults do not necessarily know what is 
best); 5) the right to control their own sexuality (instead o f being forced to be asexual or 
'othered' for previous sexual activity)^", 6) the right to be protected from secondar}' exploitation 
(such as the media, human rights organisations, fundraising departments, N G O S who exploit the 
S-ulnerability' and weakness o f children, turning children into victims to garner support); and 7) 
the right to be protected from harm inflicted by 'caring' social agencies (what happens to 
children when they are cleaned of f the streets?).^' These rights are quite different from those in 
the CRC, where the child, for example, docs not have the 'right to work', where the traditional 
family is privileged, and the main goal for childhood is that it occur in the presence o f a 
responsible adult. See Chapters 6 and 7 for further discussion. Ennew's approach to children's 
rights also includes enabling and empowering the child to a much greater extent, whereas the 
CRC is focuses on enabling others to act on the child's behalf. Ennew's version o f rights has 
less to do with forcing children into the 'care' o f adults, and more to do with providing children 
a greater arsenal for protection against adults, in other words, when necessan* enabling children 
to protect and provide for themselves. Ennew's approach could be to children in western and 
global south contexts who find themselves without a responsible adult (parents with substance 
abuse problems, with chronic illness, with psychological illnesses, and so on) who find the 'care' 
offered by the state (as envisioned by the CRC) to be non-existent, utterly unhelpful, or abusive 
itself Again, the normative aims underlining rights discourse dictates which 'true' 
childhood/which 'true' child is designated. A particular performance o f the child dictates which 
children matter, which children will be problematiscd, and which children will be ignored. 
Importantly the normative aims underHmng the rights discourse places clear Hmits on the rights 
of the child and even the protection o f childhood. By requiring 'care' and thus dependency, the 
CRC delimits the construction o f the categor)' cluld, and therefore delimits the types o f rights 
and protection that will be offered by the CRC. This can be seen when the CRC is applied to 
children who do not have responsible adults. 
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b. Girl-child: Gender-Neutrality and The CRC's Performance of the Family 
& Culture as Happy and Safe 
In addition to stigmatising ccrtain childhoods such as street children and children who are head 
of the household, the CRC's vision for childhood also renders ccrtain childhoods a less 
problematic and thus less visible. The question of whether the Convention has relevance for the 
girl child has met with mixed reviews. Price-Cohcn argues that the Convention 'is so 
comprehensive in its protection of the girl child that it cannot be fairly compared with 
|CRDAW].''^ In her view CEDAW pales m comparison. On the other hand, Freeman has 
argued that, while the CRC's non-discrimination principle is indeed fundamental, there has been 
litde improvement in the position of the girl child since the Convention.' ' Similarly, in separate 
articles, Kirsten Backstrom and Savitri Goonesekere argue that neither the CRC nor CEDAW 
address the unique abuses encountered by the female child.''' FottreU has argued that the girl-
child was simply too controversial to include in the CRC, at a time when cohesion within the 
children's right movement was a focus meant to ensure that an international children's rights 
convention would be possible.'^ This section argues that the girl-child is excluded from the 
CRC's protection, despite the CRC's inclusion of Article 2's non-discrimination principle. 
Because the CRC has the family (in other words, the child in the 'care' of adults) as the context 
for its normative childhood, the girl-child and the issues faced by the girl-child within the family 
are aU but ignored. First, far from being a 'feminist landmark', however that might be defined, 
this section will argue that the CRC's use of gender-neutral language demonstrates the lack of 
importance and priority given to the girl-child. Second, this section will argue that the CRC's 
performance of the family and culture as a happy and safe space for children fails to address the 
discrimination faced by many female children in the context of the familv environment that is 
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justified on the basis of cultural norms. Finally, this section will explore the ways in which the 
girl-child in the west is similarly not included in the CRC's protection. 
i. Debating the Efficacy of the CRC's Gender-Neutral Language 
This section argues that the CRC's use of gender-neutral language does not somehow translate to 
the inclusion of both genders without distinction. Given the focus of the CRC and the drafting 
histor\' of the CRC, this section argues that the gender-neutral language instead reflects a male 
normative framework. Simply put, the child most predominant in the minds of tlie drafters of 
the CRC was male, the unmarked [boy] child.'' Price-Cohen argues that the CRC is a landmark 
as a result of the CRC's gender-neutral language." Notably she does not specify how gender-
neutral language makes the CRC such a landmark. Gender-neutral language has both potentially 
positive'" and negative repercussions. Focus in the CRC is on the forms of violence and the 
infringement of protection rights of both boys and girls, without addressing the gender specific 
violence and exploitation perpetuated against girls in their families, communities and at a 
national level." Goonesekere argues that the gender-neutral approach has dominated a 
children's rights context in which gender-neutral concerns are paramount." She argues that this 
can be seen in the traditional protection areas such as child sexual abuse and trafficking, child 
soldiers, and child labour, where discussions and research has focused on various forms of 
violence and infringements of protection rights of both girls and boys, without addressing the 
unique violence and discrimination faced by girls as a result of gender bias in their families, in 
their communities and at national levels."' For example, while the CRC addresses the issue of 
child soldiers, it remains silent on issues such as child-marriage."^ One could argue that by 
making the child gender-neutral (much less race-neutral, sexual-orientation neutral, socio-
economically neutral, and so on), the CRC mutes the different experience of those not covered 
by the gender-neutral terminology. Yet, even more so, neutralit)' docs not mean that only issues 
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faced by boys and girls are paramount, but instead that the issues faced by boys are paramount. 
Our gender-neutral child is a male, straight, wliite, upper class, citizen of a western state." 
To make the point that the issues faced by certain girl-children arc not addressed in the CRC, 
both Backstrom and Goonesckere examine several articles of the Convention in light of various 
discriminator)' practices the girl-child experiences, such as female infanticide, sex-related 
abortions, sers'ilc marriage, dowr)' murder, a disproportionate work load in the home, denial of 
education, denial of reproductive health, and forced early marriages.""' Far from including the 
girl-child within the pur\'iew of the CRC, the gender-neutral language of the Convention appears 
to only address the issues that the male child experiences. It is one thing to state that girls are 
equal to boys, as the CRC does in Article 2. But if the Convention does not address the ways in 
which girls are made unequal to boys as a matter of discrimination (preferential feeding, 
preferential education, and so on) then what is gained by this formal equality and gender-
ncutralit}'? This chapter argues, as l^reeman, Goonesekere, and others have argued, that the 
allegedly gender-neutralit}' of the CRC is unconvincing. 
By way of illustration, one of the few articles that do address female specific discrimination is 
Article 24 (right to health). Notably, Article 24 did not originally include any reference to what 
the Convention eventually calls 'traditional practiccs prejudicial to the child' until 1987."^ Only in 
1987 (eight years into the ten year drafting process) was a sex specific practice, characterised as 
detrimental to the girl-child's health, considered for inclusion."' Notably, only female genital 
cutting was originally the focus, suggesting that only certain discriminator}' practices were 
considered problematic, while others were not."' Ultimately, during this discussion it was argued 
that the more general 'traditional practices' was preferred as it would cover, not only female 
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genital cutting, but also other practices discriminator)' practices based on sex, such as preferential 
feeding."" While Article 24 addresses certain forms o f physical violence the girl-child might face, 
the Convention does not address the discriminatory practices against the girl-child that do not 
represent an immediate health risk. For example, the Convention sets no minimum age for 
marriage."' Although early marriage may affect her right to priman' education for example, child 
marriage does not necessarily implicate a risk to the girl's health. Finally, it is notable that, while 
the drafting process o f the C R C begin in 1979 (the year o f the child), gender neural language was 
not introduced until some 10 years later, just before the Convention was adopted in 1989.'" One 
could argue that gender was hardly on the minds o f the drafters as a key agenda, but rather an 
afterthought, as demonstrated in Article 24's development where specific issues that the girl-
child faces were not contemplated until the 11''' hour o f drafting the CRC (when the Convention 
was virmally complete). At its most basic, the child was a 'he' for almost the entire 10 year 
period of drafting o f the Convention." 
The argument that the C R C privileges the gender-neutral (read male) child appears to have 
strength. Nonetheless, what if the limits placed on the rights and even protection o f the child 
are not a result o f pnvUeging the boy and liis issues (remembering that the Convention allows 
for him to face direct combat at the age o f 15, see below for a further discussion)? What if die 
limits placed on the rights and protection o f the girl-child are rather a reflection o f very specific 
adult, culmral, and state centric lines o f power? Undoubtedly, the CRC's version o f childhood is 
masculine, as also indicated for example by the developmental trajector)' from irrationalit)' to 
rationalit)' or from dependence to independence.'^ The Convention privileges the family (in 
other words, the adult's power over the child), cultural and traditional values, and the state. As 
such, the CRC only affords protection and rights to the extent that those rights and that 
protection do not interfere with these Imes o f power, even when diose lines o f power result m 
the lack o f protection o f the child (whether die girl or boy child). This limitation on nghts and 
protection is particularly pronounced in the instance o f inter-family/cultural violence against the 
girl-child (discussed in the next section). One could then mquire whetiier that the pnvilegmg o f 
the family, culture, and the state adversely and disproportionately impacts the girl - child, 
particularly when tiiose Hnes o f power themselves are based upon mascuHne norms such as the 
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public versus private domain.'' There seems to be a strong argument to answer this question in 
the affirmative (discussed in the next section). As with the international law and human rights 
more generally, the CRC is no exception in its embrace of gender bias in what appears to be 
gendcr-neutralit)'.'" However, this chapter argues that greatest bias is given by the CRC, not to 
the boy child (though this bias holds worrisome implications), but to the family. 
ii. Does the CRC Adequately protect the Girl-Child from Inter-
Family/Inter-Cultural Discrimination? 
This section contends that the CRC deprioritises the girl child's rights as well as her protection, 
by privileging the family and cultural value. Although the CRC includes a prohibition on sex 
discrimination in Article 2, the CRC's privileging of the family and cultural/traditional values 
places clear limits on the extent to which the girl-child will be given rights and protection. Price-
Cohen argues that the Convention effectively addresses inter-family discrimination.® To 
support these statements she points to language of Article 19 (right to be protected by the state 
from all forms of mental and physical violence) and Article 31 (right to social reintegration). A 
restatement of convention articles, however, lacks persuasion. This thesis has repeatedly argued 
that there is extremely little protection provided by the Convention in relation to intra-family (in 
other words, parent on child) violence, discussed at length in (Chapter 7. This lack of protection 
is particularly clear when one contrasts the protection and power given to parents and the family 
in the CRC (as discussed in Chapter 7) with the protection given to women in relation the family 
in CEDAW, where the women's role in and autonomy from the family is comparatively more 
respected,'*' if for no other reason than the fact that the woman may enter and exit the family at 
her own will." According to CliDAW, a woman has the same rights of autonomy as given to 
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Article 1 6 ( 1 ) of C E D A W is particularly interest ing when th inking about the re la t ionsh ip b e t w e e n adult and child: 
I. States Parties shall take all appropria te measu res to e l iminate d i scr imina t ion agains t w o m e n in all mat te rs relat ing to 
marr iage and family relations and in part icular shall ensure , on a bas is of equal i ty o f m e n and w o m e n ; 
(a) The same right to enter into marr iage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to en te r into man-iage on ly with their f r ee and full consen t ; 
(c) The same rights and responsibi l i t ies dur ing mar r iage and at its d isso lu t ion; 
(d) The same rights and responsibi l i t ies as parents , i r respect ive o f their mari ta l s tatus, in ma t t e r s re la t ing to their children; in 
all cases the interests of the children shall be pa ramoun t ; 
men. As discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 4, this is simply not true for the child. ™ Also as 
discussed in Chapter 7, the protection provided by Article 19 assumes that the state is willing and 
capable to inter\'cne within the family when the family unit breaks down, and that if removal 
from the home was deemed necessary' by the state that such care would be 'better' for the child. 
More miportantly, because of how the family is constructed in the Convention (natural, 
foundational to societ}', place of happiness and love, and so on), the family, at least in terms of 
child-parent relationships, seems to be all but immune from inter\-ention, as discussed in Chapter 
7. 
The CRC docs not protect the girl child from intta-family discrimination, particularly 
discrimination that is often is condoned by culture and communities. For example, while female 
genital cutting, child marriage, or denial of reproductive health information appear to be covered 
by Article 24 as prejudicial practices, state parries may simply characterise these practices as 
cultural positives, measures aimed at fostering family and communit}' solidarit)', principles also 
remforced by the Convention." The education provisions of the CRC also call for the 
promotion of a spirit of equalit)' among the sexes. Yet, Backstrom notes that this goal is 
undermined by the Convention, which also states that education should be directed at 
encouraging rcspect for parents and cultural values, failing to take into account that the girl-
child's parents and her culture's values may deny her access to education.'"" 
Backstrom argues that outside of Article 2's ban on discrimination on the basis of sex and Article 
24's condemnation (but not ban) of 'traditional practices', the CRC does little to combat cultoral 
and structural discrimination the female child encounters. Article 24 is argued to be one of the 
only articles that relate spccificaUy to the issues faced by girls. As discussed above, the 
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Convention does not address the ways in which the girl child is made unequal that do not 
represent a health risk. The CRC's reinforcement of the sanctit)' of the family unit tends to 
disregard the fact much of the discrimination the girl-child faces often occurs within the 
family."" The CRC's elevation of culmre also fails to acknowledge that, not only are those 
within the girl-child's family often the primar\- actors in the discrimination against the girl-child, 
but that it is often cultural practices that specifically discriminate against the girl child. Cultural 
values may at times justif}- the discrimination carried out by families and communities. As such, 
the Convention arguably protects the rights of the girl-child, providing for her only to the extent 
that those rights and provisions do not undermine the power given to the family (in other words, 
the parents over the child) and the power given to culture or traditional values. That the girl-
child experiences all forms of discrimination on the basis of gender within these spheres is all but 
overlooked or, condoned. 
iii. Application to the Girl-Child in the West 
While many academics focus on practices of the global south, this paper argues that the 
Convention fails to consider not only the global south girl-child, but also the girl-child from the 
west (and not just the global south girl-child who Hvcs in the west). There are manifold 
examples of discrimination against the girl-child in the west that go unaddressed in the 
Convention. Regardless, the critiques of the CRC regarding the girl-child usually, if not always, 
focus on the girl-child in the developing w o r l d . Q u i t e obviously girls in the west face 
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discrimination on the basis o f their gender. They too are, for example, more likely to be given a 
disproportionate workload at home, to be discouraged in their education, to earn less, to lack 
access to reproductive health and sex education,"" (both o f which impact access to education 
and earning potential) and to be mistreated while in detention.""* It is curious, therefore, that 
international discourses on the girl-child rarely consider the western girl-child. One could 
imagine that such lack o f attention could easily be understood as 1) the west judging the global 
south without examining the situation o f girls within its borders, 2) the call o f the global south to 
examine a group that has been left out the international discourse on children's rights despite the 
violence and discrimination that girl-child in the west faces, or 3) the perception that the girl-
child in the west is better off, and therefore o f less concern."'^ While this thesis will not explore 
this tension in detail, there seems a disconnect between the domestic academic literature 
emerging from the west regarding the girl-child that discusses the discrimination she faces and 
academic literature that discusses the girl-child in the context o f international children's rights. 
This seems unfortunate as the critique that the western girl-child is not included in the CRC 
would seem to also strengthen the arguments that the CRC is exclusionan*. It should be noted 
that this chapter is not arguing that the girl-child from the global south is included in the 
language o f the CRC. This thesis accepts that the global south girl-child is not represented in the 
Convention. Rather, the salient point is that it is not simply the global south girl-child (and 
global south child more generally) that is excluded from the Convention. The exclusivity o f the 
Form of Trafficking in Girls. 12 JOURNAL OF GENDER. SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW 233. 233 (2004): Brent Wible, Achieving 
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Rights Universalism and Cultural Relativism Toward Health Capabilities. 96 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1447. 1447 (2008); 
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Practice Standards. 33 MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW RL:VIEW 833. 833 (2009); Justina Llram. Les enfants de mauvats 
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CRC can also be seen in the context of the western girl-child (and the western child more 
generally). 
By claiming gender-neutrality through die use of gender-neutral language, the CRC can 
masquerade as though it is pnvileging issues faced by both boys and girls. The CRC's version of 
gender-neutrality translates to mean, not the protection of the girl-child, but something quite the 
opposite. By privileging the family (in other words, the power of parents over the child), 
cultural, and state centric lines of power, many of the issues faced by the girl-child are ignored, 
lost to more important priorities. In privileging the family and culmre, the drafters of the CRC 
decided that the girl-child in relation to discrimination cominitted by the family and/or 
rationalised by her culture, does not require inter\'cntion and as such can be ignored. Keeping 
the girl-child within the confines of the family, the culture, and community, as with the agenda of 
removal of street children discussed above, becomes more important than addressing the 
specific problems faced behind the cushy veils of the happy and safe family and culture. The 
combined forces of gender discrimination coupled with the discmpowered state of dependency 
required for the period of childhood, leaves the grrl-child open to unique forms of discrimination 
not addressed in the Convention, or horribly condoned. 
This section has sought to dislodge the CRC's claim to address die 'needs' of the universal 
category 'child' by examining childhoods that arc excluded from the enjoyment of the CRC's 
rights and protection. Put another way, the CRC does not address certain children's 'needs' 
because 1) they arc problematised for their failure to comply with the CRC's requirements of 
childhood, or 2) they are ignored for they are not deemed problematic to the CRC's vision of 
childhood. The CRC maintains certain lines of power that are adult, culmral, and state centric. 
These lines of power demarcate the boundaries of the CRC's protection and rights to the child. 
As a result, certain children and certain childhoods wiU be problematised (for example, the street 
child, the child who is head of the household), while others will be ignored (for example, the girl-
child experiencing discrimination witliin the family). Far from being guided by the rights of the 
child, much less the protection of the child, the CRC's rights regime is dictated instead by ven-
specific lines of power. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The CRC's performance of the child dictates which children matter, which children will be 
problematised, and which children will be ignored. The girl-child, who experiences traditional 
practices prejudicial to her health, may be overlooked. The 15-17 year old soldier engaged in 
direct combat may be overlooked.""^ The street child may require intcn^ention. After being 
'rescued', the street child and the child soldier, who may now be experiencing secondary' abuse 
from 'caring' agencies, may be overlooked. Intra-family violence, discrimination by family 
justified by cultural and traditional values are considered low priorities. Responsible children 
with irresponsible parents, children who must work because they lack both a wiUing/capable 
parent and state, may be converted into adults or alternatively must have their childhood 
restored. This chapter draws upon, and adds to a varict)' of authors who have written about 
numerous versions of childhood that are left out of the Convention. These alternative versions 
of childhood reveal the identitv' category 'chUd' to be highly fracmred. If that is indeed the case, 
might it be worth considering the category' 'child'm the CRC? The category 'child' may be in 
itself a fiction, constructed primarily for practical purposes, but the category' is constructed along 
political/ideological Hnes. Perhaps because no child was involved in the construction of the 
political category child in international law even greater wanness is appropriate. 
Grappling with the exclusivit)' of the category' of the 'child' in the CRC is important to 
understanding who and what purposes are ser\'ed in designating the 'developing child' and the 
'child in care' as a normative framework for international law's discourse on children's rights. 
The genealogy' developed in this chapter sought to investigate local, discontinuous, disqualified, 
illegitimate knowledges about the CRC's categon' 'child' against the CRC's claim of a umversal 
'tmth' about childhood. There are verj' specific and highly poHtical reasons for performing the 
child one way over aU others. Asking questions such as, 'who is left out' or, asking ourselves 
'who matters' or 'who is deserving', and wly, is an essential critical process. That the Convention 
excludes or marginalises childhoods that do not fit mto the CRC's adult-child bman', that the 
Convention only gives rights to the child to the extent that those rights do not disrupt the adult-
child bmar\', and fmally, that the Convention only protects the child to the extent diat such 
protection does not disrupt the adult-child binarj-, exposes some harsh poHtical 'reaHties' of the 
CRC's rights regime. In this way, the CRC mamtams stams quo power relations where the adult 
IS positioned over the child, where traditions and values (read inculcating proper gender, sexual 
onentation, patriotism, and so on) are at times deemed more miportant than even the protection 
of the child, and where the state is positioned not only over the child, but as a pnmary actor m 
famiUes as weU as societ)-. In this way, the stams quo power relations of adults, traditions, and 
- Even the 2- Oplional Protocol does no. bar 15-,7yearold children ^ ^ P * 
Protocol 10 the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children m Armed Conn.ct. heb. 12. 2002. 
A/RES/54/253 hnp://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-conflicl.hlm. 
the state over children is maintained throughout the Convention, and at times even at the cost of 
protecting the categor)' 'child', to whom it is alleged '[hujmankind owes . . . the best it has to 
j107 give. 
Far from an objective description of the universal childhood, the CRC is a reflection of highly 
political, highly controversial ideologies. Beyond the critique that the CRC is exclusive (in other 
words, maintaining adherence to the adult-child binar)' at the cost of excluding a vast majorit)- of 
children), it is important to understand the reasons for its exclusivity. It is absolutely essential to 
understand how those political ideologies are masked within the CRC, through claims that the 
rights allocated are primarily about children (a slogan for exceptional political purpose), or about 
families (opposed to sustaining parental control). These arc the ways in which the CRC defies 
criticism. A ver\' political adult-child binan- sets limits on what rights and protections wiU be 
afforded (by adults) to children. The CRC's absolute commitment to the adult-child binar)' sets 
limits on who counts as a child, and therefore who is worthy of rights allocation. The CRC does 
so to uphold certain dominant claims to power by adults, culmres, and states. The CRC, far 
from a description of some 'natural' child, is rather a reflection of powerful adult, cultural and 
state centric political ideologies. If there is no 'natural' child and the CRC instead functions to 
protect certain status quo lines of power, we must then ask ourselves (and/or actual children) 
where to from here? To continue to act as though the CRC is merely 'for children', 'about 
protection', 'inclusive', 'universal in its application', 'possible for all children' risks being willingly 
blind, a far cry from 'the best |humankind| has to give'."" 
^ Declaration o f l h e Rights o f l h e Child. Dec. 10. 1959. G.A. Res. 1386. U.N. GAOR. U * Sess. . Supp. No. 16. Preamble. 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Dec. 10. 1959. G.A. Res. 1386. U.N. GAOR. 14"^  Sess. , Supp. No. 16, Preamble. 
CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis antiques the CRC's articulation of the categor)' 'child', the taken for granted/self-
evident assumption that children are fundamentally different from adults, and that this 
'difference' justifies their differential and submissive positioning in relation to adults; all under 
the banner of the nghts of the child. This thesis was motivated by the perceived lack of 
theoretical engagement with die CRC's 'child', unlike most other idcntitj' categories such as 
gender, race, and disabilit}'. It sought to examine the vision of the child articulated in the CRC 
by employing a postmodern dcconstrucrionist analysis, which draws heavily from Michel 
Foucault and |udith Buder. This thesis argues that the CRC's vision of the child as 'developing' 
and thus in need of 'care' as articulated in the child's allocation of rights enables the regulation 
and control of childhood. As a result, this thesis argues that the CRC does not describe nor 
provide for the 'true' childhood. Radier, the CRC prescribes a 'true' childhood, conferring 
™lnerability and dependency as markers of childhood. The CRC defines what a 'true' childhood 
should be, without questioning versions of childhood excluded by tliis definition. This 
conclusion revisits the framework of argument presented in this thesis, and considers elements 
of a possible reconstruction for the CRC's 'child'. 
Chapter 2 sought to canvass accounts of the CRC with a view towards questioning the legal 
construction of the child in the CRC. This chapter argued that dominant discourses on the CRC 
fail to explicate the categorj' 'child', with each perspective instead insist that it better knows the 
'true' child. Dominant perspectives on the CRC simply disagree on whether the CRC captured 
the 'true' child. By adopting a 'universal' child, the CRC engages in its own iteration of the 'true' 
(and universal) category' 'child'. This disagreement over the identity' 'child' did not and has not 
resulted in the questioning whether an identit)' 'child' is possible or even helpful. Discussion 
continues to focus rather on who 'knows' the fundamental 'child' best. In addition to exploring 
main stream perspectives that accept the fundamental difference of childhood from adulthood 
on the basis of the child's immaturitj'/incapacit)'. Chapter 2 also explored certain academics who 
have argued that the child's alleged immaturitj'/incapacit)' has no relevance to the discussion of 
the child's rights. Such arguments forecasted some of the positions taken in tliis thesis; 1) adult 
society simply does not 'know' children's capacities, and further that capacit\- should never be a 
precursor for rights, an idea accepted in the context of other minorities, but rejected in the 
context of children, 2) the methodology of protection is insufficient, harmful, and potentially 
abusive; again an idea that has been accepted in the context of other minorities, but rejected in 
die context of cliildren, 3) the umversaHsation of the categor)' 'child' is exclusionan- as the CRC 
IS based on a particular t)pe of childhood that is not enjoyed by everj' child and, as a result. 
further marginalises and stigmatises those who arc not envisioned by the CRC, and 4) finally, the 
CRC's commitment to remedying the \'ulnerabilit)' unique to childhood goes only as far as rights 
that do not blur what it means to be an adult (capable) and what it means to be a child 
(incapable). 
When one speaks of 'the child' or 'the rights of the child', one is using an identity' category' to 
distinguish those who fall into the category 'child' from others who do not (adults). The major 
theoretical perspectives this paper employed to deconstruct the identity' of the child in the CRC 
are Michel Foucault and Judith Buder. Chapter 3 explored certain parts of the theoretical 
perspectives of Foucault and Butler to argue that identity categories are inevitably based on a set 
of alleged 'natural' characteristics that those within the category uniformly share. In an attempt 
to examine the relatively unexplored identity category 'child', a variety of theoretical tools that 
have been 'successfully' deployed to deconstruct other identity categories were discussed with 
the \'iew to make the argument in later chapters that the category 'child' is not based upon some 
'natural' characteristics that those who are aged 0-18 possess. 
Notably, the category 'child' is not the only identity category singled out for their own human 
rights convention. Before engaging in a deconstruction of the category 'child', Chapter 4 sought 
to examine other categories that have been singled out from the human family for 'special' 
attention, in other words given their own international human nghts document. Through this 
comparison. Chapter 4 argues that no other international human rights convention identifies tiiat 
the problems faced by an identity category result exclusively from the category's 'biological' or 
'inherent' difference, as opposed to a socially constructed difference. Further, no odier category 
of persons is required to relinquish certain fundamental rights as the remedy for such difference. 
Put anodier way, no other identity category is constructed as whoUy biologicaUy 
immamre/incapable and thus required to turn over to another identity category (read 
aduks/parents) certam fundamental nghts. Chapter 4 argued that despite similarities m how the 
law constructs the categories 'woman', 'person with disabikties', 'elder' and 'child', the law's 
differential treatment ('remedy', or 'rights') of the category 'child' reflects not some sort of 
inherent difference of childhood, but rather reflects and upholds the adult-child binary, where 
aduks are presumed capable and children mcapable. What is made possible through this 
construction of the child-as-mcapable/mimawre/dependent, far from shoring up of autonomy 
and participation, as done with all other identity categories, is that ^•uklerablllty and dependency 
become markers of childhood. In comparison with the deconstructions brought to bear against 
other identity categories, Chapter 4 ultimately noted diat the CRC evades critique for its 
engagement in universalising the 'child' based on some biological 'facts' of childhood. 
To better understand the 'facts'/'truths' about childhood. Chapter 5 then explored various 
critical perspectives on the categorj- 'child' emerging from the field of sociology that help identifj' 
certain assumptions made about childhood that make possible the differential treatment of the 
categoty 'child' in the CRC described in Chapter 4. These critical perspectives reflect the 
theoretical method outlined in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 first examined literature that argues that the 
categoty' 'child' is a social construct as opposed to a biological given, as is accepted in the CRC 
and indeed by a majority of those who write about the CRC. Chapter 5 then considered three 
'truths' that have been identified by certain sociologists that appear to rationalise the differential 
treatment of the categoty' 'child'. In the CRC: 1) childhood is a period of development,' and 2) 
children are uniquely \Tjlncrable and thus in need of protection, and 3) childhood is a time 
defined by needs.^ Finally Chapter 5 explored the ways in which these 'truths', and thus the 
categoty' 'child' is constructed through the adult - child binan". It was argued that to understand 
what the characteristics of the categoty- 'child', one must understand the categoty' 'adult'. To be a 
'good' child, one must not be an adult. A 'child' is, only to the extent that a 'child' is not an 
'adult'. Within a binan' opposition, neither term can be original and fundamental because both 
are related to each other in a system of mutual dependences and differences.' Nonetheless, the 
binaty' relation is never equitable.'' In the adult-child. Chapter 5 argued, adultness is associated 
with privileged or valued characteristics such as rationality or mindfulness, whereas childishness 
is associated with rrrationality or recklessness. 
With these 'truths' in mind, Chapters 6 and 7 inquired as to how the CRC constructs, not only 
the categoty' 'child', but also the child's 'needs', in light of the third 'truth' identified in Chapter 5 
(childhood as defmed by a period of needs). Chapter 6 deconstructed the CRC's 'truth' of the 
categoty' 'child' as developing, through the use of Woodhead's 'needs' equation; 
' R I : x S T A I N T O N R O G E R S a n d W E N D Y S T A I N T O N R O G E R S . S T O R I E S OF C H I L D H O O D : SHIFTING A G E N D A S OF C H I L D C O N C E R N 
( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
- MARTIN WOODHEAD, Psychology and the Cullura! ConsincUon of "Children S Needs in GROWING UP IN A CHANGING 
S O C I E T Y . 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
^ Jack Balkin. Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory. 96 YALE LAW REVIEW 743 . 751 ( 1987 ) . 
Sarah Holloway and Gill Valentine. Spatiality and the New Social Studies of Childhood. 34 (4) SOCIOLOGY 763 . 765-766 
( 2 0 0 0 ) : L E E N A A L A N E N . M O D E R N C H I L D H O O D : E X P L O R I N G THE ' C H I L D Q U E S T I O N S " IN S O C I O L O G Y ( 1 9 9 2 ) : A n n e O a k l e y . 
Women and Children First and Last: Parallels and Differences Between H omen S and Children's Studies, in CHILDREN'S 
C H I L D H O O D S : O B S E R V E D AND E X P E R I E N C E D ( B e r r \ ' M a v a l l e d 1 9 9 4 ) 
X [the child] needs Y [a particular thing that is secured in the form of a right] for 
Z Jto accomplish some measure]^. 
Chapter 6 examined specific rights in the Convention that reference the child's development and 
examined how development operates (what the term 'development' makes possible) within each 
of those articles. Chapter 6 argued that to be a 'true' or 'real' child according to the CRC, a 
person nominated a child must be 'developing'. This chapter then sought to explicate how this 
'truth' of the 'child-as-developing' permits a particular hierarchy of power surrounding the child.'' 
The chapter concluded that the CRC, in its allocation of 'rights' to children, sustains and 
supports a hierarchy of power, where adults (parents, and the state as a back-up parent) are 
positioned over the child, in the name of protection and even as a fulfilment of the 'rights of the 
child'. This hierarchy of power is made possible, and even 'necessarj'' by constructing childhood 
as a state of development. 
Chapter 7 investigated the 'truth' in the CRC that the child though construction of her/his rights 
requires protection or 'carc', a result of the child's state of development (examined in Chapter 6). 
Chapter 7 argued that the CRC imagines the child to be in a particular positional matrix: the 
family or some similar form of 'care'. This chapter employed a textual analysis to examine how 
die CRC em-isions relations between the parent, the state, and the child. The family or 'care' is 
defined in the Convention as the adult positioned over the child, with die child only given 
autonomy and protection rights that reinforce the adult - child binan*. In this way, family/'care' 
(the adult positioned over the child) or 'dependency' (on a parent) and, as such ™lnerability 
become markers of childhood. UnUke other human rights discourses that seek to redress 
hierarchies, the CRC reinforces and even sustains the inequaHties between adults and children. 
Unlike any other human nghts discourse that offers p r o t e c t i o n s > » the state, die CRC also offers 
children protection from themselves, as if children suffer subjugation, inequaUt>', 
disenfranchisement, and abuse from themselves. Unlike the definition of the family in the 
CRC's Preamble where aU members of the human family have equal and inaHenable rights, the 
child finds him/herself in this family charactensed by inequaHt>' and with rights that are alienable 
because she/he has been marked by the CRC as a 'child'. 
' MARTIN W O O D H E A D . Psycholo^ and,he Cultural Cons,rue,ion ofCluldren S Needs", in GROW,NC UP .N A CHANGING 
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Chapter 8 then examined the ways in which the CRC's version of childhood is produced and 
enforced through the CRC's excrcise of both juridical power (particularly through incarccration 
and corporal punishment), as well as discipHnan* power (in particular the gaze over the child 
through compulsor)' education and mandatory 'care'). I'his chapter argued that, through its 
performance of die 'cluld' as developing and 'in care', the CRC makes possible the regulation 
and control of childhood. The 'child-as-developing' justifies the exercise of both juridical power 
(through corporal punishment and forms of incarceration) and disciplinan- power (through 
constant surveillance m 'care' and at school). In this way, the islands of 'care' and 'education' 
become the means through which the CRC's normative childhood is enforced and produced. 
Structuring the everj-day life enable the social reproduction of the categorj- 'child'.' As discussed 
in Chapter 3, this process of moulding is what Foucault refers to as the technologies of 
governmentalit}': calculated preoccupation with activities directed at shaping, channelling and 
guiding the conduct of persons through the production, dissemination, and utilisation of 
knowledge." As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, these 'truths' (children arc developing and 
therefore require 'care') masquerade as neutral descriptions of subjects (objective statements 
about what the child fundamentally is), opposed to prescriptions (political statements about what 
the child should be). Butler argues that identit)' categories are not the came or basis, but rather 
the effects of institutions, practices discourses, with multiple and diffused points of origin.' These 
'truths' ser\'e the basis for activities that are directed at moulding the subject. According to a 
Foucauldian critique, the developmental framework, discussed in Chapter 6, operates as a regime 
of 'truth' or a system of beliefs and procedures used to construct a norm and the normal. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, these norms govern behaviour and thmking, and work to exclude certain 
ways of acting or being. Alternati\-e 'truths' are marginalised, diversit}' is reduced to abnormalit)'. 
The developmental framework determines who and what a child is, and which children and what 
concerns wiU be disregarded. Establishing a 'truth' about children also means specifically that 
certain children's needs wiU be taken into consideration while others wiU be disregarded. As 
discussed in the (Chapters 1, 3 and 5, this thesis argues that there is no single universal pattern of 
development, and no universal childhood. As such, children who fail to meet that which is 
defined as normal are excluded and/or 'require' inten-ention. 
Finally, Chapter 9 explored children that are marginalised, ignored, or stigmatised by the CRC's 
version of childhood. As discussed in Chapter 3, Foucault and Butier both use the technique of 
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genealog)', which investigates local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against 
the claims of a universal 'truth'.'" Foucault described his method as an effort 'to question over 
and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people's mental habits ' ." Chapter 9 
argued that the CRC's performance of childhood is exclusionarj'. This chapter contended that, 
in universalising the child, the CRC not only sustains certain power relations, but also expels or 
stigmatises certain childhoods from the human rights discourse. The CRC's performance of the 
child dictates which children matter, which children will be problematised, and which children 
will be ignored. Tt is through excluded knowledges, excluded children, parents, states, families, 
cultures, and traditions that the politics involved in nominating a particular 'true childhood' 
within international discourse on rights of the child may be understood. Believing that certain 
political stakes are ser\'ed in the construction of identity, one must consider what configuration 
of power constructs exist, and therefore what forms of power restrain and regulate the subject. 
Chapter 9 sought to explore possible impHcations of casting the child is cast as irresponsible, the 
adult as responsible, the family as happy and safe, cultures and traditions as promoting the well-
being of the child. 
In light of the resiliency of 'truths' surrounding the CRC's child, this thesis sought to understand 
who benefits from this construction of childhood. Some have argued the CRC's political aims to 
include limiting the work force to protect access to finite resources, to protect gendered and 
hetero— norms, to underline the current hierarchy of power: the positioning of the state over 
adult over child, to underhne the centraHty of the state, and so on. For example, Prout argues 
that in a world that is perceived as shifting, complex, and uncertain, the child may operate as a 
vessel or repositor}' for nostalgic longings for stabilit)' and certainty or a figure with redemptive 
possibility.'^ As children are seen as 'unfinished' or 'developing', Prout contends that children 
appear a good target for controlling the future, or at least a target that still retains a wide social 
credibility." The health, welfare, and rearing of children have been linked to the destiny of the 
state.'" The child then becomes the focus of numerous projects that purport to safeguard the 
'child' from physical, sexual, and moral danger, to ensure the child's 'normal' development.'^ As 
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such, it is argued that childhood has become the most intensively governed identit}' categor}'." 
The way in which 'we' treat 'our' children becomes indicative of the state of our social structure, 
a measure of our achievement of civilisation." These beliefs mform the 'need' to increase 
control, socialise, and constrain children." As one author writes, 
[w]e are compelled to care about the well-being and prospects of other peoples' 
children as a condition of preser\-ing our nationhood . . . [A] call to recast the 
ground of public discourse on the collective stams of children . . . to recover . . . 
traditions of common intent essential to sustain our nationhood into the next 
centurj'." 
Children become a conduit through which nationhood is preser\'ed and sustained. The current 
hierarchy of power is sustained. Without the control of children, how would proper gender, 
class, and sexualit}' be reproduced? Without the regulation of childhood, how would structures 
of power be sustained? How else would 'respectful' and 'productive' citizens be made? In a 
sense, controlling childhood becomes controlling the fumre. The regulation of childhood is the 
regulation of the future, where status quo hierarchical relationships are maintained.^" 
It is noteworthy that this thesis does not claim to be apolitical. As stated in the introduction, this 
project is poHtical at the start, first by choosing the CRC as opposed to other documents about 
children, and then by selecting certain parts of the CRC (for example articles relating to 
education) while omitting examination of other portions (for example article relating to life 
imprisonment). This thesis does have an 'ax to grind'^' with the CRC's articulation of the 
category 'child'. It simultaneously does set this author's analysis outside the scope of the 
deconstruction. Both these elements underline this project as poUtical. However, it is important 
to highlight the limits of poHtical intent for this project. This thesis does not argue that children 
should be treated the same as adults. This thesis sought instead to explicate the assumptions 
made about the category- 'child' in the CRC and inquire as to the basis of those assumptions. It 
may ver)' well be that in certain cases differential treatment of those nominated a 'child' or an 
'adult' is preferable. As Holt contends. 
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|m]ost people who believe in the institution of childhood as we know it see it as 
a kind of walled garden in which children, being smaU and weak, are protected 
from the harshness of the world outside until they become strong and clever 
enough to cope with it. Some children experience childhood in just that way. 1 
do not want to destroy their garden or kick them out of it. If they like by, by all 
means let them stay in it. But 1 believe that most young people, and at earlier 
and earlier ages, being to experience childhood not as a garden but as a prison. 
What I want to do is put a gate, or gates, into the wall of the garden, so that 
those who find it no longer protective or helpful, but instead confining and 
humiliating, can move out of it and for a while tr)' living in a larger space. If that 
proves too much for them, they can always come back into the garden. Indeed, 
perhaps we all ought to have walled gardens to take refuge in when we feel we 
must." 
Quite possibly, differential treatment may at times be needed for individuals in either categorj-. 
This acknowledgement leads this project to question what might be the nature of that differential 
treatment, what might a reconstruction for the CRC's child look like. This thesis has primarily 
focused on deconstructing the assumptions that the child is 'developing' mamrity/capacit)- and 
that the child requires 'care'. Nevertheless, elements of a possible reconstruction do emerge. In 
particular, the child's right to participate (the 'right to express [his/her] -s-iews freely in all matters 
affecting the child') found in Article 12 provides a basic starting point for reconstruction. Again, 
it is noteworthy that the categor)' 'child' has thus far not been allowed to form a political identity-
of their own. When 'we' (adults) speak about the category' 'child' in the CRC, both the categor)' 
'child' and the CRC itself are the products of an entirely different categor)' of persons, in other 
words adults. Participation, even unqualified participation, may be a starting point. 
Studying Buder and Foucault's responses to many of the same claims, in particular that their 
cntiquc of identity poHtics makes coUective poHtical action impossible, one identifies anodier 
element of a reconstruction: the coahtion. As was argued in Chapter 3, Foucault's critique of 
identit)' does not deny the use of identity' as a basis for poHtical action, but rather demonstrates 
its limitations and dangers.'' Foucault does envision poHtical action based on 'creating a new 
cukural life, or common interest',-" instead of coalitions built on perceived essences. Moving 
beyond identity poKtics recognises that identities are constructions. In this way Foucault 
suggests that die key struggle is to fracmrc the limitations imposed on us by normaHsing identity' 
categones. Butler likewise envisages this new configuration of poHtics as an anti-foundational 
coaUtion pohtics that would accept the need to act within the tensions produced by 
^ 3 r H " ° F o u c r / , 4 2 , H u H e > . . R . , r a n s . , ,978,. 
« S e i p l c a u t Pomes, and Problemaii-.anom. in THE ESSENTIAL W O R K S OF FOUCAULT. VOLUME I. Paul 
Rabinow ed., 1994). 
contradiction, fragmentation and divers i t ) ' " Per Buder, the process of universalit)' is made 
open-ended by being brought into crisis again and again by what is outside of itself. Butler 
argues that die task of politics would be to keep the process of universality open, to keep it as a 
contested site of persistent crisis, and to not let it be setded.^'' 
The possibility of political action appears too often to rely upon the understanding that an 
essential united identit}' postured against some essential united form of domination, j-ields one 
the floor, yields one the space to have a voice, or as Buder has said 'you've achieved recognition, 
status, legitimation; and that is the end of your struggle . . . becoming sayable is the end of 
politics.'^' Otto has instead argued that by not 'seeking and maintaining unit}' at all costs against 
monolithic understandings of domination', a coalition relies on the possibilit}- of dialogue across 
vast differences in power and knowledge'" In this way, her concept of coalition gives up 'the 
desire and the apparent safet)' of certaint\- and prescription', as well as arguably at least some 
political purchase, and learns 'how to live and act so that differences and incommensurabilities 
can inform and contest the practices of individual identities and collective solidarities'?' The 
shape of such a coalition will not be developed here, only identified as a starting point. Yet a 
coalition, at its most basic, does not require a unified essential identit)'. The refusal to accept an 
'essential' and 'natural' identity categor\- acknowledges that categories are both unnatural and 
exclusionarj-. In this view, categories are more open to evolution and change because they are 
more open to criticism. The CRC is a perfect example of how the fiction of a universal and natural 
category' (child) forecloses critical inquky about whose interests are being represented and along 
what political lines. By insisting that the CRC represents the essential universal child as opposed to 
the interests of those, in particular states and adults, who have deeply political aims, the CRC 
evades the interrogation of how those interests are manifested, how the child is constructed in 
the CRC and what rights are given to whom. In contrast, by rejecting a 'universal' and 'essential' 
identity category' and rather relying on shared interests or a coalition that includes the 
participation of children, a children's political movement may better avoid requiring the 
normalisation and assimilation of children into a fictional universal categorj' 'child'. 
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APPENDIX I 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
U.N. General Assembly 
Document A/RES/44/25 (12 December 1989) 
The General Assembly, Recalling its previous resolutions, especially resolutions 33/166 of 20 December 
1978 and 43/112 of 8 December 1988, and those of the Commission on Human Rights and the 
Economic and Social Council related to the question of a convention on the rights of the cliild, 
Taking note, in particular, of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1989/57 of 8 March 1989, by 
which the Commission decided to transmit the draft convention on the rights of the child, through the 
Economic and Social Council, to the General Assembly, and Economic and Social Council resolution 
1989/79 of 24 May 1989, 
Reaffirming that children's rights require special protection and call for continuous improvement of the 
situation of children all over the world, as well as for their development and education in conditions of 
peace and securit}'. 
Profoundly concerned that the situation of children in many parts of the world remains critical as a result 
of inadequate social conditions, namral disasters, armed conflicts, exploitation, illiteracy, hunger and 
disability, and convinced that urgent and effective national and international action is called for. 
Mindful of the important role of the United Nations Children's Fund and of that of the United Nations 
in promoting the well-being of children and their development, 
Convinced that an international convention on the rights of the child, as a standard-setting 
accomplishment of the Umted Nations in the field of human rights, would make a positive contribution 
to protecting children's rights and ensuring their well-being. 
Bearing in mind that 1989 marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
and the tenth anniversarj' of the International Year of the Child, 
1. Expresses its appreciation to the Commission on Human Rights for having concluded the 
elaboration of the draft convention on the rights of the cliild; 
2. Adopts and opens for signature, ratification and accession the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child contained in the annex to the present resolution; 
3. Calls upon all Member States to consider signing and ratifying or acceding to the Convention 
as a matter of priority and expresses the hope that it will come into force at an early date; 
4. Requests the Secretarj'-General to provide all the facilities and assistance necessarj' for 
dissemination of information on the Convention; 
5. Invites United Nations agencies and organizations, as well as intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, to intensify their efforts with a view to disseminating information on 
the Convention and to promoting its understanding; 
6. Requests the Secretarj'-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fort\'-fifth session a 
report on the status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
7. Decides to consider the report of the Secretarj'-General at its fony-fifth session under an item 
entided "Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child". 
61st plenar)- meeting 
20 November 1989 
ANNEX 
PREAMBLE 
The States Parties to the present Convention, Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in 
the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignit)' and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peacc in the world. 
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights and in the dignit)' and worth of the human person, and have determined to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. 
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that ever)-one is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, poliucal or other opinion, nauonal or social origin, propert)-, birth or other states. 
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of I luman Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that 
childhood IS entitled to special care and assistance. 
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the namral environment for the 
growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary 
protection and assistance so that it can fuUy assume its responsibilities within the community. 
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personaUt}', should 
grow up m a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding. 
Considering that the child should be fuUy prepared to live an individual Ufe in societ)', and brought up in 
the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and m particular in the spirit of 
peace, dignit)', tolerance, freedom, equaUtj' and soUdarit}', 
Bearing in mind that the need to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva 
Declaration of the Rights o f the Child o f 1924 and m the Declaration o f the Rights o f the Child adopted 
by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959 and recogmzed in the Universal Declaration o f Human 
Rights, in the hiternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in articles 23 and 24), in 
the Internadonal Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in pardcular in ardcle 10) and in the 
statutes and relevant instruments o f specialized agencies and international organizadons concerned with 
the welfare of children, 
Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration o f the Rights o f the Child, "the child, by reason of 
his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth". 
Recalling the provisions o f the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and 
XX'elfare o f Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and 
Internationally; the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration o f Juvenile justice 
(The Beijing Rules); and the Declaration on the Protection o f Women and Children in Emergency and 
Armed Conflict, 
Recogmzing that, in all countries in the world, there are children living in exceptionally difficult 
conditions, and that such children need special consideration. 
Taking due account o f the importance o f the traditions and cultural values o f each people for the 
protection and harmonious development o f the child. 
Recognizing the importance of international co-operation for improving the living conditions o f children 
in eveq- countn', in particular in the developing countries. 
Have agreed as follows: 
P A R T I 
Article 1 
For the purposes o f the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen 
years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. 
Article 2 
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child 
within their jurisdiction without discrimination o f any kind, irrespective o f the child's or his or her 
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic 
or social origin, propert)', disabilit)', birth or other status. 
2. States Parties shaU take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms 
o f discrimination or punishment on the basis o f the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the 
child's parents, legal guardians, or family members. 
Article 3 
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests o f the child shall be a 
primarj' consideration. 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessarj- for his or her well-
being, taking into account the rights and duties of Iiis or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals 
legall)' responsible for h im or her, and, to this end, shall take aU appropriate legislative and administrative 
measures. 
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or 
protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly 
in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitabilit)' of their staff, as well as competent supen-ision. 
Article 4 
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, admimstrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social and 
cultural rights. States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available 
resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation. 
Article 5 
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the 
members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other 
persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of 
the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the 
present Convention. 
Article 6 
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life. 
2. States Parties shall ensure to the max imum extent possible the sun ival and development of the child. 
Article 7 
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the 
nght to acquire a nationalit)' and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her 
parents. 
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and 
their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child 
would otherwise be stateless. 
Article 8 
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including 
nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference. 
Where a child is illegaUy deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identit)'. States Parties 
shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to speedily re-estabHshmg his or her 
identity. 
Article 9 
1 States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents agamst their will, 
except when competent authorities sub|ect to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law 
and procedures, that such separation is necessar)' for the best interests o f the child. Such determination 
may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect o f the child by the parents, or 
one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child's place of 
residence. 
2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 o f the present article, aU interested parties shall be given an 
opportunit)' to participate in the proceedings and make their views known. 
3. States Parties shall respect the right o f the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the 
child's best interests. 
4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Part)', such as the detention, 
imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from any cause while the person is in 
the custody o f the State) o f one or both parents or o f the child, that State Party shall, upon request, 
provide the parents, the cliild or, if appropriate, another member o f the family with the essential 
information concerning the whereabouts o f the absent member(s) of the family unless the provision of 
the information would be detrimental to the well-being o f the child. States Parties shall further ensure that 
the submission o f such a request shall o f itself entail no adverse consequences for the person(s) 
concerned. 
Article 10 
1. In accordance with the obligation o f States Parties under article 9, paragraph 1, applications by a child 
or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose o f family reunification shall be dealt 
with by States Parties in a positive, humane and expedidous manner. States Parties shall further ensure 
that the submission o f such a request shall entail no adverse consequences for the applicants and for the 
members o f their family. 
2. A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis, save 
in exceptional circumstances personal reladons and direct contacts with both parents. Towards that end 
and in accordance with the obligauon o f States Parties under article 9, paragraph 2, States Parties shall 
respect the right o f the child and his or her parents to leave any countn', including their own, and to enter 
their own countr)'. The right to leave any country' shall be subject only to such restrictions as are 
prescribed by law and wliich are necessary to protect the national security, public order (ordre public), 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms o f others and are consistent with the other rights 
recognized in the present Convendon. 
Article 11 
1. States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return o f children abroad. 
2. T o this end. States Parties shall promote the conclusion o f bilateral or multilateral agreements or 
accession to existing agreements. 
Article 12 
1. States Parries shall assure to the child who is capable o f forming his or her own views the right to 
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views o f the child being given due weight 
in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunitj' to be heard in any judicial 
and admimstrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an 
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules o f national law. 
Art ic le 13 
1. T h e ch i ld shal l h ave the r ight to f r e e d o m of expre s s ion ; this r ight shall inc lude f r e e d o m to seek, rece ive 
and impar t i n f o r m a t i o n and ideas o f aU k inds , r egard les s of f ront iers , e i ther orall)-, in w n t i n g or in pr int , in 
the f o r m of art, o r th rough any o the r m e d i a o f the ch i ld ' s cho ice . 
2. T h e exerc i se o f this n g h t m a y be sub jec t to cer ta in restr ic t ions , but these shall only be such as are 
prov ided by l aw and are necessa ry : 
(a) For r e spec t o f the r ights o r r epu ta t ions o f o thers ; o r 
(b) For the p ro tec t ion o f na t iona l secur i ty o r o f pub l i c o rde r (ordre publ ic ) , or of publ ic hea l th or mora l s . 
Article 14 
1. States Par t i es shal l r espec t the r ight of the chi ld to f r e e d o m of thought , consc i ence and rel ig ion. 
2. States Par t i es shall respect the r ights and dut ies of the parents and, w h e n appl icable , legal guard ians , to 
provide d i rec t ion to the chi ld in the exerc i se of his o r her r ight in a m a n n e r cons is tent wi th the evo lv ing 
capacit ies o f the chi ld . 
3. F r e e d o m to man i f e s t one ' s re l ig ion or be l i e fs may be subject only to such l imi ta t ions as are prescr ibed 
by law and are necessar}- to protec t pub l i c safet}', o rder , hea l th or mora l s , o r the fundamenta l r ights and 
f r eedoms o f o thers . 
Article 15 
1. States Par t ies recogni2e the r ights of the chi ld to f r e e d o m of assoc ia t ion and to f r e edom of peace fu l 
assembly . 
2. N o res t r i c t ions m a y be p l aced on the exerc i se o f these r ights o ther than those imposed in con fo rmi t y 
with the law and w h i c h arc necessar)- in a democra t i c societ) ' in the interests of nat ional securit) ' or pubUc 
safety, pub l i c o r d e r (ordre publ ic ) , the pro tec t ion of publ ic heal th o r mora l s or the protect ion of the 
r ights and f r e e d o m s o f o thers . 
Artic le 16 
1. N o ch i ld shall be sub jec ted to arbitrar)- or un l awfu l in ter ference wi th his or her pr ivacy , fami ly , h o m e 
or c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , no r to un l awfu l a t tacks on his or her h o n o u r and reputat ion . 
2. T h e chi ld has the r ight to the pro tec t ion o f the law against such in te r fe rence o r attacks. 
Artic le 17 
States Par t ies r e c o g m z e the impor t an t funcUon p e r f o r m e d by the m a s s med i a and shall ensure that the 
child has access to i n f o r m a t i o n and mater ia l f r o m a divers i ty o f nat iona l and internat iona l sources , 
espec ia l ly those a i m e d at the p r o m o t i o n o f his or her social , spir imal and mora l we l l -be ing and phys ica l 
and men t a l hea l th . T o t ins end . S ta tes ParUes shaU: 
(a) E n c o u r a g e the m a s s med i a to d i s semina te in formaUon and mater ia l o f socia l and cultural benef i t to 
the chi ld and in a c co rdance w i th the spirit o f Art ic le 29 ; 
(b) Encourage international co-operation in the production, exchange and dissemination o f such 
information and material from a diversit)' o f cultural, national and international sources; 
(c) Encourage the production and dissemination o f children's books; 
(d) Encourage the mass media to have particular regard to the linguistic needs o f the child who belongs to 
a minorit}' group or who is indigenous; 
(e) Encourage the development o f appropriate guidelines for the protection o f the child from information 
and material injurious to his or her well-being, bearing in mind the provisions o f Articles 13 and 18. 
Article 18 
1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition o f the principle that both parents have 
common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, 
legal guardians, have the primar)- responsibilit)- for the upbringing and development o f the child. The best 
interests o f the child will be their basic concern. 
2. For the purpose o f guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present Convention, States 
Pardes shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance o f their child-
rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development o f institutions, facilities and ser^'ices for the care 
o f cliildren. 
3. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children o f working parents have the 
right to benefit from child-care ser\'ices and facilities for which they are eligible. 
Article 19 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to 
protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injur)- or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care o f parent(s), legal 
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child. 
2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of 
social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the 
child, as well as for other forms o f prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, 
treatment and follow-up o f instances o f child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for 
judicial involvement. 
Article 20 
1. A child temporarily or permanently depnved o f his or her family environment, or in whose own best 
interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and 
assistance provided by the State. 
2. States Parties shall in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative care for such a child. 
3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, kafalah o f Islamic law, adoption or if necessary 
placement in suitable institutions for the care o f children. Wlien considering solutions, due regard shall be 
paid to the desirability of continuity in a child's upbringing and to the child's ethnic, religious, cultural and 
linguistic background. 
Article 21 
States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the best interests of 
the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall: 
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities who deterirune, in 
accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all pertinent and reliable information, 
that the adoption is permissible m view of the child's stams concerning parents, relatives and legal 
guardians and that, if required, the persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption 
on the basis of such counsell ing as may be necessary; 
(b) Recognize that inter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative means of child's care, if the 
child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in 
the child's countr}' of origin; 
(c) Ensure that the child concerned by inter-countn- adoption enjoys safeguards and standards equivalent 
to those existing in the case of national adoption; 
(d) Take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in inter-countrj- adoption, the placement does not result 
in improper financial gain for those involved in it; 
(e) Promote, where appropriate, the objectives of the present article by concluding bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements or agreements, and endeavour, within tliis framework, to ensure that the placement of the 
child in another country is carried out by competent authorities or organs. 
Article 22 
1. States Pardes shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a cluld who is seeking refugee states or 
who IS considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and procedures 
shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by any other person, receive 
appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the 
present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the 
said States are Parties. 
2. For this purpose. States Parties shall provide, as they consider appropriate, co-operation in any efforts 
by the United Nations and other competent intergovernmental organizations or non-governmental 
organizations co-operating with the United Nations to protect and assist such a child and to trace the 
parents or other members of the family of any refugee child in order to obtain information necessary for 
reunification with his or her family In cases where no parents or other members of the family can be 
found, the child shall be accorded the same protecuon as any other child permanendy or temporarily 
deprived of his or her family environment for any reason, as set forth in the present Convention. 
Article 23 
1 States Parties recognize that a mentally or physicaUy disabled child should enjoy a full and decent Ufe, m 
conditions which ensure digmty, promote self-reUance and facilitate the child's active parucipation in the 
community . 
-> States Parties recognize the right of the disabled child to special care and shaU encourage and ensure 
the extension subject to available resources, to the eUgible cluld and those responsible for his or her care, 
of assistance for which appHcation is made and winch is appropriate to the child's condition and to the 
circumstances of the parents or others caring for the child. 
3. Recognizing the special needs of a disabled cliild, assistance extended in accordance with paragraph 2 
of the present article shall be provided free of charge, whenever possible, taking into account the financial 
resources of the parents or others caring for the child, and shall be designed to ensure that the disabled 
child has effective access to and receives education, training, health care ser\'ices, rehabil itation sen.'ices, 
preparation for employment and recreation opportunit ies in a manner conducive to the child's achieving 
the fullest possible social integration and individual development , including his or her cultural and 
spiritual development. 
4. States Parties shall promote, in the spirit of international co-operation, the exchange of appropriate 
information in the field of preventive health care and of medical , psychological and functional treatment 
of disabled children, including dissemination of and access to informat ion concerning methods of 
rehabilitation, education and vocational ser\-ices, with the aim of enabling States Parties to improve their 
capabilities and skills and to widen their experience in these areas. In this regard, particular account shall 
be taken of the needs of developing countries. 
Article 24 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to 
ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care ser\'ices forth in the 
present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitar ian instruments to which the 
said States are Parties. 
2. For this purpose. States Parties shall provide, as they consider appropriate, co-operat ion in any efforts 
by the United Nations and other competent intergovernmental organizations or non-governmental 
organizations cooperadng with the United Nadons to protect and assist such a child and to trace the 
parents or other members of the family of any refugee child in order to obtain information necessar}^ for 
reunificadon with his or her family. In cases where no parents or other members of the family can be 
found, the cliild shall be accorded the same protection as any other child permanently or temporarily 
deprived of Ins or her family environment for any reason, as set forth in the present Convention. 
States Parties shall pursue full implementaUon of this right and, in particular, shall take appropriate 
measures: 
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality; 
(b) To ensure the provision of necessar)- medical assistance and health care to all children with emphasis 
on the development of primarj- health care; 
(c) To combat disease and malnutnUon, including within the framework of primaq- health care, through, 
iner alia, the application of readily available technology and through the provis ion of adequate nutritious 
foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental 
pollution; 
(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers; 
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are informed, have access to 
education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages 
of breast-feeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents; 
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education and services. 
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a v iew to abolishing traditional 
practices prejudicial to the health of children. 
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-operation with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization o f the right recognized in the present article. In this regard, particular 
account shall be taken o f the needs o f developing countries. 
Article 25 
States Parties recognize the right o f a child who has been placed by the competent authorities for the 
purposes o f care, protection or treatment o f his or her physical or mental health, to a periodic review o f 
the treatment provided to the child and all other circumstances relevant to his or her placement. 
Article 26 
1. States Parties shall recognize for every child the right to benefit from social security^ including social 
insurance, and shall take the necessary measures to achieve the full realization o f this right in accordance 
with their national law. 
2. The benefits should, where appropriate, be granted, taking into account the resources and the 
circumstances o f the child and persons having responsibility for the maintenance o f the child, as well as 
any other consideration relevant to an application for benefits made by or on behalf o f the child. 
Article 27 
1. States Parties recognize the right o f every child to a standard o f living adequate for the child's physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral and social development. 
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure, within their 
abilities and financial capacities, the conditions o f living necessary for the child's development. 
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate 
measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this nght and shall in case o f 
need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing 
and housing. 
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery o f maintenance for the child 
from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child, both within the State Party 
and from abroad. In particular, where the person having financial responsibility for the child Uves in a 
State different from that o f the child. States Parties shall promote the accession to international 
agreements or the conclusion o f such agreements, as weU as the making o f other appropriate 
arrangements. 
Article 28 
1. States Parties recognize the right o f the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right 
progressively and on the basis o f equal opportumty, they shall, in parucular: 
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
(b) Encourage the development o f different forms o f secondary educaUon, including general and 
vocational education, make them available and accessible to every c h M , and take appropriate measures 
such as the introducuon o f free education and offering financial assistance in case o f need; 
(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis o f capacity by every appropriate means; 
(d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all cliildren; 
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction o f drop-out rates. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a 
manner consistent with the child's human dignit)' and in conformity with the present Convention. 
3. States Parties shall promote and encourage international co-operation in matters relating to education, 
in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination o f ignorance and illiteracy throughout the 
world and facilitating access to scientific and technical knowledge and modern teaching methods. In this 
regard, particular account shall be taken o f the needs o f developing countries. 
Art ic le 29 
1. States Parties agree that the education o f the child shall be directed to: 
(a) The development o f the child's personalit}', talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest 
potential; 
(b) The development o f respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles 
enshrined in the Charter o f the United Nations; 
(c) The development o f respect for the cluld's parents, his or her own cultural identit}', language and 
values, for the national values o f the country' in which the child is living; the countr}' from which he or 
she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own; 
(d) The preparation o f the child for responsible life in a free societ}-, in the spirit o f understanding, peace, 
tolerance, equalit)' o f sexes, and friendsliip among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and 
persons o f indigenous origin; 
(e) The development o f respect for the natural environment. 
2. N o part o f the present article or Article 28 shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty o f 
individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the obser%-ance o f 
the principles set forth in Paragraph 1 o f the present article and to the requirements that the education 
given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State. 
Art ic le 30 
In those States in winch ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons o f indigenous origin exist, a 
child belonging to such a minoritj ' or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in communit) ' with 
other members o f his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own 
religion, or to use Ins or her own language. 
Art ic le 31 
1. States Parties recognize the right o f the child to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational 
activities appropriate to the age o f the child and to parucipate freely in cultural life and the arts. 
2. States Parties shaU respect and promote the right o f the child to participate fuUy in cultural and artistic 
Ufe and shall encourage the provision o f appropriate and equal opportunities for cultural, artistic, 
recreational and leisure activit)'. 
Article 32 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be 
harmful to the cliild's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. 
2. States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to ensure the 
implementation of the present articlc. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of other 
international instruments. States Parties shall in pardcular: 
(a) Provide for a min imum age or min imum ages for admission to employment; 
(b) Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of employment; 
(c) Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the, effecdve enforcement of the 
present article. 
Article 33 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislative, administrative, social and 
cducauonal measures, to protect children from the illicit use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances as def ined in the relevant international treaties, and to prevent the use of children in the illicit 
production and trafficking of such substances. 
Article 34 
States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For 
these purposes. States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent: 
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage m any unlawful sexual activit}'; 
(b) The exploitative use of cluldren in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; 
(c)The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. 
Article 35 
States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the 
abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form. 
Article 36 
States Parties shaU protect the child agamst all other forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the 
child's welfare. 
Article 37 
States Parties shall ensure that: 
(a) No child shaU be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishnnent. 
Neither capital punishment nor Hfe imprisonment without possibility of release shaU be imposed for 
offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age; 
(b) N o child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or 
imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last 
resort and for the shortest appropriate penod of time; 
(c) Ever)' cliild deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of 
the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age. In 
particular, every child deprived of liberty shall be separated f rom adults unless it is considered in the 
child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family 
through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances; 
(d) Evety child deprived of his or her libert)- shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other 
appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of liis or her liberty-
before a court or other competent, independent and imparual authority, and to a prompt decision on any 
such action. 
Article 38 
1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child. 
2. States Parties shall take aU feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 
fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities. 
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into 
their armed forces. In recruidng among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who 
have not attained the age of eighteen years. States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are 
oldest. 
4. In accordance with their obHgarions under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian 
population in armed conflicts. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care 
of children who are affected by an armed conflict. 
Article 39 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovety' and 
social reintegradon of a child victim of: any form of neglect, c,\ploitation, or abuse; torture or any other 
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovety' and 
reintegradon shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the 
child. 
Article 40 
1. States Pardes recognize the right of evety- chUd alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed 
the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and 
worth, which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and 
which takes into account the child's age and the desu-ability of promoting the child's reintegration and the 
child's assuming a constructive role in society'. 
2. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of international instruments. States Pardes 
shall, in particular, ensure that: 
(a) N o child shall be alleged as, be accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law by reason 
of acts or omissions that were not prohibited by national or international law at the time they were 
committed; 
(b) Ever)' child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least the following 
guarantees: 
(i) To be presumed innocent until proven guilt)' according to law; 
(u) To be informed prompdy and directly of the charges against him or her, and, if appropriate, through 
his or her parents or legal guardians, and to have legal or other appropriate assistance in the preparation 
and presentation of his or her defence; 
(iii) To have the matter determined without delay by a competent, independent and imparual authority or 
judicial body in a fair hearing according to law, in the presence of legal or other appropriate assistance 
and, unless it is considered not to be in the best interest of the child, in particular, taking into account his 
or her age or situation, his or her parents or legal guardians; 
(iv) Not to be compelled to give testimony or to confess quilt; to examine or have examined adverse 
witnesses and to obtain the participation and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under 
conditions of equality; 
(v) If considered to have infringed the penal law, to have this decision and any measures imposed in 
consequence thereof reviewed by a higher competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial 
body according to law; 
(vi) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if the child cannot understand or speak the language 
used; 
(vii) To have his or her privacy fully respected at all stages of the proceedings. 
3. States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and instituuons 
specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law, 
and, in particular: 
(a) The establishment of a m immum age below which children shall be presumed not to have the capacity 
to infringe the penal law; 
(b) WTienever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such children without resorting to 
judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected. 
4. A variet)' of dispositions, such as care, guidance and supervision orders; counselling; probaaon; foster 
care; education and vocational training programmes and other alternatives to institutional care shall be 
available to ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being and 
proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence. 
Article 41 
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the 
realizauon of the rights of the child and which may be contained in: 
(a) The law of a State Party; or 
(b) International law in force for that State. 
PART II 
Article 42 
States Parties undertake to make the principles and provisions of the Convention widely known, by 
appropriate and active means, to adults and children alike. 
Article 43 
1. For the purpose of examining the progress made by States Parties in achieving the realization of the 
obligations undertaken in the present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, which shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided. 
2. The Committee shall consist of ten experts of high moral standing and recognized competent in the 
field covered by this Convention. The members of the Committee shall be elected by States Parties from 
among their nationals and shall serve in their personal capacit)', consideration being given to equitable 
geographical distribution, as well as to the principal legal systems. 
3. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by 
States Parties. Each State Part)' may nominate one person from among its own nationals. 
4. The initial election to the Committee shall be held no later than six months after the date of the entrj' 
into force of the present Convention and thereafter every second year. At least four months before the 
date of each election, the Secretar)--General of the United Nations shall address a letter to States Parties 
inviting them to submit their nominations within two months. The Secretarj'-Gcneral shall subsequendy 
prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating States Parties which have 
nominated them, and shall subinit it to the States Parties to the present Convention. 
5. The elections shall be held at meetings of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General at United 
Nations Headquarters. At those meetings, for which two thirds of States Parties shall constimte a 
quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those who obtain the largest number of votes and 
an absolute majorit)- of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting. 
6. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years They shall be eligible for re-
election if renominated. The term of five of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the 
end of two years; immediately after the first election, the names of these five members shall be chosen by 
lot by the Chairman of the meedng. 
7. If a member of the Coinmittee dies or resigns or declares that for any other cause he or she can no 
longer perform the duties of the Committee, the State Party which nominated the member shall appoint 
another expert from among its nationals to serve for the remainder of the term, subject to the approval of 
the Committee. 
8. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure. 
9. The Committee shall elect its officers for a period of two years. 
10. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at United Nations Headquarters or at any 
other convenient place as determined by the Committee The Committee shall normally meet annually. 
The duration of the meetings of the Committee shall be determined, and reviewed, it necessarj-, by a 
meeting of the States Parties to the present Convention, subject to the approval of the General Assembly. 
11. The Secretar^'-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessarj- staff and facilities for the 
effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the present Convention. 
12. With the approval of the General Assembh', the members of the Committee established under the 
present Convention shall receive emoluments from United Nations resources on such terms and 
conditions as the Assembh' may decide. 
Art ic le 4 4 
1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Committee, through the Secretar)'-General of the United 
Nations, reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and 
on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights: 
(a) Within two years of the entr)' into force of the Convention for the State Party concerned; 
(b) Thereafter ever)' five years. 2. Reports made under the present article shall indicate factors and 
difficulties, if any, affecting the degree of fulfillment of the obligations under the present ConvenUon. 
Reports shall also contain sufficient information to provide the Committee with a comprehensive 
understanding of the implementation of the Convention in the country' concerned. 
3. A State Party which has submitted a comprehensive imtial report to the Committee need not, in its 
subsequent reports submitted in accordance with paragraph 1 (b) of the present article, repeat basic 
information previously provided. 
4. The Committee may request from States Parties further information relevant to the implementation of 
the Convention. 
5. The Committee shall submit to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, 
every two years, reports on its activities. 
6. States Parties shall make their reports widely available to the public in their own countries. 
Artic le 45 
In order to foster the effective implementation of the ConvenUon and to encourage internauonal co-
operation in the field covered by the Convention: 
(a) The specialized agencies, the United Nations Children's Fund, and other United NaUons organs shall 
be entitled to be represented at the consideration of the implementation of such provisions of the present 
Convention as faU within the scope of their mandate. The Committee may invite the speciaUzed agencies, 
the United NaUons Children's Fund and other competent bodies as it may consider appropriate to 
provide expert advice on the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their 
respective mandates. The Committee may invite the speciaUzed agencies, the United Nations Children's 
Fund, and other United Nations organs to submit reports on the implementation of the Convention in 
areas falling within the scope of their activities; 
(b) The Committee shaU transmit, as it may consider appropnate, to the speciaUzed agencies, the Umted 
Nations Children's Fund and other competent bodies, any reports from States ParUes that contam a 
request, or mdicate a need, for technical advice or assistance, along with the Committee's observauons 
and suggestions, if any, on these requests or indications; 
(c) The Committee may recommend to the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to 
undertake on its behalf smdies on specific issues relating to the nghts of the child; 
(d) The Committee may make suggesuons and general recommendauons based on informauon received 
pursuant to arucles 44 and 45 of the present Convention Such suggestions and general recommendauons 
shall be transmitted to any State Party concerned and reported to the General Assembly, together with 
comments, if any, from States ParUes. 
P A R T II I 
Art ic le 46 
The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States. 
Article 47 
The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments o f ratification shall be deposited with the 
Secretarj'-General o f the United Nations. 
Article 48 
The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any State. The instruments o f accession shall 
be deposited with the Secretar)--General of the United Nations. 
Article 49 
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date o f deposit with 
the Secretar5'-General o f the United Nations o f the twendeth instrument o f ratification or accession. 
2. For each State ratif j ing or acceding to the Convenuon after the deposit o f the twentieth instrument o f 
rarification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirdeth day after the deposit by 
such State o f its instrument o f ratificauon or accession. 
Article 50 
1. Any State Part)' may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General o f the United 
Nations. The Secretar} -General shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to States Parties, 
with a request that they indicate whether they favour a conference o f States Pardes for the purpose o f 
considering and voting upon the proposals . In the event that, within four months from the date o f such 
communicaUon, at least one third o f the States Parties favour such a conference, the Secretar^'-General 
shall convene the conference under the auspices o f the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a 
majorit)' o f States ParUes present and voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General 
Assembly for approval. 
2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 o f the present article shall enter into force 
when It has been approved by the General Assembly of the Umted Nat ions and accepted by a two-thirds 
majorit)' o f States Parties. 
3. When an amendment enters into force, it shall be binding on those States Parties which have accepted 
It, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions o f the present Convention and any earlier 
amendments which they have accepted. 
Article 51 
1. The Secretarj'-General o f the United N a u o n s shall receive and circulate to all States the text o f 
reser\'aUons made by States at the time o f ratification or accession. 
2. A reser\-ation incompatible with the object and purpose o f the present Convention shall not be 
permitted. 
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to that effect addressed to the Secretar}'-
General of the United Nations, who shall then inform all States. Such notification shall take effect on the 
date on which it is received by the Secretarj'-General. 
Article 52 
A State Part)' may denounce the present Convention by written notification to the Secretan-General of 
the United Nations. Denunciation becomes effective one year after the date of receipt of the notification 
by the Secretary-General. 
Article 53 
The Secretary-Gcneral of the United Nations is designated as the depositaq- of the present Convention. 
Article 54 
The original of the present Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
In witness thereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective 
Governments , have signed the present Convention. 
APPENDIX II 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) 
G.A. res. 1386 fXIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, 
U.N. Doc. A/4354. 
Preamble 
VXTiereas the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental 
human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to promote social 
progress and better standards of Ufe in larger freedom, 
Wliereas the United Nauons has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Righ/s, proclaimed that everj-one is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, propertj', birth or other 
status, 
NXTiereas the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturit)% needs special safeguards and care, 
including appropriate legal protecdon, before as well as after birth. 
Whereas the need for such special safeguards has been stated in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child of 1924, and recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the statutes of specialized 
agencies and international organizations concerned with the welfare of children. 
Whereas mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. 
Now therefore. 
The General Assembly 
Proclaims this Declaration of the RJghts of the Child to the end that he may have a happv childhood and enjoy 
for his own good and for the good of society' the rights and freedoms herein set forth, and calls upon 
parents, upon men and women as individuals, and upon voluntarj- organizadons, local authorities and 
national Governments to recognize these rights and strive for their observance by legislative and other 
measures progressively taken in accordance with the following principles: 
Principle 1 
The child shall enjoy all the rights set forth in this Declaration. Ever)' cliild, without 
any exception whatsoever, shall be entitled to these rights, without distinction or 
discrimination on account of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, propert)-, birth or other status, whether of himself 
or of his family. 
Principle 2 
The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and 
facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, 
morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of 
freedom and dignity. In the enactment o f laws for tliis purpose, the best interests o f 
the child shall be the paramount consideration. 
Princ ip le 3 
The child shall be entided from his birth to a name and a nationality. 
Princip le 4 
The child shall enjoy the benefits o f social security. Me shall be entitled to grow and 
develop in health; to this end, special care and protection shall be provided both to 
him and to his mother, including adequate pre-natal and post-natal care. The child 
shall have the right to adequate nutrition, housing, recreation and medical services. 
Princip le 5 
The child who is physically, mentally or socially handicapped shall be given the 
special treatment, education and care required by his particular condition. 
Principle 6 
The child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, needs love 
and understanding. He shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the 
responsibility o f his parents, and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of 
moral and material security; a child o f tender years shall not, save in exceptional 
circumstances, be separated from his mother. Society and the public authorities shall 
have the duty' to extend particular care to children without a family and to those 
without adequate means o f support. Payment of State and other assistance towards 
the maintenance o f children of large families is desirable. 
Principle 7 
The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least 
in the elementaty stages. He shall be given an education winch will promote his 
general culture and enable him, on a basis o f equal oppormnity, to develop his 
abilities, his individual judgement, and his sense of moral and social responsibility, 
and to bccome a useful member o f society. 
The best interests o f the child shall be the guiding principle o f those responsible for 
his education and guidance; that responsibiUty Hes in the first place with his parents. 
The child shaU have full opportunity for play and recreation, which should be 
directed to the same purposes as education; society and the public authorities shall 
endeavour to promote the enjoyment o f this right. 
Princip le 8 
The child shall in aU circumstances be among the first to receive protection and 
relief 
Princ ip le 9 
The child shall be protected against aU forms of neglect, cruelty' and exploitation. 1 le 
shaU not be the subject o f traffic, in any form. 
The child shall not be admitted to employment before an appropriate minimum age; 
he shall in no case becaused or permitted to engage in any occupation or 
employment which would prejudice his health or education, or interfere with his 
physical, mental or moral development. 
Principle 10 
The child shall be protected from practices which may foster racial, religious and any 
other form o f discrimination. He shall be brought up in a spirit o f understanding, 
tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace and universal brotherhood, and in full 
consciousness that his energy' and talents should be devoted to the service o f his 
fellow men. 
